J. N. HARE, J. ( 1 ) -THIS revisional application is directed against the judgement and order dated 31. 8. 88 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Midnapore in Sessions Trial Case No. XXIII/august 1987 acquitting the accused opposite parties of the charges under sections 148, 304 Part-I/149 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, the prosecution case was as under : on 16. 2. 1986 at about 8 A. M. P. Ws. 1 to 6 and the deceased Gadadhar Dey were cultivating plot No. 403 of Mauza-Deypara, for growing 'til', crops belonging to the village deity "sri Sri Nilkantha Mahadeb" when the accused persons in a body armed with various weapons like lathis, spades, ballams etc. attacked them and assaulted the deceased Gadadhar Dey and injured three of them. The victims were removed to Deypara Primary Health Centre wherefrom Gadadhar was shifted to Midnapore Sadar Hospital for treatment as his condition was grave. Gadadhar succumbed to his injuries. The petitioner lodged First Information Report with the Police on the basis of which a case was started against the accused persons. After completion of investigation Police submitted charge-sheet against the accused persons which in the usual course ended in the committal of the case to the court of session. The accused persons stood their trial under sections 148,304 Part-I/149 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code with the result already indicated above. ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved by the order of acquittal the petitioner who was the de facto complainant has preferred this revision. ( 4 ) MR. Dey has contended that the learned Judge did not consider the material evidence of the eye - witnesses in support of the charges and the order of acquittal suffers from grave illegality resulting in failure of justice. ( 5 ) IN revision against acquittal by a private complainant the scope of interference by High Court is limited. Dey has contended that the learned Judge did not consider the material evidence of the eye - witnesses in support of the charges and the order of acquittal suffers from grave illegality resulting in failure of justice. ( 5 ) IN revision against acquittal by a private complainant the scope of interference by High Court is limited. In K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1962 SC 1788 , the Supreme Court has held that although it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal ; but this jurisdiction should be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of section 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a tiding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. Some cases of this kind however may be indicated which would justify the High Court in interfering with a tiding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial Court or by the appeal Court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittals and in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of section 439 (4 ). ( 6 ) IN Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram 1973 Cr. LJ 1404 : AIR 1973 SC 2145 , the Supreme Court has held that in revision against acquittal by a private complainant the High Court cannot reappraise evidence for itself as if it is acting as a Court of appeal and then order a retrial. ( 7 ) NORMALLY retrial should not be ordered unless there is some infirmity rendering the trial defective. The reason is that the expression of opinion by the High Court on the evidence before it with respect to the commission of alleged offences though not binding on the Court, holding fresh trial, may nevertheless leave an unconscious impression on the Court holding such trial. ( 8 ) THE same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Bansila1 and Ors. v. Laxman Singh AIR 1986 SC 1721 . It has been held that it is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial Court that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a retrial of the acquitted accused. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the trial Court may in the opinion of the High Court be wrong, will not justify the setting aside of the order of acquittal and directing a retrial of the accused. Even in an appeal the Appellate Court would not be justified in interfering with an acquittal merely because it was inclined to differ from the findings of fact reached by the trial Court on the appreciation of the evidence. The revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted in its scope. Even in an appeal the Appellate Court would not be justified in interfering with an acquittal merely because it was inclined to differ from the findings of fact reached by the trial Court on the appreciation of the evidence. The revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted in its scope. ( 9 ) THE instances mentioned by the Supreme Court in Chinnaswamy case (supra) as justifying interference with orders of acquittal in the exercise of revisional powers were illustrative and not exhaustive. 'this has been made clear in Ayodhya Dube and Ors. v. Ram Sumer Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1415 . It has been observed that Criminal Justice System does not admit of 'pigeon hole'. Life and the Law do not fall neatly into slots. When a court starts laying down rules enumerated (1), (2), (3), (4) or (a), (b), (c), (d), it is arranging for itself traps and pitfalls. Categories, classifications and compartments which statute does not mention, all tend to make law 'less flexible, less sensible and less just'. In that a case the Sessions Judge acquitted the accused by ignoring the probative value of the First Information Report and reliable testimony of eye witnesses and without considering material evidence on record and his judgement was full of inconsistencies and consisted of faulty reasoning, the order of the High Court in revision directing retrial by setting aside acquittal was held to be justified. ( 10 ) BEARING the above in mind let us now proceed to consider whether this is an exceptional case which calls for interference by the High Court. ( 11 ) IT appears on a perusal of the lower court judgement that the learned Judge is rather inconsistent in his reasonings and he has committed grave error of law. During the same incident accused Krishna Prosad Pal also received severe injuries. The learned Judge has held that there were assaults and counter-assaults by the parties, and cases and counter-cases had been filed against the parties. He has held that the circumstances clearly and unmistakably point out that there was preparedness on either sides. The substance of his bindings seems to be that as both parties were prepared for show-down and there was free fight between both the parties, there is no question of attracting section 149 or the, question of right of private defence. He has held that the circumstances clearly and unmistakably point out that there was preparedness on either sides. The substance of his bindings seems to be that as both parties were prepared for show-down and there was free fight between both the parties, there is no question of attracting section 149 or the, question of right of private defence. The logical corollary of this finding is that in such a situation each one would be guilty for the injuries caused by him. The learned Judge is entirely wrong in holding that in such a situation nobody can be held responsible or guilty either jointly or severally of any offence. It is true that in such a situation there is no question of vicarious liability or the right of private defence and each person would be liable for the injuries caused by him. Now, there is specific evidence of a number of eye-witnesses regarding the specific injuries caused by specific persons. There is evidence that O. P. No. 1 Krishna Prosad Pal alone hit Gadadhar on the head with the blunt side of the spade which proved fatal. The medical evidence also says a special injury on the head. The learned Judge has not considered all this material evidence to ascertain whether O. P. No. 1 Krishna Prosad Pal could be held individually liable for the death of Gadadhar. Similarly there is evidence that O. P. No. 2 Kamal Pal hit Gour Maity with a lathi causing simple injury. O. P. No. 3 Bimal Pal hit Puma Dey with the blunt side of the spade causing simple injury. O. P. No, 4 Shyamal Pal hit Ajit with a lathi. There is no evidence against O. Ps. 5 to 11 participating in any assault. The learned Judge ought to have considered all this evidence and found out whether O. Ps. 2, 3 and 4 could be held liable individually for the simple injury caused by each of them. The learned Judge clearly committed an error of law resulting in failure of justice and this appears to be an exceptional case where the Court may interfere against the order of acquittal in revision at the instance of a private party. ( 12 ) THE occurrence took place more than five years before and it is not in the interest of justice that O. Ps. ( 12 ) THE occurrence took place more than five years before and it is not in the interest of justice that O. Ps. 2, 3 and 4 who may be responsible at best for simple injury should be re-tried for such a petty offence after a lapse of 53 years. The case of O. P. No. 1, Krishna Prosad Pal, however, stands on a different footing. The evidence is that he dealt the fatal blow resulting in the death of Gadadhar. The order of acquittal of O. Ps. 2 to 11 should not, therefore, be disturbed, but the order of acquittal of O. P. No. 1, Krishna Prosad Pal is liable to be set aside and there should be an order for fresh trial after framing a fresh charge against O. P. No. 1 u/s. 304 Part-II simplicitor. ( 13 ) IN the result, the revisional application is allowed in part only. The impugned order of acquittal of O. P. No. 1 Krishna Prosad Pal only is set aside. The order of acquittal in respect of others, namely, O. Ps. 2 to 11 would stand. The case is sent back to the Court below for a fresh trial against O. P. No. 1 Krishna Prosad Pal on a fresh charge as indicated above. Revision allowed in part.