B. J. HEGDE, J. ( 1 ) APPELLANT-PLAINTIFF virayya filed o. s. No. 10 of 1978 before the civil judge, gadag, for partition and possession of his 1/2 share in the suit properties. The suit was dismissed on 6-8-1979. The plaintiff challenged this judgment in r. a. No. 41 of 1979 on the file of the additional district judge, dharwad. This appeal also came to be dismissed on 31-7-1982. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the plaintiff has filed this second appeal. ( 2 ) THE following genealogy which is not disputed shows the relationship of the parties: shiddalingayya irayya (died in 1957) nagayya (died in 1917) -----------------------------------------------1 siddaya (deft. 1) virupaxayya (deft. 2) i i i i basayya nagayya sangayya veerayya (deft. 3) (deft. 4) (deft. 5) (plaintiff) as stated, the appellant-plaintiff filed the suit for partition and separate possession of his 1/2 share alleging that basawa, widow of nagayya took him in adoption on 5-5-1973. Defendant No. 2 is the natural father of the plaintiff whereas dcfendants-3 to 5 are his natural brothers. Siddayya, defendant-1 is the contesting defendant. He denied the adoption and contended that after the death of irayya, there has been a partition between defendants 1 and 2. The fact that the appellant was adopted on 5-5-1973 by basawa, widow of nagayya who died in 1917, is not disputed. The courts below have, on facts, held that there has been a partition between siddayya and virupaxayya in the year 1959. These are all questions of fact not liable to be disturbed in this second appeal. ( 3 ) SRI k. i. bhatta, learned counsel for the appellant, points out that the right and title of late nagayya who died in the year 1917 had vested with his brother virupaxayya by survivorship and since there has been no partition between nagayya and irayya, the plaintiff should be held to have 1/2 share in the entire joint family property which his adoptive father nagayya would have got in a partition. To substantiate his contention, he relied on a decision in the case of vasant v dattu, AIR 1987 SC 398 wherein it is stated that the introduction of a member into a joint family, by birth or adoption, may have the effect of decreasing the share of the rest of the members of the joint family, but it would not involve any question of divesting any person of any estate vested in him and when a widow of a deceased coparcener adopts a child, Section 12 proviso (c) does not preculde the adopted child from claiming his share in the joint family properties for if a share is given to the adopted child there is no question of "divesting" any person of any estate which vested in him before adoption. ( 4 ) SHRI gachchinamath, learned counsel for respondent-1 has no quarrel with this proposition propounded by Shri k. i. bhatta. However, he contends that this decision would not apply to the facts of the case as there has been a partition as between siddayya and virupaxayya, sons of irayya before the date of adoption and after the death of nagayya. He contends that the adoption that took place on 5-5-1973 cannot divest any property allotted in the partition of the joint family properties. In support of his proposition, he relies on a decision in the case of y. k. nalavade vananda g. Chavan, AIR 1981 bom. 109 which has been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of dharma shamrao agalawe v pandurangmiragu agalawe, AIR 1988 SC 845 . The relevant portion of the said decision reads as follows: "section 12 is aimed at eradicating such inequities. Adoption is expressly made effective from the date of adoption Section 12 consists of two parts. The second part specifically deals with the ties forged and snapped on adoption and their effect on the rights in the property acquired during the subsistence of such ties. Both the parts of Section 12 are aimed at abolishing the much maligned doctrine of "relation back" by reference to its retrospective effect on the rights in the property. Though, both the parts make adoption effective from the date of adoption, raising fictions to that effect, mechanism resorted to, to achieve the same objective, is different in the one from the other. Though, both the parts make adoption effective from the date of adoption, raising fictions to that effect, mechanism resorted to, to achieve the same objective, is different in the one from the other. The fiction raided in the first part is to be effective "for all purposes" from the date of adoption. This prevents the adoption in the joint family from having any retrospective effect on its property. Under the Rule of survivorship, a member gets interest in the property on his birth or adoption. The Section prevents the Rule of surviroship from having any effect before the date of adoption and prevents the adopted son from reopening the partition effected after the death of his adoptive father and consequently reaching the property in the hands of the divided members or their heirs". Section 12 of the hindu adoptions and maintenance Act, 1956, reads thus:"12. An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family: provided that (a) the child cannot marry any person whom or she could not have married if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth; (b)any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligation, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth; (c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption. "a reading of Section 12 makes it clear that the doctrine of 'relation back' of the adoption is put to an end and the adoption is made effective only from the date of adoption. The fiction employed in the first part of this Section is applicable for all purposes from the date of adoption and the person adopted would be considered having been born in the family only on the date of adoption and not before. The fiction employed in the first part of this Section is applicable for all purposes from the date of adoption and the person adopted would be considered having been born in the family only on the date of adoption and not before. The adopted son therefore cannot reopen the partition that took place after the death of his adoptive father and before his adoption. The conclusions of the courts below that the appellant is not entitled for the relief of partition are correct. ( 5 ) THE appeal is therefore dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .