Judgment :- Common prayer in all these original petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is to declare S.29A(2B) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act and Ext.P2 circular issued by Board of Revenue, ultra vires, unconstitutional, inoperative and invalid. In some of the original petitions, S.29A(2A) is also under challenge. 2. S.29A provides for the procedure for inspection of goods in transit through notified areas or any other place found necessary. Sub-S.(2) authorises the checking officer to detain the goods and permit it to be transported only on furnishing security, provided that he has reason to suspect (i) that the goods under transport are not covered by proper and genuine documents in cases where such documents are necessary. or (ii) that there was attempt to evade tax. Proviso permits him, in appropriate cases, to release the goods on execution of bonds, in cases covered by Sub-s.(2) if it is found that there is collusion for the purpose of evading tax. Sub-s(2A) authorises detention of vehicle also. Sub-s.(2B) contemplates three contingencies. They are concerning reasonable belief on the facts, (i) that tax payable for the sale or purchase of goods under transport is not paid. or (ii) that the dealer, whose goods are transported, has not paid any tax in accordance with the procedure prescribed. or (iii) that he has, at any time, defaulted payment of tax for any period. In such cases, officer can prevent the goods and he need allow the goods to be transported only after realising the tax due on the turnover of the goods transported. In case of refusal, goods shall be detained and dealt with as if it was an attempt to evade tax. Relevant portions of Ext.P2 contain executive directions to effectuate the above said provisions. 3. S.5 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act (the Act for brevity ) contains the charging provision, which provides for levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods. S.7(2) contains provision for permission on application to pay tax in advance on monthly or other prescribed instalments and for that purpose to submit returns also. There are also other provisions like Rules 10,11 and 21 for submission of returns and payment of tax. S.7(2) contains provision for permission on application to pay tax in advance on monthly or other prescribed instalments and for that purpose to submit returns also. There are also other provisions like Rules 10,11 and 21 for submission of returns and payment of tax. Under rule 33(17), every wholesale dealer, while delivering goods to a retail dealer in pursuance of a sale, where no sale bill is issued, or every person who consigns goods by any vehicle or vessel or any other means in pursuance of a sale, where a sale bill is not issued, or consigns goods through the said means from one godown to another or from one of his shops to another for the purpose of storage or sale, shall issue a delivery note in Form No.26. Ss.16 and 17 provide for final assessment and S.23 provide for payment and recovery of tax. Rule 18 prescribes for annual return and final assessment. These are said to be the only modes of assessment and collection contemplated under the Statute. 4. Argument was that S.29A(2A) and (2B) of the Act are diametrically opposite to these provisions and Ext.P2 circular is beyond the competence of the Board of Revenue, whose authorisation could be traced only under S3. S.29A(2A) and (2B) are contended to be Violative of Articles 14,19(1) (g), 265 and 301 to 304 of the Constitution of India. Ext.P2 is challenged on the following grounds, viz. a) a statutory provision or rule cannot be amended or nullified by an executive order. b) Statutory provisions could be enforced only in the manner provided and not otherwise. c) there is absence of statutory provision for collection of advance tax. and d) it is violative of Article 30 of the Constitution. 5. Decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Punalur Paper Mills Limited (1987 (2) K.L.T. 194), which considered the force of the circulars issued under S.119 of the Indian Income Tax Act, was brought to my notice in order to contend that similar provisions are not there in the Act authorising Board of Revenue to issue circulars like Ext.P2. But, under S.3 of the Act, Board of Revenue is having powers to issue such orders, instructions and directions to such officers and persons as it may deem fit for the proper administration of the Act. Only question for consideration is whether Ext.P2 exceeded those powers or not. But, under S.3 of the Act, Board of Revenue is having powers to issue such orders, instructions and directions to such officers and persons as it may deem fit for the proper administration of the Act. Only question for consideration is whether Ext.P2 exceeded those powers or not. There cannot be any dispute regarding the proposition of law, laid down in A.K. Roy and another v. State of Punjab and ore. (1986 (4) S.C.C.326) and various other decisions cited before me by petitioners, that if a statute enacts that a thing shall be done in a particular manner and in no other manner, any deviation will invalidate the proceedings. When a power is given to do a thing in a particular way, it must be done in that way or not at all. Other modes of performance must be taken to be necessarily forbidden. That principle has also no application to the facts of these cases, in as much as nothing seems to be done in violation of the statutory provisions. 6. Distribution of legislative power as between Union and States is dealt with in Part XI Chapter I of the Constitution. As provided in Article 246, List I of Seventh Schedule is the Union list and List II is the State list. Entry 54 in the State list is taxes on sale of purchase of goods other than news papers subject to the provisions of Entry 92A in the Union list. That is the legislative power of the State. Entry 92A in the Union list is taxes on sale or purchase of goods other than news papers when such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. That means, irrespective of the legislative power of the State in Entry 54, such power does not extend to taxation on sale or purchase of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, which is the prerogative of the Union. By Entry 92B in the Union list, introduced by the 46th amendment of the Constitution, legislative power of the Union was extended to taxes on consignment of goods (whether consignment is to the person making it or to any other person), when such consignment takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. By Entry 92B in the Union list, introduced by the 46th amendment of the Constitution, legislative power of the Union was extended to taxes on consignment of goods (whether consignment is to the person making it or to any other person), when such consignment takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. That means, so far as sale, purchase or consignment is concerned, if it is in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, State has no legislative power of taxation. That aspect was not in dispute. 7. In Builders Association of India and others v. Union of India and others (1989 (73) S.T.C. 370), Supreme Court upheld the validity of the 46th amendment of the Constitution. That decision was followed in Goodyear India Limited v. State of Haryana and another (1990 (76) S.T.C. 71), which said that Entry 92A of List I is the exclusive domain of the Union and mere consignment of goods by a manufacturer to his own branches outside the State does not in any way amount to a sale or disposal of the goods as such. Consignment or despatch of goods is neither a sale nor a purchase. 46th amendment was carried out in the background of the representations from State Governments, to whom revenue from sales tax has been assigned, as to the large scale avoidance of sales tax leviable on inter-State sale of goods through the device of consignment of goods from one State to another and as to the leakage of local sales tax in works contracts, hire purchase transactions, lease of films, etc. Though Parliament could levy tax on these transactions, as tax on sales has all along been treated as an item of revenue to be assigned to the States, in regard to these transactions also, which resembles sales, it was considered that the same policy should be adopted. 8. Law Commission, therefore, recommended the definition of sale in the Central Act to be amended. Union accepted this recommendation in part. But, instead of amending the definition of sale, it inserted a new entry, Entry 92B, in the first schedule authorising taxes on consignment of goods when such consignment takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. 8. Law Commission, therefore, recommended the definition of sale in the Central Act to be amended. Union accepted this recommendation in part. But, instead of amending the definition of sale, it inserted a new entry, Entry 92B, in the first schedule authorising taxes on consignment of goods when such consignment takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. So also, Parliament amended Article 269(1)(g) and 269(3) and added Article 269(1)(h) including taxes on consignment of goods when such consignment takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, in the items of taxes to be levied and collected by the Union, but to be assigned to the States. As pointed out in Goodyear India Limited's case (1990 (76) S.T.C. 71), it is well settled that the entries in the Constitution only demarcate the legislative fields of the respective legislatures and do not confer legislative powers as such. Tax pan despatch of goods outside the territory of the State certainly is in the course of interstate trade or commerce. In other words, it amounts to imposition of consignment tax, which is the exclusive prerogative of the Parliament. Entry 92B in List I will have to be given the widest interpretation. As a result of the Constitutional changes introduced by 46th amendment in Article 269 read with the entry, tax on consignment of goods now comes within the exclusive legislative field of the Parliament. But real question to be considered is whether the impugned provisions relate to any matter within the exclusive domain of the Parliament or not. In other words, one has to determine whether the impugned provisions amount to restrictions directly and immediately on the trade or commerce movement. 9. Article 265 of the Constitution says that no tax shall be imposed or collected except by the authority of law. Article 301 says that subject to the other provisions in Part XIII, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India sfeall be free. But, as provided in Article 302, Parliament can impose restrictions as may be required in public interest. We are not concerned with Article 303, because admittedly, no such contingency has arisen. But, notwithstanding anything contained in Articles 301 and 303, under Article 304(b), State can make laws imposing such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within the State as may be required in public interest. 10. We are not concerned with Article 303, because admittedly, no such contingency has arisen. But, notwithstanding anything contained in Articles 301 and 303, under Article 304(b), State can make laws imposing such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within the State as may be required in public interest. 10. As observed in Kalyani Stores v. State of Orissa and others (1966 (1) S.C.R.865), imposition of duty or tax in every case is not tantamount per se to infringement of Article 301. Only such restrictions or impediments which, directly or immediately, impede free flow of trade, commerce or intercourse fall within the prohibition imposed by Article 301. Every case must be judged on its own facts. Unless the court finds that there is an infringement of the right guaranteed under Article 301, further question whether the Statute is saved under Article 304(b) does not arjseat all. Goodyear India Limited's case (1990 (76) S.T.C. 71) was followed in Murli Manohar & Co and another v. State of Haryana and another (1991 (80) S.T.C. 79) and Muter/an Papers Limited v. State of Punjab (1991(81) S.T.C.152 ). (1991) 80 S.T.C 79 held that what was declared unconstitutional by Supreme Court was ody the levy of tax where raw materials are purchased and used inside the State for manufacture of finished goods which are then simply-and without any sale - despatched - rather, consigned - outside the State. (1991) 81 S.T.C. 152 said that since tax levied was tax on consignment of goods, the provisions imposing tax were beyond the competence of the State legislature as the power to impose such tax vested in the Parliament by virtue of Clause (h) of Sub clause (1) of Article 269 read with Entry 92B in Schedule VII List I by the 46th amendment. But, even before the 46th amendment, Entry 54 in List II read with Article 246(3) conferred powers on State legislatures to impose tax on sale or purchase of goods and not on mere consignment of goods since consignment of goods implicate is neither a sale nor purchase or disposal of goods. 11. Atiabari Tea Company Ltd. v. State of Assam and others ( A.I.R.1961 S.C 232) also said that freedom declared by Article 301 is not an absolute freedom from all legislations. 11. Atiabari Tea Company Ltd. v. State of Assam and others ( A.I.R.1961 S.C 232) also said that freedom declared by Article 301 is not an absolute freedom from all legislations. Both the Parliament and State legislatures are given powers to legislate in respect of trade, commerce and intercourse, though it is equally clear that legislation should not have the effect of putting impediments in the way of free flow of trade or commerce. It is not an absolute freedom as is seen from Entries 89 and 92A in List I, Entries 52, 54 and 56 to 60 in LIgtnand Entry 35 in List III. Union and State Legislatures have the power to legislate by way of taxation so as not to erect trade barriers. Freedom under Article 301 does not mean freedom implicate, but it only means freedom from taxation, which has the effect of directly impeding the free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse. It is subject to the non discriminatory restrictions imposed by Parliament in public interest under Article 302. Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and others (AIR. 1962 S.C.1406) said that neither the widest nor the narrow interpretation are acceptable and that though the interpretation given in AI.R.1961 S.C. 232 is correct, it should be subject to the clarification that regulatory measures or measures imposing compensatory taxes for the use of trading facilities do not come within the purview of the restrictions contemplated by Article 301 and such measures need not comply with the requirements of the proviso to Article 304(b). In other words, it is the free movement of goods from one part of the country to another that was intended to be saved by Article 301. If any act imposes any direct restriction on free movement of such goods, Article 301 is attracted. A tax on sate of goods does not directly impede free movement of transport of goods. Same view was taken in State of Madras v. N.K. Nataraja Mudaliar(1968 (3) S.C.R.829) and followed in State of Kerala v. A.B. Abdul Kadir and others (1969 (2) S.C.C. 363). 12. It was argued on behalf of petitioners that consignment sale is not sale and State cannot claim tax and, hence, S.29A(2A) and (2B) are hit by Article 301 read with Article 304(b). Ext.P2 was also challenged for the same reason. 12. It was argued on behalf of petitioners that consignment sale is not sale and State cannot claim tax and, hence, S.29A(2A) and (2B) are hit by Article 301 read with Article 304(b). Ext.P2 was also challenged for the same reason. There cannot be any dispute regarding the proposition of law supported by various decisions cited before me that an executive direction like Ext.P2 cannot override the statutory provisions of the Act or Rules. But real question is whether Ext.P2 has contravened any provision of the Act or Rules or whether S.29A(2A) and (2B) exceeded the limits so as to make inroads into the Union list or offend Articles 14, 19(l) (g) and 301 to 304 of the Constitution. 13. It was argued by Government Pleader that Ss.29A(2A) and (2B) as well as Ext.P2 are strictly in conformity with Entry 54 in Schedule VII List II and they are only intended as measures to check evasion of taxes due to the State under the provisions of the Act and in conformity with the statutory provisions. To me, it appears that the submission is sound. Both the impugned provisions do not create any new tax liability. They only deal with situations arising out of non-payment of tax and attempts to evade tax under the existing provisions. Nothing more is attempted to be prevented or enforced. S.29A only enables verifications for the satisfaction that there is no tax evasion. S.29A(2A) in such a situation only authorises security being enforced and the proviso authorises release of goods on execution of bonds also in appropriate cases. S.29A(2A) deals only with a grave situation where a calculated act of collusion to evade taxis noticed. It authorises detention of vehicles also pending security. S.29A (2B) authorises detention of goods for being dealt with in certain cases as if the transport was an attempt to evade tax in three contingencies. First and second contingencies may not create any problem because they only deal with cases of evasion of tax concerning goods involved in the transport. But the third contingency stands on a different footing. It deals with cases of previous default for any period. That means, so far as the third contingency is concerned, S.29A(2B) is intended as an enforcing provision for realisation of past arrears. That provision has no nexus to the object of avoiding tax evasion. But the third contingency stands on a different footing. It deals with cases of previous default for any period. That means, so far as the third contingency is concerned, S.29A(2B) is intended as an enforcing provision for realisation of past arrears. That provision has no nexus to the object of avoiding tax evasion. It may act as an impediment in the free flow of goods unconnected with the object of tax evasion. Previous arrears could be therefor many reasons, including pendency of appeals and revisions. Such arrears could be enforced through other means. It may not be proper to detain the goods for enforcing the previous liability which could otherwise be enforced. To that extent alone, I think S.29A (2B) could be challenged as offending Articles 14, 19(1)(g) or 301 of the Constitution, in the light of the principles referred to above. Ss.29A(2A) and 2(B) themselves are part of the legislative exercise. They are not executive actions. Such actions are within the legislative competence also. 14. It is true that Ext.P2 is not artistically worded. Words 'consignment' and 'advance tax' used in Ext.P2 were subjected to serious comments. As pointed out by Government Pleader, these words could have been used only inadvertently and in a loose sense. As already stated, it is an admitted fact that tax on consignment could be levied only by Parliament and not by State Legislatures. Impugned provisions do not evidently deal with consignment tax. So far as advance tax is concerned, it is true that there is no provision in the Act or Rules, except the impugned provisions, for such collection. But what is attempted to be collected under the impugned provisions is only tax on goods, which is attempted to be evaded. What is attempted to be collected is only tax statutorily due to the State. Ext. P2 made it clear that before ordering detention, officer must be satisfied that there was collusion and attempt to evade tax. Some illustrative guidelines are also given in the circular for finding out what exactly collusion is. Notice is also contemplated by the circular. So far as goods taxable only at the last point are concerned, Ext.P2 made it clear that what is prohibited is transport outside the State through the border check posts without collection of tax. Some illustrative guidelines are also given in the circular for finding out what exactly collusion is. Notice is also contemplated by the circular. So far as goods taxable only at the last point are concerned, Ext.P2 made it clear that what is prohibited is transport outside the State through the border check posts without collection of tax. It is, therefore, clear that what is intended to be enforced is only collection of tax due to the State statutorily as authorised by Entry 54 in List II Vllth schedule. It cannot cover any tax on inter-State trade or commerce or consignment tax. Evidently, the purpose and object are only avoidance of evasion of tax legitimately due to the State. If that be so, complaint could only be as against mala fide exercise of the powers, for which appropriate directions could be given by the State. So also, when such individual instances occur, parties could approach this Court also. There can be honest and dishonest traders and dealers. Anyhow, it is within the powers of the State to provide for measures which are only incidental or ancillary for enforcement of the tax liability. 15. It was argued that the Act and Rules do not provide for collection of advance tax and that the assessee is having time till 15th of next month to submit returns and pay monthly tax in advance. It was also pointed out that the unit of taxation is. the annual turnover and hence, liability could only be annual. For that purpose, it was pointed out that the taxable events cannot be taken as individual sales or purchases. I do not think I will be able to agree. Man individual sale or purchase goes beyond the taxable limit, that by itself is a taxable event, even though the annual tax as a whole, on the basis of the transactions for the whole year, may be the limit. In spite of the provision of assessment and recovery, annually or at periodical intervals after submission of returns, right to make collection in the event of attempts at evasion of tax is ancillary or incidental to the powers of realisation of tax. Such power must be considered to be implicit in Section 17 and other relevant provisions, even if there is no statutory provision to that effect. Such power must be considered to be implicit in Section 17 and other relevant provisions, even if there is no statutory provision to that effect. That question itself does not arise because the impugned provisions contained in Sub S.(2A) and (2B) themselves are statutory)-' exercises within the competence of the State Legislature and they themselves provide for collection of advance tax. Otherwise, there could be instance where tax is lost to the State forever, Impugned provisions are intended to be applicable only in cases where proper documents are sot available or there is attempt to evade tax. Nobody could legitimately challenge these provisions. If S.29A(2A) and (2B) along with Ext. P2 are properly implemented, there cannot be any instance of goods or vehicles not liable to pay any sales tax to the State teeing detained or action taken. If valid papers are there, checking authorities could distinguish between taxable and non-taxable items as well as items for which tax is paid or tax is due as an ears. Clause 5(iii)(b) of Ext.P2 circular's specifically says that in case of goods taxable at the last sale point, advance tax need be collected only when a request is received by the Check Post Inspector from the assessing authority showing that the dealer is in default and requesting him to realise the advance tax or if the dealer has no sales tax registration or if the registration details shown are incorrect or suspicious and when the turnover exceeds the assessable limit. It is, therefore, clear that no honest dealer need have any apprehension if the provisions are honestly enforced. Dishonest enforcement is a matter for rectification by general directions or individual corrections. Misuse cannot be a reason for erasing any statutory provisions. If such a norm is adopted almost every statutory provisions will have to be removed from the statute book, because it is common knowledge that all provisions are being misused. Misuse is a matter for correction. 16. Challenge against S.29A as violative of Articles 14 and 301 was dismissed in Sree Narayana Transports v. State of Kerala 1965 KLT 611= (1965 (16) S.T.C. 659). But a Full Bench of this Court in the decision in Yogesh Trading Co. v. Intelligence Officer of Sales Tax and others (1970 K.L.T.154) struck down S.29(3), (4) and (5) and some of the provisions of the Kerala Rules as violative of Articles 19(1) (g) and 301. But a Full Bench of this Court in the decision in Yogesh Trading Co. v. Intelligence Officer of Sales Tax and others (1970 K.L.T.154) struck down S.29(3), (4) and (5) and some of the provisions of the Kerala Rules as violative of Articles 19(1) (g) and 301. It was thereafter that S.29A was introduced and its validity was again upheld in P.K. Aboobacker and others v. State of Kerala and another (1979 (44) S.T.C, 250 =1979 KLT SN 55 P 28). Ss.29A (2A) and (2B) were introduced only thereafter. Counsel, on behalf of some of the petitioners, said that the decision in 1970 K.L.T.154 in relation to less drastic provisions is sufficient authority for holding that Ss.29(2A) and (2B) of the Act, which include more drastic provisions, are unconstitutional. But the argument of Government Pleader was that the decision in 1970 K.L.T. 154 is even now pending 'appeal before Supreme Court and that the decision could be taken as impliedly overruled in view of the decision of Supreme Court in Maharaja Tourist Service v. State of Gujarat (AI.R.1991 S.C.1650). 17. Check Post Officer and others v,K.P. Abdulla and Bros. (1971 KLT75 (&C.) = (1971 (27) S.t.c.1) said that the provisions for confiscation cannot be taken as an ancillary power. But that provision was enacted on the assumption that goods carried in a vehicle from one State to another must be presumed to be transported after sate within the State. That was the context in which Supreme Court made the above statement. In Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and others v. Ramkishan Shrikishan shaver and others (1967-(20) S.T.C 453), what was tabooed was only a provision for realisation of tax and penalty even before sale. At the same time, that decision said that while making a law under any entry in the schedule to the Constitution, it is competent to the Legislature to make all such incidental and ancillary provisions as may be necessary to effectuate the law. particularly in the case of a taxing statute, it is open to the Legislature to enact provisions which would check evasion of tax. Provision for search and seizure was upheld in that context in Bhopal Sugar Industries Limited another v. D.P. Dube (1963 (14) S.T.C. 406). What was struck down was only the definition of retail sale as including consumption. In R. Abdul Quader & Co. Provision for search and seizure was upheld in that context in Bhopal Sugar Industries Limited another v. D.P. Dube (1963 (14) S.T.C. 406). What was struck down was only the definition of retail sale as including consumption. In R. Abdul Quader & Co. v. Sales Tax Officer (1964 (15) S.T.C. 403), what was considered was the authority of a statutory provision which provided that tax illegally collected will have to be paid to the Government even though they were not exigible as tax. What is said is that incidental and ancillary powers have to be exercised in aid of the main topic of the legislation, which, in that case, was tax on sale or purchase of goods. In Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law) v. Keveyam & Co. and others (1986 (63) S.T.C. 387), question that came up for consideration was entirely different. Provisions in Ss.29(2A) and (2B), when considered in the light of these legal provisions, could definitely be taken as incidental or ancillary for the enforcement of tax. 18. As held in Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd and another v. State of Punjab and another (1990(77) S.T.C. 82), only such tax as directly and immediately restricts trade would fall within the mischief of Article 301, Part XIII of the Constitution is part and parcel of a single constitutional instrument and it cannot be read in isolation. Plenary powers are given to the States to raise revenue. Constitution lives and adapts itself to the exigencies of the situation in a growing and evolving society, economically, politically and socially. Constitutional provisions should, therefore, be interpreted with a progressive approach to suit the needs of the society for the hour. Free flow of trade does not depend upon taxes alone. Article 304 is an exception to Article 301 and the exception need be resorted to only if the tax Impugned is hit by Articles 301 and 303. If not, Article 304 will not come into the picture at all. Article 30] is only to prevent discrimination against imported goods by imposing tax on such goods at a rate higher than that borne by local goods. Discrimination in such a case would depend upon a variety of factors, including the rate of tax, and the item of goods in respect of the sale, on which it is levied. Concept of economic barrier must be adopted in a dynamic sense with changing conditions. Discrimination in such a case would depend upon a variety of factors, including the rate of tax, and the item of goods in respect of the sale, on which it is levied. Concept of economic barrier must be adopted in a dynamic sense with changing conditions. What constitutes an economic barrier at one point of time often ceases to be so at another point of time. 19. There is no point in contending that Article 14 is also violated, Equality clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution requires that all persons subjected to any legislation should be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions. Equals will have to be treated equally and unequals ought not to be treated equally. Though Article 14 prohibits classification, it permits classification for the purpose of implementing the right of equality. But, in order to pass the test on permissible classification, conditions necessary are: (1) classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia, which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group. and (ii) that differentia list have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. While classification may be founded on different basis, what is necessary is that there must be nexus between the basis of the classification and the object of the Act under consideration. Classification involved in these cases is between tax payers and tax evaders. All the categories contemplated under Ss.29A(2A) and (2B) are tax evaders or those who failed in payment of tax. Therefore, it cannot be said that Article 14 is violated. Fact that similar provisions are not there concerning goods carried through Railways cannot give room for a complaint of discrimination on account of the checks and balances available in Railways. Such provisions might have been considered unnecessary. So also, there is checking in the Railways and nothing prevents the officers also in having their checks. There is no basis for the contention that these impugned provisions involve discrimination and as such, violative of Article 14. 20. It is true that restrictions could only be by legislative actions and not by executive orders, as held in District Collector v. M/ s. Ibrahim & Co. ( A.I.R.1970 S.C.1275). Ss.29A(2A) and (2B) themselves are part of the legislative exercise. They are not executive actions. Such actions are within the legislative competence of the Government. 20. It is true that restrictions could only be by legislative actions and not by executive orders, as held in District Collector v. M/ s. Ibrahim & Co. ( A.I.R.1970 S.C.1275). Ss.29A(2A) and (2B) themselves are part of the legislative exercise. They are not executive actions. Such actions are within the legislative competence of the Government. It is also true that responsibility of the restrictions imposed under Article 304(b) or under Article 19(6) of the rights under Article 19(1)(g) are matters to be considered on the totality of the facts established by the State, as held in Khyerbari Tea Co. Ltd and another v. State of Assam and others ( A.I.R,1964S.C. 925). But that burden of the State will arise only when invasion of the right is proved. Whether the restrictions, if any, are reasonable is a matter to be considered on the totality of the facts, as held in A.B. Abdul Kadir and others v. State of Kerala ( A.I.R.1976 S.C.182 ). Restriction should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interest of the public. Word 'reasonable 'implies care and deliberations, ie. choice of a course which reason dictates. In considering these aspects, as held in Shashikant Laxman Kale and another v. Union of India and another (A.I.R.1990 S.C. 2114), it is permissible' to look into the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the law was passed and which necessitated passing of that law. For that limited purpose, the statement of object and reasons could be looked into. Objects and reasons behind the impugned provisions are checking tax evasion and malpractices rampant at that time and inadequacy of the provisions for that purpose. There may be honest and dishonest dealers. To deal with dishonest dealers for the purpose of avoiding evasion of tax, stringent measures may be necessary. If all these provisions a re struck down, the economy of the State will be in jeopardy and the situation will be a blessing to dishonest dealers. 21. Only provision that is liable to be struck down is the authorisation given in S.29A(2B) to detain the goods and deal with them in the manner provided for as if the transport of goods was an attempt to evade payment of tax in cases where the officer has reason to believe that the dealer has at any time defaulted tax for any period. I strike down that portion of S.29A(2B) alone and direct State of Kerala and Board of Revenue to take appropriate steps and issue necessary directions to see that the provisions are not misused resulting in harassment. In other respects, all the original petitions are dismissed. No costs.