JUDGMENT K.M. Agarwal, J. 1. This second appeal by the tenant against the affirming judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court was admitted for hearing on 25-3-1985 on the following two substantial questions of law : - 1. "Whether, in the absence of there being a clear plea on the point, the relief of eviction could not be granted to the plaintiff on the ground specified in clause (a) of Section 12(1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act ?" 2. "Whether the plaintiff could not be granted the relief of eviction on the ground specified in clause (ft of Section 12(1) of the Act for the reason that the circumstances established from the evidence produced in the case negatived the requirement of the plaintiff under the said clause ?" 2. It was not disputed that the suit accommodation was let out for non-residential purpose on a monthly rent of Rs. 55/-. The municipal taxes were payable by the tenant. C. S. No. 56-A/7"7 for arrears of rent for the period l-7i1976 to 31-10-1976 and for ejectment of the appellant from the suit accommodation on the ground under Section 12(1)(a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, (in short, the "Act") was earlier filed by the respondent against the appellant in the court of II Civil Judge, Class II, Damoh. By his judgment and decree dated 1-12-1977 (Ex. P.l), the learned Civil Judge was pleased to decree the claim of the respondent for arrears of rent but to dismiss his claim for ejectment on the ground under Section 12(l)(a) of the Act, because in compliance with Section 13(1) of the Act, the arrears were deposited in Court in time or within the extended period given by the Court to the tenant. The present suit for arrears of rent for the period between 1-10-1979 to 30-6-1981 i.e. for 21 months, for municipal taxes to the tune of Rs. 298/- and for ejectment on the grounds under Section 12(l)(a) and (f) of the Act was filed on 7-7-1981 by the respondent. It was alleged that in spite of demand notice dated 30-3-1981 (Ex.P.5), served on 31-3-1981, the defendant did not pay the arrears of rent and, therefore, he was liable to be ejected from the suit accommodation under Section 12(l)(a) of the Act. It was alleged that in spite of demand notice dated 30-3-1981 (Ex.P.5), served on 31-3-1981, the defendant did not pay the arrears of rent and, therefore, he was liable to be ejected from the suit accommodation under Section 12(l)(a) of the Act. It was further claimed that the plaintiff had retired from Government services with effect from the afternoon of 30-9-1979. He wanted to start his business in the suit accommodation. He had sufficient funds for the purpose. Accordingly, ejectment was sought also on the ground under Section 12(l)(f) of the Act. The suit was resisted by the appellant by contending that the arrears were deposited in the court and that the need for non-residential purpose set up by the plaintiff, was fictitious. It was alleged that the rents for the period between October, 1979 to August 1980 (for 11 months) were deposited in the Court of Rent Controlling Authority and those for the months of September, 1980 to January, 1982 were tendered by money orders, but not accepted by the plaintiff. It was also alleged that after the date of his retirement, the plaintiff had let out one room to Dr. Ashok Mishra (P.W. 2) on 1-11-1980 on monthly rent of Rs. 70/- which was indicative of the fact that the need for non-residential purpose set up by him was a device to eject the defendant from the suit accommodation. The defence was rejected and the suit for ejectment on both the grounds under Section 12(l)(a) and (f) of the Act was decreed. The judgment and decree of the trial Court were challenged with no success in the lower appellate court. Hence this second appeal has been filed. 3. During pendency of this second appeal, the appellant filed I. A. No. 3746/91 on 6-5-1991, contending that during pendency of appeal the plaintiff constructed 3 new shops adjoining the suit accommodation, which were let out to M/s. Chawla Enterprises, Shrichand Dadumal and Shri Rajendra Singh Thakur for non-residential purposes in the year 1988 and accordingly his need for the suit accommodation stands negatived. In reply to this application filed on 17-7-1981, the plaintiff asserted hat he had no funds to construct the alleged shops on his land. The aforesaid persons offered to construct the shops at their cost which was accepted by the plaintiff. In reply to this application filed on 17-7-1981, the plaintiff asserted hat he had no funds to construct the alleged shops on his land. The aforesaid persons offered to construct the shops at their cost which was accepted by the plaintiff. Accordingly, he had no alternative but to let out the newly built shops to the persons who had constructed them. Another application 1. A. No. 3747/91 was also filed on 6-5-1991 by the appellant for condoning the delay in payment of rents. 4. I. A. No. 3747/91 is rejected, because even if the delay is condoned that will fetch no benefit to the tenant. 5. In the light of the dispute between the parties about the circumstances in which the new shops were constructed and let out by the plaintiff to three persons during pendency of this appeal, I was inclined to remit the dispute to the trial Court with a direction to return its finding after recording evidence of the parties in that regard. However, the learned counsel for the respondent asserted that if the decree for ejectment passed by the courts below on the ground under Section 12(l)(a) of the Act is confirmed, there would be no necessity for remanding the case to the trial Court for returning a finding on an issue arising out of the subsequent events. Accordingly, the arguments were heard. 6. As earlier pointed out, the tenant was in arrears of rent for the period 1-7-1976 to 31-10-1976. The arrears were not paid in spite of notice and, therefore, C. S. No. 56-A/77 for ejectment on the ground under Section 12(l)(a) of the Act was earlier filed by the plaintiff against him. As the arrears were deposited in Court in accordance with Section 13(1) of the Act, the plaintiffs suit for ejectment on that ground was dismissed. Sub-section (3) of the Section 12 provides that no order for the eviction of a tenant shall be made on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by Section 13. Sub-section (3) of the Section 12 provides that no order for the eviction of a tenant shall be made on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by Section 13. At the same time proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 12 says that "no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under this sub-section if, having obtained such benefit once in respect of any accommodation, he again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for three consecutive months." The tenant-appellant having once obtained the benefit of Section 12(3) of the Act in the earlier suit, cannot derive the benefit thereunder if it is proved that he again made a default in the payment of rent of the suit accommodation for 3 consecutive months. It is, therefore, to be seen whether in payment of rent for the period between 1-10-1979 to 30-6-1981, the defendant had made any such default. Ex.D.16, Ex.D.15 amd Ex.D.17 show that the appellant had deposited rents for the period between October 1979 to August 1980. He tendered certain rents by money orders as per Ex. D. l to Ex.D.15 but those tenders cannot be said to be valid tenders as the amounts were sent after deducting money order commissions. Further the money orders sent did not show tender of rent for the months of October, November and December, 1980. In the demand notice dated 30-3-1981 a demand for arrears of rent for the period between October, 1979 to February, 1981 (17 months) was made. It was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the appellant to tender the amount of arrears of rent due against him within 2 months from the date of service of notice on him. If he had deposited the rent for the period between October, 1979 to August 1980 in the Court of Rent Controller, it was his duty to pay the arrears for the subsequent period, i.e., for the period between September, 1980 to February. 1981. That he did not do. The suit was filed on 7-7-1981, i.e., after expiry of a period of 2 months from the date of service of demand notice dated 30-3-1981 (Ex.P.5). Ex.P.6 is postal acknowledgment, showing service of demand notice on the appellant on 31-3-1981. 1981. That he did not do. The suit was filed on 7-7-1981, i.e., after expiry of a period of 2 months from the date of service of demand notice dated 30-3-1981 (Ex.P.5). Ex.P.6 is postal acknowledgment, showing service of demand notice on the appellant on 31-3-1981. The appellant was, thus, proved to be a defaulter for more than 3 consecutive months and, therefore, he could not avoid his ejectment on the ground under Section 12(1 )(a) of the Act, even if he made deposit of the arrears in Court in accordance with Section 13(1) of the Act, as held by a Full Bench of this Court in Mankuwarbai v. Sunderlal Jain, 1978 MPLJ 405 (F. B.) = 1978 JLJ 326 (F. B.). 7. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the demand notice (Ex.P.5) did not give 2 months' time for payment of arrears of rent. It was also submitted that if the arrears were deposited in Court without objection and withdrawn by the plaintiff, that would amount to waiver of the right by condoning the delay in payment of rent for 3 consecutive months. This argument deserves to be rejected. It is not necessary to mention in the demand notice the period within which the arrears are to be paid. Accordingly, if in the demand notice period is mentioned which is less than the period of 2 months, the notice will not become invalid and the tenant cannot get the excuse for avoiding the decree under Section 12(l)(a) of the Act by alleging that he was not bound to pay the arrears in compliance with such notice of demand. In Balgovind v. Bhargava School Book Depot, AIR 1958 All. 369 . it was held that where a notice demanding payment of arrears of rent within one week was served, but the landlord filed the suit after 2 months, the suit was validly presented and the landlord was entitled to a decree for ejectment on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent within 2 months from the date of service of demand notice. Similar view was taken by this Court in Dattatraya v. Martand, 1961 MPLJ 536 . 8. For all these reasons, the decree for ejectment passed by the courts below on the ground under Section 12(l)(a) of the Act does not call for any interference. 9. Similar view was taken by this Court in Dattatraya v. Martand, 1961 MPLJ 536 . 8. For all these reasons, the decree for ejectment passed by the courts below on the ground under Section 12(l)(a) of the Act does not call for any interference. 9. Even if the decree for ejectment on the ground under Section 12(l)(f) of the Act is set aside on the basis of the alleged events occurring subsequent to the date of suit, that will not protect the tenancy or ejectment of the appellant from the suit accommodation, because he is liable to be ejected on the ground under Section 12(1 )(a) of the Act for the reasons aforesaid. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the aforesaid substantial questions of law deserve to be decided in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. 11. Accordingly, this second appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their costs of this second appeal as incurred. 12. There is acute shortage of accommodation in the town of Damoh, where the suit accommodation is located. The appellant appears to be a small businessman, earning his livelihood by carrying on his business in the suit accommodation. Dussehara and Divali festivals are fast approaching. I am, therefore, of the view that in order to relieve the tenant from immediate hardship and inconvenience resulting from his ejectment from the suit accommodation, his prayer for allowing him some time for vacating the suit accommodation is allowed by giving him time till 29-2-1992 subject to following conditions : - (i) That he shall give undertaking in the Court below within 30 days from the date of this judgment and order that on or before 1-3-1992 be shall deliver peaceful and vacant possession, of the suit accommodation to the plaintiff-landlord without raising any objection or hindrance himself or through strangers in the way of his obtaining such possession of the suit accommodation. (ii) That he shall pay all arrears of rent and the rent for the month of October, 1991 with due municipal taxes and the costs awarded by the courts below within 30 days from the date of this judgment and order. (ii) That he shall pay all arrears of rent and the rent for the month of October, 1991 with due municipal taxes and the costs awarded by the courts below within 30 days from the date of this judgment and order. (iii) That he shall further pay the rent for the month of November, 1991 on or before 15-12-1991; for the month of December, 1991 on or before 15-1-1992 and for the months of January, 1992 and February, 1992, i.e., for both the months, on or before 15-2-1992.