Judgment :- Radhakrishna Menon, J. The petitioner in I. A 2405/88 in O.S.115/80 in the court of the Principal Sub Judge, Cochin, is the appellant. The judgment under attack is one by which the court below has dismissed the above application, the appellant had filed under S.30 of The Arbitration Act, to set aside the award which has been made the rule of court by the judgment. 2. The appellant entered into an agreement with the first respondent on 5-2-1974 for purchase of tea manufactured by the respondent in its estate. In the course of the dealings, disputes and differences arose in regard to non-payment of price of the tea purchased by the appellant. To get these disputes and differences referred to Arbitrators, the first respondent filed Arbitration O.P.4/1976 which subsequently was converted as O.S.115/80. During the pendency of the suit the first respondent's right was assigned to the second respondent and therefore the second respondent got himself impleaded as an additional plaintiff. Thereafter the court went into the various contentions raised by the parties elaborately and as per judgment dt.10-4-1987 referred the disputes for the decision of the Arbitrators. The Arbitrators entered upon the reference on 30th October, 1987 and the award was passed on 11th October, 1988. The award was filed before the court below on 12-10-1988. The respondents thereafter filed I. A2.080/88 to get a decree passed in terms of the award. On receipt of the notice of the filing of the award, the appellant filed I.A.2405/88 referred to above to get the award set aside on the ground of misconduct. The grounds urged by the appellant have been stated by the court below thus: "a) No dispute arose regarding the non-payment of the price of the tea supplied and therefore the Arbitrators committed misconduct in holding that they could adjudicate the dispute. b) The right to enforce an arbitration agreement is not a matter that could be assigned and therefore the Arbitrators misconducted themselves in holding that the 2nd plaintiff is entitled to enforce the Arbitration agreement. c) The Arbitrators do not constitute a Civil Court and therefore they were not justified in awarding interest. d) The rate of interest awarded by the Arbitrators at 12% per annum is in excess of the maximum rate of interest payable by nationalised banks. c) The Arbitrators do not constitute a Civil Court and therefore they were not justified in awarding interest. d) The rate of interest awarded by the Arbitrators at 12% per annum is in excess of the maximum rate of interest payable by nationalised banks. e) The Arbitrators committed a misconduct in holding that the price of tea payable is based on Ex. warehouse cost as against the claim of the defendant thai the basis for payment is cost of production as certified by Aspinwall and Company. f) The Arbitrators committed a misconduct in disallowing the damages claimed by the defendant". 3. It can be seen from the above extract that one of the main complaints pertains to the determination of the cost of production of the tea. The learned counsel for the appellant argues that the cost of production has wrongly been calculated by the Arbitrators. Had the Arbitrators in fact taken into account the materials like the accounts, correspondences etc. maintained by the company, the error in calculating the cost of production would not have been there, the counsel submits. It is further argued that the Arbitrators have not evaluated the evidence properly and this also has contributed for the wrong assessment of the cost of production. These aspects are dealt with by the Arbitrators in paragraphs 18.2 and 18.3 of the award. On going through the discussion there, we are satisfied that the findings arrived at by the Arbitrators are supported by materials. May be that on a reappraisal of the evidence the court may come to a different conclusion. That does not mean Tahiti Arbitrators have committed any misconduct. We should in this connection remember the well established principle that the arbitrator is the sole judge of the quality and quantity of evidence and it is not for the court to take upon itself the responsibility of being a judge of the evidence before the Arbitrator. Only in the event of the party concerned establishing that the Arbitrators have committed legal misconduct or the award has left matters undermined or the objection to the legality of the award is apparent on the face- of the award, the court under S.30 of the Arbitration Act can interfere with the award. Only in the event of the party concerned establishing that the Arbitrators have committed legal misconduct or the award has left matters undermined or the objection to the legality of the award is apparent on the face- of the award, the court under S.30 of the Arbitration Act can interfere with the award. A reference in this connection to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Coimbatore District Sanghom v. Balasubramonia Foundry (A.I.R.1987 SC 2045), Delhi Municipal Corporation v. M/s.Jagannath Asok Kumar ( A.I.R.1987 SC 2316), Sudarsan Trading Company v. Govt, of Kerala ( A.I.R.1989 SC 890) and food Corporation of India v. Jogindarpal Mohinderpal ( A.I.R.1989 SC 1263) is profitable. The above argument of the learned counsel under the circumstances cannot be takers cognisance of. 4. Another contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant relates to the set off claimed by the appellant. The learned counsel in this connection made specific reference to the findings of the arbitrators that the claim is time barred and contended that the said finding is without any basis. It can be seen from the various details given in the award that the claim is not barred by limitation, the counsel submits. In support of this argument the counsel made specific reference to S.37 of the Arbitration Act, which provides that all the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to arbitration as they apply to proceedings in court. There cannot be any dispute about this position in law. The question of limitation can be decided only after taking into account the facts which are relevant in the context. The findings that the arbitrator would arrive at, after evaluating the facts and also the evidence available on record, that the claim is barred or not barred by limitation, in our view, cannot be interfered with in a proceeding under S.30 of The Arbitration Act unless it is demonstrated to the court that the reasons based on which the conclusion is arrived at, are erroneous as such as propositions of law or the conclusion, the arbitrator has arrived at is one which could not possibly be sustained. The court can also interfere with the award provided it is established that the same is based on a finding made in violation of natural justice or in excess of jurisdiction. The court can also interfere with the award provided it is established that the same is based on a finding made in violation of natural justice or in excess of jurisdiction. It should however be remembered that it is not misconduct on the part of the arbitrator to come to an erroneous decision whether it is one of law or fact and whether or not the findings of fact are supported by evidence/ materials. Since the findings of fact under challenge are supported by evidence we are of the view that they are beyond challenge. The argument of the counsel that the conclusion that the counter claim is barred by limitation is not sustainable, therefore is rejected. 5. The one other contention raised on behalf of the appellant pertains to the award of interest pendente lite and the rate of interest. The learned counsel for the respondents argues that since the claim made by the Respondents falls under S.61(2) of The Sale of Goods Act, the award of interest by the arbitrators is beyond challenge. In support of this argument he pressed into service the principles enunciated in the decision of the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. S & S ltd. ( A.I.R.1972 SC 1507), There the Supreme Court, considering a contention apparently same as the one on hand, has made the following observations:-"where all the disputes including a claim for payment of the amount with interest is referred to the arbitrator, the arbitrator can award interest pendente lite Le. during pendency of the arbitration proceedings". (Headnotes) This observation perceptibly supports the above argument of the learned counsel. This observation is based on an earlier ruling of the Supreme Court in Firm Madanlal Roshanlal v. HukamchandMills Ltd., Indore (A.I.R.1967 SC 1030). It is clear from this judgment that only in such cases where the disputes are referred for arbitration in the course of the suits pending before the civil courts, the Arbitrators will be justified in awarding interest pendente lite. Not otherwise. That this is the consistent view of the apex court is clear from the recent ruling in M/s.Hind Builders v. Union of India (AIR 1990 S.C.1340 ). Not otherwise. That this is the consistent view of the apex court is clear from the recent ruling in M/s.Hind Builders v. Union of India (AIR 1990 S.C.1340 ). In this judgment their Lordships alter reviewing all the previous decisions of the Supreme Court including the decision in s & s Ltd. has held thus: "The grant of pendente lite interest would be justified only when the reference to arbitrations made in the course of a suit, since a Court has, under S X, of the C.P.C., power to grant pendente lite interest in a suit, an arbitrator to whom a reference is made in the course of the suit would be clothed with all the powers of the Court including the one to grant such interest". We therefore are of the view that the conclusion of the arbitrators as regards the claim for interest pendente lite is an error apparent. on the face of the award and hence liable to be deleted. We accordingly direct that interest pendente lite for the period from 30-10-1987 to 11-10-1988 granted be deleted from the award. The ancillary question that requires to be considered in this connection can be stated thus: Are not the respondents entitled to interest prior to the date of reference and if so for what period? The answer to this question depends upon the construction of S.3 of The Interest Act, 1978, for short The Act. The Act came into force with effect from 19-8-1981. S.3 of The Act empowers a court to allow interest to persons entitled to the debt or damages etc. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the Act has no retrospective operation and therefore the interest on the claim can be awarded only from the date of the coming into force of The Act. We are afraid that this argument cannot be accepted. A reference in this connection to the following clauses in the Section is profitable: "(a) if the proceedings relate to a debt payable by virtue of a written instrument at a certain time, then, from the date when the debt is payable to the date of institution of the proceedings. We are afraid that this argument cannot be accepted. A reference in this connection to the following clauses in the Section is profitable: "(a) if the proceedings relate to a debt payable by virtue of a written instrument at a certain time, then, from the date when the debt is payable to the date of institution of the proceedings. (b) if the proceedings do not relate to any such debt, then, from the date mentioned in this regard in a written notice given by the person entitled or the person making the claim to the person liable that interest will be claimed, to the date of institution of the proceedings". 'Debt' as defined in the Act means any liability for an ascertained sum of money and includes a debt payable in kind, but does not include a judgment debt. The unambiguous and plain language employed by the legislature in these clauses would clearly indicate that the interest due from the date when the debt is payable or from the date mentioned in that regard in a written notice given by the person entitled to the debt, as the case may be, the court can award. Referencing this connection to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Gujarat W.S.& S.B. v. Unique Erectors ( A.I.R.1989 SC 973) is profitable. If that be the position the argument of the counsel for the appellants that the respondents are not entitled to interest prior to the date on which The Act came into force, is liable to be rejected. We accordingly reject the same. 6. Yet another aspect that requires consideration is the one pertaining to the rate of interest. The learned counsel for the appellants in this regard submitted that the interest cannot be awarded at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest. The current rate of interest, the counsel submits, is 10%, but the arbitrators have awarded interest at a rate of 12%. We would have accepted this argument and directed to reduce the interest, but that has become impossible because the appellant himself had claimed interest on his claim for damages at 12%. If that be the position, the award of interest at the rate of 12% cannot be said to be on the high side. We would have accepted this argument and directed to reduce the interest, but that has become impossible because the appellant himself had claimed interest on his claim for damages at 12%. If that be the position, the award of interest at the rate of 12% cannot be said to be on the high side. A reference in this connection to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. s & s Ltd. ( A.I.R.1972 SC 1507 at 1514) is profitable. There the Supreme Court was considering a contention similar to the one on hand. We shall reproduce the observation of the Supreme Court: "Mr. Shroff further contended that the award of interest at 9% per annum is exorbitant. The short answer for negative this contention is that it is seen from the claim statement filed by both the appellant and the respondent-firm that each of them claimed for payment of the amount, due to them with interest at 12% per annum under S.61 of the Sale of Goods Act. Therefore, it follows that the rate of interest awarded is not excessive. As we have already held that the arbitrator has got power in this case to award interest from June 7,1958 at the rate specified by him, the third contention of Mr.Shroff will have to be rejected". The appeal accordingly is allowed in part; but in the circumstances no costs.