S.N. BHARGAVA, J.—These two matters arise between the same parties and in connection with the same dispute, and hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 118/1990 has been directed against the order of the Additional District Judge, Sikar, allowing an application tiled by the defendant Peer Gulam Jilani u/s 10 C.P C. and staying further proceedings in Civil Suit No. 13 of 89 filed by the plaintiff petitioner Peer Gulam Naseer.S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 172/90 has been filed by Peer Gulam Jilani against the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Sikar, dismissing an application for temporary injunction in a suit filed by Peer Gulam Jilani (appellant), for restraining Gulam Naseer and others, defendant-respondents from entering the Dargah Hazrat Nazmuddin Sahib, Fatehpur and to act as Sajjadanashin and Mutwalli of the said Dargah. 3. There is a famous Dargah Hazrat Khwaja Haji Mohd. Nazmuddin Sahib, at Fatehpur (hereinafter referred to as the Dargah). Haji Nazmuddin was the founder of the said Dargah but did not lay down any mode of succession. However, after his death, his eldest son Nasurrudin became the Sajjada Nashin and Mutwalli of the Dargah. After the death of Nasurudddin, his eldest son Gulam Nazmuddin was appointed by a Will as the Sajjada Nashin, though he was only three years of age. After the death of Gulam Nazmuddin, his eldest son Gulam Sarvar became the Sajjada Nashin and Mutwalli who framed a scheme (JAPTA) in the year 1932 for the succession of the office of Sajjada Nashin and Mutwalli of the said Dargah. After the death of Gulam Sarvar, his eldest son Nurul Hassan was appointed Sajjada Nashin through a Will. Nurul Hasan had no male issue, and therefore, he made a Will in favour of Peer Gularn Naseer who was his daughters son and nominated and declared him as Sajjada Nashin and Mutwalli, by a registered will dated 16.11.1979. Thereafter, Suit No. 31/82 was filed by Peer Gulam Naseer (minor) claiming himself to be Sajjada Nashin and Mutwalli of the Dargah, through his natural guardian and next friend Muajjam Ali, against Peer Jilani and others, seeking permanent injunction against them for restraining Peer Gulam Jilani or their agents from entering the Dargah and not to disturb him in discharging his functions as the Sajjada Nashin and Mutwalli. 4. 4. Along with the said suit, an application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. was also filed. The learned Munsif allowed the said application by his order dated 3.12.1982 and granted an injunction in favour of Peer Gulam Naseer restraining Peer Gulam Jilani from interfering in the religious duties to be performed by him as the Sajjada Nashin. It was further directed that the Rajasthan Board of Muslim Wakf will keep superintendence over the wakf property and will also manage the same, till Peer Gulam Naseer became major. Peer Gulam Jilani feeling himself aggrieved, preferred an appeal against the said order which was allowed by order dated 2.8.1986 and the order of the Munsif was set aside. Peer Gulam Naseer preferred a revision petition being S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 657/1986 before this Court which was very hotly contested and the same was allowed by this court vide order dated 28.10.1988 and the order of the Civil Judge, dt. 28.8.86 was set aside and that of the trial court was maintained. A special leave petition No. 14030/88 was also filed against the order of the High Court in the Supreme Court which was rejected in limine on 4.1.1989. Against this order, a review petition was also filed but the same was also rejected by order dated 31.3.1989. 5. Since the defendants in the suit, Peer Gulam Jilani and others were repeatedly objecting with regard to the low valuation of the suit, the plaintiff decided to raise the valuation of the subject matter of the suit and filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for amending the plaint with regard to the valuation of the suit and fixed the value at Rs. 11,000/-Amendment sought for was allowed on 19.10.1989 and the plaintiff submitted amended plaint along with the additional court fee stamps on 3.11.1989. On the same day, the trial court passed order to return the plaint to the plaintiff for being presented in proper court. The plaintiff also moved an application under Order 7 Rule 10A CPC requesting to fix the date of appearance for parties in the court of District Judge, Sikar, where he will present the suit. The trial court fixed 2.12.1989 as the date of appearance before the District Judge and the same was notified to both the parties. The plaintiff also moved an application under Order 7 Rule 10A CPC requesting to fix the date of appearance for parties in the court of District Judge, Sikar, where he will present the suit. The trial court fixed 2.12.1989 as the date of appearance before the District Judge and the same was notified to both the parties. The plaint could not be returned on the same day because the certified copy of the plaint etc. were not available. However the plaint was returned on 28.11.1989 and the same was filed in the court of District Judge, Sikar on 30.11.1989. 6. Meanwhile, Peer Gulam Jilani filed a Civil Suit No. 50/89 (175/89) for permanent injunction before the District Judge, Sikar on 28.11.1989 for restraining Peer Gulam Naseer from interfering in any way, the plaintiff with the functioning of Sajjada Nashin and Mutwalli to be discharged by Peer Gulam Jilani. Along with the said suit, he had also filed an application under Order 39 rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. for temporary injunction and an ex parte injunction order was issued in favour of Peer Gulam Jilani by the court on the same day. Peer Gulam Naseer moved an application before the District Judge, Sikar, to vacate and cancel the ex-parte order. The District Judge modified his order on 28.11. 1989 and both the parties were bound down to maintain status quo. Thereafter, both the cases were transferred to the court of Additional Distt. Judge, Sikar for further proceedings. 7. Peer Gulam Jilani moved an application u/s 10 r/w Sec. 151 CPC on 6.1.1990, praying for stay of further proceedings in Civil Suit No. 96/82 (13/89). Learned Addl. Distt. Judge allowed the said application vide its order dated 10.1.90 and stayed further proceedings in the suit. It is against this order that the Civil Revision Petition No. 118/90 has been filed by Peer Gulam Naseer. 8. Shri Bajwa, learned counsel for Peer Gulam Naseer has drawn my attention to Secs. 26,27 and Order 7 Rule 10A CPC and has submitted that the suit filed by Peer Gulam Naseer in the court of the District Judge, Sikar was continuation of his earlier suit No. 31/82 which was filed by him in the court of Munsif Magistrate, Fatehpur. Shri Bajwa, learned counsel for Peer Gulam Naseer has drawn my attention to Secs. 26,27 and Order 7 Rule 10A CPC and has submitted that the suit filed by Peer Gulam Naseer in the court of the District Judge, Sikar was continuation of his earlier suit No. 31/82 which was filed by him in the court of Munsif Magistrate, Fatehpur. He has further submitted that the suit filed by Peer Gulam Naseer should by treated as a previous suit as the aforesaid Suit No. 31/82 was filed on 6.8.82, whereas the suit filed by Peer Gulam Jilani was on 28.11.989 only. He has further submitted that if the plaint is returned on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction for presentation to the other court, the date of institution should be taken to be the date when the suit was initially instituted in the first court. In this connection, he has placed reliance on A.V. Varadarajulu Naidu V. K. V. Thavasi Nadar (1), Arya Pratinidhi Sabha V. Devraj (2), Raman V. Raman Vishwanathan (3), Smt. Savitri Devi V. Hira Lal (4), Ram Swaroop V. Pyare Das (5), and Ramayaswami V. Veerarajan Raja (6). 9. On the other hand, Shri D.L. Bardhar, learned counsel for Peer Gulam Jilani, has very vehemently submitted that the revision petition should not be entertained and ought to be dismissed as there is no error of jurisdiction: the order has been passed by a competent court and none of the conditions laid down in Sec. 115 CPC empowering High Court to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction, exists in the present case. He has further submitted that presen- tatiort of plaint in proper court, after return, can not amount to continuation of earlier suit filed in the court which had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain it, meaning thereby that when the plaint is returned to be presented in a court of competent jurisdiction, the suit is to be considered as instituted on the date of such presentation and the suit thus presented, cannot be said to be a conti-nuation of the suit filed in a court without jurisdiction. He has further submitted that the trial of the suit in the court having no pecuniary jurisdiction is of no consequence and the decree if passed is nulls and void. The proper order would be to return the plaint for presentation in the proper court. He has further submitted that the trial of the suit in the court having no pecuniary jurisdiction is of no consequence and the decree if passed is nulls and void. The proper order would be to return the plaint for presentation in the proper court. He has further submitted that Order 7 Rule 10A CPC is not mandatory and is only directory. Shri Bardhar has placed reliance on M/s. Raunak International Ltd. V. Ota Kandla Pvt Ltd. (7), Amar Chand V. Union of India (8), Hira Chand V. G. I. P. Ry. Co. (9), Gouri Dutt V. P. T. S. Shankar (10), Abdul Rajak V. Samad Kuchay (11), Kesrimal V. Bansilal (12), Nani Kutty Amma V. K. K. Nair (13), and [Vicco Laboratories V. Hindustan Rimmer (14). 10. During the course of arguments, I enquired from the learned counsel for the parties as to whether anyone of the parties has moved an application for consolidation of the two suits. Both the parties replied in negative. Shri Bajwa, submitted that even if this revision is dismissed and the proceedings of the trial court in the suit filed by Peer Gulam Naseer are stayed, still he can move an application for temporary injunction in the suit and that can be granted. In this connection, he has placed reliance on B.V. Sulunke V. Kadarappa (15), Sujan Bai V. Moti Ram (16) and V. R. Balakrishnan Nadar V. R. Vela-yudhan Nadar (17). 11. Shri Bajwa, learned counsel further submitted that this Court can and should order for consolidation of the two suits because the parties are the same, the subject matter is the same and the points to be determined are also identical and the matter in issue was also directly and substantially the same. He has further submitted that consolidation of the two suits will avoid multiplicity of litigation, unnecessary wastage of time and energy of the litigants as well as this Court and in this connection, has placed reliance on P. P Gupta V. East Asiatic Co. (18), Jai Kishan V. Bajrang Lal(19), and Venkatesha Prabhu V. K. Thejappa (20). Shri Bajwa further submitted that Sec. 10 CPC is no bar to consolidation of suits and does not take away the inherent powers of the court to consolidate the two suits, in the interest of justice, in appropriate cases. 12. (18), Jai Kishan V. Bajrang Lal(19), and Venkatesha Prabhu V. K. Thejappa (20). Shri Bajwa further submitted that Sec. 10 CPC is no bar to consolidation of suits and does not take away the inherent powers of the court to consolidate the two suits, in the interest of justice, in appropriate cases. 12. Shri Bardhar, learned counsel has submitted that if there are two cross suits then, the court should apply Sec. 10 CPC and it is wrong to invoke Sec. 15! CPC for consolidating two suits and has placed reliance on Mst. Mugli V. Khalig Dar (21). 13. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the order of the trial court. 14. I do not propose to go into the question as to whether, the subsequent suit is continuation of the earlier suit or not or which one is prior instituted suit because, in my opinion, it is a fit case in which the two suits should be conscli-dated. It is not necessary that a party should apply for consolidation; in appropriate cases, even the courts suo moto can order for consolidation in the interest of justice to avoid multiplicity and duplication in the matter of recording evidence. The subject matter in the two suits is similar and identical, parties are the same and no party is likely to suffer nor any prejudice would be caused to any of the parties. Sec. 10 CPC does not go to the root of the jurisdiction of the court trying the second suit but merely lays down a rule of procedure. It only bars separate trial! of any suit in which the matter in issue was also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties in the same court but it does not apply to simultaneous hearing of the two suits after consolidation. Sec. 10 CPC was not intended to take away the inherent powers of the court to consolidate the two suits in the interest of justice in appropriate cases. There is no conflict in the principles underlying Sec. 10 CPC and the inherent power of the court to consolidate different suits in appropriate cases. Both are meant to prevent multiplicity of litigation between the same parties. There is no conflict in the principles underlying Sec. 10 CPC and the inherent power of the court to consolidate different suits in appropriate cases. Both are meant to prevent multiplicity of litigation between the same parties. In C.P.C. there is no specific provision for consolidation of proceedings but it is a settled principle of law that the courts are competent to consolidate the proceedings in exercise of their inherent powers even suo moto in appropriate cases. On consolidation of suits, there is amalgamation of two suits in one suit and they are to be decided as if there was only one suit. In this connection, reference may be made to the definition of word consolidation given in Corpus Juris, Vol. I Art. 308, which is as under: "Consolidation of actions has been defined as the combination of several actions into one; and also as a direction that one of several pending actions involving the same facts and issues shall be tried, the result of the trial to be an adjudication of all the causes. The definitions usually given embrace, in substance, both of the definitions just stated; but it is apparent that the two entirely distinct methods of procedure, the first involving an actual consolidation, where two or more actions are united into one and tried as such, and judgment rendered accordingly in all but one involving a stay of proceedings in all but one of the cases which is tried, and the adjudication in that case made decisive of the others." 15. Taking this view, I find full support from the decisions of the Allahabad High Court, Karnataka High Court as also earlier decisions of this Court, which have been referred to by Mr. Bajwa. I am in respectful disagreement with the view expressed by J & K High Court in Mst. Muglis case (supra). Even in the case, the J & K High Court has taken the view that Order u/s 10 CPC staying or declining to stay the trial of the suit is open to revision u/s 115 CPC. 16. In this view of the matter, Revision Petition No. 118/1990 deserves to be allowed. 17. Now coming to Civil Misc. Appeal No. 172/90, learned counsel for the appellant Shri Peer Gulam Jilani, has brought to my notice documents which have been filed by him in the trial court in support of his case. 16. In this view of the matter, Revision Petition No. 118/1990 deserves to be allowed. 17. Now coming to Civil Misc. Appeal No. 172/90, learned counsel for the appellant Shri Peer Gulam Jilani, has brought to my notice documents which have been filed by him in the trial court in support of his case. He has referred to an order dated 17.1.1979 of the Wakf Board appointing a Wakf Muntajama Committee for looking after the management of the said Dargah. Peer Gulam Jilani was also appointed as a member of the said Committee vide document dt 29.11.79. The said Committee was superseded and Nurul Hasan Sajjada Nashin was appointed Receiver. Nurul Hasan, Sajjada Nashin wanted to nominate Peer Gulam Nasir as Sajjada Nashin, hence, Rajasthan Board of Muslim Wakfs prohibited Nurul Hasan from installing the minor Gulam Naseer as Sajjada Nashin. A further telegraphic order was also sent not to accommodate Gulam Nasir on Gaddi during Urs, otherwise action for removal from Receivership will be taken. The Wakf Board in its reply stated that the Receiver had been appointed by the Dargah and there is no Mutwalli who will continue till further orders. Against this order dated 28.5.82, a writ petition being Writ Petition No. 959/1982 was filed in this Court by Peer Nurul Hasan, challenging the order on the ground that Sajjada Nashin had got no authority or unqualified right to nominate any person to sit on Gaddi in spite of the fact that he is a minor or major. The said writ petition was seriously contested by the Wakf Board. Ultimately, the writ petition came to be dismissed by order dt. 3.8.1982. It was made clear in the order of this Court that the petitioner Nurul Hasan will be free to file a civil suit and the observations made in order dated 3.8.82 passed by this Court shall not cause any prejudice to any of the parties. Shri Nurul Hasan died the same day i.e. 3.8.1982 and his last rites were performed by Peer Gulam Jilani. On account of his death, Nurul Hasan could not file civil suit as mentioned in the order of this Court. On 6.8.1982, Gulam Naseer filed the civil suit and obtained an interim order restraining Gulam Jilani from interfering with the discharge of duties by Gulam Naseer as Sajjada Nashin. On account of his death, Nurul Hasan could not file civil suit as mentioned in the order of this Court. On 6.8.1982, Gulam Naseer filed the civil suit and obtained an interim order restraining Gulam Jilani from interfering with the discharge of duties by Gulam Naseer as Sajjada Nashin. My attention has also been drawn to an order of the Chairman, Wakf Board, dated 5.8.1982, nominating a Committee for the management of the Dargah with Peer Gulam Jilani as the Convener. My attention has also been drawn to an order dated 6.8.82 passed by the S.D.M. Fatehpur. 18. Shri Bardhar, counsel for Peer Gulam Jilani also referred to the Japta executed by Gulam Sarvar in 1932. He further placed reliance on an order dt. 28.8.1986 wherein the trial court had discussed all the points in detail and had granted temporary injunction. He has submitted that the appellate court should not have interfered with the discretionary order passed by the trial court and after the order of the trial court, dated 28.2.1986, Peer Gulam Jilani had started functioning as Sajjada Nashin. He also referred to the report of the S.D.M. dated 22. 9. 1986, to the Chairman, Wakf Board, wherein it has been mentioned that he had seen Gulam Jilani sitting on Gaddi in the dress of Sajjada Nashin in the Mehfil Khana, opposite the main Majar of the Dargah. He also drew my attention towards the order dated 3. 10. 1986 as also the reply filed by the Wakf in Writ Petition No. 676/1986. He has further drawn my attention to various photographs showing Peer Gulam Jilani acting as Sajjada Nashin. He also brought to my notice an application dt. 2. 12. 1989 to the Dy. S.P. wherein also there is a mention that Peer Gulam Jilani was acting as Sajjada Nashin. Shri Bardar also brought to my notice a report by Haji Abdul Aziz, Member of the Board of Muslim Wakf, dated 4. 5. 1990 as also that of Sadiq Ali, Member, Intjamia Committee, dated 11.6.1990. He has further submitted that the alleged Will dated 12.9.1979 wherein Japta of 1932 has been reproduced is also very suspicious document because it is said to be executed on !2. 9. 1979 but registered on 16. 11. 5. 1990 as also that of Sadiq Ali, Member, Intjamia Committee, dated 11.6.1990. He has further submitted that the alleged Will dated 12.9.1979 wherein Japta of 1932 has been reproduced is also very suspicious document because it is said to be executed on !2. 9. 1979 but registered on 16. 11. 1979 at Ajmer at the residence of Dargah Dewan and the witnesses are not of the area but belong to Makrana and Ajmer and not to Fatehpur. He has further submitted that the order of the Chief Court of 1929 is of no avail and is not relevant as there was no dispute about the Gaddi of the Sajjada Nashin. He has also submitted that in para 5 of the plaint filed by Peer Gulam Naseer he has not mentioned about the Will which is subsequent to the earlier Will dated 12.9.1979 but the same has not seen the light of the day and therefore the earlier Will is of no consequence. He has also brought to my notice Paras 203, 204 and 205 of Mullas Mohd. Law. 19. On the other hand, learned counsel Shri S.R. Bajwa, appearing for Peer Gulam Naseer, has submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed as this Court should not lightly interfere in the discretionary order passed by the trial court. Moreover, since there is already a decision between the parties, passed by the High Court, which has been approved and confirmed by the Supreme Court, inasmuch as the special leave petition against the order passed by the High Court has been dismissed in limine, the principles of constructive res judicata apply in full force and the trial court was fully justified in dismissi-ng the application of Peer Gulam Jilani and in this connection, he has placed reliance on Arjun Singh V. Mohinder Kumar (22), Satya Dhayan Ghosal V. Smt. Deorajin Debi (23). 20. He has further drawn my attention to Para 222 of the Mullas Mohd. Law and submited that a minor can be nominated as Sajjada Nashin by a Will and has placed reliance on Ghulam Rasul V. Ghulam Qutubddin (24). He has drawn my attention to various documents which were submitted by Peer Gulam Naseer in the suit filed by him. 21. Law and submited that a minor can be nominated as Sajjada Nashin by a Will and has placed reliance on Ghulam Rasul V. Ghulam Qutubddin (24). He has drawn my attention to various documents which were submitted by Peer Gulam Naseer in the suit filed by him. 21. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the whole matter and also gone through the bulky record, and several documents referred to by the learned counsels for parties during the course of arguments. In my opinion, this appeal deserves to be dismissed as 1 feel that the judgment of the trial court has discussed all the aspects in detail and prima facie I am not inclined to interfere with the order of the trial court. I do not propose to deal with various submissions made by learned counsels for the parties and express any opinion because that might ultimately affect the decision of the suit wherein the parties have yet to lead their evidence, but prima facie, I find that the judgment of the trial court does not require any interference. I will also not discuss her whether principles of constructive res judicata apply or not because this matter will also be a point in issue during the trial of the suit. In the earlier litigation, this Court had passed an order restraining Peer Gulam Jilani or his agents from interfering with the working of Peer Gulam Naseer as Sajjada Nashin and that order of the High Court has been duly affirmed by the Supreme Court, inasmuch as the special leave petition filed by Peer Gulam Jilani against the order of this Court, was rejected summarily. Therefore, it will not be proper to interfere in this miscellaneous appeal, with the discretion of the trial court. As such, I do not find any force in this appeal and dismiss the same. 22. In the result, Civil Revision Pet. No. 118/90 is allowed, the order of the trial court, dated 10.1.1990 is set aside and it is ordered that the two suits No. 13/89 and 50/89 (175/89) pending in the court of Addl. Distt. Judge, Sikar, be consolidated. The trial court is directed to try them together as if it was one suit. No order as to costs. As Regards Civil Misc. Appeal No..172/90, it is dismissed with no order as to costs. Distt. Judge, Sikar, be consolidated. The trial court is directed to try them together as if it was one suit. No order as to costs. As Regards Civil Misc. Appeal No..172/90, it is dismissed with no order as to costs. However, since the matter is of important nature, the trial court is directed to consolidate the two suits and decide them as one suit as expeditiously as possible. The record of the case be returned to the trial court. Parties are directed to appear before the ADJ, Sikar on 27.5,1991.