Judgment :- Nainar Sundaram, J.: In this batch of five cases, there are four writ petitions, W.P.Nos.4960 to 4963 of 1978 wherein the petitioners seek writs of mandamus restraining the Tamil Nadu from enforcing the provisions of the Wildlife (Protection) Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and the Wildlife (Protection) Tamil Nadu) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’). In the fifth writ petition, W.P.No.10603 petitioner seeks for a writ of declaration, declaring the Act and the Rules to be ultra void in the absence of provisions therein for the safety of life and property of against wild animals. In substance, the petitioners attack the constitutional vires and the Rules. The petitioners are owners of lands in hilly areas. 2. The points of attack are manifold and they may be summed up as follows: (a) There is a violation of Art.19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India as it stood Constitution 44th Amendment Act, 1978 in and by which Art.19(1)(f) was repealed. (b) There is a violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. (c) There is a violation of Art.19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. (d) There is lack of the legislative competence by giving an artificial definition expression “wild animal” (e) There is an excessive delegation under Sec.61 of the Act. We have only summarised the points of attack and we will go into the details of hereinafter. We must at this juncture straightaway point out that so far as points of attack (d) and (e) are concerned, they have not been pressed pleaded in the affidavits filed in support of the writ petitions, which have been.pending 1978 and the said points have been urged for the first time in the course of the submissions by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. 3. Before we go into the details of the points of attack, it is better that we advert to relevant provisions of the Act, which we may have to look into, in the context of considering the points of attack. In fact, learned counsel for the petitioners were only on these provisions to substantiate their attack on the constitutional vires of the Act and the Rules. The long the Preamble and the Enacting clause to the Act read as follows: “An Act to provide for the protection of wild animals and birds and for matters connected therewith or ancillary or incidental thereto. The long the Preamble and the Enacting clause to the Act read as follows: “An Act to provide for the protection of wild animals and birds and for matters connected therewith or ancillary or incidental thereto. Whereas it is expedient to provide for protection of wild animals and birds and for matters connected therewith or ancillary incidental thereto. And whereas Parliament has no power to make Law for the State with respect to any of matters aforesaid except as provided in Arts.249 and 250 of the Constitution; And whereas in pursuance of Clause (1) of Art.252 of the Constitution resolutions have passed by all the Houses of the Legislatures of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal to the effect that the matters aforesaid should be regulated in those by Parliament by Law: Be it enacted by Parliament in the Twenty-third year of the Republic of India as follows: Sec.2(16) defines “hunting” in the following terms (16) “hunting” with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, includes (a) capturing, killing, poisoning, snaring and trapping of any wild animal and every attempt to do so. (b) driving any wild animal for any of the purpose specified in Sub-clause (a); (c) injuring or destroying or taking any part of the body of any such animal or, in the case wild birds or reptiles, damaging the eggs of such birds or reptiles or disturbing the eggs nests of such birds or reptiles. “Sec.2(36) defines” wild animal “as follows:” (36) “wild animal” means any animal found wild in nature and include any animal specified in Schedule I, Schedule II, Schedule III, Schedule IV, or Schedule V, wherever found. Sec.9 deals with” Hunting of wild Animals “and it is sufficient for our purpose if we look Sub-secs.(1) and (2) and they read as follows: ” 9(1) No person shall hunt any wild animal specified in Schedule I. (2) No person shall hunt any wild animal specified in Schedule II, Schedule III or Schedule IV except under, and in accordance with the conditions specified in a licence granted Sub-sec.(5). “Sec.11 concerns with hunting of wild animals with permission therefor in certain cases whole section needs extraction as follows: 11(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force subject to the provisions of Chapter IV. “Sec.11 concerns with hunting of wild animals with permission therefor in certain cases whole section needs extraction as follows: 11(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force subject to the provisions of Chapter IV. (a) the Chief Wildlife warden may, if he is satisfied that any wild animal specified in Schedule I has become dangerous to human life or is so disabled or diseased as to be beyond recovery, by order in writing and stating the reasons therefore, permit any person to such animal or cause such animal to be hunted. (b) the Chief Wildlife warden or the authorised officer may if he is satisfied that any animal specified in Schedule II, Schedule III or Schedule IV, has become dangerous human life or to property, including standing crops on any land or is so disabled or diseased as to be beyond recovery, by order in writing and stating the reasons therefore, permit person to hunt such animal or cause such animal to be hunted. (2) The killing or wounding in good faith of any wild animal in defence of one self or of other person shall not be an offence: Provided that nothing in this Sub-section exonerate any person who when such defence becomes necessary was committing any contravention of any provision of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder. (3) Any wild animal killed or wounded in defence of any person shall be Government property”. Schedule I had got three parts-part I dealing with mammals: part II dealing with Amphibians and Reptiles; and part III dealing with Birds. Schedule II relates to Special Game and it has two parts. Schedule III relates to Big Game. Schedule IV relates to small Game. Sec.61 empowers the Government to alter the entries in the Schedules; and Sub-secs.(1) and alone may be relevant and they read as follows: “61(1) The Central Government, may, if it is of opinion that it is expedient so to do notification, add any entry to any Schedule or transfer any entry from one part of a Schedule to another part of the same Schedule or from one Schedule to another. (2) The State Government may, if it is of opinion that it is expedient so to do by notification, transfer any entry from Schedule II, Schedule III, Schedule IV or Schedule V to Schedule and may also transfer any entry from part I of Schedule II or Schedule III or Schedule IV Schedule V to any other Schedule.” 4. Now let us take up the first point of attack, namely, violation of Art.19(1)(f) of Constitution of India as it stood prior to its deletion by 44th Amendment. The said Article reads as follows: “19(1) All citizens shall have the right — (f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property.” Despite deletion by the 44th Amendment in 1978 with effect from 29th June, 1979, attack based on the allegation of violation of this Article is available to the petitioners because the Act as such was enacted at the time when Art.19(1)(f) was very much in statute book and it was also there when the Act was extended to the State of Tamil with effect from 1.1.1974, Citations were made by Mrs.Malini Ganesh, learned counsel for petitioners in W.P.Nos.4960 of 4963 of 1978 to advance this proposition and it is sufficient we place them on record in this judgment without expatiating the proposition, because could not be a dispute over it. The citations are: (i) Deep Chand v. State of U.P, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 648: 1959 S.C.J. 1050. (ii) Mahendra Lal State of UP.,A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1019, 1026-1029 (iii) Waman Rao v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 271 (278). The violation of Art.19(1)(f) is being complained of in the following manner: Sec.9(1) that no person shall hunt any wild animal specified in Schedule I, Sec.9(2) speaks about grant of licence with specific conditions annexed, for hunting of any wild animal in Schedules II, III and IV. Sec.11(1)(a) enables a person to obtain a permission to hunt or cause to hunted any wild animal specified in Schedule I, if it has become dangerous to human life so disabled or diseased as to be beyond recovery. Under Sec.11(2) the killing or wounding good faith of any wild animal in defence of oneself or of any other person shall not be offence. Under Sec.11(2) the killing or wounding good faith of any wild animal in defence of oneself or of any other person shall not be offence. Sec.11(1)(b) speaks about a person obtaining permission to hunt or cause to hunted any wild animal specified in Schedules II, III and IV if it has become dangerous human life or property including standing crops on any land or is so disabled or diseased to be beyond recovery. The grievance expressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners the background of these provisions is that in respect of a wild animal specified in Schedule if it has become dangerous to property, nothing could be done by the owner of the property to protect it and he has to take the risk of his property getting damaged by acts depradation by the wild animals specified in Schedule I. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that to hold property would include the right to hold it in any manner owner chooses and would also include all rights of enjoyment attached to the ownership the property. In this connection, the following citations were referred to: (1) Bhawrao Atmaram Patil v. Sub Divisional Officer, Chandur-Murai, A.I.R. 1955 Nag. 1, Sundararaja Iyer v. Sub-Collector of Dindigal, (1957)1 M.L.J. 307 : A.I.R. 1957 333.I.L.R. 1957 Mad. 571, (3) Syed Habib Hussain v. Kamal Chand, A.I.R 1969 Raj. 31. Here again we need not dwell much on this proposition because we can take it as a settled one. However going further, learned counsel for the petitioners would also submit that the right to hold and to enjoy property, will also include the right to protect the property and if the right to protect the property is to be abrogated, breached or violated in manner by any piece of legislation, that must be struck down violative of Art.19(1)(f). can proceed that the right to protect the property is necessary to hold it. 5. Art.19 as a deals with the great and basic rights, which are recognised and guaranteed as natural inherent in the status of a citizen of a free country. This Article gives a list of individual liberties. It does not however enjoin upon the State to legislate enactments for the protection of the same. As already adverted to, they the natural rights, inherent in the status of a citizen of a free country. This Article gives a list of individual liberties. It does not however enjoin upon the State to legislate enactments for the protection of the same. As already adverted to, they the natural rights, inherent in the status of a citizen of a free country. The Article guarantees those rights for a free citizen. When there is a complaint of restriction or abridgement violation of such rights by a legislation, the court must examine the substance of legislation. The effects of the legislation are relevant for this purpose. Art.19( 1) can invoked only when the law is made directly infringing a fundamental right. The possible indirect or remote or collateral effects of a legislation upon any particular fundamental cannot be said to constitute a restriction upon that right. 6. In Choranjit Lal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 41: 1951 S.C.J. 29, the question violation of Art.19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India in the context of provisions of Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance 2 of followed by Act 28 of 1950 was put forth in the following manner: "The main ground put forward by the petitioner is that the pith and substance of enactments is to take possession of and control over the mills of the company which are valuable assets and such taking of possession of property is entirely beyond the powers the Legislature. The provisions of the Act, it is said, amount to deprivation of property shareholders as well as the company within the meaning of Art.31 of the Constitution restrictions imposed on the rights of the shareholders in respect to the shares held by constitute an unjustifiable interference with their rights to hold property and as such are under Art.19(1)(f)." In the judgment of Mukherjea, J., the first question that arose for consideration was: "Whether the restrictions that have been imposed upon the rights of the petitioner shareholder in the company under the Sholapur Act amounts to infringement of his acquire, hold or dispose of property within the meaning of Art.19(1)(f) of the Constitution." The learned Judge dealt with the question in the following manner: "So far as the first point is concerned, it is quite clear that there is no restriction whatsoever upon the petitioner’s right to acquire and dispose of any property. The shares, which holds, do remain his property and his right to dispose them of is not fettered in anyway. The shares, which holds, do remain his property and his right to dispose them of is not fettered in anyway. hold’ a property means to possess it, there is no infringement of his right either for as stated already, the acts complained of by the petitioner do not amount to dispossession him from any property in the eye of law. It is argued that ‘holding’ includes enjoyment benefits that are ordinarily attached to the ownership of property. The enjoyment fruits of a property is undoubtedly an incident of ownership. The pecuniary benefit, shareholder derives from the shares he holds" is the dividend and there is no limitation the petitioner’s right in this respect. The petitioner undoubtedly has been precluded exercising his right of voting at the election of Directors so long as the statutory Directors continue to manage the affairs of the company. He cannot pass an effective resolution concurrence with the majority of shareholders without the consent or sanction of the Government and without such sanction there is also a disability on him to institute winding up proceedings in a court of law. In my opinion there are rights or privileges are appurtenant to or flow from the ownership of property, but by themselves and independently they cannot be reckoned as property capable of being acquired, disposed of as is contemplated by Art.19(1)(f) of the Constitution. I do not think that has been any restriction on the rights of a shareholder to hold, acquire or dispose enactment and consequently Art.19(1)(f) of the Constitution is of no assistance to the petitioner." 7. In All India Bank Employees ‘Association v. National Industrial Tribunal, A.I.R. 1962S.C. 171: (1962)3 S.C.R 269 : (1961)2 Lab.L.J. 265: (1962)32 Com. Cas. 414, the proposition countenanced us that the right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(c) does not extend concomitant right to effective collective bargaining or to strike. 8. In Bennett Coloman and Company Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 106: S.C.C. 788, after referring to the earlier pronouncements, it has been countenanced direct operation of the Act upon the rights forms the real test. 9. In Menaka Gandhi v. of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597: (1978)1 S.C.C. 248 : (1978)2 S.C.J. 312, the test countenanced is to see whether the right of which breach is complained integral part of a named fundamental right or partakes of the same basic nature character of that fundamental right. 9. In Menaka Gandhi v. of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597: (1978)1 S.C.C. 248 : (1978)2 S.C.J. 312, the test countenanced is to see whether the right of which breach is complained integral part of a named fundamental right or partakes of the same basic nature character of that fundamental right. The relevant passages run as follows: “It would thus be seen that even if a right is not specifically named in Art. 19(1), it be a fundamental right covered by some clause of that Article, if it is an integral named fundamental right or partakes of the same basic nature and character fundamental right. It is not enough that a right claimed by the petitioner flows or from a named fundamental right or that its existence is necessary in order to make exercise of the named fundamental right meaningful and effective. Every activity facilitates the exercise of a named fundamental right is not necessarily comprehended that fundamental right nor can it be regarded as such merely because it may not be otherwise to effectively exercise that fundamental right. The contrary construction lead to incongruous results and the entire scheme of Art.19(1) which confers different and sanctions dif-dwewnr ewareixriona according to different standards depending nature of the right will be upset. What is necessary to be seen is, and that is the test must be applied, whether the right claimed by the petitioner is an integral part of fundamental right or partakes of the same basic nature and character as the fundamental right so that the exercise of such right is in reality and substance nothing an instance of the exercise of the named fundamental right.” “ Every activity that may be necessary for exercise of freedom of speech and expression that may facilitate such exercise or make it meaningful and effective cannot be elevated the status of a fundamental right as if it were part of the fundamental right of free and expression. Otherwise, practically every activity would become part of fundamental right or the other and the object of making certain rights only as fundamental rights with different permissible restrictions would be frustrated.” 10. Otherwise, practically every activity would become part of fundamental right or the other and the object of making certain rights only as fundamental rights with different permissible restrictions would be frustrated.” 10. In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 898, it has been countenanced that if the impact of the law on any of the rights under Clause (1) of Art.19 is incidental, indirect, remote or collateral and is dependent upon factors, which may not come into play, the anvil of Art.19 will not be available for judging its validity. principle countenanced runs as follows: “Even for determining the validity of a legislation on the ground of infringement fundamental rights, the subject-matter and the object of the legislation are not irrelevant. For instance, if the subject matter of the legislation directly covers any fundamental freedom mentioned in Art.19(1), it must pass the test of reasonableness the relevant head in Clauses (2) to (6) of that Article. If the legislation does not directly with any impugned abridges any of the rights enumerated in Art. 19(1). The mere fact that the impugned incidentally, remotely or collaterally has the effect of abridging or abrogating those will not satisfy the test. If the answer to the above queries be in the affirmative, impugned law in order to be valid, must pass the test of reasonableness under Art.19. the impact of the law on any of the rights under Clause (1) of Art.19 is merely indirect, remote or collateral and is dependent upon factors which may or may not come play, the anvil of Art.19 will not be available of judging its validity.” 11. Let us now examine the present complaint. The Act has been enacted to provide protection of animals and birds and for matters connected with or ancillary or thereto. The statement of objects and reasons runs as follows: “Statement of objects and reasons”: The rapid decline of India’s wild animals and of the richest and most varied in the world, has been a cause of grave concern, some animals and birds have already become extinct in this country and others are in the of being so. Areas which were once teeming with wildlife have become devoid of it in sanctuaries and National parks the protection afforded to wildlife needs to be The wild Birds and Animals Protection Act, 1912 (8 of 1912), has become completely outmoded. Areas which were once teeming with wildlife have become devoid of it in sanctuaries and National parks the protection afforded to wildlife needs to be The wild Birds and Animals Protection Act, 1912 (8 of 1912), has become completely outmoded. The existing state laws are not only outdated but provide punishments which commensurate with the offence and the financial benefits which accrue from poaching trade in wildlife produce. Further, such laws mainly relate to control of hunting and emphasise the other factors which are also prime reasons for the decline of wildlife,namely, taxidermy and trade in wildlife and products derived therefrom. 2. Having considered the relevant local provisions existing in the States, the Government came to the conclusion that these are neither adequate not satisfactory. There is, therefore, an urgent need for introducing a comprehensive legislation, which would provide protection of wild animals and birds and for all matters connected therewith or ancillary incidental thereto. 3. Legislation in respect of the aforesaid subject-matter is relatable to entry 20 of the List in the seventh schedule to the Constitution, namely protection of wild animals and Parliament has no power to make a lav? in this regard applicable to the State from the provisions of Arts.249 and 250 of the Constitution) unless the Legislatures of more States pass a resolution in pursuance of Art.252 of the Constitution empowering parliament to pass the necessary legislation on the subject. The Legislatures of the States Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal have passed such resolutions. 4. The Bill seeks to- (a) constitute a Wildlife Advisory Board for each State. (b) regulate hunting of wild animals and birds. The Legislatures of the States Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal have passed such resolutions. 4. The Bill seeks to- (a) constitute a Wildlife Advisory Board for each State. (b) regulate hunting of wild animals and birds. (c) lay down the procedure for declaring areas as sanctuaries National parks, etc.; (d) regulate possession, acquisition or transfer of, or trade in, wild animals, animal and trophies and taxidermy thereof; (e) provide penalties for contravention of the Act." Sec.9(1) has laid down that no person shall hunt any wild animal specified in Schedule Sec.11 has brought in special circumstances under which notwithstanding what has expressed in Sec.9(1) a person is enabled to hunt a wild animal in Schedule I Sec.11(1)(a) enables a person armed with a permit issued therefor to hunt or cause to be hunted any animal specified in Schedule I if it becomes dangerous to human life or is so disabled diseased as to be beyond recovery under Sec.11(1)(b) a person having obtained a therefor would hunt any wild animal specified in Schedules II, III, and IV when become dangerous not only to human life, but also to property including standing any land or is so disabled or diseased as to be beyond recovery. It is true so far as animal specified in Schedule I is concerned, a person cannot obtain permission to even if it becomes dangerous to property including standing crops on any land. From is not possible to say that it has abridged the right of the citizen to protect his property a wild animal specified in Schedule I, The right to protect one’s property from animal specified in Schedule I need not necessarily be equated to a right to hunt that animal in protection of one’s property. To put it in other words, it is not permissible advance a theory that only by hunting the wild animals specified in Schedule I, that they have become dangerous to property, there could be protection to property. have seen above, the definition of "hunting" in Sec.2(36) is wide enough to cover very contingencies as per Clauses (a) to (c) thereof. It could not be claimed that without any wild animal specified in Schedule I, when it has proved dangerous to property, owner of the property could not have protection therefor. have seen above, the definition of "hunting" in Sec.2(36) is wide enough to cover very contingencies as per Clauses (a) to (c) thereof. It could not be claimed that without any wild animal specified in Schedule I, when it has proved dangerous to property, owner of the property could not have protection therefor. It is here the court is enjoined find out as to whether what the legislation has done has really property, which is an of the right to hold property. There could be no gainsaying that without hunting animals specified in Schedule I even if they prove dangerous to property, there ways and means of protecting the property from such wild animals. The method and of protection need not necessarily be by the hunting of the wild animals. This Court catalogue the methodology or means of protecting one’s property from a wild specified in Schedule I when it proves dangerous to property. The Act as such, deprived the right of the owner of the property to hold, to enjoy and to protect his the latter two being treated as incidents to the right to hold property. The provisions of the Act only prohibit the of the wild animals specified in Schedule I and also gives an exception while the wild specified in Schedule I prove a danger to human life. We are not able to conceive right to hunt a wild animal, even when it proves dangerous to property is an integral the fundamental right to hold property under Art.19(1)(f) or partakes of the same nature and character as that fundamental right. The right to hunt a wild animal proves dangerous to property and in order to protect the property from it may be viewed one of the rights appurtenant to or flowing from the right to hold property. But by itself taken independently, it cannot be reckoned as property capable of being acquired, disposed of as is contemplated by Art. 19(1)(f). As laid down by the highest Court land every activity that may be necessary for the exercise of a fundamental right or to it meaningful or effective cannot be elevated to the status of a fundamental right as part of the fundamental right. It is not enough that the right claimed flows or emanates a named fundamental right or that its existence is necessary in order to make the of the fundamental right meaningful and effective. It is not enough that the right claimed flows or emanates a named fundamental right or that its existence is necessary in order to make the of the fundamental right meaningful and effective. It must be an integral part of the fundamental right or partakes of the same basic nature and character as that fundamental right. The right claimed by the petitioners to hunt a wild animal even when it dangerous to property cannot fit in with the above propositions. the provisions of the such do not abridge the right to hold property by direct and immediate operation. We not subscribe our support to a proposition that only by hunting the wild animals specified Schedule I, there would be protection to one ’ s property, viewed from this angle, there scope for advancing a complaint that the provisions of the Act have violated Art.19(1)(f) the Constitution as it stood prior to the 44th Amendment. 12. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that Art.14 Constitution of India is also violated in that there was denial of equal protection of the argument is built in this way. A person can with permission accorded therefore wild animal specified in Schedules II, III and IV when it becomes dangerous not only human life but also to property. While the same person or another person, who is confronted with a wild animal specified in Schedule I becoming dangerous to property, could not even by obtaining permission therefor. We may straightway point out that under equal protection means equal treatment to equal persons placed in similar circumstances. rightly contended by Mr.R.Muthu-kumarasamy, learned Additional Central Government standing counsel appearing for the 4th respondent, a person in danger of life is not an to a person facing danger to his property. They are not equals. The principle of equality not mean that every law will have universal application for all persons, who are circumstances in the same position. Varying situations and varying circumstances require separate treatments. A person facing danger to his life cannot be equated person facing danger to his property. They are in different situations. Equality concept cannot be brought in so naively to imagine and advance the present theory of discrimination. The law made to meet different situations and circumstances and persons involved cannot be frowned upon as having breached the fundamental right of equal protection laws. They are in different situations. Equality concept cannot be brought in so naively to imagine and advance the present theory of discrimination. The law made to meet different situations and circumstances and persons involved cannot be frowned upon as having breached the fundamental right of equal protection laws. Certainly it cannot be complained that the very same person has been discriminated when he is placed under different circumstances. The law could deal with the same differently in different circumstances. In our view, the invocation of Art.14 has no place all. 13. We have already noted the third complaint is that Art.19(1)(g) is also violated in that virtue of the breach of Art.19(1)(f) the right of the petitioners to carry on their occupation has been breached. We have found that the grievance built on Art.19(1)(f) sustainable. In this view, the case of violation of Art.19(1)(g) loses its basis and has be eschewed. 14. Then we are left with the last two contentions concerning lack of legislative competence and excessive delegation. The theory of lack of legislative competence is advanced Mrs.Malini Ganesh learned counsel for the petitioners, in the following manner; Entry List III now transferred to List III as Entry 17-B by the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 only about protection of wild animals and birds. Definition of wild animal" in Sec.2(36) speaks in an artificial definition by including any animal specified in Schedule I, Schedule II, Schedule III, Schedule IV and Schedule V wherever found and further empowers the Government to add any entry to any of the Schedules. Hence the provisions of the Act can be used in discriminately not only to protect wild animals, but also non animals by bringing them within its ambit. As a proposition, it is well-settled that possibility of abuse or misuse of powers so as to exceed their ambit conferred by law ground for invalidating the law itself. If there is an allegation of abuse or misuse of power in specific instances, that could be the subject-matter of scrutiny and testing individual cases. A cogent and a meaningful reading of the Act does point out that it be taken to have conferred a power upon the Authority, to include any animal other wild animal, within the ambit of the Act. A cogent and a meaningful reading of the Act does point out that it be taken to have conferred a power upon the Authority, to include any animal other wild animal, within the ambit of the Act. The Act has indicated the policy, which inspired and even though it has not by itself made a complete and precise classification of the matter and leaves the selective process and the extension of its provisions to individual objects to be done by the Executive Authority in future, there is sufficient guidance said Authority to act. The Act as such cannot be struck down as lacking in guidelines that context as wanting in legislative competency as there is a possibility of providing protection of non-wild animals also. As we indicated earlier, if a particular exercise of is complained of as abuse or misuse or travelling beyond the scope of the Act, that will a testing if occasion therefor arises. After all, Sec.2(36) speaks about any animal found in nature. We are not called upon in the present cases to adjudicate as to the meaning any animal found wild in nature. Theories and counter-theories are possible knowledgeable men in this field will have to express their opinion and we do not propose enter into that arena, since the point does not arise directly for our consideration. 15. The other argument that there is an excessive delegation of legislative power Sec.61 empowers the Government to add any animal to any of the schedules is also tenable one. What is contended is that the power is not qualified or canalized limitation like “add any animal found wild in nature”. Sec.61 is found only in the Act. is intended only for the protection of the wild animals. There need not be a visualization presumption that an animal not found wild in nature according to the expertise available to the Authority is likely to be included in the Schedules. This again comes the rule that the possibility of misuse or abuse of or travelling beyond the powers conferred is not a ground for frowning upon the very Act itself as invalid. This again comes the rule that the possibility of misuse or abuse of or travelling beyond the powers conferred is not a ground for frowning upon the very Act itself as invalid. Specific complaints, contingencies therefore arise, can be tested, We have touched the last two aspects arguments put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioners for the sake of completion, though the respondents have expressed their own reservation for these aspects advanced at the stage of the hearing of the writ petitions, when they have no sufficient opportunity to disclose the requisite materials and make the necessary submissions counteract these lines of thinking. We did not hear any independent attack on the Most likely by urging the points, which according to the learned counsel for the petitioners would prove to be infirmities, making the very provisions of the Act as a whole invalid, wanted this Court to strike down the Rules also. The provisions of the Act could survive from the scathe of the attack put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 16. The result of our analysis of the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondents, is that these writ petitions deserve dismissal and we dismiss them. We make no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.