Judgment :- Thomas, J. A rich businessman hired an assassin to annihilate his rival. The victim was shot dead in his own house by the assassin on the dawn of 9-10-1981. This is the nub of the prosecution case against two persons who were charged with criminal conspiracy and murder. besides same ancillary offences. Trial court acquitted both and the State has filed this appeal against acquittal. Deceased's brother Gopinathan filed a revision against acquittal. but the revision petitioner since died. 2. The victim was Majeendran whose residence was at Kaloor road (Ernakulam) near the office of Weekshanam" newspaper. Majeendran was a rising cinema producer who had other business activities also. On 9-10-1981 early morning a visitor sounded the calling bell in Majeendran's house. The servant maid of the house (P.W.3) informed the visitor that Majeendran was sleeping. But the visitor told her that he came with an urgent errand. Majeendran was then woken up by his wife. As he went and opened the front door. the visitor shot him with a firearm and ran away. Majeendran slumped down bleeding from the chest. Hearing the sound of shots. other inmates of the house rushed in. Majeendran was taken first to a private hospital (City Hospital) and since his condition was serious. he was removed to a major hospital in the City (Medical Trust Hospital). However. he could not be saved and he slouched his head by 10 a.m. 3. First Information Statement was furnished by Majeendran's brother. Investigation was commenced on the same day. Second accused. who is alleged to have hired the services of the assailant. was arrested on 26-10-1981 at Madras. First accused (the alleged murderer) could not be arrested as he was absconding. but he surrendered before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Ernakulam on 4-7-1984. Test identification parades were conducted by the local Judicial Magistrates in requisition made by the investigating officer. 4. Prosecution story. with more details. is the following: Majeendran was a film producer. besides his other business activities. Second accused was a rising abkari tycoon. Second accused used to receive financial help from his paternal uncle Ramakrishnan (P.W.50). Later. Majeendran also succeeded in receiving substantial financial help from Ramakrishnan. Second accused started feeling that he was not getting as much financial aid from his uncle as be fore or as he expected since Majeendran was extracting much money from his uncle P.W.50. Second accused used to receive financial help from his paternal uncle Ramakrishnan (P.W.50). Later. Majeendran also succeeded in receiving substantial financial help from Ramakrishnan. Second accused started feeling that he was not getting as much financial aid from his uncle as be fore or as he expected since Majeendran was extracting much money from his uncle P.W.50. This feeling burgeoned the germ of hostility in his mind against the deceased which in due course grew into ran cour. Eventually. second accused determined to finish him off. He plotted with first accused the modus operandi to liquidate Majeendran. He taught first accused how to use a revolver. On the previous day of occurrence. first accused took a room in Ideal Lodge at Thottakkattu road (a road parallel to Layam road at Ernakulam -distance between the two roads is about 200 feet). First accused checked out from the lodge by early morning on 9-10-1981. He hired an autorikshaw and proceeded to the destination. He got down in front of Veekshanam office and walked up to deceased's house. After shooting the victim. first accused escaped from the scene without taking his chappals. Thereafter. he absconded and after a very long time he surrendered before Chief Judicial Magistrate. Ernakulam. on 4-7-1984. However. second accused was arrested on 26-10-1981. 5. Learned Sessions Judge. after a detailed consideration of every item of evidence. reached the conclusion that prosecution has failed to prove either the case of criminal conspiracy or even the case that it was first accused who shot the deceased. Learned Public Prosecutor mounted a fusillade of attacks on the reasons adopted by the learned Sessions Judge/According to the Public Prosecutor. learned Sessions judge's strained reasons reflect a perverse approach to the evidence and it resulted in unmerited acquittal of both the accused. We have been taken through the entire massive evidence adduced in the case including all the relevant documents. Learned counsel for the defence who spared no efforts to support the reasons advanced by the learned Sessions Judge. sounded a caution that interference in appeal with an order of acquittal cannot be lightly made. 6. We must inform ourselves of the proper approach to be made while dealing with an appeal against acquittal. appellate court holding a different view or reaching a different conclusion is hardly sufficient for interference. But. if the reasons of the trial judge are faulty and the conclusions wrong. 6. We must inform ourselves of the proper approach to be made while dealing with an appeal against acquittal. appellate court holding a different view or reaching a different conclusion is hardly sufficient for interference. But. if the reasons of the trial judge are faulty and the conclusions wrong. appellate court is justified in interfering with the order of acquittal. The legal position on this aspect has been laid down way back in 1934 in SheoSwarup v. King (Vol.LKI Indian appeals 398 ). Lord Russel of Killowen who delivered the judgment of Privy Council observed that there is no foundation for the view that the High Court has no power to reverse an order of acquittal on a matter of fact unless the lower court had blundered or had reached distorted conclusions etc. "No limitation should be placed upon that power. unless it be found expressly stated in the Code." No limitation has been imposed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Yet judicial precedents have shown a line of difference in approach between appeal against conviction and appeal against acquittal. In a recent decision in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal (AIR 1988 SC 2154) the dictum laid down in Sheo Swamp's case was quoted and followed by the Supreme Court. Supreme Court has observed thus: "The principles relating to limitation of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal do not detract from the plenitude of the power of the appellate court to review and re appreciate the evidence if the order of acquittal on a review of the evidence is found to be grossly erroneous. The powers of the appellate court. in an appeal against the acquittal. are not different from or inconsistent. with. those that the appellate court has in an appeal against a conviction; the difference is. as is sometime stated. more in the manner of approach and the perspective rather than in the content of the power". This principle has been reiterated by a Division Bench of this Court in State of Kerala v. Cheriyan (1991 (2) KLT 196). 7. There is no dispute that Majeendran was shot at by an intruder in his own house during the early hours of 9-10-1981 and the assailant ran away with the firearm. Nor has it been disputed that P.W.3 servant maid saw the assailant through the window just before the deceased opened the door. 7. There is no dispute that Majeendran was shot at by an intruder in his own house during the early hours of 9-10-1981 and the assailant ran away with the firearm. Nor has it been disputed that P.W.3 servant maid saw the assailant through the window just before the deceased opened the door. P.W.3 has no doubt that first accused was the assailant. If her identification commends acceptance as fool proof. there is no difficulty at all and no further evidence may be necessary as far as the case against first accused is concerned. But a whopping weight was mounted on the correctness of her identification. According to the learned Sessions Judge. "it is apparent that she could not have in such a situation formed any impression in herself regarding the identity of that man". 8. P.W.3 was a young girl of 20 when she saw the assailant. No defect or infirmity of eye sight has been suggested to her during cross-examination. She had conversed with the assailant though it was only exchanging one or two sentences between them. Human mind is such that a witness. like P.W.3 could in all probabilities retain the image of the intruder who killed her master if she had seen him. Here we have no doubt that P. W.3 had seen the assailant. The face of the assailant would have left an indelible image in her mind. Court need not expect a witness to enumerate distinguishing facial features of the assailant with meticulous precision. There may not be translatable distinguishing features for an assailant. yet a witness who had a glimpse of his face would be able to remember and identify him since that person is associated with an event of unusual importance for the witness. 9. No doubt. P.W.3 deposed that the person whom she saw was not a tall man whereas first accused has a height of 6 feet. She told the police that the assailant was "not very tall". Learned counsel argued. on the strength of those answers. that the assailant could never be the first accused. We arc not impressed by the argument because P. W.3 would not have had the opportunity to form an impression of the height of the visitor. since she saw him only through the window. Normally. one looks at the face of the visitor in such circumstances and not his height. 10. that the assailant could never be the first accused. We arc not impressed by the argument because P. W.3 would not have had the opportunity to form an impression of the height of the visitor. since she saw him only through the window. Normally. one looks at the face of the visitor in such circumstances and not his height. 10. Though there is some dispute regarding the exact time when she saw the assailant. there is no dispute that there was sufficient light then for her to identify the assailant. (P. W.20. a B.Com. student residing in the neighborhood. said that when he heard the sound of shots. there was day light since he had already put off the light). P. W.3 herself said that light was burning outside the house when the assailant visited deceased's house. P.W.3 said that assailant then wore blue pants and blue shirt. 11. Be that as it may. we feel that corroborative evidence is necessary to give assurance that the identification made by P. W.3 is correct since human capacity to retain facial image in mind is liable to fade by lapse of time. 12. Though P.W.3 had identified first accused in a test identification parade conducted by a judicial magistrate. we hesitate to accept it as a corroborative evidence for the following reasons: P.W.3 said that some police officers showed her the photo of first accused before the test identification parade and that someone outside the sub jail (where the parade was held) told her that she should point out the tallest among the persons arrayed in the parade and that first accused was the tallest among the paraded men. The above pre-parade interference with P.W.3 has eroded the value of test identification parade so far as this witness is concerned. 13. We now proceed to consider other items of evidence adduced by prosecution to corroborate the identification made by P.W.3. 14. On the same morning. P.W.9, a boy who resides near the house of occurrence. saw a man running from opposite direction and crossing rail line. He was wearing blue pants and blue shirt. P.W.9 identified first accused as that person. (The witness was then returning after supplying milk to the inmates of another house). He gave three reasons for remembering the face of that person. saw a man running from opposite direction and crossing rail line. He was wearing blue pants and blue shirt. P.W.9 identified first accused as that person. (The witness was then returning after supplying milk to the inmates of another house). He gave three reasons for remembering the face of that person. First is that the man was visibly perturbed; second is that he had no foot-wear and third is that the place where this boy saw the running away man was very near to the house of the deceased and a couple of hours later he heard the hot news in the City that Majeendran was shot dead. The time at which he saw the man running away synchronized with the possible time when the assailant could have run away from Majeendran's house after the murder. It is important to note that this witness was questioned by the investigating officer on the next day of the occurrence. It is also important to note that he correctly identified first accused in the test identification parade conducted by the judicial magistrate of second class (P. W.61) on 7-8-1984. (The parade earlier arranged had to be postponed as first accused developed a boil on his face). There is absolutely no circumstance which vitiates the identification made by him in the test identification parade. Learned counsel contended that since photo of first accused was shown to P.W.3. court may presume that the same technique would have been employed in respect of this witness also. There is no scope for any such presumption. This witness said that he did not see any photo of first accused before he participated in the parade. There is a special significance for his evidence as he noticed that the man who was clad in blue pants and shirt was running without any foot-wear. (That aspect in his evidence was not challenged in cross examination at all). Mention has to be made in this context that the assailant. in his frantic efforts to escape from the scene of occurrence. had left his frantic efforts to escape from the scene of occurrence. had left his chappals in front of deceased's house. Those chappals (M.O.I series) were taken into custody from that place. 15. We are sorry to note that the trial judge sidelined the testimony of P.W.9 on very trivial reasons. had left his frantic efforts to escape from the scene of occurrence. had left his chappals in front of deceased's house. Those chappals (M.O.I series) were taken into custody from that place. 15. We are sorry to note that the trial judge sidelined the testimony of P.W.9 on very trivial reasons. Learned Sessions Judge pointed out that the shirt and pants of the first accused were not recovered by the policeand]hatP.W.9didnot tell the police about the perturbed face of the running man. Obviously. the police would not have asked him whether there was any such change on his face. Learned Sessions Judge did not believe what P.W.9 said that he had not seen the photo of the first accused in newspapers. This is because defence produced two issues of Malayala Manorama (Exts. D2 and D10) which carried the photo of the first accused. Kerala is a State where a record number of newspapers are being published and circulated and it is quite possible that the witness might be reading some other newspaper and not the newspaper which published first accused' s photo. Learned Sessions Judge who rejected the testimony of P.W.3 on the ground that the witness saw the photo of the first accused in the newspaper disbelieved the testimony of P.W.9 on the ground that he did not see the photo in newspapers. Such an approach is hardly commendable. 16. Another reasoning of the learned Sessions Judge is that P.W.9 would not have correctly identified first accused in the test identification parade because " it is impossible to believe that all the ten persons selected from the Sub Jail would measure even approximately the same height of 6 feet as the first accused appears to have". The Magistrate who conducted test identification parade himself said in clear terms in his report as well as in his evidence that he selected 10 persons from among the prisoners of the Sub Jail having similar height. complexion etc. it is too much to disbelieve even the judicial magistrate on that score. It appears that learned Sessions Judge accepted whatever point argued by the defence counsel without any exception. 17. P. W.4. a young teenaged girl. living a few yards east of deceased's house deposed that while she was proceeding to the toilet around 6 or 6.15 in the morning. It appears that learned Sessions Judge accepted whatever point argued by the defence counsel without any exception. 17. P. W.4. a young teenaged girl. living a few yards east of deceased's house deposed that while she was proceeding to the toilet around 6 or 6.15 in the morning. she heard the sound of somebody running and that she turned and saw first accused running and crossing a water channel and also the rail line. First accused was wearing blue pants and blue shirt. She further said that she heard about the incident in this case on the same day. She was questioned by the investigating officer on the next day. She also correctly identified the first accused in the test identification parade. But she too was disbelieved by the trial judge for the same trivial reasons which he mentioned while dealing with the testimony of P.W.9. This witness is an educated girl having studied up to matriculation. 18. The aforesaid items of evidence amply corroborate the testimony of P.W.3 that she identified first accused as the man who shot the deceased. It is distressing to note that learned Sessions Judge used P.W.7's testimony to negative the identification evidence of other witnesses because P.W.7 had failed to identify first accused in court. Sessions Judge totally ignored the fact that P.W.7 pointed out first accused in the test identification parade held byP.W.61 Magistrate. We cannot comprehend as to why the learned Sessions Judge found utility with what P.W.7 said in court contrary to what he told P.W.61 Magistrate. and lavishly used that evidence to tarnish the testimony of those witnesses who identified first accused consistently. 19. Prosecution has pressed into service some other items of evidence also to further corroborate the evidence regarding identification of the assailant. Evidence is let in to show that first accused stayed in "Ideal Lodge" on the night of 8-10-1981 and checked out on the early morning of 9-10-81 and traveled in an autorikshaw driven by P.W.2. Ext. P20 is the register maintained in Ideal Lodge and Ext. P20(a) is the relevant entry alleged to have been written by first accused in his own hand. P.W.17, proprietor of the lodge. was examined. That witness has no direct knowledge as to who stayed in his lodge on the crucial day. But his evidence has some practical utility when he said that the dates indicated in Ext. P20(a) is the relevant entry alleged to have been written by first accused in his own hand. P.W.17, proprietor of the lodge. was examined. That witness has no direct knowledge as to who stayed in his lodge on the crucial day. But his evidence has some practical utility when he said that the dates indicated in Ext. P20 register were by reckoning the day as starting with sun rise. eg:-if a man left the lodge at 5 a.m. on 9th. the date of departure was noted in the register as 8th itself. This practice. spoken to by the proprietor of the lodge. is not peculiar to this lodge. The person who was at the counter of the lodge (one Surendran) could not be traced out during trial. 20. We will now consider whether Ext. P20(a) was written by the first accused. If it was written by the first accused. it affords a leap forward for prosecution. Ext. P20(a) entry was subjected to examination by handwriting expert in the Forensic Science Laboratory with the help of sophisticated microscope. Ext. P20(a) was compared with the admitted handwritings of first accused contained in Exts.P9. P10. P14. P16 and P17 which are inland letters written by first accused. Those- letters were written by first accused-a fact clearly admitted by him in court Though the letters are in Malayalam. there are a few English words in those letters. 21. P.W.63 (the handwriting expert) pointed out in his report (Ext. P99) that the man who wrote Ext. P20(a) would have made a conscious attempt to disguise his identity. A careful scrutiny of the first column inExt.P20(a) convinced us that expert's conclusion on that score is well founded. P.W.63 then pointed out his reasons to conclude that the man who wrote the admitted inland letters had written Ext. P20(a) also. His reasons are: All the questioned writings were found consistent among themselves on a thorough inter se comparison. (The expert treated Ext. P20(a) and inland letters as "questioned writings"). P.W.63 then pointed out his reasons to conclude that the man who wrote the admitted inland letters had written Ext. P20(a) also. His reasons are: All the questioned writings were found consistent among themselves on a thorough inter se comparison. (The expert treated Ext. P20(a) and inland letters as "questioned writings"). Some of the inconspicuous individual writing characteristics in which they agree have been enumerated thus: (i) The nature of start and movement of writing the terminal letter "r" in English writings; (ii) The movement of writing the intermediate letter "o" with its variations; (iii) The nature of start and movement of writing the letter "a" with its shape; (iv) The manner of writing the letter "k"; (v) The nature of finish of the intermediate letter "y'; (vi) The manner of writing the letter "e" with variations' (vii) The nature of execution of letter "d". According to the expert. "the similarities found between the questioned and standard writings are numerous and significant. No material difference can be said to exist between the questioned and standard writings when the conscious nature of the questioned writing in'Q1'. Ext. P20(a) and the inter se consistency of the questioned writings as a whole were taken into account. The similarities are not due to any accidental coincidence or admitted imitation. but are only due to any authorship". We are impressed by the aforesaid objective reasons advanced by the expert in arriving at his conclusion. 22. We also compared Ext. P20(a) with the English written portions in the admitted inland letters. We did it with the help of a magnifying glass. We are fortified in concluding that the same hand would have written the disputed and admitted writings. The expert's opinion considerably aided us in reaching the said conclusion. 23. One of the reasons highlighted by the learned Sessions Judge to reject the evidence concerning handwriting in Ext. P20(a) is that no attempt was made to get specimen handwritings from the accused to be compared with the handwriting in Ext. P20(a). According to him. the said circumstance "is sufficient to justify this court in not placing any reliance in the opinion given by P.W.63 regarding the identity of the handwriting contained in Ext. P20(a)". Learned Sessions Judge also said that "a mere look at the writing contained in Ext. P20(a). According to him. the said circumstance "is sufficient to justify this court in not placing any reliance in the opinion given by P.W.63 regarding the identity of the handwriting contained in Ext. P20(a)". Learned Sessions Judge also said that "a mere look at the writing contained in Ext. P20(a) will show that it has absolutely no comparison with the English writings available in the letters written by the first accused and referred to above". He should have looked at it more closely instead of making a "mere look" especially when the expert pointed out that the writer of Ext. P20(a) had made a conscious effort to conceal his identity. Learned Sessions Judge found it unsafe to act on the expert's opinion regarding handwriting without substantial corroboration. He observed that "the need for corroboration has been accepted universally as a rule of law". 24. Nothing in Ss.45 to 47 and 73 of the Evidence Act (which are provisions relating to handwriting and/or expert evidence) requires corroboration for expert's evidence as a rule. A fact is said to be proved when after considering the matter before it. the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probabe that "a prudent man ought. under circumstances of a particular case" to act upon the supposition that it exists (vide S.3 of the Evidence act. ). Perhaps a court would require corroboration on the facts of a particular case. That is different from saying that without corroborative evidence no expert evidence shall be relied on. But to say that corroboration is sine quo non for accepting or acting on the opinion of experts is to impose a restriction which law does not warrant. In Murali Lai v. State of M.P. (AIR 1980 SC 531). Chinnappa Reddy. J. has observed thus: "There is no justification for condemning expert's opinion -evidence to the same class of evidence as that of an accomplice and insist upon corroboration. True. it has occasionally been said on very high authority that it would be hazardous to base a conviction solely on the opinion of hand writing expert. But. the hazard in accepting the opinion of any expert. handwriting expert or any other kind of expert. is not because experts. in general. are unreliable witnesses - the quality of credibility or incredibility being one which an expert shares with all other witnesses--. But. the hazard in accepting the opinion of any expert. handwriting expert or any other kind of expert. is not because experts. in general. are unreliable witnesses - the quality of credibility or incredibility being one which an expert shares with all other witnesses--. but because all human judgment is fallible and an expert may go wrong because of some defect of observation. some error of premises or honest mistake of conclusion". Their Lordships. in that decision. made a survey through all the previous decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject and laid down the law in unmistakable language thus: "We are firmly of the opinion that there is no rule of law. nor any rule of prudence which has crystallized in to a rule of law. that opinion evidence of a handwriting expert must never be acted upon. unless substantially corroborated. But. having due regard to the imperfect nature of the science of identification of handwriting, the approach. as we indicated earlier. should be one of caution. Reasons for the opinion must be carefully probed and examined. All other relevant evidence must be considered. In appropriate cases. corroboration may besought. In cases where the reasons for the opinion are convincing and there is no reliable evidence throwing a doubt on the uncorroborated testimony of an handwriting expert may be accepted. There cannot be any inflexible rule on a matter which. in the ultimate analysis. is no more than a question of testimonial weight. We have said so much because this is an argument frequently met with in subordinate courts and sentences torn out of context from the judgment of this court are often flaunted". 25. P.W.2 is an important witness in this case. The substance of his evidence is this: On the previous night his autorikshaw was parked in front of Woodlands Hotel (which is near to Ideal Lodge). By early morning. when he took the vehicle to Ideal Lodge on being told that some body required the vehicle for a trip. first accused got in the vehicle. Just when the vehicle started moving. second accused came there through the cross road (which connects Layam road with Thottakkattu road ) and he also joined the first accused. But he alighted from the vehicle when it reached in front of his house situated on Layam road. first accused got in the vehicle. Just when the vehicle started moving. second accused came there through the cross road (which connects Layam road with Thottakkattu road ) and he also joined the first accused. But he alighted from the vehicle when it reached in front of his house situated on Layam road. P.W.2 after leaving first accused near Veekshanam office came back to his usual place. 26. P.W.2 was interrogated by the police only on 8-10-82. One of the sharp criticisms made against P.W.2 is based On this long delay in questioning him. Counsel cited some decisions to support his contention that long delay on the part of investigating officers in questioning material witnesses and recording their statements will render evidence of such witnesses unreliable (vide Balakrishna Swain v. State of Orissa-AIR 1971 SC 804). Evidence in this case shows that police did not know till 8-10-1982 that it was in P.W.2's autorikshaw that first accused traveled. Nor did P.W.2 have reason to think that it was first accused who had shot the deceased dead. Of course. he knew about second accused involvement in the murder. He did not voluntarily go to police station to Inform the police that second accused traveled in his autorickshaw for a short distance. How could that be used as a ground to disbelieve him? 27. Another attack made against the testimony of P.W.2 is based on Ext. Dl letter. During cross-examination the witness was confronted with Ext. Dl which was written by the witness himself and addressed to one Joseph. It is dated 20-J1-85. As per Ext. Dl, he informed the addressee that his licence and. badge (for driving autorickshaw) were spized by the Dy.S. P.. Crime Branch and they were not returned to him and that he was compelled to say that both the accused traveled in his vehicle. In re-examination. P.W.2 came out with an explanation regarding circumstances under which he wrote Ext. Dl as this: One Joseph approached him with an offer to pay him handsomely for retracting from his statement given to the police. But the witness declined to oblige him. Later when he was hard pressed for money for thatching his house. he approached Joseph and the latter insisted that he should write down what Joseph wanted if money was to be paid. As he was in dire need of money. But the witness declined to oblige him. Later when he was hard pressed for money for thatching his house. he approached Joseph and the latter insisted that he should write down what Joseph wanted if money was to be paid. As he was in dire need of money. he wrote as dictated to him and the inland letter was collected by the said Joseph who paid him Rs. 500/-. 28. Learned Sessions Judge disbelieved P.W.2's evidence mainly on the ground that he is a man who would stoop to do anything if he gets money. As the first blush. one may think like that. But the testimony of such an important witness as P.W.2 cannot be disposed of as easily as that. On a closer scrutiny of his evidence. we felt that the Sessions Judge did not make the correct approach to judge the veracity of his testimony. It is perspicuous from Ext. D1 that the man who wangled the letter would have been the emissary of one of the accused who was prowling for some material to scuttle the value of P.W.2's evidence. No sensible person can think that P.W.2 would have given Ext. D1 on his own initiative. Ext. D1 was produced by the second accused within 18 days of its making (P.W.2 was examined in court on 8-12-85). No doubt. the fact that P.W.2 received money for writing Ext. D1 has a reflection on him. But that fact alone cannot be allowed to shroud his entire testimony. Ext. D1 came into existence long after P.W.2 gave his version to the police. The very fact that the accused secured Ext. D1 from P.W.2 within a few days before his examination in court does indicate that at least one of the accused resorted to frantic steps to extract such a letter from him. But P.W.2 stuck to his earlier version furnished to the police despite the cash received by him. If P.W.2 was a crooked man. he would have disowned Ext. D1 or would have given some other explanation exculpating himself. His admission that he received Rs. 500/-. looking at it from a different angle. is reflection of his frankness. After all he is a poor man. an autorikshaw driver. The impression one gathers by going through his evidence is that despite all temptations he divulged truthfully all what he knows. D1 or would have given some other explanation exculpating himself. His admission that he received Rs. 500/-. looking at it from a different angle. is reflection of his frankness. After all he is a poor man. an autorikshaw driver. The impression one gathers by going through his evidence is that despite all temptations he divulged truthfully all what he knows. Money paid to him did not ultimately change his version when he came to the witness box. The Supreme Court pointed out in State of U.P. v. Shanker (AIR 1981 SC 897) that it is rare to come across the testimony of a witness which does not have a fringe or an embroidery of untruth although the core of his evidence is true in the main. At any rate. it is improper to keep aside the testimony of a witness on the mere ground that he survived the ingenious maneuverability of the accused to freeze his evidence. The vivid details spoken to by him and the fact that his credit remained unshaken inspite of drilling cross-examination and his candid admission of circumstances against him persuade us to believe that the facts spoken to by him in court are true. 29. Learned Public Prosecutor made an endeavour to use Exts. P9 and P10 letters. Those letters were sent by first accused to his brother P.W.13 during his abscondence. Ext. P9 letter was sent by him on 9-11-81. The contents of the letter are the following: "Immediately after Anandettan comes out. you should meet him. He would come to the company. You should tell him to take me out on bail and to engage a good advocate for me. You should also tell him that I went there. I would come there next month. You should ask him whether Anandettan had anything to-convey to me.... You should collect Rs. 1.000/- from him and keep it with you". Ext. P10 letter was written on 18-11-81 in which he directed his brother to tear off all his previous letters. Learned Public Prosecutor made a powerful plea that those letters should beaded on as they reveal clinching circumstances exhibiting the complicity of the first accused in conjunction with the second accused. According to the Public Prosecutor. the reference to "Anandettan" in Ext. P9 was unmistakably to second accused who was then in detention. (Second accused's alias name is Anandan. Learned Public Prosecutor made a powerful plea that those letters should beaded on as they reveal clinching circumstances exhibiting the complicity of the first accused in conjunction with the second accused. According to the Public Prosecutor. the reference to "Anandettan" in Ext. P9 was unmistakably to second accused who was then in detention. (Second accused's alias name is Anandan. If any person by name Anandan is addressed by another as Anandettan, it means in Malayalam. particularly in social set up. that either both are kith and kin or their relationship is affectionate or cordial). Learned Sessions Judge pointed out that the reference to "Anandettan" in Ext. P9 could have been to P.W.14 whose name is also Anandan. Learned Public Prosecutor argued that both P.Ws.13 and 14 gave false evidence to give such a twist to Exj.P9 letter and that anyone who reads that letter would be convinced beyond speck of doubt that it refers to one Anandettan who was in detention. We do not propose to embark on Ext. P9 letter more since none other than the two prosecution witnesses (though one is direct brother of the first accused himself and the other was declared hostile) have given a different version about the letter. 30. Even without Exts. P9 and P10 we can unhesitatingly conclude that it was the first accused who shot at Majeendran on the morning of 9-10-1981. 31. Next we proceed to consider whether there was criminal conspiracy between first accused and second accused for the murder of Majeendran. A court which deals with evidence regarding conspiracy must bear in mind that in the very nature of things utmost secrecy would normally be employed by the conspirators to prevent leakage of the cabal to outsiders. Such secrecy is necessary for the successful implementation of any plot. more so when the plot is for committing a serious crime. It is normally difficult for any prosecution to adduce positive evidence regarding every details of a criminal conspiracy. unless one of the conspirators himself is drafted to become an approver or the administration spreads sufficient intelligence net work during the pre-commission stage of a crime. Hence it would be fastidious to insist on positive evidence to unfold the full conspectus of a criminal conspiracy. It was for those reasons that courts have adopted a pragmatic approach about proof of intrigues. Hence it would be fastidious to insist on positive evidence to unfold the full conspectus of a criminal conspiracy. It was for those reasons that courts have adopted a pragmatic approach about proof of intrigues. In Kehar Singh v. State (delhi administration) (AIR 1988 SC 1883 - "Smt. Indira Gandhi murder case" -1988 (2) KLT SN 29). Jagannatha Shetty, J. has observed thus: "Generally. a conspiracy is hatched in- secrecy and it may be difficult to adduce direct evidence of the same the prosecution will also more often-rely upon circumstantial evidence.'... It is however. essential that the offence of conspiracy requires some kind of physical manifestation of agreement. The express agreement. however. need not be proved. Nor actual meeting of two persons is necessary. Nor it is necessary to prove the actual words of communication: The evidence as to transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful design may be sufficient. The relative acts or conduct of the parties must be conscientious and clear to mark their concurrence as to what should be done". 32. To support the case of criminal conspiracy between the two accused in this case. prosecution pointed out that left to himself first accused had absolutely no axe to grind against the deceased. nor was the murder committed for burglary or robbery. Neither prosecution nor accused has a case that first accused had any personal motive to murder the deceased. The way in which first accused perpetrated the crime smacks of a definitive feature that he did it at the instance of someone else. 33. The first circumstance to doubt about second accused's involvement is that the deceased. before his death and after receiving bullets. told his partner P. W.5 that this was done by "Anandan's people". We have no doubt that Anandan referred to here is second accused since the deceased to Id P.W.S that it was that Anandan who resided at Layam road. There is overwhelming evidence to show that the permanent residence of second accused before the occurrence was at Layam road and that he was called Anandan. (In fact. second accused himself described his permanent residence as at Layam road when he and Coconut Development Board entered into a lease arrangement on 26-2-1982 as evidenced by Ext. P65). IfthetestimonyofP.W.5 can be believed. we have no doubt that Majeendran's immediate doubt was focused on the second accused. 34. (In fact. second accused himself described his permanent residence as at Layam road when he and Coconut Development Board entered into a lease arrangement on 26-2-1982 as evidenced by Ext. P65). IfthetestimonyofP.W.5 can be believed. we have no doubt that Majeendran's immediate doubt was focused on the second accused. 34. P. W.5 was the partner of the deceased. He deposed that on coining to know of the incident he rushed to Majeendran's house and then accompanied him up to Medical Trust Hospital and that when all others were cleared from the room where deceased was admitted. deceased told him that the act was done by Anandan's people. There is no merit in the criticism that P. W.5 should have elicited this fact earlier from the deceased. It is for P.W.5 to choose the opportune or convenient time to ask his friend about it. 35. Learned counsel for the accused argued further that evidence concerning the alleged dying declaration was elicited by the Special Prosecutor in the trial court through a leading question and hence the answers given by the witness to such leading question in chief-examination must be ignored. The question put to P.W.5 in chief-examination is this: "Did you ask the deceased anything?" P.W.5 answered in the affirmative. There is no legal infirmity in asking leading question in chief-examination unless the question is objected to by the other side. The law is not that leading question by itself is illegal or improper when it is put by the party who calls the witness. But if the question itself contained the entire answer court would treat such answer with the worth it deserves. This is the disadvantage of a leading question when put in chief-examination. S.142 of the Evidence Act reads thus: "Leading questions must not. if objected to by the adverse party. be asked in an re-examination. except with the permission of the Court. The Court shall permit leading questions as to matters which are introductory or undisputed. or which have. in its opinion. been already sufficiently proved." A reading of the section indicates that there is no legal hurdle in putting leading question during examination in chief without permission of the court. if the opposite side does not object to it. Need to obtain permission of the court to put leading question would arise only in the contingency where the opposite side takes objection. if the opposite side does not object to it. Need to obtain permission of the court to put leading question would arise only in the contingency where the opposite side takes objection. Even if the opposite side objects. court has a wide discretion in allowing leading question to be put. Second para to S.142 of the Evidence Act shows that court has no discretion to disallow a leading question if it relates to undisputed matters or introductory matters or matters already proved. Discretion to allow or disallow a leading question can be exercised by the court only when such leading question relates to matters other than those enumerated above. We are aware that in some of the early decisions leading questions in chief-examination were treated as most improper. eg:- in Miru Bhagat v. Emperor (AIR 1922 Pat. 582) Courts. J. had stated that it was improper of the prosecution to put a leading question and "it is impossible to attach any value to evidence elicited by the prosecution in this way". We think that the said observation has been made very broadly and without any discussion of the legal implications of S.142 of the Evidence Act. Court has to consider the frame of each question and then decide whether the answer to the question is liable to be ignored. In Chakrapani v.Chandoo (AIR 1959 M.P. 84) Hidayatullah, C.J. (as he then was) dealt with a leading question which was objected to by the trial court. Position becomes different when the opposite side raises objection to the leading question being put in chief-examination. 36. Learned counsel submitted that since the question and answer were recorded as such by the trial court. it can be presumed that the leading question was objected to by the defence counsel. The mere fact that it was recorded by the trial court as question and answer is not sufficient to deduce that the opposite side objected to the leading question. Under S.276 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the judge has a discretion to record any evidence in the form of question and answer instead of recording it in narrative form. When a judge records it as question and answer the only presumption is that the counsel concerned requested the court to record the question and answer as such. and nothing more. At any rate. When a judge records it as question and answer the only presumption is that the counsel concerned requested the court to record the question and answer as such. and nothing more. At any rate. we are not persuaded to ignore the answer given by P.W.5 to the question quoted above on the mere ground that it was elicited through a leading question in chief-examination. Frame of question was not so objectionable or suggestive of a definite answer. 37. Learned Sessions Judge disbelieved P.W.5 on the premise that deceased would have had no occasion to say so to P.W.5 in the sequence of events narrated by him in cross examination. A portion from cross examination of the witness has been extracted in the judgment of the lower court and learned judge passed his comment like this: "The sequence of events so narrated by P.W.5 himself is sufficient to demonstrate that really there would have been no occasion whatsoever for deceased Majeendran to tell him anything about the authorship of the injuries sub stained by him just before he breathed his last". This approach was rather unfair to the witness since P.W.5 narrated in clear terms to chief-examination the sequence of events including the fact of what deceased told him. In cross-examination many answers given to several different questions were recorded at a stretch and unfortunately learned Sessions Judge quoted those answers as though they were answers to one question. Sequence of events cannot be twisted or interspersed like that. P.W.5 has absolutely no other personal animus towards second accused to concoct a false story against him. 38. The next important circumstance is the ran cour which second accused had towards the deceased. Prosecution cited P.W.12. who was the driver of the deceased. to prove that the second accused and the deceased became bitter enemies and second accused was brimming with acerbity against the deceased and that in the fracas which occurred at two places they hurled challenges and counter challenges against each other. But P.W.12 was won over by the accused and he resiled from his earlier version contained in Ext. P8 Case Diary statement. Still some broad aspects have emerged in evidence which throw light on the probability of the second accused treating the deceased as his bete noire. 3. P. W.50 is the paternal uncle of the second accused. But P.W.12 was won over by the accused and he resiled from his earlier version contained in Ext. P8 Case Diary statement. Still some broad aspects have emerged in evidence which throw light on the probability of the second accused treating the deceased as his bete noire. 3. P. W.50 is the paternal uncle of the second accused. He deposed that till] 980 second accused was his business partner. but from 1981 onwards the witness started to help the deceased. On P.W.SO's guarantee the deceased secured a loan of about rupees three lakhs from South Indian Bank. P.W.SO's confidence in deceased reached its climax when he brought a plot of land in the City in the name of the deceased. (Ext. P71 is the release deed which deceased's wife executed in favour of P.W.50 after the death of the deceased releasing the rights of the name lender to that property). 40. Learned Public Prosecutor here contended on the strength of the testimony of P. W.50 that when second accused found his paternal uncle drifting away from him and helping the second accused. the germ of acerbity was germinated in the mind of second accused. Public Prosecutor wanted us to appreciate the testimony of P.W.10 (deceased's brother) in the light of the above. 41. P. W.10 is the youngest brother of Majeendran. He said that the first floor of Majeendran's residence was used as the office of his transporting business and a telephone extension is provided in the first floor. A call from outside could beat tended by using either the receiver on the ground floor or on the first floor. P. W.10 deposed that on one day he overheard a telephonic conversation between Majeendran and second accused. as the witness took up the receiver on the first floor. (Majeendran was talking through the receiver in the ground floor). In the conversation second accused was heard telling Majeendran in an angry tone that he should stop visiting the former' s paternal uncle and that Majeendran would be dealt with if the amount due to his uncle was not paid back. Learned Sessions Judge sidelined his evidence solely for the reason that he told about it to the police only when he was questioned by the investigating officer on 14-10-82. Soon after the occurrence. he was questioned by the Cisy Crime Circle Inspector (P. W.67). Learned Sessions Judge sidelined his evidence solely for the reason that he told about it to the police only when he was questioned by the investigating officer on 14-10-82. Soon after the occurrence. he was questioned by the Cisy Crime Circle Inspector (P. W.67). That interrogation was confined to the time when he came to know of the incident and what he did next. That apart. it is not necessary that P.W. 10 should have then told the police about a phone conversation which he overheard. since he was not aware that second accused was involved in the murder. As on that date people were only aware that the murder was committed by one person who was not known to the inmates of the house. Occasion for P. W.10 to recollect the phone conversation would have arisen only when he came to know that second accused was the man who deputed an assassin. Then the question is whether he should have on his own initiative gone to the police and told them about the phone conversation. If he had done it. it would have been well and good. If he did not do it. but thought he could tell the police when he was questioned next. it is hardly aground to term his evidence as perjury. We bear in mind the broad aspect that P.W.10 had no reason to concoct such a story. Learned Sessions judge looked at his evidence from a wrong angle. 42. The next circumstance is what P. W.2 had spoken about the second accused. We have already discussed the testimony of P. W.2 in detail. The circumstance which came out of his evidence as against second accused is that he got the autorickshaw on the morning (date of occurrence) and talked with first accused and got down in front of his house at Layam road. Just before alighting. he reminded the first accused to return "the thing". According to the Public Prosecutor. "the thing" which he wanted to return was. in all probabilities. a firearm which he would have secretly handed over to the assassin. 43. Learned counsel for the second accused contended that the testimony of P. W.2. even if relied on as against first accused. cannot be relied on as against the second accused. According to the Public Prosecutor. "the thing" which he wanted to return was. in all probabilities. a firearm which he would have secretly handed over to the assassin. 43. Learned counsel for the second accused contended that the testimony of P. W.2. even if relied on as against first accused. cannot be relied on as against the second accused. He pointed out that the long delay in tracing out this witness the was questioned by P. W.70 only on 9-10-82) itself is sufficient to reject the testimony. As we scrutinized the Case Diary file' we cannot attribute any oblique reason for not questioning this witness earlier. In fact. P.W.70, as soon as he came to know that the first accused traveled in the autorickshaw of this witness located P. W.2 and questioned him. P. W.2 did not voluntarily tell the police because he did not know that first accused was involved in the murder of Majeendran. He would not have attached any importance for the circumstance that second accused traveled in his autorickshaw for a very short distance. that too at a place far away from the house of occurrence. Learned counsel then contended that the test identification parade arranged as for P. W.2 on 28-9-84 was only a farce. especially because of the long delay in arranging the parade. In fact. no test identification parade was necessary as for P. W.2 because his evidence shows that he knew the second -accused earlier also. Perhaps the investigating officer arranged a test identification parade only for his satisfaction that the person mentioned by P. W.2 is none else. The only consequence for the aforesaid delay in holding test identification parade is that the court cannot use it for corroboration. Learned counsel brought our attention to a portion of the Case Diary statement which was used during cross-examination of P.W.2 which reads thus: "I do not carefully look at the second man who got into the autorikshaw". Why should P.W.2 look at him so carefully. The autorikshaw drivers do not usually look at the faces of passengers carefully at all times. unless they have any particular reason to do so. When P.W.2 knew the second accused. he had no reason to look at his face carefully. 44. Why should P.W.2 look at him so carefully. The autorikshaw drivers do not usually look at the faces of passengers carefully at all times. unless they have any particular reason to do so. When P.W.2 knew the second accused. he had no reason to look at his face carefully. 44. Learned counsel cited a large number of decisions before us to contend that Supreme Court and High Courts have declined to believe the testimony of witnesses whose evidence has similar drawbacks. We do not think it necessary to catalogue all those decisions since the credit of a witness is to be evaluated and judged from the evidence in that particular case and not because another witness in another case was disbelieved by the court even if there are similarities in evidence between two cases. In fact. Supreme Court has deprecated the practice of resorting to other decided cases for appraising and evaluating the worth and credit of evidence of a witness in a particular case (vide Charan Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1975 SC 246). The following observations are apposite in this context: "The question of credibility of a witness has primarily to be decided by referring to his evidence and finding out as to how the witness has fared in cross-examination and what impression is created by his evidence taken in the context of the other facts of the case. Criminal cases cannot be put in a strait jacket. Though there may be similarity between the facts of some cases. there would always be shades of difference and quite often that difference may prove to be crucial. The same can also be said about the evidence adduced in one case and that produced in another. Decided cases can be of help if there be a question of law like the admissibility of evidence. Likewise. decided cases can be of help if the question be about the applicability of some general rule of evidence. eg:- the weight to be attached to the evidence of an accomplice. This apart. reference to decided cases hardly seems apposite when the question before the court is whether the evidence of a particular witness should or should not be accepted." 45. The evidence P.W.2 establishes a crucial circumstance in this case which points to a pre concert between first and second accused. 46. This apart. reference to decided cases hardly seems apposite when the question before the court is whether the evidence of a particular witness should or should not be accepted." 45. The evidence P.W.2 establishes a crucial circumstance in this case which points to a pre concert between first and second accused. 46. Another circumstance which prosecution relies on is that some nullets were recovered from a well in the residential compound of second accused at Layam road. This circumstance by itself has no inculpatory implication of the second accused. 47. The last circumstance pressed into service by prosecution against second accused is the recovery of M.O.14 projectiles (bullets) from beneath a concrete slab attached to the steps leading from second accused's house at Layam road. 48. P.W. 70. Dy. S.P., deposed that first accused told him like this: "Some bullets. after firing. were picked up and put in a plastic container and later they were kept in the gap beneath the slab in front of the eastern door of Anandettan's house. lean take them out". Ext. P74 is the mahazar drawn up by the Dy. S.P. when M.O.14 projectiles were recovered from second accused's house pursuant to the said information. 49. An assortment of onslaughts was mounted against the aforesaid item of evidence. (First accused surrendered before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 4-7-84 and he was given over to police custody on 7-7-84. M.O.14 projectiles were recovered on 15-4-84 as per Ext. P74 mahazar. First accused was produced back to judicial custody on 17-7-1984). The stand of first accused is that those bullets were planted there at the instance of the investigating agency and a stage managed recovery was made. According to the learned counsel. since first accused was questioned on 7-7-84 itself police could have recovered the projectiles on that day if any such information was given. The fact the bullets were recovered only on 15-4-84 is prima facie evidence that the recovery was concocted. contended the counsel. The second point argued is. since first accused filed a complaint (Ext C. 3) on 17-7-84 soon after he was produced back to judicial custody. due weight must be given to his complaint that a recovery was stage managed by the police by planting projectiles at the spot. The third. point argued is that P.W.53 who gave his signature as attestor in Ext. since first accused filed a complaint (Ext C. 3) on 17-7-84 soon after he was produced back to judicial custody. due weight must be given to his complaint that a recovery was stage managed by the police by planting projectiles at the spot. The third. point argued is that P.W.53 who gave his signature as attestor in Ext. P74 mahazar is a tail of the police and particularly of P.W. 70 Dy. S.P. and hence he would never have seen the recovery. The fourth point is that the statement alleged to have been made by first accused would not in any manner connect second accused. 50. We cannot presume that the interrogation of first accused would have been completed on the first day when P.W. 70 got custody of first accused. P.W. 70 being a Dy. S.P. could. not be expected not to attend other work for any other case merely because he got custody of an accused in one case. If it is to be insisted that interrogation of an accused should be completed on the first day itself. it would scuttle investigations and courts would be criticised for impeding effective progress of investigations. The mere fact that first accused filed a written complaint when he was produced back from police custody is not sufficient to infer that he did not give any statement to police. It is easy to discern from Ext. C3 that it was prepared and drafted by first accused's advocate (even when first accused surrendered before the court. a counsel was appearing for him). 51. P.W. 53. no doubt. is a man available to the police at their beck and call. There were other attestors in Ext. P74 mahazar, one was a member of the staff of Coconut Development Board. (Second accused's house at Layam road was then in the possession of Coconut Development board ). Another attestor was a resident in the City. They were cited in the witness list for prosecution and were summoned by the trail court. But Special Prosecutor examined P.W. 53 alone to support the recovery. Evidence of an attestor witness to prove Ext. P74 is not that important in this case. since first accused himself admitted that he was taken by the police to the place and bullets were taken out from the place. His version is that it was only a stage managed recovery. Evidence of an attestor witness to prove Ext. P74 is not that important in this case. since first accused himself admitted that he was taken by the police to the place and bullets were taken out from the place. His version is that it was only a stage managed recovery. As the difference between what first accused said and what P.W. 70 said about the recovery of M.O.14 is only a thin layer. the evidence of attesting witness does not cause any decisive impact. Learned Sessions Judge lost sight of this important aspect when he gave too much importance to P.w. 53's hobnobing with the police. 52. A scrutiny of the evidence of P.W. 70 regarding recovery does reveal that M.O.14 projectiles were recovered from second accused's house on the strength of the statement made by the first accused. No doubt. first accused's statement cannot be used against second accused. But it does not mean that the circumstance that first accused concealed some projectiles in the residence of second accused has no impact on the complicity of second accused in the crime. We pointed out earlier that the said house at Layam road was in the physical possession and use of second accused during the time of occurrence. (Released it to Coconut Development Board on 26-2-82 as per Ext. P65 lease deed. Till then the house was in second accused's physical possession. When the recovery was effected. the house was in the possession of Coconut Development board. ) Since first accused absconded after the occurrence. M.0.14 bullets would have been concealed beneath the slab prior to the occurrence. It would be pedantic to think that first accused would have done it without the knowledge of second accused. 53. Now we have to consider one of the most important arguments advanced by learned counsel Sri. M.N. Sukumaran Nayar for the second accused regarding indentity of the bullets. possible substitution of some bullets and possibility of some other firearm being used to fire the deceased etc. Very detailed. we should say. well studied and impressive arguments were addressed by Sri. M.N. Sukumaran Nayar on that subject. 54. The arguments of the learned counsel were focused on the points that (1) the projectiles recovered from the dead body or projectiles recovered as per Ext. Very detailed. we should say. well studied and impressive arguments were addressed by Sri. M.N. Sukumaran Nayar on that subject. 54. The arguments of the learned counsel were focused on the points that (1) the projectiles recovered from the dead body or projectiles recovered as per Ext. P74 mahazar (from second accused's house) could never have been fired from a revolver of which second accused had licence and further that (2) the opinion of P.W. 59 (who gave evidence. as ballistic expert. although learned counsel is not prepared to call him as a ballistic expert) that M.Os.12 and 14 projectiles could have been discharged from one and the same firearm is unsupported by objective reasons. 55. Prosecution led evidence to show that second accused had a licence to possess a revolver. Ext. P46 is the "Gun Licence Register" maintained in Robcrtsonpet Police station (Karnataka State). Ext. P 46 (a) is an entry which shows that licence was granted to the second accused on 31-12-1979. Ext. P46 (b) is the extract of the said licence. From the description of the firearm. as shown in Ext. P46(b) it is clear that it is a revolver made by "M/s Webley and Scott Ltd." The length. the weight and the number of the revolver are also indicated in Ext. P46(b). P.W. 59 ballistic expert said that the projectiles recovered in this case had rifling impressions of 6 grooves and 6lands (as the bullets come out through the rifled barrel. they may contain various rifling marks including marks corresponding to the "grooves and lands" in the barrrel of the firearm). It is the defence case that the uniform standard of all the revolvers manufactured by M/s Webley and Scott contains? lands and 7 grooves. Though P.W. 59 was not initially inclined to agree with the above defence suggestion. he later admitted more or less clearly that revolvers of M/ s Webley and Scott have uniform standard of 7 grooves and 7lands. This is supported by the celebrated work made on the subject by Mr. J. Howard Mathews ( "firearms Identification"- Second printing Vol.I-the table given at page 334). Another book entitled " The Identification of Firearms and Forensic Ballistics" by Major Sir Gerald Burrard also refers to this aspect at page 141 in the third edition "Seven grooves; right hand twist; narrow lands and broad grooves; used in all Webley revolvers". 56. J. Howard Mathews ( "firearms Identification"- Second printing Vol.I-the table given at page 334). Another book entitled " The Identification of Firearms and Forensic Ballistics" by Major Sir Gerald Burrard also refers to this aspect at page 141 in the third edition "Seven grooves; right hand twist; narrow lands and broad grooves; used in all Webley revolvers". 56. Be that as it may. a finding that M.Os.12 and 14 projectiles could not have been fired from a Webley and Scott revolver would only help us to find that first accused would have used either a revolver made by another manufacturer or some other firearm. We do not know how far this helps the second accused because second accused had already informed the authorities (vide Ext. P35 petition) that he lost possession of the licensed revolver as early as September. 1981 itself. We do not know whether the aforesaid representation made by the second accused through Ext. P35 is correct or not. It is not uncommon that persons. who have licence to possess one firearm. possess other firearms also without any license. though law forbids it. 57. We also find much force in the contention that the conclusion arrived by P.W. 59 in Ext. P77 report that M.Os.12 and 124 projectiles could have been fired from the same firearm is not supported by data. Ext. P77 report shows that M.0.12 projectile was very much distorted and the distinguishable rifling marks on it consisted of two land marks and one goove mark. P.W.59 has stated in Ext. P77 report that individual characteristics on the projectiles could not be discerned. Yet. the expert said in his conclusion that individual characteristics of the identifiable rifling marks on all the projectiles were found to be similar. From the report itself we can discern that the aforesaid conclusion is not supported by data. We. therefore. hesitate to act on the said conclusion of P.W.59. 58. However. there is no reason to positively say thatM.O.12 projectile would necessarily have been fired from a different firearm. It is one thing to say that data is insufficient to conclude that both sets of projectiles could necessarily have been fired from the same firearm and it is another thing to say that M.Os.12 & 14 projectiles would necessarily have been fired from the same firearm. Merely because the projectiles did not contain delible or discernible imprints or such minute marks. Merely because the projectiles did not contain delible or discernible imprints or such minute marks. does not mean that the two sets of bullets should have gone out from two different barrels. 59. The defence made an endeavour to build up an argument that P. W.70 had substituted the bullets recovered from the dead body with M.O.12. We would have side stepped the said venture as a smoke screen built on some accidental concidences. But the aforesaid venture gained approval from the learned Sessions Judge as he expressed "lot of suspicion under the circumstances" about the bullets. A court may entertain doubt when it conscientiously and fairly entertains a reasonable doubt. but not otherwise. Doubt should not be entertained by criminal courts due to some hunch or on the basis of a mere possibility. More so. when the allegation is of such a grave nature that the properties which reached the court were later fabricated. We scrutinised the evidence on that aspect with great care. 60. Some facts have to be stated here regarding the bullets produced. A bullet was recovered from the dead body by P.W.44 doctor who conducted autopsy (M.0.12 is said to be that bullet). M.O.10 bullet was collected by the police from the dining room of the deceased when the scene of occurrence was examined. Both bullets were forwarded to the Magistrate's Court in October 1981 itself. Until the arrest of first accused. those bullets were not required to be sent to the laboratory for examination. On 10-7-84. the Magistrate forwarded M.O.12 and the other bullets to the Forensic Science Laboratory in a sealed cover on the request made by P.W.70 Dy.S.P. A specimen seal impression. as usual. was sent in separate cover along with a forwarding letter. Both were despatched through the Sub Inspector of Police. Ernakulam. When the articles were received in the Forensic Science Laboratory. they noted that specimen seal impression in the separate cover was missing. Hence the articles were returned to the Magistrate through the same messenger who brought it to the Magistrate's Court on 13-7-84. As the Magistrate was not available. the Sub Inspector kept the articles with him till 16-7-84 (14th and 15th were holidays). When the Sub Inspector reached the court on 16th. Magistrate was on the bench and the office insisted that the articles should be verified by the Magistrate himself. As the Magistrate was not available. the Sub Inspector kept the articles with him till 16-7-84 (14th and 15th were holidays). When the Sub Inspector reached the court on 16th. Magistrate was on the bench and the office insisted that the articles should be verified by the Magistrate himself. As the Sub Inspector could not remain in court since he had other duties. he produced them to the Magistrate on 17th (next day). The advocate for the second accused filed a petition on 17th alleging the possibility of removal of bullets from the sealed packet. So. the Magistrate examined the seal personally and found that there was no tampering. They were again sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory with the specimen seal. 61. Both the Magistrate and the office clerk in the Magistrate's Court (P.Ws. 61 and 62 respectively) said that specimen seal impression was also included in the separate cover sent to Forensic Science Laboratory on 10-7-84. The argument is that the specimen seal would have been pilferred by the messenger (Sub Inspector) in transit to counterfeit another seal in order to tamper with the sealed packet. Our scrutiny of the evidence satisfied us that much ado was created only due to an accidental omission to include the specimen seal in the separate cover sent to Forensic Science Laboratory. True. P.Ws. 61 and 62 said that specimen seal was also included in the separate envelope. But we cannot over look that they were only speaking from memory and not with reference to any record which particularly shows that they took special care to include the specimen seal also. Learned Sessions Judge who felt "lot of suspicion" about it ought to have given duo weight to what the Magistrate (P.W.61) said that he personally verified the seal on the packet returned by Forensic Science Laboratory on 13th and was satisfied that there was no tampering on it. He had to verify it with special care because the accused made an allegation at that stage itself that bullet was substituted. According to us. the defence would have been inspired to file such a petition as they came to know from some source that Forensic Science Laboratory returned the packet for want of specimen seal impression. He had to verify it with special care because the accused made an allegation at that stage itself that bullet was substituted. According to us. the defence would have been inspired to file such a petition as they came to know from some source that Forensic Science Laboratory returned the packet for want of specimen seal impression. Second accused was a man of great resources and hence he would have hackneyed his own sleuth at every stage to know as to what was happening. 62. Another circumstance highlighted by the defence in support of their contention that the bullet was substituted is the deformed condition of M.O.12 bullet. According to the learned counsel. M.O.12 which had only entered into the human body would not have so extensively deformed. P.W.44 doctor who recovered M.O.12 bullet from the dead body said that even when he recovered it. it was a deformed bullet. though he does not remember the precise extent of deformation. He also said that the track of the bullet in the dead body showed that the bullet could have deflected after hitting the sternum. It must be remembered that sternum is one of the sturdiest bones in the human body. It must also be remembered that jacket cover of M.O.12 projectile was made of lead which is relatively ductile and malleable. 63. Learned Sessions Judge accepted all the contentions of the defence regarding substitution of M.O.12 bullet. The argument is that it was intended to make the bullet in conformity with M.O.14. For that why should Dy.S.P. take all the laborious and risk-involved process of tampering with a court packet and seal? It it not far easier for him to produce a bullet (as per Ext. P74 Mahazar) similar to the one recovered from the dead body? Even if Dy.S.P. ventured to tamper with the seal on the packet. why should he pilfer the specimen seal from the fastened envelope. as he could make an impression of the seal from the seal on the packet-itself? 64. We feel that much ado was created by the defence due to some accidental slip in the office of the Magistrate's Court to insert the specimen seal in the separate envelope. 65. In recapitulation of circumstances which enmesh the charge of criminal conspiracy. as he could make an impression of the seal from the seal on the packet-itself? 64. We feel that much ado was created by the defence due to some accidental slip in the office of the Magistrate's Court to insert the specimen seal in the separate envelope. 65. In recapitulation of circumstances which enmesh the charge of criminal conspiracy. we enumerate them like this: (1) First accused by himself had no personal hostility or grudge towards the deceased' and in all probabilities he shot the deceased at the behest of someone else. (2) Second accused was brimming with acerbity towards the deceased. (3) It was second accused on whom even the deceased focused his suspicion soon after receiving bullet injuries even though the shot was fired by first accused (4) First accused had on some day before the occurrence hoarded discharged bullets in the house of the second accused which indicates some conjunction between both the accused in relation to a firearm as a preparation. (5) On the morning of the fateful day both the accused were together in an autorickshaw and the second accused left the assassin alone after telling him to return "the thing" which could possibly be a firearm. 66. Are those circumstances sufficient to establish criminal conspiracy between first and second accused to murder the deceased? In most cases proof of conspiracy is largely inferential. No doubt. such inference must be based on solid circumstances. It has been held in Noor Mohammad Yusuf Momin v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971SC885). "once reasonable ground is shown for believing that two or more persons have conspired to commit an offence then anything done by anyone of them in reference to their common intention after the same is entertained becomes. according to the law of evidence. relevant for proving both conspiracy and the offences committed pursuant thereto". Similar observation has been made by the Supreme Court in Ram Narain v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1973 SC 1188). 67. According to us. the above enumerated circumstances establish beyond reasonable doubt that first accused shot the deceased dead pursuant to a criminal conspiracy entered into between the first and second accused. 68. In the result. we find accused guilty of the offence under S.302 of the Indian Penal Code. 67. According to us. the above enumerated circumstances establish beyond reasonable doubt that first accused shot the deceased dead pursuant to a criminal conspiracy entered into between the first and second accused. 68. In the result. we find accused guilty of the offence under S.302 of the Indian Penal Code. We find second accused guilty of the offences under S.302 read with S.120B(1) of the I.P.C. Hence we set aside the order of acquittal passed by the lower court in regard to those offences. Accordingly. we convict first accused of the offence under S.302 of the I.P.C. and the second accused of the said offence S.302 of the I.P.C. read with S.120B of the I.P.C. and sentence each of them to imprisonment for life. We direct the learned Sessions Judge. Ernakulam. to take all necessary steps to commit both the accused to prison.