Judgment :- 1. The petitioner, a practising advocate, was appointed as temporary Judicial II Class Magistrate by the first respondent by the order in G.O. No. 3104, Home dated 10-12-1982 under R. 13 of the Tamil Nadu State Magisterial Service Rules, hereinafter called the Rules. The petitioner joined as a Judicial II Class Magistrate at Kulithalai in Tiruchi District and from there she was transferred to Aruppukottai, Kamarajar District. Subsequently she was transferred as Judicial II Class Magistrate, III, Vellore. The first respondent by G.O. Ms. No. 809 dated 25-3-1986 ordered the termination of the services of the petitioner as temporary Judicial II Class Magistrate and tne order of termination runs as follows: “Public Services—Tmt, S. Rajalakshmi, Temporary Judicial Second Class Magistrate— Terrminaion—Orders—Issued. HOME (COURTS I) DEPARTMENT G.O. Ms. NO 809 Dated; 25th March, 1986, Panguni 11, Kurothana. Thiruvalluvar Aandu, 2017. Read: G.O. Ms. No. 3104, Home, datsd 10-12-1982. Read also: From the High Court, D.O. No. 22/85, Con. El, dated 4-1O-1985. ORDER: Under R. 13(1)(a) of the Tamil Nadu State Magisterial Service Rules, the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby terminates the temporary services of Tmt. S. Rajalakshmi, as temporary Judicial Second Class Magistrate in the Judicial Department in the Tamil Nadu State Magisterial Service. 2. The Registrar, High Court, Madras is requested to terminate the temporary services of Tmt. S. Rajalakshmi as temporary Judicial Second Class Magistrate. “(By order of the Governor) T.V. Venkataraman Special Commissioner & Secretary To Governor” In pursuance thereof the second respondent passed the notifincation No. 9/86 dated 3-4-1986 relieving the petitioner with effect from the date of service of the notification. Notification No. 9/86 referred above runs as follows :— “R.O.C. No. 22/85. Con. El. Notification No. 9186. Thirumathi S. Rajalakshmi, Judicial Seeond Class Magistrate No. III, Vellore, who had been appointed temporarily as Judicial Second Class Magistrate in G.O. Ms. No. 3104, Home, dated 10-12-82, and whose services in Judicial Department have been terminated in G.O. Ms No 809 Home (Cts. 1), dated 25-5-86, is relieved with effect from the date of service of this notification. High Court, Madras 600 104(Sd). S. Janarthanam, Dated: 3-4-1986.Registrar” The petitioner has in this petition challenged the validity of G.O. Ms. No. 3104, Home, dated 10-12-82, and whose services in Judicial Department have been terminated in G.O. Ms No 809 Home (Cts. 1), dated 25-5-86, is relieved with effect from the date of service of this notification. High Court, Madras 600 104(Sd). S. Janarthanam, Dated: 3-4-1986.Registrar” The petitioner has in this petition challenged the validity of G.O. Ms. No. 809 dated 25-3-1986 issued by the first respondent and the notification No. 9/86 dated 3-4-1986 issued by the High Court, Madras and prayed for issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus for quashing the G.O.Ms No. 809 passed by the first respondent and notification No. 9/86 issued by the second respondent and for directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service with the attendant benefits. 3. Mr. K. Chandru, learned counsel for the petitioner, in the first place, contended that on the date of the impugned order, no doubt, the petitioner was holding the post of a temporary Judicial II Class Magistrate; under R. 13(e) of the Rules, the Government has the right to terminate the service of the petitioner at any time without notice and without assigning any reason. However, any order of termination of a tempoary Government servant could not be sustained if the foundation of the order of termination was an alleged misconduct on the part of the Government servant and if the order of termination caused a stigma on the Government servant had amounted to a punishment. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the foundation of the order of termination of service in this case, though innocuosly worded as an order of termination under R. 13(e) of the Rules, is ihe allegations of misconduct levelled against the petitioner and, therefore, the order amounted to punishment. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that if the impugned order is construed as an order of punishment, then, the removal of the petitioner from service without holding an enquiry would violate Art. 311 of the Constitution of India and consequently the impugned order will have to be quashed. Therefore, the question for consideration is, whether the impugned order of termination of service of the petitioner is not a termination simplicitor in exercise of the power conferred under R. 13(e) of the Rules or would, in effect be an order of punishment. Therefore, the question for consideration is, whether the impugned order of termination of service of the petitioner is not a termination simplicitor in exercise of the power conferred under R. 13(e) of the Rules or would, in effect be an order of punishment. It is now settled law that the form of the order of termination or the language in which it is couched is not conclusive. When an allegation is made by the employee assailing the order of termination of service as one based on misconduct, though couched in innocuous terms, it is incumbent on the part of the Court to lift the veli to see the true nature vof the order. As observed by the Supreme Court in Anoop v. Govt. of India . 1989 Writ L.R. 439 (D.B.). “The form of the order is not decisive as to whether the order is by way of punishment and that even an innocuously worded order terminating the service may in the fact and circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry into allegation of serious and grave character of misconduct involving stigma has been made in infraction of the provision of Art. 311(2) Where the form of the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the Court before which th: ordjr is chillengel to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. If the Court holds that ths order though in the form is merely a determination of employment is in reality a cloilc for an order of punish runt, the court would not be debarred, mirely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to the rights conferred by law upon the employee.” The Supreme Court in the above decision further observed thus: “Even though the order of discharge may be non committal, it cannot stand alone. Thouah the noting in the file of the Government may be irrelevant, the cause for the order cannot be ignored. The recommendation of the Director which is the basis or foundation for the order should be read along with the order for the purpose of determining its true character. Thouah the noting in the file of the Government may be irrelevant, the cause for the order cannot be ignored. The recommendation of the Director which is the basis or foundation for the order should be read along with the order for the purpose of determining its true character. If on reading the two together the Court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground as the appellant has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Art. 311(2; of the Constitution”. In Jarnail Singh & others v. State of Punjab & others 1986-2-L.LJ. 268 the same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the following terms: “The position is now well settled on a conspectus of the decisions referred to hereinbefore that the mere form of the order is not sufficient to hold that the order of termination was innocuous and the order of termination of the services of a probationer or of an ad hoc appointee is a ter mination simpliciter in accordance with the terms of the appointment without attaching any stigma to the employee concerned It is the substance of the order i e , the attending circumstances as well as the basis of the order that have to be taken into consideration. In other words, when an allegation is made by the employee assailing the order of termination as one based on misconduct, though couched in innocuous terms, it is incumbent on the Court to lift the veil and to see the real circumstances as well as the basis and foundation of the order complained of in other words, the Court, in such case, will lift the veil and will see whether the order was made on the ground of misconduct inefficiency or not. In the instant case we have already referred to as well as quoted the relevant portions of the averments made on behalf of the State respondent in their several affidavits alleging serious misconduct against the petitioners and also the adverse entries in the service records of these petitioners, which were taken into consideration by the Departmental Selection Committee without giving them any oiportunity of hearing and without following the procedure provided in Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of India, while considering the fitness and suitability of the appellants for the purpose of regularising their services in accordance with the Government Circular made in October. 1980 Thus the impugned orders terminating the services of the appellants or the ground that the “the posts are no longer required” are made by way of punishment,” 3 A. It is in the background of the principles of law that the question whether the termination of the petitioners service in this case is a termination simpliciter in exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 13(e) of the Rules or it is by way of punishment has to be considered. The respondents have not filed any counter-arfidavit denying the various allegations in the affidavit filed in support of this writ petition. In these circumstances, I called for the file relating to the present writ petition from the second respondent and perused the same to find out the circumstances under which the orders challenged in the writ petition came to be passed A perusal of the file shows that on 1-6-1984 one Boopathi, President of Aruppuk-kottai People Organisation, Aruppkkottai sent a petition to the Chief Justice, High Court, Madras with a copy to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aruppukkottai Siva-ganga containing several allegations against the petitioner. The allegations in the petition in brief are that the petitioner received bribe at the rate of Rs. 25 and above Through one Vasanthakumart, Head-Clerk and Thiru Manickavasagam Clerk, Judicial II Class Magistrates Court, Aruppukkottai. A list of cases wherein the petitioner has released the accused after receiving the bribe amount of Rs. 100 to Rs. 500 was also given and it was further alleged in the petition that the petitioner was in the habit of disposing of the cases without examining witnesses and even without issuing summons to police favouring the party who has bribed her. 100 to Rs. 500 was also given and it was further alleged in the petition that the petitioner was in the habit of disposing of the cases without examining witnesses and even without issuing summons to police favouring the party who has bribed her. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sivaganga who received the petition from the said Boopathy on 6-6-1985 forwarded the same to the Special Officer, Vigilance Cell, High Court, Madras for necessary action. The Special Officer, Vigilance Cell of High Court, Madras on receipt of the petition and the letter from the Chief Judicial Magistrate submitted a note to the Chief Justice referring to the allegations of corruption made in the petition sent by the said Boopathi against the petitioner. In the note submitted by the Special Officer he also referred to the telegram sent by the Bar Members of Aruppukkottai Bar Association praying for not reposting the petitioner to Aruppukkottai after the expiry of the maternity leave granted to the petitoner. The Special Officer prayed for orders from the Chief Justice as to whether the Registry may be required not to repost the petitioner to Arppukkottai after the expiry of the maternity leave and whether a probe may be made with regard to the allegations made against her. On 1-10-1985, on the office note submitted by the Special Officer, Vigilance Cell, High Court, Madras referring to the various complaints of corruption received against the petitoner, the then Chief Justice passed an order stating that the service of the petitioner may be terminated by an order of termination simpliciter. Thereupon the second respondent sent a D.O. letter No. 22/85 dated 4-10-1985 to the Special Commissioner and Secretary to the Government Home Department requesting that the orders of the Government may be obtainad terminating the service of the petitioner in the Judicial Department in the Tamil Nadu State Magisterial Service. On the basis of the D.O. Letter No. 22 85 dated 4-10-1985 received from the second respondent, the 1st respondent passed the impugned G.O.Ms. No. 809 terminating the temporary service of the petitioner. Thus a perusal of the file goes to show that the then Chief Justice recommendeu for the termination of the service of the petitioner on the basis of the complaints of corruption referred to in the office note put up by the Special Officer, Vigilance Cell, High Court, Madras. No. 809 terminating the temporary service of the petitioner. Thus a perusal of the file goes to show that the then Chief Justice recommendeu for the termination of the service of the petitioner on the basis of the complaints of corruption referred to in the office note put up by the Special Officer, Vigilance Cell, High Court, Madras. Therefore, the impugned order though couched in innocuous terms cannot be considered as an order of termination simpliciter. On a consideration of the entire circumstances of the case 1 am satisfied that the impugned order is not so innocuous as it appears to be on the face of it. The alleged acts of misconduct viz., the allegations ot corruption referred to in the office note submitted to the Chief Justice by the Special Officer, Vigilance Cell, was the real foundation of the order of termination. As the order of termination passed in this case is a result of certain allegations of corruption made against the petitioner, it has to be concluded thar the impugned order is not an order of termination simpliciter but it amounts to punishment. From this it follows that the impugned order has to be quashed inasmuch as the procedure laid down in Art. 311(2) of the Constitution has hot been followed. 4. Before parting with this aspect of the case I must refer to the decision of the Division Bench of this court in The High Court rep, by its Registrar v. R. Periasamy . 1989 Writ L.R. 439 (D.B.) The writ petitioner in that case, a law graduate, who was initially recruited as an Assistant in the Electricity Board, was selected to act temporarily as Judicial Second Class Magistrate. When he was reverted to his parent department by an order terminating bis temporary service, he challenged the said order by filing a writ petition before this Court. The learned single Judge allowed the writ petition and set aside the order of termination. The writ appeal filed by the Registrar, High Court, Madras against the order of the learned single Judge was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court holding that where a person is borrowed from one department and is asked to work in another department temporarily, if he is reverted back to the original department, there is no question of termination of any service in the proper sense of the term. The Division Bench further held that when the writ petitioner was reverted back to the original department his service in the transferred department have come to an end and he goes back to the parent department as he is having a lien in the parent department. The Division Bench observed that the termination of the temporary service as a Magistrate is a logical corollary to the reversion to parent department. The Division Bench ultimately held that where there is a mere order of reversion even though the reason for the reversion may be unfitness or any other cause that can have no bearing because the Writ Petitioner merely goes back to the parent department, his rightful place and on that score, as to the reason for the reversion, the order cannot be held to be punitive in character. The above decision is clearly distinguishable on facts. That was a case where a person holding a permanent post in another department was selected as a temporary Judicial II Class Magistrate and he was reverted to his parent department by an order terminating his temporary service as Judicial 11 Class Magistrate, which is not the position in the present case 5. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even if the impugned order is an order of termination simpliciter, the junior most in the post must be terminated. Since most of the petitioners juniors similarly placed like the petitioner continued to work, it is discriminatory in character in that the petitioner alone has been singled out and her service, as Judicial II Class Magistrate was terminated while many of her juniors have been retained in *hat post and, therefore, the impugned order is violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the protection of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution will be available even to temporary Government servants like the petitioner., who have been arbitrarily discriminated, against and singled out for harsh treatment in preferencce to her juniors. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the protection of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution will be available even to temporary Government servants like the petitioner., who have been arbitrarily discriminated, against and singled out for harsh treatment in preferencce to her juniors. The petitioner filed W.M.P.No 1238 of 1990 seeking permission of this Court to raise additional grounds in the writ petition for raising the above plea and the same was ordered on 29-3-1990 In paragraph 10 of the additional affidavit the petitioner has specifically stated that most of the petitioners juniors were allowed to continue in the post of the judicial Second Class Magistrate and that the petitioner alone was singled out and her service was terminated. The above averment has not been denied by the respondents. A similar case came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Government Branch Press v. D.B. Belliappa . A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 429.The respondent in that case was appointed as a temporary junior compositor in the Government Branch Press, Mercara. A notice was served on the respondent by the petitioner in that case calling upon him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for taking outside the press some copies of the ballot papers relating to the Directors election of Coorg cardamom Cooperative Societies, Mercara. Thereafter on 3-1-1967 an order was served informing him that his appointment was purely temporary and terminable at any time without any previous notice and witaout reasons being assigned and, therefore, his services were terminated with immediate effect. The respondent filed a writ petition to quash the said order of termination. It was contended on behalf the appellant-management that the respondents appointment was purely temporary governed by the conditions in the contract of his service and was liable to be terminated without notice at any time. The Supreme Court, rejecting the con tention of the appellant, observed as follows:— “The protection of Arts. 14 and 16(1) will be available even to such a temporary Government servant if he has been arbitrarily discriminated against and singled out for harsh treatment in preference to his juniors, similarly circumstanced. It is true that the competent authority had the discretion under the conditions of service governing the employee concerned to terminate the latters employment without notice. 14 and 16(1) will be available even to such a temporary Government servant if he has been arbitrarily discriminated against and singled out for harsh treatment in preference to his juniors, similarly circumstanced. It is true that the competent authority had the discretion under the conditions of service governing the employee concerned to terminate the latters employment without notice. But such discretion has to be exercised in accordance with reason and fair play and not capriciously. Bereft of nationality and fairness, discretion degenerates into atbitrariness which is the very antithesis of the rule of law on which our democratic Polity is founded. Arbitrary, invocation or enforcement of a service condition terminating the service of a temporary employee may itself constitute denial of equal protection and offend the equality clause in Arts. 14 and 16(1). Art. 16(1) guarantees “equality of opportunity of all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any off ce under the State.” The Supreme Court in the above decision further observed thus: “The principle that can be deduced from the above analysis is that if the services of a temporary Government servant are terminated in accordance with the conditions of his service on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct or his unsuitability for the job and/or for his work being unsatisfactory or for a like reason which marks him off a class apart from other temporary servants who have been retained in service, there is no question of the applicability of Art. 16. Conversely, if the services of a temporary Government servant are terminated, arbitrarily, and not on the ground of his unsuitability, unsatisfactory conduct or the like which would put him in a class apart from his juniors in the same service, a question of unfair discrimination may arise, notwithstanding the fact that in terminating his service, the appointing authority was purporting to act in accordance with the terms of the employment.” The Supreme Court in that case agreed with the High Court that the impugned order sufferred from the vice of unfair discrimination and was violative of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. 6. It is not the case of the respondent in the present case that the service of petitioner as Judicial II Class Magistrate was terminated on the ground of her unsuitability, unsatisfactory conduct or the like. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. 6. It is not the case of the respondent in the present case that the service of petitioner as Judicial II Class Magistrate was terminated on the ground of her unsuitability, unsatisfactory conduct or the like. No special circumstance or reason has been disclosed, which would justify the discriminatory treatment meted out to the petitioner particularly when her juniors have been retained in service. Therefore, the impugned order also suffers from the vice of unfair discrimination and is violative of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution and on that ground also the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 7. In the result, the writ petition is allowed, the impugned orders, viz, G.O. Ms. No. 809, Home dated 25-3 1986 and the notification of the second respondent No. 9/86. dated 3-4-1986 are quashed and the petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service with all attendant benefits within eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There will be no order as to costs.