JUDGMENT - B.N. SRIKRISHNA, J.:---This writ petition, under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, impugns an order of the Industrial Court, Nasik, dated 17th March, 1989, made in Complaint (ULP) No. 468 of 1987 under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The petitioner is a Trade Union of workmen employed in the Public Works Department. The petitioner-Union filed a complaint before the Industrial Court, Nasik, under Items 5, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Act on behalf of 14 workmen working in the Public Works Department of State of Maharashtra. It alleged that the concerned 14 workmen had been served with retrenchment orders on 2-7-1987 terminating their services with effect from 9-8-1987. The petitioner Union had raised an industrial dispute, inter alia, with regard to the conditions of service of the workmen of the Public Works Department carried on the Daily Wage Estabishment, Work Charged Establishment and Temporary Establishment. By the said dispute, one demand made was that any workman who had worked on any one or more of the said Establishments, for a period of one year or more, should be made permanent and taken on the permanent Establishment and given all the consequential benefits. This dispute was admitted in conciliation by the Conciliation Officer on 18th September, 1984, under section 12(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Pending the proceedings in conciliation, the first respondent terminated the services of the 14 concerned workmen on 2-7-1987 on the ground that they were temporary. Subsequently the Conciliation Officer made a Failure Report dated 7-9-1987 and the Industrial Dispute came to be referred for adjudication of the Industrial Tribunal by a reference dated 2-3-1988. On these facts, about which there is no dispute, the petitioner contended before the Industrial Tribunal that the action of termination of services of its member-workmen amounted to an alteration of the conditions of service applicable to them in regard to a matter connected with the dispute which was admitted in conciliation. Since the said alteration was prejudicial to the interest of workmen, it amounted to the contravention of the provisions of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act inasmuch as such change had not been brought out with the express permission of Conciliation Officer before whom the proceedings were pending. Since the said alteration was prejudicial to the interest of workmen, it amounted to the contravention of the provisions of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act inasmuch as such change had not been brought out with the express permission of Conciliation Officer before whom the proceedings were pending. The petitioner also contended that the retrenchment was bad for want of publication of the Seniority Notice and for failure to follow the rule of 'last come first go' enunciated in section 25-c, of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was, therefore, pleaded before the Industrial Court that the retrenchment of the concerned 14 workmen amounted to unfair labour practice under Items 5, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Act. The Industrial Court rightly rejected the contention based on want of publication of seniority list and non-compliance with section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Industrial Court found that these contentions had not been established factually. On the question as to whether there was contravention of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Industrial Court took the view that the workmen on whose behalf of the complaint had been filed were not workmen concerned in the conciliation proceedings and further that the termination of their services did not amount to breach of the provisions of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. This order of the Industrial Court is impugned in the present petition. 3. Mr. Kochar, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, rightly did not impugn the findings of the Industrial Court on the issue of want of publication of seniority list and contravention of section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. He concentrated in attacking the finding of the Industrial Court that there was no breach of the provisions of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore there was no unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. 4. The notice dated 25th September, 1984, issued by the Conciliation Officer and Additional Commissioner of Labour, Bombay, addressed to the petitioner-Union and the first respondent makes it clear that preliminary discussion in connection with the dispute between the Public Works Department, Rural Development, Irrigation, Power and Supply Department and its workmen, was held on 18th September, 1984, and that the dispute was admitted in conciliation under section 12(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act on the same day. The dispute had arisen out of the demands contained in the letter dated 20th January, 1984, addressed by the Action Committee of the workmen to the first respondent. The first demand in the annexure to the said letter pertained to the demand for making permanent all workmen whose names were maintained in the Daily Wage Establishment. Work Charged Establishment and Temporary Establishment, after completion of 240 days and for giving them consequent benefits. The Failure Report made by the Conciliation Officer on 7-9-1987 also shows that the demands were admitted in conciliation proceedings on 18th September, 1984, and had ended in a failure. It is not in dispute that this Industrial dispute was ultimately referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication by reference order dated 2-3-1988. In view of these facts, it is clear that between 18th September, 1984 to 1-3-1988, the Industrial dispute was pending conciliation proceedings, the terminus a quo of the conciliation proceedings being the date of admission of conciliation and the terminus ad quem being the date of making of the reference, as indicated in section 29(2)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. Mr. Soni, learned Assistant Government Pleader, for the respondents, strenously contended that the order of the Industrial Court was perfectly correct in law and justified on the facts. He pointed out that, way back on 15th March, 1978, much before the dispute was ever raised, the Government had laid down certain norms as to the number of workmen on different establishments. By a Circular dated 12-11-1986, this policy decision as to the norms was reiterated and the concerned Departments were called upon to strictly conform thereto. Thus, contends Mr. Soni, there is no mala fides, no unjustified or arbitrary action on the part of the respondents. Apart from justifying the action on merits, Mr. Soni also contended that the complaint under the provisions of the Act was not maintainable even if it was assumed that there was a breach of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as the breach of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act was actionable either under the special machinery of Industrial Tribunals created under the provisions of that very Act. For a breach of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, the machinery under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act cannot be utilised or brought into play, according to the learned Assistant Government Pleader. Then he contended that assuming that it was permissible for the petitioner to move the Industrial Court under the Act, there was no breach of section 33(1)(a) at all on facts inasmuch as the status of the workmen was that of temporary workmen prior to the commencement of the proceedings, during the proceedings and upto the date of retrenchment. This status had not been changed at all during pendency of conciliation proceedings and hence there was no alteration within the meaning of section 33(1)(a). Finally, Mr. Soni, submitted that assuming that there was contravention of section 33(1)(a), that per se, did not amount to unfair labour practice within the meaning of any of the Schedules of the Act and therefore the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to grant any relief. 6. I am afraid, the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents are no longer res integra. In (S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees Union v. S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Tradings Ltd. and another)1, 1986(69) Indian Factories Journal, 310, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the very same arguments being presented to me. In the case before Their Lordships, a closure had been resorted to contrary to the provisions of section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act and the contention was raised that even if the closure was contrary to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, it did not amount to an unfair labour practice under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act and therefore the Industrial Court under the said Act had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint or grant any relief. The Supreme Court rejected this argument by taking the view that Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act was wide enough to accomodate within itself the breach of any statute which per proprio vigore, must be read as part and parcel of the employment contract itself. Any breach of such a statute, in the view of the Supreme Court, would amount to failure to implement award, settlement or agreement within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. The contention of Mr. Any breach of such a statute, in the view of the Supreme Court, would amount to failure to implement award, settlement or agreement within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. The contention of Mr. Soni, on this aspect of the matter, therefore, has no merit and has to be rejected. 7. The justification of the retrenchment of the concerned workmen is wholly besides the point and irrelevant. The question before the Industrial Court was not whether the workmen were justifiably retrenched, but whether their retrenchment amounted to breach of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act and consequently an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. This is the question considered by the Industrial Court on which a finding adverse to the petitioner has been recorded. This is the only adverse finding which the petitioner has impugned in the present petition. Despite the efforts of Mr. Soni to persuade me to hold that there was no change in the conditions of service of the workmen, as they continued to be temporary throughout and consequently there was no breach of section 33(1)(a), I am afraid, this question also is not res integra in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in (The Bhavnagar Municipality v. Alibhai Karimbhai and others)2, 1977 L.I.C. 834. In the case before the Supreme Court, daily rated workmen of the Municipality had raised an industrial dispute. The subject matter of the dispute was connected with the conversion of the temporary workmen into ermanent. During the pendency of this dispute, the Municipality removed the concerned workmen from service and the Supreme Court took the view that such tampering with status quo ante of those workers was a clear alteration of the conditions of their service and the alteration was in regard to matter connected with the pending industrial dispute and thus there was contravention of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court on this issue, I decline to accede to the able arguments advanced by Mr. Soni touching this aspect of the matter. 8. In my view, the Industrial Court erred in law and misdirected itself in coming to the conclusion that there was no breach of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Soni touching this aspect of the matter. 8. In my view, the Industrial Court erred in law and misdirected itself in coming to the conclusion that there was no breach of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The circumstances clearly showed that there was breach of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Once the conclusion is reached that there was breach of section 33(1)(a), it is only a short hop therefrom to the conclusion that there is an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.G. Chemical's case (supra). The impugned order of the Industrial Court is, therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside which I hereby do. It is held that the retrenchment of the concerned workmen by the respondents amounts to an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. They shall be entitled to the consequential relief of reinstatement and back wages for the period of their unemployment. The order of reinstatement and back wages shall be carried into effect within eight weeks from today failing which, in addition to other consequences, the back wages shall carry simple interest at 12 per cent per annum from the date on which they ought to have been paid, until payment. 9. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. -----