Judgment Aftab Alam, J. 1. Painful, slow and arduous has been the progress of this case. This is best borne but by the simple fact that this application arises out of a departmental proceeding that commenced in 1963 when on 3-11-1963 the petitioner was put under suspension in contemplation of a departmental proceeding. On 27-4-1979 an order was passed discharing the petitioner. When this order was under challenge before this Court in a writ petition this Court (and the petitioner) were informed that the discharge order was set aside in a departmental appeal that had been earlier filed by the petitioner The writ petition was, thus, rendered infructuous. The departmental proceeding (then 17 years old), however, was not allowed to come to an end as the appellate authority while allowing the petitioners appeal gave directions that a fresh order should be passed in the case after rectifying the lacunae as pointed out by him in the departmental proceeding earlier held against the petitioner. The departmental proceeding, thus, lingered on and an order was then issued putting the petitioner once again under suspension. The petitioner was relieved from suspension at that stage by the intervention of this Court. Thereafter, it took five years and some more interference by this Court when a fresh order was passed on 21-6-1985 once again discharging the petitioner from service. This order was recalled by another order dated 17-8-1985 and was substituted by order dated 4-12-1986. This time the petitioner was spared the punishment of discharge and this order imposed on him the following two punishments: (i) The period of suspension for all purposes shall be treated as period of suspension and for this period the petitioner would not be entitled to any payment beyond what was already paid to him by way of subsistence allowance. (ii) Recovery of a sum of Rs. 182.47 which the petitioner was accused of having defalcated from the Government fund. 2. The petitioner now once again stands in this Court after about 28 years of the commencement of the departmental proceeding against him. The instant writ petition was originally filed against the order dated 21-6-1985 which the petitioner was discharged from service. This order declared that as the petitioner had failed to submit his second show cause despite opportunities given to him, the punishment was being awarded to him in absence of a show cause from him. The instant writ petition was originally filed against the order dated 21-6-1985 which the petitioner was discharged from service. This order declared that as the petitioner had failed to submit his second show cause despite opportunities given to him, the punishment was being awarded to him in absence of a show cause from him. One of the grounds of challenge to this order was that such a statement was manifestly incorrect as it was evident from other circumstances and earlier orders passed by this Court that the petitioner had actually submitted his second show cause before the concerned authorities. Under the circumstances while admitting this application for hearing, this Court gave the following interim direction. The pendency of this application will not preclude the Director, Animal Husbandly, Bihar respondent No. 2 in passing appropriate order on the second show cause filed by the petitioner, a copy of which has been handed over by him to learned Standing Counsel No. 1. Thereafter during the pendency of this application another order dated 17-8-1985 was passed recalling the order the order dated 21-6-1985 which originally came under challenge in this application and finally the order dated 4-12-1986 was passed which awarded the aforementioned punishment to the petitioner. This necessitated the filing of another petition bringing the two orders, (dated 17-8-1985 and 4-12-1986) on record and seeking reliefs in light of the subsequent developments. This application though erroneously filed under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code is actually a petition for amendment of the original writ petition and seeks some additional and amended reliefs in view of the subsequent developments. By order dated 28-3-1990 this (amendment) petition was directed to be considered at the time of final hearing of the writ petition. learned Counsel for the petitioner pressed this application and sought permission also to challenge the order dated 4-12-1986 a copy whereof has been enclosed as Annexure-2 to the amendment petition. The prayer is quite natural and logical. The disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner now stands culminated in the order dated 4-12-1986 and in order to seek any relief it is essential for the petitioner to challenge that order and get it set aside. I may, at this stage, note that neither the writ petition nor the amendment petition are very happily or comprehensively drafted. The disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner now stands culminated in the order dated 4-12-1986 and in order to seek any relief it is essential for the petitioner to challenge that order and get it set aside. I may, at this stage, note that neither the writ petition nor the amendment petition are very happily or comprehensively drafted. This is, however, explained by the fact that the petitioner has been conducting this case in person. He has himself drafted those petitions and has appeared in Court in person. In that view of the matter, ingnoring any technical and procedural short coming. I allow the amendment petition and give opportunity to the petitioner to challenge the order dated 4-12-1986 and to amend and mofify his relief, accordingly. 3. At this stage, I should further like to record that the petitioner though not very conversant with the procedures of Court or the legal niceties has been remarkably able to master the facts of his case. This is for the simple reason that for the greater part of his working life (for 28 years) the petitioner was made to litigate rather than he allowed to devote his energies and potential towards some fruitful and socially constructive duties. While arguing his case any deficiency in his knowledge of law was set off by his mastery over the facts of his case. The situation reminded me of an Urdu couplet where the poet says: (In plain words I narrate the story of a broken heart: Indeed, there is no delight (in my narration) of a story well told. This matter came to this Court on a number of occasions and the subject-matter of the charges against him was also the subject-matter of some criminal trials. The orders passed from time to time by this Court and the Criminal Courts have not been made enclosures to the writ petition or the amendment petition but the certified copies of all these orders were produced before me and I have looked into them. These certified copies are or orders (passed by this Court and by Criminal Courts) in the same matter and between the same parties and, therefore, I see no difficulty in looking into them to gather as to what directions were given to the departmental authorities from time to time by this Court. These certified copies are or orders (passed by this Court and by Criminal Courts) in the same matter and between the same parties and, therefore, I see no difficulty in looking into them to gather as to what directions were given to the departmental authorities from time to time by this Court. At the conclusion of the case the certified copies have been directed to be returned back to the petitioner only after their photo stat copies were made which are kept on the record of this case. 4. Now for the facts in some detail. 5. The petitioner was put under suspension on 3-11-1963 in contemplation of a departmental proceeding on allegations of defalcation, of some Government money. On the same allegatios criminal cases were also instituted against him and three first information reports were lodged on 4-12-1963, 12-4-1964 and 26-4-1964. The crimial cases instituted against the petitioner gave rise to four sessions trial which finally concluded in judgments of acquittal in favour of the petitioner. 6. The first case Session Trial No. 28 of 1967. In this case the petitioner was accused of having defalcated a sum of Rs. 51 from the money. The definite defence of the petitioner-accused was that irregularities in the vouohers had actually been committed by the District Animal Husbandry Officer and the petitioner in his capacity as Accountant had raised objections to their being passed. According to the petitioner he was falsely implicated in this case on that account, It is to be noted that the trial ended in the petitioners acquittal. It is also relevant to note that the acquittal was not for any technical reason or for non-production of witnesses but after considering the prosecution case and the evidence adduced before it the learned trial court on merits did not believe the accusation levelled against the petitioner and held that the prosecution had failed to establish the charges against the accused. This judgment dated 17-2-1968 passed by the 2nd Assistant Sessions Judge in Session Trial No. 28 of 1967 came to this Court at the instance of the State in an appeal against the petitioners acquittal and by a reasoned order dated 27-6-1974 passed in Government Appeal No. 16 of 1968 this Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of acquittal passed in favour of the petitioner by the trial court. 7. 7. The next criminal case against the petitioner was Session Trial No. 18 of 1968. This case after commitment to the Court of Sessions was split up in terms of Sec. 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code at the instance of the prosecution. This gave rise to three criminal cases which were numbered as Session Trial No. 18 of 1968, Session Trial No. 327 of 1975 and Session Trial No. 328 of 1975. Session Trial No. 18 of 1968, after split, related to an alleged defalcation of Rs. 400 by the petitioner. In this trial the petitioner was acquitted by judgment dated 20-1-1984. In course of the trial the prosecution examined three witnesses by the trial Court found that there was no evidence to show that the accused had committed offence under Sec. 467 read with Secs. 471, 409, 468 and 477 of the Penal Code and was, thus, entitled to be acquitted of all the charges levelled against him. 8. Session Trial No. 327 of 1975 related to an alleged defalcation of Rs. 200 from the Government fund. This case also ended in acquittal by judgment dated 30-7-1983 as the prosecution failed to examine any witness in this case. 9. The last case being Session Trial No. 328 of 1975 was also in relation to an alleged defalcation of 200 and this case also ended in acquittal by judgment dated 20-1-1984. In this case the prosecution examined only one witness and there was no evidence to show that the accused had committed offences as alleged by the prosecution. He was, therefore, held entitled to be acquitted of all the charges. 10. The aforesad criminal cases taken together take care of all the charges relating to defalcation/misappropriation against the petitioner and as it is shown above the criminal courts held and found that the prosecution had failed to bring home the charges against the petitioner. It also must be noted that though two of the cases failed for want of evidence as the prosecution despite the lapse of almost a decade failed to produce any evidence, in the other two cases the trial courts after consideration of the parties case and a detailed appreciation of all the evidence led before them held that the petitioner was not guilty and that the prosecution had failed to establish the charges. 11. 11. In the meanwhile, the departmental proceeding seems to have lingered on simultaneously with the criminal trials. It appears that in that regard the petitioner came to this Court in C. W. J; C. No. 1387 of 1977 which was disposed of by order dated 30-8-1977 with a direction that the proceeding against the petitioner should be concluded within four months from that date. There were also some directions relating to the supply of some papers to the petitioner for the purposes of the departmental enquiry. The next time the petitioner came to this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 378 of 1978. This was disposed of at the time of admission itself by an order dated 22-2-1978. In this order also there were certain directions regarding the supply/inspection of certain papers by the petitioner. The material direction with which I am concerned at the moment relates to the conclusion of the departmental proceeding and it was observed in that order that it appeared that the petitioner had till then not filed his show cause. The order, therefore, clarified that it was only after filing of the show cause that further steps in the proceeding should be taken. In the circumstances, the authorities were directed to dispose of the proceeding within four months of the filing of the show cause by the petitioner. With these directions, the application was disposed of. In pursuance of this order the petitioner is said to have filed his show cause on 15-5-1978. As the departmental proceeding did not conclude as directed by this Court, the petitioner again came to this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 748 of 1979. In this case vide order dated 6-3-1979 the respondent authorities were directed to show cause as to why a proceeding for contempt be not initiated against them for violating the earlier directions given by this Court for concluding the departmental proceedings within the specified time. It was in course of hearing of this writ petition that on 2-7-1979 the Court and the petitioner were informed that the departmental proceeding had, in fact, been concluded and an order of his discharge was passed by the Director, Animal Husbandry on 27-4-1979. This order of discharge was enclosed as Annexure A to the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of respondent athorities and in view of the aforesaid circumstance the petitioners application (C.W.J.C. No. 748 of 1979) was permitted to be withdrawn. 12. This order of discharge was enclosed as Annexure A to the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of respondent athorities and in view of the aforesaid circumstance the petitioners application (C.W.J.C. No. 748 of 1979) was permitted to be withdrawn. 12. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the order of his discharge before the Director, Animal Husbandry, Bihar, Patna on 16-7-1979. Having waited in vain for some time for an order to be passed on his appeal the petitioner again came to this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 303 of 1980, this time challenging the order of his discharge dated 27-4-1979. Again this Court (and the petitioner) were informed by the learned Standing Counsel No. VI appearing on behalf of the State that the appellate authority had set aside the order of his discharge dated 27-4-1979 which came under challenge in that writ petition. This rendered the writ petition infrctuous and it was dismissed as such. 13. This appellate order is rather important for the purposes of this case and requires to be considered in some detail. From the appellate order it appears that the discharge order was passed against the petitioner for the following charges: (i) Defalcation of Rs. 177.47 as appearing from column Nos. 9, 17, 29 and 35 of the audit report. (ii) Permanent defalcation (whatever it may mean;) of Rs. 5. (iii) Making payment contrary to Rules. (iv) Misbehaviour, indiscipline and behaviour contrary to Rules. (v) Use of uncivilised language in letters and talking in threatful language before the superior officer. The appellate authority found that the deparmental proceeding earlier held against the petitioner suffered from a number of lacunae and accordingly set aside the discharge order. The relevant discussion as contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the order are extracted herein below; (3) I have looked into the enquiry report and carefully gone through its documents. The appointing authority has passed final order on the basis of the report of the enquiring officer dated 15-4-1979. A perusal of the departmental proceeding file clearly shows that opportunity of show cause had not been given to the proceede before the order of discharge has been issued by the Director. It is essential that a copy of the report of the enquiring officer is furnished to the procedee and he is directed to show cause within a reasonable time of a fortnight to a month. It is essential that a copy of the report of the enquiring officer is furnished to the procedee and he is directed to show cause within a reasonable time of a fortnight to a month. On the basis of the show cause received and perusal of the enquiry report and other documents connected with the case, the appointing authority has to take a decision regarding the departmental proceeding. This is well established procedure which unfortunately has not been followed by the Director of Animal Ausbandry. Further on the persual of the enquiry report it appears that some documents relating to the cases have not been examined by the enquiring officer, because they have been filed in the Court in connection with some pending criminal cases against the procedee. The procedee has, however, filed judgment of acquittal by the Court of Second Assistant Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur vide judgment dated 17-2-1968. He has also filed judgment of the Hon ble High Court giving clean acquittal on 27-6-1974. It is not clear from the file that any other case is pending against the procedee. However, it is essential that all the documents filed in the Court would be examined by the enquiring officer to come to proper conclusion in this case. (4) No doubt departmental proceeding has been inordinately delayed and to some extent blame goes to the procedee for not cooperating with the enquiring officer. There are well established procedure for concluding departmental proceeding when the procedee does not cooperate. Ex parte enquiry should be conducted after issue of the due notice to the proced. In this case proceeding is vitiated on the vital point of non-issue of show cause notice--I do not wish to cover other points. I, therefore, set aside the order passed by the Director of Animal Husbandry and remand the case to him to remove these infirmities and then pass a proper order against the procedee. Following the appellate order the under Secretary to the Government wrote to the Director, Animal Husbandry, Bihar Patna communicating to him the appellate order and directing to continue the petitioner under suspension with effect from 27-4-1979 and to conclude the proceeding after rectifying the lacunae pointed out by the appellate authority 14. The petitioner once again moved this Court in two separate writ petitions. The petitioner once again moved this Court in two separate writ petitions. In C.W.J.C. No. 1859 of 1989 the petitioner challenged the further continuation of the departmental proceeding against him and in C.W.J.C. No. 1860 of 1980 the petitioner challenged the order continuing him under suspension with effect from 27-4-1979. Both writ petitions were admitted and the order purporting to continue the petitioner under suspension was stayed. There were certain interim orders passed also in C.W.J.C. No. 1859 of 1980 staying the continuation of the proceeding but the same were later modified and the proceeding was allowed to continue. There was again a contempt proceeding against the departmental authorities on the petitioners allegation that in violation of the stay order passed by the High Court he was not being allowed to rejoin his services. In this contempt case, a statement was made before the Court that the petitioner was not only allowed to join but he was also paid the arrears of his salary and in this manner that contempt application was disposed of. 15. In the meanwhile following the appellate order a new enquirying officer was appointed by order dated 24-6-1980 to conduct re-enquiry as directed in the appellate order. It seems that after an order on 29-7-1981 the enquiry officer submitted his report apparently without holding any enquiry at all. The covering letter which enclosed this enquiry report is dated 29-7-1981 and has been addressed from Dr. Shiv Shankar, Mishra, Regional Director, Animal Husbandry to Director, Animal Husbandry. A copy of this communication has been enclosed as Annexure-3 to the amendment petition. The very first paragraph of the letter discloses that the enquiry officer was unable to inspect the Court orders (as directed by the appellate authority while setting aside the earlier order of discharge) despite efforts made by him. The second paragraph states that on the basis of the materials (already on the record) he was in agreement with the earlier enquiry report submitted in the case and, accordingly, he was submitting enquiry report along with the materials. The petitioner states and this has not been controverted, that this enquiry report was submitted without examining any witnesses or giving any information to the petitioner about the proposed enquiry or affording an opportunity to get himself or any of his witnesses examined before the enquiring officer. In short this was no enquiry in the eye of law. The petitioner states and this has not been controverted, that this enquiry report was submitted without examining any witnesses or giving any information to the petitioner about the proposed enquiry or affording an opportunity to get himself or any of his witnesses examined before the enquiring officer. In short this was no enquiry in the eye of law. The petitioner further makes a grievance that a copy of this enquiry report was never supplied to him. 16. No order seems to have been passed on this enquiry report awaiting reply from the petitioner to a second show-cause notice. Then it appears that by order dated 23.7-1984 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 1860 of 1980 the petitioner was directed to file a second show cause by 13-8-1984 and the authorities were directed to pass final orders by 3-9-1984. This order was partially modified by subsequent order dated 16-8-1984 by which the petitioner was given time to file his show cause by 25-8-1984. 17. Finally the two writ petitions being C.W.J.C. Nos. 1859 and 1860 came up for final hearing and were disposed of by a common judgment, dated 9-5-1985. In this judgment this Court took note that: Since the petitioner had already shown cause against the second notice, the Director, Animal Husbandry, Bihar before whom the enquiry is pending or any other officer before whom such enquiry, is pending will dispose of that enquiry within 7 weeks from today. If he does not pass final order on the second show cause within this period, it will be deemed that the departmental enquiry has been decided in favour of the petitioner and he will then be entitled for reinstatement and paid all his emoluments etc. that may be due to him in accordance with the rules. 18. These two applications were disposed of with the above direction along with some other directions regarding the filing of appeal etc. in case an adverse order was passed against the petitioner. Following this, the order dated 21-6-1985 was passed which was enclosed as Annexure-1 to the instant writ petition and, originally, came under challenge in this application. As already noted above this order professed that the petitioner had failed to file his second show cause and in that circumstance, the punishment order was being passed without considering his show cause. Following this, the order dated 21-6-1985 was passed which was enclosed as Annexure-1 to the instant writ petition and, originally, came under challenge in this application. As already noted above this order professed that the petitioner had failed to file his second show cause and in that circumstance, the punishment order was being passed without considering his show cause. This statement was patently incorrect as it was the admitted position in the judgment dated 9-5-1985 passed in C.WJ.C. Nos. 1859 and 1860 of 1980 that the petitioners second show cause had already been filed before the Director, Animal Husbandry. It is also established from other materials brought on the record of this case that the petitioner had actually submitted his second show cause both before the Regional Director, Animal Husbandry, North Bihar, Region, under whom the petitioner was then posted and before the Director, Animal Husbandry who was, the disciplinary authority in relation to the petitioner. 19. In addition to this at the time of admission of this case a copy of the second show-cause notice was handed over to the State Counsel who supplied it to the Director and following that the order dated 21-6-1985 was recalled by the order dated 17-5-1985 to be finally substituted by the order dated 14-12-1986 which inflicted the punishment on the petitioner as noted above and which how come under challenge. 20. From this long narration of events spread over almost three decades one thing that clearly emerges is that the authorities have been acting quite mindlessly, unreasonably and in an ad hoc and completely disjointed manner without any consideration of what transpired earlier and in disregard of the directions given by this Court and the superior departmental authority from time to time. I find that this long winded and crippling departmental proceeding is wholly vitiated and suffers from the vice of malice in law for more reason than one. 21. First there has been no consideration at all of the judgments passed by the criminal Courts on allegations which were identical to some of the charges against the petitioner. As has been shown above all the criminal cases on the same allegations ended in acquitttal after the criminal courts had discussed the prosectution case and the defence case had considered the prosecution evidence at length. As has been shown above all the criminal cases on the same allegations ended in acquitttal after the criminal courts had discussed the prosectution case and the defence case had considered the prosecution evidence at length. In the facts and circumstances of this case, it is difficult to conceive as to how a departmental proceeding on the same charges could succeed when the criminal courts on the same allegations had considered and appreciated the same evidence and had not believed them. Even if the departmental proceeding relating to these charges was not to fail on this score at least the judgments passed by the criminal courts, including this Court, deserved a serious consideration and some reason should have been assigned as to why the departmental authority should take a different, view. This aspect of the matter was also noted by the appellate authority which took note of the fact that the judgments in the criminal cases, till then rendered, had been brough to the notice of the departmental authorities. Even then these judgments were not taken into consideration and admittedly the second enquiry report and the punishment order passed on that basis do not take into account those judgments. (ii) Secondly, the appellate Court had taken note of a number, of lacunae in the earlier proceeding. The absence of a second show-cause notice was only one of them. In the departmental proceeding following the appellate order the authorities mechanically confined themselves to the show-cause notice in complete disregard of the other lacunae pointed out by the appellate authority. (iii) Thirdly, the so-called second enquiry was no enquiry at all in the eye of law. In this exercise the enquiry officer appears to have contended himself with going through the materials already on the record and the report submitted by the earlier enquiry officer and conveniently agreeing with the earlier report. As stated by the petitioner and not denied by the State Counsel, no witnesses were examined in course of this enquiry on behalf of the department or on behalf of the petitioner. No. sittings of enquiry were ever held and no notice or information in regard to the enquiry was given to the petitioner. The whole matter appears to have concluded on the desk of the Regional Director, who had been appointed as the enquiry officer. Such an enquiry can never form the basis of an order of punishment. No. sittings of enquiry were ever held and no notice or information in regard to the enquiry was given to the petitioner. The whole matter appears to have concluded on the desk of the Regional Director, who had been appointed as the enquiry officer. Such an enquiry can never form the basis of an order of punishment. It is further a fact that no copy of even this enquiry report was furnished to the petitioner in absence of which a second show cause becomes wholly meaningless. 22 Fourthly, Annexure-1, dated 21-6-1985 does not appear to have been passed on the merits of the case after due application of mind it was passed simply to formally comply with the Courts direction to take a final decision within a specified time. In view of all this I find and hold that the orders dated 21-6-1985 as contained in Annexure-1 and dated 4-12-1986 as contained in Annexure-2 to the amendment petition are unsustainable in the eye of law. 23. I, accordingly, quash the two orders. 24. Consequently I find and hold the petitioner entitled to his full wages for the period he was put under suspension. All payments for this period should be made to the petitioner along with the incidental benefits of annual increments and periodical revisions of scale from time to time. All the payments on the aforesaid basis must be the petitioner within six months from the date of receipt/production of this order. The petitioner shall further be paid his post retirement benefits disregarding the departmental proceeding against him and his suspension and as if he was never put under suspension. His post retirement benefits must be calculated and payments made on that basis within three months from the date of receipt/production of this order or the date when the petitioner makes a duly filled up application in this regard, whichever is later. All concerned departments and authorities must render full help and co-operation in the final determination and early payment of the arrears of his wages and his post retirement benefits in terms of this order. 25. In the result, this application is allowed with costs. The petitioner must be paid Rs. 5,000 by way of costs within three months from the date of receipt/production of this order.