Judgment :- These two civil revision petitions have a long history; but the point that consideration is a very simple one. Unfortunately, it has been overlooked by the court, which has resulted in the filing of these two revision petitions. 2. Chronologically, there was a mortgage by deposit of title deeds on 10.6.1959 in Pandiyan Bank Limited, which was subsequently merged with Canara Bank. There was for recovery of certain money against the mortgagors by a third party-creditor in O.S.No.100 of 1960 on the file of Sub Court, Salem, which ended in a decree. In execution of the in E.P.No.143 of 1964 items 2 to 5 of the suit properties were brought to sale. While mortgagee Pandiyan Bank filed a suit O.S.No.185 of 1964, Sub Court, Salem for enforcement of the mortgage. When the suit was pending, defendants 2 to 10, who were the mortgagors, entered into an agreement of sale with respect to item 4 thereof on 11.11.1964 M/s.Rajendra Mills Limited. The said Rajendra Mills Limited is the petitioner in C.R.P.No.245 of 1989 and hereafter, it will be referred to as ‘the 1st petitioner. There was a preliminary decree in the suit on 1.3.1965. On 27.3.1965, defendants 2 to 10 executed a sale favour of the 1st petitioner with a direction to pay a sum of Rs.85,000 to the 21.7.1966, all the properties were brought to sale in court auction in E.P.No.143 of the money-decree-holder. They were purchased by one Kandasami Chettiar. On 31.7.1966, final decree was passed in the mortgage suit and the Bank filed R.E.P.No.1 of 1967 of the mortgaged properties. On 6.2.1967, the 1st petitioner got the sale deed compulsorily registered in its favour with respect to item 4. Thereafter, the 1st petitioner R.E.A.No.443 of 1967 in R.E.P.No.143 of 1964 for setting aside the court auction sale 21.7.1966 with respect to item 4. The auction purchaser had taken possession on through court, but on 28.4.1973, the application filed by the 1st petitioner to set sale was allowed. On 1.12.1973, the auction purchaser sold items 2, 3 and 5 Sahadevan, who is the 10th respondent in R.E.P.No.1 of 1967. Sahadevan filed R.E.A.No.258 of 1976 for impleading him as a party to the execution proceedings, but it was dismissed he filed C.M.A.No.556 of 1976 in this Court, which was allowed. Consequently, impleaded as the 10th respondent in R.E.P.No.1 of 1967. Sahadevan filed R.E.A.No.258 of 1976 for impleading him as a party to the execution proceedings, but it was dismissed he filed C.M.A.No.556 of 1976 in this Court, which was allowed. Consequently, impleaded as the 10th respondent in R.E.P.No.1 of 1967. On 23.6.1980, the petitioner C.R.P.No.140 of 1989 purchased items 2, 3 and 5 from Sahadevan and his sons petitioners are referred to hereafter as ‘petitioners 2 and 3’. On 4.8.1980, the Subordinate Judge, Salem, directed in R.E.P.No.1 of 1967 the sale of items 1 and 4 in the first instance. The 1st petitioner filed C.R.P.No.2337 of 1980 against the said order after getting leave this Court to file the same in C.M.P.No.8680 of 1980. The said revision petition was allowed on 7.9.1982. The matter was remanded to the executing court. This Court directed the petitioner to implead himself as a party to the execution proceedings. The 1st petitioner filed R.E.A.No.223 1983 for impleading it a party. That petition was ordered and the 1st petitioner impleaded. One of the judgment-debtors, by name, V.Gopal, who is the 1st respondent these revision petitions, filed R.E.A.No.850 of 1983 for appointment of a Commissioner make local inspection, etc., and R.E.A.No.851 of 1983 for the appointment of a receiver items 2, 3 and 5. He did not implead petitioners 2 and 3 as parties to those applications. may be noted that item 4 is not one of the properties, for which, appointment of was sought. Both petitions were ordered on 1.10.1983. Petitioners 2 and R.E.A.Nos.881 and 883 of 1983 for setting aside the orders made in R.E.A.Mo.850 and of 1983. Those applications were allowed on 6.1.1984. The executing court found that 1st respondent was guilty of abuse of process of court in filing R.E.A.Nos.850 and 1983. The 1st respondent filed C.R.P.Nos.738 and 739 of 1984 in this Court against orders in R.E.A.Nos.881 and 883 of 1983. But the revision petitions were not ultimately and they were dismissed on 27.6.1986. The first respondent also R.P.Nos.736 and 737 of 1984 against the orders in R.E.A.Nos.850 and 851 of 1983, were consequential to the orders in R.E.A.Nos.881 and 883 of 1983. This Court set those orders on the ground that they were non speaking orders and remanded the same fresh consideration. The first respondent also R.P.Nos.736 and 737 of 1984 against the orders in R.E.A.Nos.850 and 851 of 1983, were consequential to the orders in R.E.A.Nos.881 and 883 of 1983. This Court set those orders on the ground that they were non speaking orders and remanded the same fresh consideration. Obviously, it was not brought to the notice of this Court that the in R.E.A.Nos.850 and 851 of 1983 were consequential to the orders in R.E.A.Nos.881 883 of 1983. 3. After remand, the learned Subordinate Judge directed the 1st respondent to implead necessary parties to his applications in R.E.A.Nos.850 and 851 of 1983. The Subordinate Judge viewed that petitioners 2 and 3 were necessary parties, as they purchased items 2, 3 and 5 from the 10th respondent on 23.6.1980. However, respondent filed C.M.A.No.680 of 1987 in this Court against the said direction to necessary parties. 4. The C.M.A. was presented in this Court on 3.8.1987 and taken on file on 4.8.1987. matter was posted for admission on 5.8.1987. On that day, the learned Judge who heard appeal for admission, passed the following order: "It is seen that this Court in C.R.P.No.737 of 1984 directed the learned Subordinate Judge dispose of the matter on merits after setting aside the order already passed in E.A.No.850 1983 on 6.1.1984. The learned Judge instead of complying with the order passed Court and disposing the matter on merits, has directed the petitioner to implead the parties in this petition by 10.8.1987. It is brought to my notice by learned counsel appellant that except the decree holder, respondents 2 to 9 were already ex parte regards respondent No. 10 is concerned, he has already parted with the property and Court has already found him not entitled to marshalling and so they are not necessary parties in the present proceedings. In the circumstances the court below is directed dispose of the application on merits without insisting to implead the other respondents appeal is ordered accordingly." Thus, the learned Judge allowed the appeal even without admitting the appeal or notice to the respondents therein. The matter was brought to this Court again mentioned ’ on 23.10.1987. It was represented to the learned Judge that there mistake in the number of the application which was stated as R.E.A.No.850 of 1983 correct number was R.E.A.No.851 of 1983. The matter was brought to this Court again mentioned ’ on 23.10.1987. It was represented to the learned Judge that there mistake in the number of the application which was stated as R.E.A.No.850 of 1983 correct number was R.E.A.No.851 of 1983. Thereupon, the learned Judge directed correction to be made and also gave a direction that the Subordinate Judge should the matter and dispose of the same positively on 9.11.1987. 5. In view of the order made in C.M.A.No.680 of 1987, referred to above, the Subordinate Judge allowed the application R.E.A.No.851 of 1983 on 25.11.1987 appointing receiver. That order was challenged in C.M.A.No.53 of 1988 in this Court by petitioner on the ground that the receiver was trying to dispossess the 1st petitioner 4. Subsequently, on 25.1.1988, the 1st petitioner entered into a compromise with decree-holder (Bank) and similarly, petitioners 2 and 3 also entered into a compromise. virtue of the settlement, the 1st petitioner paid Rs. 1,08,000 to the Bank and petitioners and 3 paid Rs3,82,760 to the Bank. On receipt of the amounts, the Bank filed a memo executing court, which read as follows: "This execution petition is not pressed since the matter is settled out of court. The decree holder prays that the Hon’ble Court may pleased to dismiss the petition as not pressed without costs and render justice." 6. Accordingly, the execution petition was dismissed by the executing court on and the receiver was discharged. Consequently, the 1st petitioner withdrew C.M.ANo.53 1988 as settled out of court. 7. The 1st petitioner herein filed R.E.A.No.294 of 1988 for discharging the receiver receivership and directing him to deliver the properties taken over by him and in his pursuant to the order in R.E.A.No.851 of 1983. He also filed R.E.A.No.230 of 1988 return of the title deeds filed in court under O.34, Rule 5, C.P.C. The 10th respondent E.P., viz., Sahadevan filed E.A.No.360 of 1988 for delivery of possession to him of items and 5 by the receiver. To the above petitions, the petitioners herein were not made Petitioners 2 and 3 filed R.E.A.No.963 to 965 of 1988 for impleading them as E.P.No.1 of 1967 and for directions. The executing court heard R.E.A.Nos.230, 294 of 1988 together and disposed them of by a long order containing about 100 pages, order part of it runs only to a page and a half. The executing court heard R.E.A.Nos.230, 294 of 1988 together and disposed them of by a long order containing about 100 pages, order part of it runs only to a page and a half. The rest is only a reproduction affidavits filed in support of the petitioners, counter affidavits and the written submitted by counsel. The executing court held that the 1st respondent was entitled possession of the properties from the receiver and allowed the petitions filed by petition filed by Sahadevan was dismissed. Consequent to the said order, thecourt dismissed R.E.A.Nos.963 to 965 of 1988 filed by petitioners 2 and 3. 8. These two revisions are filed against the order of the executing court in R.E.A.No.294 1988 directing the receiver to deliver possession of properties to the first respondent. petitioners obtained leave of this Court to file revision petitions as they were not the application before the executing court. There is no revision petition against the other applications. 9. A bare perusal of the facts stated above clearly shows that the first respondent entitled to get possession of the properties from the receiver. Item 4 was sold judgment-debtors including the first respondent to the first petitioner. I have referred to the relevant transactions. It was the first petitioner who got the court sale of the said item set aside by filing R.EA.No.443 of 1967 in R.E.P.No.143 of regards items 2, 3 and 5, petitioners 2 and 3 purchased from Sahadevan, who purchased them from Kandaswamy Chettiar, the court auction-purchaser. I have referred to the fact that the court auction-purchaser took possession of all the through court on 11.1.1971. Thus, the title and possession of the properties had gone the judgment-debtors long back and they had no interest in them thereafter. The the executing court in favour of the first respondent does not contain any appreciable reasoning. It states merely that the written arguments submitted by counsel for respondent were well founded. 10. Learned counsel for the first respondent contends before me that the executing dismissed the execution petition and the decree remains unsatisfied for the purpose record. Further, according to him, a fresh execution petition cannot be filed as it will barred. Hence, it is argued that the first respondent being one of the mortgagors is to take possession of the properties since the purchasers of the properties, petitioners, had not complied with the. Further, according to him, a fresh execution petition cannot be filed as it will barred. Hence, it is argued that the first respondent being one of the mortgagors is to take possession of the properties since the purchasers of the properties, petitioners, had not complied with the. terms of the conveyance and discharged mortgage decree. This contention is wholly without any substance. I have already referred the fact that the decree holder had filed a memo in the executing court stating matter has been settled out of court and it is on that basis the execution petition pressed. The petition was dismissed only on filing the memo. If there was no certification the payment of the decree amount and satisfaction of the decree, the decree-holder at all take advantage of the same; but certainly not the judgment-debtors. The debtors having parted with their title decades back cannot claim to be entitled to of the properties. In fact, in this case, there was no necessity for certification of separately. The memo filed by the decree-holder proves that the decree had been by settlement outside court. The fact that the decree-holder who is no longer interested executing the decree will not nullify the transactions between the judgment-debtors petitioners or enable the judgment-debtors to wriggle out of the same. 11. Learned counsel for the first respondent submits that the receiver took possession properties from the first respondent and, therefore, the latter is entitled to get possession. Even the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the application appointment of receiver viz., R.E.A.No.851 of 1983 prove that possession was not first respondent at that time. In fact, he would not have filed any application appointment of receiver if he had been in possession of the properties. On the other the allegations in the affidavit were that third parties were attempting to cause damage the properties and trying to waste the same. The first respondent referred to petitioners and 3 herein as third parties. But, they had in fact purchased the property from Sahadevan, who was a purchaser from the court auction purchaser. It is futile on the part of respondent to contend that he was in possession before the appointment of receiver that the receiver took charge of the properties from him. The records prove the report filed by the receiver does not also support the claim of the first respondent. 12. It is futile on the part of respondent to contend that he was in possession before the appointment of receiver that the receiver took charge of the properties from him. The records prove the report filed by the receiver does not also support the claim of the first respondent. 12. It is argued that the first respondent being the person at whose instance the was appointed, is entitled to get possession from the receiver on the termination proceedings. There is no substance in this contention. The receiver was not appointed proceeding between the petitioners on the one hand and the first respondent on the In fact, the first respondent secured the appointment of receiver behind the back petitioners, without impleading them as parties. The petitioners had no opportunity contest the application for appointment of receiver. The application was dismissed executing court consequent to the orders in R.E.A.Nos.881 and 883 of 1983 on a finding the first respondent was guilty of abuse of process of court. But, without bringing to the notice of this Court, the first respondent managed to get his C.R.P.Nos.736 and 1984 allowed by this Court on the ground that the executing court had passed non orders and the application for appointment of receiver remanded for fresh consideration any rate, the order appointing a receiver made by the executing court cannot bind petitioners and no reliance can be placed thereon by the first respondent to defeat the of the petitioners. 13. It is then contended that this Court held in C.M.A.No.680 of 1987 that the petitioners were not necessary parties to the petition for appointment of receiver and directed executing court to dispose of the petition within a specified time and, therefore, the order the executing court is binding on the petitioners and at any rate they cannot challenge validity thereof. I have already referred to the fact that the order in C.M.A.No.680 of was made at the stage of admission without even notice to the respondents. For the second time the first respondent was guilty of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi and he obtained the said order. He did not inform this Court of its earlier order in C.R.P.No.2337 of 1980 the orders of the executing court in R.E.A.Nos.881 and 883 of 1983. For the second time the first respondent was guilty of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi and he obtained the said order. He did not inform this Court of its earlier order in C.R.P.No.2337 of 1980 the orders of the executing court in R.E.A.Nos.881 and 883 of 1983. This Court was misled believe that the executing court was acting contrary to the directions issued by this Court C.R.P.No.737 of 1984 by directing the first respondent to implead the necessary parties R.E.A.No.850 of 1983. Hence, it is not open to the first respondent to rely on an order Me obtained from this Court by concealing the relevant facts. 14. Even otherwise, the order made in C.M.ANo.680 of 1987 is unsustainable as it is allowing an appeal at the admission stage without any notice to the respondents or giving opportunity to them to be heard. Such an order cannot bind the petitioners herein. In Management of Oriental Mercantile Agency v. The Presiding Officer and others, A.I.R. S.C. 1143: (1973)1 S.C.C. 287 , the Supreme Court had considered the validity of an order a Division Bench of this Court in a writ appeal while dismissing the appeal in limine, containing remarks prejudicial to the rights of the respondent. In that case, an industrial dispute was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. The question was whether non-employment of its workmen was justified and what relief they were entitled to. Labour Court held that the non-employment of the workmen was justified and they were entitled to any relief. A writ petition was filed by the workmen and a single Judge of Court held that the non-employment was unjustified and set aside the order of the Labour Court. The learned single judge remanded the matter back to the Labour Court for granting reliefs to the workmen on the basis of his finding. An appeal was filed by the management and it was dismissed in limine. But the Appellate Bench observed that the effect of the judgment single judge was to set the entire matter at large and the Labour Court should decide case afresh on all the issues. What happened thereafter in that case is not necessary purpose of this judgment, though the matter became intriguing and complicated on of subsequent orders passed by the single judge and Division Benches. What happened thereafter in that case is not necessary purpose of this judgment, though the matter became intriguing and complicated on of subsequent orders passed by the single judge and Division Benches. Suffice it for this to refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court on the order passed by the Bench referred to above. “We have no doubt that the learned Judges who dismissed W.A.No.113 of 1967 were, respect, in error in making observations which were calculated to prejudice the without giving them an opportunity of being heard. True, that the appeal of the management was dismissed but that was only in form. In substance, the management got the wanted, because it was really interested in getting over the judgment of Venkatadri, that the Labour Court to which the matter was remitted could commence adjudication. The Division Bench, by its order of summary dismissal, asked the Labour to start from scratch, in total violation of the principles of natural justice. We are also that, apart from this, the Division Bench was in error in taking the view that Venkatadri, had not expressed a final conclusion on the questions arising before him. It is unfortunate that the learned Judge remitted the matter to the Labour Court for ” fresh disposal he, as he ought to have, specifically directed the Labour Court to pass final orders accordance with his judgment, the unsavoury sequence of events following upon his could have been easily avoided. That, however, is not to indicate approval in any manner the view taken by the Division Bench that the learned judge had released the proceedings a fresh determination by the Labour Court. Thus, the order of the Division Bench Appeal 113 of 1967 is unsustainable.” 15. In The Director of Handlooms and Textiles, Office of the Director of Handlooms Textiles: Madras and others v. K.Venkatesan and others; (1988)1 M.L.J. 226 : (1988)1 605, a Division Bench of this Court strongly deprecated the practice of allowing writ at the stage of admission without issuing notice to the respondents, virtually granting relief desired by the petitioner though technically the order is termed as one of dismissal. The Division Bench observed as follows: “......Allowing a writ petition straightaway when it comes up for admission is therefore improper disposal, even though the power exercisable is under Art.226 of the Constitution India. The Division Bench observed as follows: “......Allowing a writ petition straightaway when it comes up for admission is therefore improper disposal, even though the power exercisable is under Art.226 of the Constitution India. The principles of fair play and justice are not excluded, when this power is invoked. has become necessary to elaborate upon this point because this is not the first case a writ petition without issue of notice to respondents and without hearing them, gets as it comes up for admission. There are instances in which writ petitions are dismissed admission stage, but directions are issued for compliance, which virtually results in petitioner getting the desired relief. This sort of directions or conditions imposed in admission but technically concluding the order as dismissed or ordered accordingly, would not proper or permissible, because to the extent relief is extended by such manner of leads to respondents without notice, being compelled to do certain acts, about which have not been heard at all.” 16. In Hajee Syed Ishaq Sahib v. Hajee A.Moqdoom Sheriff and others, 1988 T.L.N.J. had occasion to point out that when a revision or appeal is dismissed in limine without to the respondent, the decision might be binding on the petitioner or appellant and operate as res judicata against him in a subsequent proceeding with reference to decided against him but it cannot operate as res judicata as against the respondent who no opportunity to put forward his case. 17. Thus, the order in C.M.A.No.680 of 1987 is of no effect in so far as the petitioners concerned. They are, therefore, entitled to question the correctness and validity of the of the executing court appointing a receiver without hearing them. At any rate, that having passed now and the receiver having claimed to have taken possession, it is open to the petitioners to appear before the executing court and claim that they are to be put back in possession when the receiver is discharged. They are in no way prevented from making such a claim and enforcing their rights as against the first respondent, by the order of this Court in CM. A.No.680 of 1987 Hence, the contentions advanced by learned counsel for the first respondent are negatived. 18. The order passed by the executing court in R.E.A.No.294 of 1988 directing delivery possession to the first respondent is unsustainable and it is hereby set aside. A.No.680 of 1987 Hence, the contentions advanced by learned counsel for the first respondent are negatived. 18. The order passed by the executing court in R.E.A.No.294 of 1988 directing delivery possession to the first respondent is unsustainable and it is hereby set aside. These two civil revision petitions are allowed and R.E.A.No.294 of 1988 filed by the first respondent herein is dismissed. It is stated that pursuant to the order of the executing court the first respondent claims to have taken possession from the receiver. If that is so, he is bound deliver the property to the petitioners herein, who are rightfully entitled thereto. It is open the petitioners to file appropriate applications before the executing court, if necessary, for appropriate reliefs. It is made clear that neither the first respondent nor other judgment debtors have any right to claim possession of any of these properties as they have already parted with their title. The petitioners are entitled to their costs in these revision petitions which shall be paid by the first respondent. Petitions allowed.