State of M. P. v. Babulal — 1991 DIGILAW 454 (MP)

JUDGMENT R.K. Verma, J. -- 1. This judgment shall also govern the disposal of F.A. No. 83/91 (State of M.P. and Anr. v. Ramkishan & Anr.). 2. This is an appeal filed by the plaintiffs against the Order dated 11.5.91 passed by the learned Trial Court of 11th Additional Judge to the Court of the District Judge, Indore in Civil Suit No. 18-A of 1991 rejecting the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. apparently on two grounds viz.. that the suit was barred by limitation and that the suit does not disclose a cause of action. 3. The State of M.P. and the Commandant at Indore filed the instant suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction restraining the defendants from entering or carrying on any activity upon the lands in suit as well as for possession in case the plaintiffs are found not to be in possession of the lands. The suit lands are Khasra No. 206/1, 206/2, 209 and 212 of total area 4.8 acres in Gadrakhedi opposite Kila Maidan in the city of Indore. 4. The plaintiffs have also sought declaration that the decree obtained by defendant No.1 against the plaintiff No.1 on 27.1.1986 in Civil Suit No. 118-A/85 is null and void and without jurisdiction. 5. The learned Trial Court has by the impugned order rejected the plaint apparently on the grounds contained in clause (a) and (d) of Order 7 Rule 11 viz, that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action and that the suit appears from the statement in the plaint, to be barred by limitation. 6. In this appeal the plaintiff has challenged the correctness of the order rejecting the plaint. The rival contentions of the parties on the questions of non-disclosure of cause of action and bar of limitation are based upon the reading of the plaint. 7. Therefore, in order to appreciate and decide the rival contentions of the parties it is necessary first to examine the plaint averments with reference to the reliefs sought in the suit. 8. It has been pleaded in the plaint that the Maharaja of the Holkar State was the owner of the lands in suit and the defendants did not held the land under any of the tenures or in any right title or interest nor any right was created in favour of the defendants. 8. It has been pleaded in the plaint that the Maharaja of the Holkar State was the owner of the lands in suit and the defendants did not held the land under any of the tenures or in any right title or interest nor any right was created in favour of the defendants. The plaintiffs have by reference to Revenue Laws obtaining in the earstwhile Holkar State, Madhya Bharat State and the present State of M.P., which governed the suit lands, it has been pleaded in first 15 paragraphs of the plaint that the ownership of the lands in suit vested in the State Government and the defendants never held the said lands as Bhumiswamis or Government lessees or occupancy tenants under the M.P. Land Revenue Code nor any indenture was executed in favour of the defendants by the plaintiffs creating any title in them. 9. In paragraph 16 of the plaint the plaintiffs have pleaded that the title of defendant No.1 to the lands in dispute has been investigated in earlier judicial proceedings and it has been finally held that the defendant No.1 does not have any right, title or interest in relation to these lands. 10. After referring to the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 the plaintiffs have pleaded, in para 19 of the plaint that even assuming that the defendant No.1 held the land in dispute in any right, title or interest whatsoever, he was not entitled to held any land in excess of the ceiling limit of 1500 Sq. Mts. since any land in excess of the ceiling limit is liable to be acquired compulsorily under Section 10 of the Ceiling Act. 11. In Paragraphs 20 to 26 of the plaint, it has been pleaded that in 1985 the defendant No.1 filed a suit (C.S. No. 118-A/85) in the Court of the VIth Civil Judge Class II, Indore, against the State of M.P. and the Tahsildar Nazul Indore, who were not validly served with the summons of the suit and that an ex-parte decree on the basis of ex-parte evidence full of untruth and suppression of facts was passed by the learned Civil Judge on 23.12.1985 against the plaintiffs who are, therefore, not bound by the impugned ex-parte decree. 12. 12. In paragraph 27 of the plaint the plaintiffs have pleaded that a perusal of the plain t in the above suit and the testimony recorded therein shows no reference to the earlier judicial proceedings referred to in paragraph 16 of the plaint and as such, the ex-parte decree obtained by the defendants is based on suppression of material facts on the part of defendant No.1 which constitutes a fraud on the Court. 13. In paragraph 29 it has further been pleaded that it was suppressed from the learned Civil Judge that no such suit could be filed in view of the fact that the matter was barred on the principle of res-judicata by virtue of the decree earlier passed by the learned Civil Judge Class II, Indore in Civil Suit No. 122/67 against the defendant No.1. 14. In paragraph 30 and subsequent paragraphs of the plaint, the plaintiff has averred that the defendant No.1, while obtaining the impugned decree on allegation of adverse possession, suppressed from the learned Civil Judge the fact that in the earlier proceedings up to the Board of Revenue, the defendant No. 1 had made a claim of title alleging his status as 'Maurusi Krishak' i.e. a lessee and that his claim of title was negatived. The pleadings imply that the plea of adverse possession of defendant No.1 for an uninterrupted period of 30 years was liable to the negatived even in ex-parte proceedings in suit, had the defendant No.1 disclosed the fact of earlier proceedings wherein he claimed himself to be a lessee. 15. It has been pleaded in paragraph 34 of the plaint that the equitable reliefs of declaration and injunction could not have been granted to the defendant No.1 who had not come to Court with clean hands, since he had deliberately suppressed material facts from the learned Civil Judge. 16. It has been pleaded that the defendant No.1 claims to have executed a sale-deed in favour of defendant No.2 Housing Co- operative Society in respect of the suit lands on 3.12.87 without having any lawful right, title or interest and that the sale was violative of the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act and that the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that the sale by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 is invalid. 17. 17. The plaintiffs have pleaded in para 43.2 of the plaint that the defendant No.1 asserted title by adverse possession for the first time in the Civil Suit No. 118-A of 1985 filed on 2.5.1985 which was decided ex-parte on 27.1.86 and before that he claimed his status as ' Maurusi Krishak' and as such, the instant suit has been filed within limitation reckened from the time of such assertion of adverse possession by defendant No. 1. 18. After filing of the suit by the plaintiff on 2.4.91, the notice was issued to the defendants for 27.6.91 for framing of Issues. The defendants instead of filing a written-statement filed an application under Order 7, Rule 11 read with section 151 C.P.C. raising two objections in paras 3 and 4 thereof that the instant suit is barred by the principle of res judicata in view of the decree dated 27.1.86 passed in Civil Suit No. 118-A/85 and that the suit was also barred by limitation. But from the discussion in the impugned order it appears that while addressing arguments in support of their application under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. the defendant also raised an additional contention that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action and that contention has been accepted by the learned Trial Court, As regards the defendant's contention grounded on the plea of limitation the learned Trial Court has held that the plaintiffs' relief for declaration that the decree dated 27.1.86 passed ex-parte against the plaintiff No.1 in Civil Suit No. 118-A/85, is null and void and without jurisdiction, is barred by limitation. 19. The learned Trial Court has, however, held that the question of relief of other declarations that the plaintiffs are owners of the land in suit and the defendant have no right title or interest therein and that the sale of the land by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 is illegal, null and void, can arise only after the plaintiffs arc held entitled to the relief of declaration that the ex-parte decree dated 27.1.80 passed in Civil Suit No. 118-A of 1985 is null and void. But the learned Trial Court has held the plaintiffs not entitled to the declaration that the decree dated 27.1.86 is null and void or without jurisdiction as the suit for such declaration was barred by limitation. 20. But the learned Trial Court has held the plaintiffs not entitled to the declaration that the decree dated 27.1.86 is null and void or without jurisdiction as the suit for such declaration was barred by limitation. 20. The learned Trial Court also found that the plaintiffs' averments in the suit did not disclose a cause of action. 21. The learned Trial Court has, therefore rejected the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC. by the impugned order on the grounds that the suit was barred by limitation and that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action. 22. Being aggrieved by the order rejecting the plaint the plaintiffs have filed this appeal. 23. The learned counsel for the appellants has challenged the rejection of the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. by the learned Trial Court and has raised the following three contentions in that behalf viz.. (1) that the plaint having been admitted and summons to settle issues, served, the defendants could not be allowed to raise an objection to the maintainability of the suit without filing the written-statement; (2) that the learned trial Court was wrong in holding that the instant suit was barred by limitation and (3) that the learned trial Court was wrong in allowing the objection that the plaint docs not disclose a cause of action. 24. As regards the first contention it has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that the instant suit was filed on 2.4.91 and the plaintiff was directed to remain present on 5.4.91. On 5.4.91 the Court directed registration of the suit and issue of summons to the defendants for settlement of issues on the next date of hearing, which was fixed as 27.6.91. But upon service of summons, the defendants instead of filing written- statement, filed an application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC on 1.5.91 and pressed for its early hearing. The plaintiffs were issued notice of this application by special process and the case was fixed for 6.5.91. On 6.5.91 the plaintiffs appeared and asked for time to file reply to the defendants' application under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. The case was next fixed for 9.5.91 when the plaintiffs prayed for further time for filing reply to the defendant's application. On 6.5.91 the plaintiffs appeared and asked for time to file reply to the defendants' application under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. The case was next fixed for 9.5.91 when the plaintiffs prayed for further time for filing reply to the defendant's application. Prayer was also made on behalf of the plaintiff to fix the case for hearing on the application after the summer vacation. The learned Trial Court rejected the prayer of the plaintiffs and fixed the case on 11.5.91 which was the last working day before closing of the Courts for summer vacation, for reply and arguments. On 11.5.91 the plaintiff filed a number of documents referred to in the plaint and also the reply to defendants' application under order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. In the reply the plaintiffs raised the objection that the defendants cannot challenge the maintainability of the suit without filing the written-statement. After hearing the parties, the learned trial Court has by the impugned order allowed the defendants' application under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. and rejected the plaint. 25. Grievance has been made by the learned counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs that the learned trial Court acted with undue haste in considering the question of maintainability of the suit in the application of the defendants under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. without affording adequate opportunity to the plaintiffs to meet the objection of the defendants. It has been pointed out that the plaintiffs appeared on 6.5.91 in response to notice issued to them for hearing of the application under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. and after giving two short dates for reply and hearing the learned Trial Court has on 11.5.91 passed the impugned order of rejection of the plaint. 26. Learned Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs has cited a Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Nishit M. Prabhu Verlekar v. Chandranath Vinayak Dhume and others; (A.I.R. 1986 Bombay 46) in support of his submission that once a summons for settlement of issues is served on the defendants, as in the instant case, they are bound to file their written- statement and there is no provision whatsoever in the Code which provides that a defendant can raise any objection to the maintainability of the suit by any application before filing his defence. The rejection of the plaint for declaration of ownership of land, on the basis of an application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC., made by the defendants without filing their written- statement was held to be improper in that case, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand, has submitted that the preliminary objection to the maintainability of the suit under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC. should be determined at the threshold and that it is upon the Court to exercise the power under O.7, R.11 CPC, at any stage. In support of his submission the learned counsel has cited three decisions of the Supreme Court viz. Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi (AI.R. 1986 S.C. 1253); Samar Singh v. Kedamath and others (AI.R. 1987 S.C. 1926) and T. Arivandandam v. T. V. Satyapal and another; (AI.R. 1977 S.C. 2421). 27. It has, however, not been shown, apart from emphasizing that the plaint should have been examined at the instance of the defendants, only after their filing of the written-sk1tement, as to how on account of short dates given by the learned Trial Court for hearing of the application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC., the plaintiffs have been prejudiced. It has also not been shown that the learned Trial Court, while deciding the application under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. has considered or placed reliance on any material outside the averments in the plaint, so as to vitiate exercise of power under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. and render order of rejection illegal on that account. 28. Accordingly, in my opinion, the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, is not substantial and is, therefore, rejected. 29. As regards the second contention of the learned counsel for the appellants relating to trial Court's finding of the suit being barred by limitation, it has been submitted that the learned Trial Court has wrongly assumed that Article 59 of the Limitation Act 1963 governing the suit for setting aside decree, applied to the instant suit filed by the State Government also. 30. Article 59 of the Limik1tion Act, 1963 provides a limitation of three years for a suit by a private person to set-aside a decree and that the period of limitation is to be reckoned from the time when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the decree set-aside first became known to him. 30. Article 59 of the Limik1tion Act, 1963 provides a limitation of three years for a suit by a private person to set-aside a decree and that the period of limitation is to be reckoned from the time when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the decree set-aside first became known to him. It is the contention of the learned counsel that the limik1tion for the instant suit riled by the Skate Government will be governed by Article 112 of the Act which provides that the period oflimik1tion for any suit by or on behalf of any State Government shall be 30 years and that the time from which the period begins to run, shall be the time when the period of limitation would begin to run under the Act against a like suit by a private person. The like suit by a private person is one governed by Article 59 of the Act wherein the time from which period begins to run is the time when the facts entitling the plaintiffs to have the decree set-aside first became known to him. Accordingly, the learned trial Court should have seen whether or not the instant suit has been filed within a period of 30 years reckoned from the time when the facts entitling the plaintiffs to have the decree set-aside first became known to them. The instant suit seeking a declaration that the decree obtained by defendant No.1 against the Sk1te Government plaintiff No.1 on 27.1.86, in Civil Suit No. 118-A/85 is null and void and without jurisdiction, has been filed on 2.4.91 and is, therefore, within limik1tion, if Article 112 of the Limitation Act is held applicable instead of Article 59 which the learned Trial Court has applied in the insk1nt case. The learned counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs has submitted that Article 112 of the Act of 1963 which provides for a limitation of 30 years is in substitution of the equivalent Article 149 of the old Limitation Act of 1908 which provided a limitation period of 60 years for similar suits by the Government and that Article 112 of the present Act and Article 149 of the old Act have been applicable for all kinds of action that the Government may choose to bring by way of suit. Reliance has been placed in this connection on a decision of this Court in Union of India v. R.C. Jail and another ( 1958 JLJ 611 ). 31. Learned counsel for the appellants has cited a few decisions to show the applicability of Art. 112 or its equivalent Article 149 of the Act in Government suits where in like suits by private persons different Articles of Limitation apply. These are, AI.R. 1915 Bombay 197 (Manilal Gangadas Desai & ors. v. Secretary of State and another), (1978) 48 Camp. Cases. 277 (Union of India. v. National Over seas and Grindlays Bank Ltd., and I.L.R. (1970) 1 Pb. & Hrya., (Private Lall Khanna v. The State Bank of Patiala & Ors. ) The question of limitation, therefore, deserved consideration and closer examination and the plaint could not be rejected by holding the suit prima facie barred by limitation 32. It appears to me that Art. 112 of the Limitation Act is an omnibus provision of Limitation applicable to the suits instituted by the Government. There is no doubt that Article 112 or the Act of 1963 or its equivalent provision or Art. 149 in the old Act of 1908 makes a distinction between claims of Government and claims of individuals by providing much longer period or limitation for suits instituted by the Government. But this distinction is made on a rational basis of classification and is held valid under Art. 14 of the Constitution in a decision of the Supreme Court in Nev Rattan Mal and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan (AI.R. 1961 S.C. 1704) wherein it has been observed that the fact that in the case of the government, if a claim becomes barred by limitation, the loss falls on the public i.e. on the community in general and to the benefit of the private individual who derives advantage by the lapse of time, in itself, would appear to indicate as sufficient ground for differentiating between the claims of an individual and the claims of the community at large and moreover it is a known fact that the Governmental machinery does not move as quickly as the individuals. The learned Trial Court is, in my opinion, not right in holding the suit as time-barred by applying Art. 59, applicable to a suit by private person to the instant suit filed by the State Government. 33. The learned Trial Court is, in my opinion, not right in holding the suit as time-barred by applying Art. 59, applicable to a suit by private person to the instant suit filed by the State Government. 33. The third contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is directed against the Trial Court's finding that the plaint docs not disclose "a" cause of action. It has been submitted that the defendants' application under order 7, Rule 11 CPC does not raise this objection and as such, the learned Trial Court ought not to have considered this objection merely on oral submissions. I do not think that the learned counsel is right in this submission of his, since Order 7, Rule 11 (a) C.P.C. which provides that the plaint shall be rejected where it does not disclose a cause of action, confers upon the Court the power to reject the plaint on the ground of non-disclosure of the cause of action and there appears no statutory impediment in the exercise of this power on the ground that the defendants have not raised any objection in this behalf in their application under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. But in this connection, however, the submission of the learned counsel that appellants have not been given adequate opportunity to meet the objection as to maintainability of the suit under order 7, Rule 11 (a) C.P.C. assumes importance since it cannot be disputed that the appellants were required to meet the new objection of non-disclosoure of cause of action in the plaint without prior notice and for the first time at the time of argument." only. The plaintiffs prayer for adjournment, having been refused before commencement of the arguments the plaintiffs could not have repeated the prayer for adjournment for meeting the new objection taken at the time of arguments and were, therefore, prejudiced. 34. After having gone through the plaint carefully and examined the averments with reference to the reliefs sought in the suit, as briefly referred to in paragraphs 8 to 16 above, I am of the opinion that it is wrong to conclude that the facts pleaded in the plaint do not disclose a cause of action. 34. After having gone through the plaint carefully and examined the averments with reference to the reliefs sought in the suit, as briefly referred to in paragraphs 8 to 16 above, I am of the opinion that it is wrong to conclude that the facts pleaded in the plaint do not disclose a cause of action. The plaint averments do contain essential bundle of facts on which the plaintiffs based their title and their right to relief as also the fact that the defendants disputed the title which necessitated filing of the instant suit for declaration of title. 35. It is clear from the pleadings in the plaint that the appellant State continued to be the owner of the suit lands from the time of erstwhile Holkar State till date and the defendant No.1 had in the past claimed therein the right and status of a lessee. It is also apparent from the plaint averments that the question of title was decided against the defendant No.1 in respect of the suit lands in earlier Civil Suit No. 122/67 decided by Civil Judge Class II, Indore as also in the earlier proceedings culminating in the decision of Board of Revenue. It also appears from the plaint averments that it was upon fraudulent concealment of these earlier decisions that the defendants obtained the ex parte decree of title in respect of the lands in dispute in the subsequent Civil Suit No. 118-A/85 dated 27.1.86. It is the plaintiffs' case on the plaint that the said ex parte decree is inoperative, being tainted by fraud committed by the defendant No. 1. The plaintiffs' pleading is also to the effect that the defendant No.1 obtained ex-parte decree against the State and the Collector without their knowledge of the suit because of want of proper service of summons on them and by deliberately concealing the existence of earlier civil Court decision as well as Revenue Court decision conclusively deciding the question of title against the defendant No. 1. 36. The argument made on behalf of the respondent-defendants has been that the particulars of the fraud have not been pleaded by the plaintiffs and as such, the ex-parte decree declaring the title of the defendant No.1 in Civil Suit No. 118-A/85 is not liable to be challenged on the ground of alleged fraud. 36. The argument made on behalf of the respondent-defendants has been that the particulars of the fraud have not been pleaded by the plaintiffs and as such, the ex-parte decree declaring the title of the defendant No.1 in Civil Suit No. 118-A/85 is not liable to be challenged on the ground of alleged fraud. It has been submitted that the ex-parte decree, therefore, stands and operates as res judicata to bar the instant suit for declaration of title filed by the plaintiffs. On such argument the learned lower Court appears to have concluded that on a meaningful reading of the plaint, no right to sue is disclosed and the suit can be said to be meritless. 37. To my mind the plaint averments, if analysed legally and logically, cannot lead to the conclusion as reached by the learned lower Court. The plaintiffs have, in effect, pleaded that the ex-parte decree is not binding on the State of Madhya Pradesh or the Collector, Indore or the Tahsildar Nazul since they were not legally served in that suit and that the defendants committed fraud upon the Court by deliberately suppressing the fact that there is in existence an earlier decree passed by the Court of Civil Judge Class II, Indore, against the defendant No.1 on the question of title of suit lands, which created a bar of res judicata, against the subsequent Civil Suit No. 118- A/85 which has been wrongly decreed ex-parte. These averments of the plaintiffs call for decision of the issues; whether there was regular and sufficient service in law on the defendants in the Civil Suit No. 118-A/85 so as to make the ex-parte decree binding and operative against the appellant" and whether the non-disclosure in Civil Suit No. 118-A/85 for declaration of title filed by the defendant No.1, of the fact of existence of earlier decisions determining the question of title, amounted to fraud vitiating the ex-parte decree passed therein. 38. The learned lower Court, as it appears from the impugned order, was also obsessed by the consideration of the defendants' plea taken in their reply that the ex-parte decree passed in Civil Suit No. 118-A/85 created a bar of res judicata for the instant suit for declaration of title. 38. The learned lower Court, as it appears from the impugned order, was also obsessed by the consideration of the defendants' plea taken in their reply that the ex-parte decree passed in Civil Suit No. 118-A/85 created a bar of res judicata for the instant suit for declaration of title. The defendants' plea of bar of res judicate cannot be considered while considering the question of rejection of the plaint on the grounds stated under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC. The plea of bar of res judicata can be considered only after the defendants filed their written statement in defence of the suit. In that connection, the effect of earlier decisions on the question of title against defendant No. 1 in Civil Court as well as in Revenue Court as pleaded in the plaint, can also be examined during the trial of the suit. 39. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the application of the defendants under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC does not make any reference to cause of action or absence thereof, in the plaint and that the learned lower Court while passing the impugned order, does not appear to have applied its mind whether particulars of fraud are lacking as is the contention made by the learned counsel for the respondents in this Court and that even -if the pleadings were to be considered as inadequate or lacking in particulars the plaintiffs could have been ordered to furnish particulars. It has been submitted that if the learned Lower Court has gone further then the objection raised under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC for examining the plaint with reference to clause (a) thereof as well, it should have given adequate opportunity to the plaintiffs so as to avoid surprise to them. The rejection of the plaint, in the circumstances, was not justified without giving opportunity to the plaintiffs for amending the plaint so as to supply further particulars, if at all, found wanting. It has been submitted that the averments in the plaintiff para 21 alleging that the service of summons in the earlier suit was not proper or valid, should have been accepted prima facie as correct and it cannot be said upon the totality of the facts pleaded that there is no cause of action, requiring examination on merits. 40. It has been submitted that the averments in the plaintiff para 21 alleging that the service of summons in the earlier suit was not proper or valid, should have been accepted prima facie as correct and it cannot be said upon the totality of the facts pleaded that there is no cause of action, requiring examination on merits. 40. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and in view of the discussion aforesaid, I am of the opinion that the plaint filed by the plaintiffs in the instant suit, has been wrongly thrown out on the ground of absence of cause of action as well as on the ground of bar of limitation. The plaint averments disclose sufficient cause of action deserving trial of the suit on merits and the claim prima facie appears to be one made within limitation. The impugned order, therefore, is liable to be set- aside. 41. Learned counsel for respondents-defendant" has in his arguments in support of the impugned order laid stress on the aspect that the defendant No.2 Housing Co-operative Society is a bona fide purchaser without notice from defendant No.1 and that the Society has allotted plots of land to its members and is going ahead with the development of the land in pursuance of permission obtained from government-authorities. This matter upon a proper defence being raised by the defendants in their written-statement, which they may now file, can be investigated and its effect determined during the trial. 42. As regard the connected appeal (F.A.No. 83/91). which is directed against an identical order passed under Order?, Rule 11 CPC is C.S. No. 19-A/91 wherein similar relief of declaration of title including declaration that the ex-parte decree passed in C.S. No. 249-A/85 dated 23.12.1985 is illegal, null and void and without jurisdiction has been prayed for, the same also deserves to be allowed. 43. In the result this appeal as well as F.A. 83/91 are allowed. The impugned orders rejecting the plaint are set-aside and the cases are remanded for being proceeded with in accordance with law. In the circumstances there shall, however, be no order as to cost.