Judgment :- Nainar Sundaram, J. This writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned Judge in W.P.No.1628 of 1990. The petitioner in the writ petition is the appellant herein respondents in the writ petition are the respondents herein. Convenience suggests to us writ petition while dealing with the controversy in the writ appeal. The petitioner is working as a B.T. Assistant, is the fourth respondent school. The post of the headmaster at the fourth respondent-school fell vacant on 31.5.1988, on account of the retirement of the previous incumbent. So far as the qualification of the petitioner to the post is concerned, the petitioner is qualified. The petitioner claims that the post of the headmaster should be filled up as G.O.Ms.No.1297, Education Department, dated 21.7.1979. The foundation for this claim the petitioner is referable to Clause 2(b)(i), which lays down that the vacancies in the of headmasters of middle schools due to death, retirement, resignation, etc. shall be filled by the senior-most among persons working as Secondary Grade Teachers or in other cadres of trained teachers, but qualified for B.Ed. Tamil Pandit. According to the petitioner, he being the senior-most teacher should be preferred. He came to this Court by way of the petition asking for a writ of mandamus to appoint the petitioner as headmaster of the fourth respondent school pursuant to G.O.Ms.No.1297. The move of the petitioner was counter acted by respondents 3 and 4 and the main question that cropped up for consideration the contentions raised by the parties, centered around the enforcibility of clause 2(b)(i) G.O.Ms.No.1297, so far as the fourth-respondent school is concerned. That the fourth respondent school is a minority school is not in dispute. It was argued before the learned single Judge on behalf of the petitioner that Sec.19 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulations) Act, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Act, enabling the Government to make rules regulating the number, qualifications and conditions of service (including promotion, pay, allowances, leave, pension, provident fund, insurance and age of retirement and rights as respects disciplinary matters) of the teachers and other persons employed any private school, should govern minority schools also and under Sec.14 of the directions also could be given, and viewed from either of the angles, G.O.Ms.No.1297, has be implemented and the fourth respondent school cannot demur over the implementation the same. On behalf of respondents 3 and 4, it was contended that G.O.Ms.No.1297, would amount to infringement of the minority rights guaranteed under Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India, and hence has got to be ignored and the fourth-respondent school must have a hand with reference to the choice of the headmasters. On behalf of respondents 3 and 4, pronouncement of Srinivasan, J. in Ethiraf v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1990)1 M.L.J. 284, well as the earlier pronouncement of Ramanujam, J. in The Meston Training College Association, Madras v. Joint Director of School Education, Madras and others, W.P.No.5186 1981, Order dated 16.11.1982, were pressed into service. It must be noted that Srinivasan, J. in Ethiraj v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1990)1 M.L.J. 284, has followed the ratio Ramanujam, J.) in The Meston Training College Association, Madras v. Joint Director School Education, Madras and others, W.P.No.5186 of 1981, Order dated 16.11.1982. petitioner placed reliance on the pronouncement of a learned single Judge of the High Court of Kerala in Fr.Francis Fernandez v. District Educational Officer, Ernakulam and others, (1989)3 S.L.J. 15, where there was a challenge of an order of the State Government directing the appointment of Senior-most teacher as headmaster as violative of fundamental right under Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India. The learned single Judge of the High Court of Kerala repelled the challenge and held that the right minority managements in the choice of headmasters of their schools is not absolute could be regulated by statutory provisions relating to promotion of teaching staff. 2. The learned single Judge in the present case in substance opined that the right management to appoint headmasters according to their own rules and regulations would stand infringed if G.O.Ms.No.1297, has got to be applied. 2. The learned single Judge in the present case in substance opined that the right management to appoint headmasters according to their own rules and regulations would stand infringed if G.O.Ms.No.1297, has got to be applied. The learned single Judge expressed the view that the senior-most teacher may have an ideology which is totally contrary to ideology of the minority institution and hence such choice will amount to interference with the administration in their hands guaranteed under Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India a result, the learned single Judge held that clause 2(b)(i) of G.O.Ms.No.1297 cannot enforced against minority institutions; and the learned single judge ordered the writ petition in the following terms: “ As a necessary concomitant of the above reasoning, it follows that if the senior teacher like the petitioner in this case is entitled otherwise to be appointed as a headmaster, there is no reason why he should not be appointed, unless the management has adequate reasons to ignore his claims as affecting their minority fight. While, therefore, upholding the right of the respondents 3 and 4 to fill up the post of headmaster in the respondent school without reference to the offending portions of the G.O.Ms.No.1297, Education, dated 21.7.1979, I direct the respondents 3 and 4 to consider the claims of petitioner also. It is only if the respondents 3 and 4 come to the conclusion on valid reason that the petitioner is ill-equipped to be appointed as headmaster or grounds affecting their rights guaranteed under Art.30 of the Constitution of India, that the respondents 3 and 4 appoint some other person of their choice as headmaster. Since the post of headmaster kept vacant for a long time, I direct the respondents 3 and 4 to fill up the post within weeks from today in accordance with the directions given above. The writ petition is ordered in the above terms. There will be no order as to costs. ” As already noted, this writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge. 3. The writ petition is ordered in the above terms. There will be no order as to costs. ” As already noted, this writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge. 3. Mr.K.Chandru, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the pronouncements of this Court, referred to before the learned single Judge and preferred him for being followed, do not tell anything on the subject in issue in the present case and wants us to adopt the reasoning of the learned single Judge of the High Court of Kerala Fr.Francis Fernandez v. District Educational Officer, Ernakulam and others, (1989)3 S.L.J. We went through the pronouncements of the two learned single Judges of this court, were referred to before and relied on by the learned single Judge. We find that they entirely on a different aspect, namely, with reference to availability of an appellate But by eschewing those two pronouncements from application to the facts of the case, we cannot straightway find a solution and give an answer in favour of the petitioner. 4. The moot question that arises for consideration is as to whether clause 2(b)(i) G.O.Ms.No.1297 in anyway infringes the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.30(i) Constitution to minority institutions, like the fourth respondent school. Profuse is the law even at the level of the highest court in the land, which has spoken on the scope ambit of Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India. But, apart from taking guidance on principles from the pronouncements, we must say that each case has got to be decided own facts taking note of the implication of the act, rule, regulation, order or proceeding, which has come to be made and the impact, it may have on the right guaranteed to institutions under Art.30(i) of the Constitution of India. Here we find a case where clause 2(b)(i) of G.O.Ms.No.1297, there is a prescription that in the choice of headmasters the middle, schools to fill up vacancies arising due to death, retirement, resignation, Middle Schools are directed to fill up the posts by the senior most among persons working Secondary Grade Teachers or in other cadres of trained teachers, but qualified B.Ed./Tamil Pandit. 5. 5. With regard to the scope of and the sanctity to be annexed to the right guaranteed Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India, we find an elaborate discussion by a Bench of this Court in The Madras Diocese of the Church of South India State of Tamil Nadu, W.P.No.295 of 1975, Order dated 24.9.1976, and it is worthwhile make the following extracts from the said pronouncements: "Under Art.30(1) all minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The right guaranteed this Article is a fundamental right available to religious or linguistic minorities. This among the group of rights relating to freedom of religion, freedom to manage affairs, freedom as to attendance at religious institution or religious worship in educational institutions, cultural and educational rights. Art.25(1) ensures that all are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice propagate religion; but this right is subject to public order, morality and health, and other provisions of Part-Ill of the Constitution. Though the right under Art.25(1) is of amplitude, it is, however, not absolute. The right is subject to public order, morality health and the other provisions of the part. Clause (2) of the Article further abridges scope of the right. Again, the freedom to manage religious affairs given by Art.26 to denomination or any section thereof is not absolute either, because it is subject the order, morality and health again. But, the right under each of Arts.28 to 30 is not subjected to any limitation or restriction. The right guaranteed in Art.30(1) is in absolute terms, abridgement of the substance of the rights is therefore, permissible. Unlike the under Art.19, the right under Art.30(1) cannot even be subjected to reasonable restriction public interest. So, the right of a religious or linguistic minority to make its own choice educational institutions, establish and administer the same, is of the widest amplitude, untrammelled. The test being what is good or is in the interest of the religious or minority, no other criterion like reasonableness or public interest can avail to abridge scope and effect, for otherwise the right will lose its purpose. The right is in two parts right to establish; and (2) the right to administer. The test being what is good or is in the interest of the religious or minority, no other criterion like reasonableness or public interest can avail to abridge scope and effect, for otherwise the right will lose its purpose. The right is in two parts right to establish; and (2) the right to administer. The right to establish an educational institution is secured all religious or linguistic minorities, which include not merely religious linguistic minority communities, but also individuals belonging to either of them. A belonging to a religious or linguistic minority community, has unbridled and absolute establish any institution of his choice, which means that any restriction which will have effect of abridging that right will be unconstitutional. Likewise the right to administer from any limitation, so that a religious or linguistic minority community or an individual belonging to either has the whole field of administration of the institution open, uninhibited by any interference. A religious or linguistic minority, including an individual belonging has unfettered right to found any educational institution of its or his choice, and administer according to its or his wish and discretion. But as administration does not maladministration, any regulation which will ensure proper administration will be permissible. So also will be permissible any regulation, procedural in character, which is designed further the objects of the right and which does not in fact and substance, eat into the of the right. While regulation of the right, therefore, is not open to objection, any restriction in the sense that it has the effect of abridging the right or making in road into its substance, call it regulation or restriction, is unconstitutional. That, in our opinion, is the ambit effect of the right under Art.30(1) and as laid down in the Supreme Court cases from Education Bill, (1969)S.C.R. 995, to St.Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat, (1974)1 719.A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1389. While there is this uniformity of opinion including in the decision of the Supreme Court in the Gandhi Faiszeam College, Saharanpur v. University Agra, Civil Appeal No.1611 of 1969, as to the scope and effect of Art.30(1) as expounded the different cases, the problem in each case has presented seemingly differing approaches, or points of view or yardstick in testing the validity of an allegedly offending provision or rule, or regulation or administrative order vis-a-vis the impact on the fundamental right. But we should think though the various decisions of the Supreme Court, as we see them, absolute character the right has always been kept in view and any erosion on its substance has not permitted. Most of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court were reviewed by Bench of the same Court in St.Xavier College v. State of Gujarat, (1974)1 S.C.C. 719: 1974 S.C. 1389. 6. In Sidharajbhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 540, this is what has been observed: “The right established by Art.30(1) is a fundamental right declared in terms absolute the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Art.19 it is not subject to reasonable restrictions is intended to be a real right for the protection of the minorities in the matter of setting educational institutions of their own choice. The right is intended to be effective and is be whittled down by so-called regulative measures conceived in the interest not minority educational institution, but of the public or the nation as a whole. If every which while maintaining the formal character of a minority institution destroys the power administration is held justifiable because it is in the public or national interest, though its interest as an educational institution the right guaranteed by Art.30(1) will be ‘teasing illusion’ a promise of unreality. Regulations which may lawfully be imposed either legislative or executive action as a condition of receiving grant or of recognition must directed to making the institution while retaining its character as a minority institution effective as an educational institution. Such regulation must satisfy a dual test the reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution and is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the community or other person who resort to it. “With regard to what type of regulations would not amount to restrictions, the observations run as follows: “Regulation made in the true interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline, sanitation, morality, public order and the like may undoubtedly be imposed. Such regulations are not restrictions on the substance of the right which is guaranteed; they secure the functioning of the institutions, in matters educational.” 7. In Rt.Rev.Aldo Maria Patroni v. Kesavan and others, A.I.R. 1965 Ker. 75(F.B.), countenanced that:” The post of the headmaster is of pivotal importance in the file of a school. Such regulations are not restrictions on the substance of the right which is guaranteed; they secure the functioning of the institutions, in matters educational.” 7. In Rt.Rev.Aldo Maria Patroni v. Kesavan and others, A.I.R. 1965 Ker. 75(F.B.), countenanced that:” The post of the headmaster is of pivotal importance in the file of a school. Around wheels the tone and temper of the institution; on him depends the continuity of its traditions, the maintenance of discipline and the efficiency of its teaching. The right to choose headmaster is perhaps the most important facet of the right to administer a school; has to be held that the imposition of any trammel thereon-except to the extent of prescribing the requisite qualifications and experience-cannot but be considered as a violation right guaranteed by Art.30(1) of the Constitution. To hole otherwise will be to make right’s teaching illusion, a promise of unreality ’. 8. In Mother Provincial v. State, A.I.R. 1970 Ker. 196, the Full Bench of the High Court Kerala set down the proposition in the following terms: “Art.30(1) is not a character for maladministration; regulation, so that the right to may be the better exercised for the benefit of the institution is permissible; but the one goes beyond that and imposes, what is in truth, not a mere regulation but a on the right to administer, the article comes into play and the interference cannot be by pleading the interests of the general public; the interests justifying interference be the interests of the institution concerned.” 9. In State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2079, the proposition countenanced runs as follows: “Art.30(1) contemplates two rights which are separated in point of time. The first right initial right to establish institutions of minority’s choice. It is irrelevant that in addition minority community others from other minority communities or even from the majority community can take advantage of institutions. The next part of the right relates to the Administration of such institutions means ‘ management of the affairs ’ of the institutions. This management must be free control so that the founders or their nominees can mould the institutions as they think and in accordance with their ideas of how the interests of the community in general and institutions in particular will be best served. There is, however, an exception that standards of education are not a part of management as such. This management must be free control so that the founders or their nominees can mould the institutions as they think and in accordance with their ideas of how the interests of the community in general and institutions in particular will be best served. There is, however, an exception that standards of education are not a part of management as such. The minority institutions cannot be allowed to fall below the standards of excellence expected of educational institutions, or under the guise of exclusive right of management, to decline to follow general pattern.” 10. In Director of School Education v. Rev. Brother G.Arogiasamy, (1971)1 M.L.J. 325 , Bench of this Court summed up the proposition in the following terms. “Art.30(1) of the Constitution entitles a minority community, whether based on religion language, not only to establish but also to administer educational institutions of their These rights are absolute and unqualified. They are not subject to any restrictions unlike fundamental rights under Art.19. The right to administer includes the right to admit students of their choice. But that is not to say that the State is not entitled to make reasonable regulations. But, at the same time, what is important to notice is that such a regulation should be conceived and made from the standpoint of and for the benefit of the minority institution in the matter so its establishment and its administration. General standards achieved by the regulations may be good from the public point of view, but enforcement such general standards in a minority institution may destroy or defeat or severely curtail protection given to it by Art.30(1). The regulations can only be made in the interests institution and they cannot be made in the interest of outsiders.” 11. In St.Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1398, the principle countenanced runs as follows: “Another conclusion which follows from what has been discussed above is that a law interferes with a minority’s choice of qualified teacher of its disciplinary control over teacher and other members of the staff of the institution is void as being violative of Art.30(1). of course, permissible for the State and its educational authorities to prescribe qualifications of teachers possessing the requisite qualifications are selected by minorities for their educational institutions, the State would have no right to veto selection of these teachers. of course, permissible for the State and its educational authorities to prescribe qualifications of teachers possessing the requisite qualifications are selected by minorities for their educational institutions, the State would have no right to veto selection of these teachers. The selection and appointment of teachers for an educational institution is one of the essential ingredients of the right to manage an educational institution and the minorities can plainly be not denied such right of selection appointment without infringing Art.30(1).” 12. In Rev. Br.A. Thomas v. Deputy Inspector of Schools, A.I.R. 1975 Mad. 214, argued on behalf of educational authorities that since the Government gives aid to minority educational institutions, it could insist on teaching staff of their choice being appointed argument was repelled in the following terms: ” The learned Government Pleader strenuously contends that, though the petitioner institution is a protected institution, inasmuch as it received aid from the Government, as all the teachers whether they are in protected or unprotected institutions are paid., Government through the aid the Government have a right, in order to do social inasmuch as it has to provide employment for the higher grade teachers, to tell institution that it should not employ a secondary grade teacher in higher grade vacancies. We are unable to accept this contention as far as it relates to protected institutions. Ahmedabad St.Xavier ’ s College v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1974S.C. 1389, as well as decisions go a long way to recognise the freedom of management on the part denominational institutions and the management includes also appointment of teachers their choice. It is not necessary to say more than this in this case. Here it happens to case of employment of minority communities or even from the majority community can take advantage of these institutions. The next part of the right relates to the Administration of such institutions which means ‘management of the affairs’ of the institutions. This management must be control so that the founders or their nominees can mould the institutions as they think and in accordance with their ideas of how the interests of the community in general and institutions in particular will be best served. There is, however, an exception that standards of education are not a part of management as such. This management must be control so that the founders or their nominees can mould the institutions as they think and in accordance with their ideas of how the interests of the community in general and institutions in particular will be best served. There is, however, an exception that standards of education are not a part of management as such. The minority institutions cannot be allowed to fall below the standards of excellence expected of educational institutions, or under the guise of exclusive right of management, to decline to follow general pattern. “10. In Director of School Education v. Rev. Brother G.Arogiasamy, (1971)1 M.L.J. Bench of this Court summed up the proposition in the following terms.” Art.30(1) of the Constitution entitles a minority community, whether based on religion language, not only to establish but also to administer educational institutions of their These rights are absolute and unqualified. They are not subject to any restrictions unlike fundamental rights under Art.19. The right to administer includes the right to admit students of their choice. But that is not to say that the State is not entitled to make reasonable regulations. But, at the same time, what is important to notice is that such a regulation should be conceived and made from the standpoint of and for the benefit of the institution in the matter so its establishment and its administration. General standards achieved by the regulations may be good from the public point of view, but enforcement such general standards in a minority institution may destroy or defeat or severely curtail protection given to it by Art.30(1). The regulations can only be made in the interests institution and they cannot be made in the interest of outsiders. “11. In St.Xavier ’ s College v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1398, the principle countenanced runs as follows:” Another conclusion which follows from what has been discussed above is that a law interferes with a minority ’ s choice of qualified teacher of its disciplinary control over and other members of the staff of the institution is void as being violative of Art.30(1). of course, permissible for the State and its educational authorities to prescribe qualifications of teachers possessing the requisite qualifications are selected minorities for their educational institutions, the State would have no right to veto selection of these teachers. of course, permissible for the State and its educational authorities to prescribe qualifications of teachers possessing the requisite qualifications are selected minorities for their educational institutions, the State would have no right to veto selection of these teachers. The selection and appointment of teachers for an educational institution is one of the essential ingredients of the right to manage an educational institution and the minorities can plainly be not denied such right of selection appointment without infringing Art.30(1). “12. In Rev. Br.A. Thomas v. Deputy Inspector of Schools, A.I.R. 1975 Mad. 214, argued on behalf of educational authorities that since the Government gives aid to educational institutions, it could insist on teaching staff of their choice being appointed argument was repelled in the following terms: ” The learned Government Pleader strenuously contends that, though the petitioner institution is a protected institution, inasmuch as it received aid from the Government, as all the teachers whether they are in protected or unprotected institutions are paid., Government through the aid the Government have a right, in order to do social inasmuch as it has to provide employment for the higher grade teachers, to tell institution that it should not employ a secondary grade teacher in higher grade vacancies. We are unable to accept this contention as far as it relates to protected institutions. Ahmedabad St.Xavier ’ s College v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1974S.C. 1389, as well as decisions go a long way to recognise the freedom of management on the part denominational institutions and the management includes also appointment of teachers their choice. It is not necessary to say more than this in this case. Here it happens to case of employment of more qualified teachers in the interests of higher standards of education and the Education Department cannot insist that that should not be done by the institution. This has nothing do with the aid given. The aid given by the Government does not clothe the Government with any right of the type they have claimed to interfere with the freedom of management the institution to employ teachers of their choice, who have a higher qualification than prescribed by the Department." 13. As observed in Sidharjbhaiv. This has nothing do with the aid given. The aid given by the Government does not clothe the Government with any right of the type they have claimed to interfere with the freedom of management the institution to employ teachers of their choice, who have a higher qualification than prescribed by the Department." 13. As observed in Sidharjbhaiv. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 540, ‘ regulation made the true interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality, order and the like may undoubtedly be imposed; such regulations are not restrictions on substance of the right which is guaranteed; they secure the proper functioning of institution in matters educational. This passage, if we can say, so, with respect, succinctly provides the guidelines as to when a regulation need not be frowned upon as making inroad into the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.30(1) of the Constitution of Coming to paragraph 2(b)(i) of G.O.Ms.No.1297, it has been stipulated that in the matter filling up the vacancies in the posts of headmasters arising on account of the contingencies the choice could be only from senior-most of the staff mentioned therein. Practically this curtails the sphere of choice of headmasters for the minority institutions the fourth respondent school. From the angle of the minority institutions especially regard to the standard and ideologies which they would like to keep up and adhere to matter of imparting educational courses, this imposition will curtail their freedom of regarding the head of the teaching staff. The minority institutions would like to go by norms and standards in the selection and appointment of headmasters, which as per estimate and assessment may bring in and ensure excellent service in their field of activities, serving their community. Though seniority maybe a salutary guiding factor in the matter promotions or selections to higher posts, it is not always possible to commend it as the criterion with reference to the choice of personnel for higher posts. We have to view matter not from the general angle, but only from the angle of the minority institutions, which stand as a class by themselves having been secured the fundamental right Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India. What has been guaranteed under Art.30(1) absolute, and no abridgement of the same could be brooked. The right is not only establish, but also to administer educational institutions of their choice. What has been guaranteed under Art.30(1) absolute, and no abridgement of the same could be brooked. The right is not only establish, but also to administer educational institutions of their choice. That right is widest amplitude and must remain untrammelled. Any regulatory measure, though conceived in public interest, but not of the minority institution, may have to be frowned as infringing upon that right. By their choice of headmasters or principals, the minority institutions, will be in a position to adhere to their traditions and standards in educational field. If any prescription other than qualifications and the like is to be imposed that would be trammelling their right guaranteed to them under the Constitution. regulatory measure cannot be justified by pleading the interests of the general public, the interests of the minority institutions stand affected. 14. At this juncture, we may advert to the pronouncement of the learned single Judge High Court of Kerala in Fr.Francis Fernandez v. District Educational Officer, Ernakulam others, (1989)3 S.L.J. 15. The learned single Judge has viewed the direction by the State only senior-most teachers should be appointed as headmasters as a regulatory measure as not infringing upon the right of the minority institutions under Art.30(1) Constitution of India. In view of our preceding advertence to the discussion of the principles as done by the pronouncements and our analysis of the implications of paragraph 2(b)(i) G.O.Ms.No.1297, we are not able to persuade ourselves to appreciate and accept the thinking of the learned single Judge of the High Court of Kerala in the pronouncement, referred to above. We have no ambiguity in our mind that though paragraph 2(b)(i) G.O.Ms.No.1297, could be stated to have been conceived in public interests and may the interests of the teaching personnel; but when applied to a minority institution its may not be its benefit from its own point of view. It would amount to interference with fundamental right, and such interference cannot be justified by projecting the interests of the general public. The justifying feature has got to be assessed only from the angle the interests of the minority institution. This is the standard uniformly adopted pronouncements. Accordingly, we do not find any warrant for interference with the ultimate decision of the learned single Judge. This obliges us to dismiss the writ appeal and accordingly we dismiss this writ appeal. No costs. B.S. ---- Appeal dismissed.