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1991 DIGILAW 461 (MAD)

SM. AM. AR. RM. Meyyoppa Chettiar v. The Government of Tamil Nadu, Represented by the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Madras

1991-07-11

MISHRA

body1991
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the hereditary trustee of Sri Veerateeswarer Temple, Thiruvirkudi, Nannilam taluk, Thanjavur district. He has moved this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing of the order of the first respondent in G.O.Rt No. 424 CT & RE Department dated 4-6-1982. According to the allegations in the affidavit accompanying the writ petition, the petitioners ancestor created a trust and set apart certain properties for its management stating that it was a private trust and the management exclusively vested on the members of the family by hereditary succession. He filed O.A. No. 17 of 1972 before the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Thanjavur, which was ultimately transferred to the file of the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. (Judicial). The said application was allowed by order dated 17-8-1973 by the Deputy Commissioner declaring the petitioner as the hereditary trustee of the Trust on the footing that the trust was a public trust coming within the provisions of the Tamil Nadu, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’. 2. The second respondent herein, however, issued notice of demand for contribution and audit fees before the declaration in favour of the petitioner. The said demand notice was issued in the name of the mother of the petitioner, viz., Meenakshi Achi and served upon her on 18-11-1972. The petitioner has stated: “On 30-11-1972 I objected to the demand and further brought to the notice of the 2nd respondent herein the nature of the trust, the fact that I and not my mother am in management as hereditary trustee and further objecting to the quantum giving particulars of the properties and yield therefrom. These objections were reiterated subsequently by letter of my counsel dated 7-3-1973 and a letter sent by me under certificate of posting on 20-11-1973. When another demand was made by the 2nd respondent which Was received on 18-6-1974, my counsel by his letter dated 30-6-1974 reiterated my objections. It was brought to the notice of the 2nd respondent that my mother was still shown as the hereditary trustee and the demands served on her. It was also brought to the notice of the 2nd respondent that the income assessed was very high and certain copies of, documents were required from the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent did not reply to these objections and letters. It was also brought to the notice of the 2nd respondent that the income assessed was very high and certain copies of, documents were required from the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent did not reply to these objections and letters. “When the Assistant Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., Nagapattinam demanded monies towards alleged audit fees and contribution my counsel by letter dated 25-7-1975 brought to the notice of the Assistant Commissioner the pendency of the objections to the demand before the Commissioner as also the fact that the Inspector, H.R &CE., Nannilam issued notices calling for enquiry into the matter presumalty under the orders of the 2nd respondent. Thereafter when {the Assistant Commissioner, H.R. & C.E.. Nagapattinam camped at Virkudi I and my agent met him, produced the village accounts and other records showing the true income from the property and on the basis of the enquiry made by Assistant Commissioner the demands were revised and 1 paid the money due from faslis 1381 to 1385 as per the revised demands.” In these circumstances I was shocked to receive a communication from the second respondent dated 6-9-1976 and made fn D. Dis. 6142/76 purporting to overrule my objection on the grounds that no proper accounts were maintained and the objections were not filed within time. As against the orders of the 2nd respondent I filed W.P. No. 572 of 1977 before this Honble Court. This Honble Court in and by on order dated 1-4-1975 observing that 1 have an alternative remedy of revision to the Government declined to issue the writ prayed for. I therefore filed a revision petition before the 1st respondent challenging the order of the first respondent on several grounds. The 1st respondent in and by an order dated 4-6-1982 and made in G.O.Rt. No. 424 CT. & RE. rejected my revision petition. 3. The order of the first respondent in G.O.Rt. No. 424 dated 4-6-1982 reads as follows; “Kalasanthi Kattalai attached to Arulmigu Viratesswarar temple, Thiruverkudi, Nannilam taluk in Thanjavur district is under the control of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Administration Department, duly assessed to contribution on an annual income of Rs. 11,644 from fasil 1381. Since the Hereditery Trustee of the Kalasanthi Kattalai has failed to furnish Budget statement, as per rule, contribution was fixed under S. 6 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, with effect from f asli 1381. 11,644 from fasil 1381. Since the Hereditery Trustee of the Kalasanthi Kattalai has failed to furnish Budget statement, as per rule, contribution was fixed under S. 6 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, with effect from f asli 1381. A demand notice for the payment of contribution by this temple was sent to the Hereditery Trustee of the temple on 18-11-72. But, the Hereditary Trustee presented an objection petition on 23-1173. This objection petition, and also the subsequent objection petitions from fasli 1381 to 1384 were rejected by the Commissioner, Hindu Keligious and Chant able Endowments Administration Department in his K. Dis. 15735/73 dated 15-4-76 on the ground thai no proper accounts were maintained for the income of the Kattalai and that the objections were not raised within the time limit. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has come up to Government with a revision petition. 2. The Government have examined revision petition along with the connected records. As the revision petitioner has not maintained the accounts of the Kattalai property, and he did not raise objections to the concerned authorities within the time limit, the Government see no case to interfere. The revision petition in accordingly rejected.” This order reiterated the order of the Assistant Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. (Admn.) Department, in his K. Dis. 15735/73 dated 15 4-76 that no proper accounts were maintained for the income of the Kattalai and that the objections were not raised within the time limit and the revision petition was disposed of saying that the Government have examined the revision petition along with the connected records and as the revision petitioner has not maintained the accounts of the Kattalai properly and he did not raise objections to the concerned authorities within the time limit, the Government saw no case to interfere. 4. In the counter affidavit that has been filed on behalf of the respondents these allegations have been replied more by stating what the provisions under S. 94 (2) (a) of the Act provide as well as the Rules framed in G.O.Ms. No. 4920, Revenue, dated 30-11-1960. The fact that the notice was served on the petitioners mother Meenakshi Achi on 18-11-1972 is not denied. No. 4920, Revenue, dated 30-11-1960. The fact that the notice was served on the petitioners mother Meenakshi Achi on 18-11-1972 is not denied. It is, however, stated that the petitioners objections were received only on 20-11-1973 without stating anything about the allegation of the petitioner that he objected to the demand and further brought to the notice of the second respondent the nature of the Trust on 30-11-1972 and that his counsel by letter dated 7-3-1973 reiterated the objections. 5. S. 94 of the Act provides as follows: “94(0 The contributions, costs, charges and expenses payable under S 92 and 93 shall be assessed on and notified to the trustee of the religious institution concerned in the prescribed manner; Provided that if for any reason, any portion of the contribution, costs, charges and expenses has escaped assessment, the Commissioner may, within the prescribed period, serve on the trustees a notice essessing him to the portion of the contribution, costs, charges or expenses as the Case may be, due and demanding payment thereof within fifteen days from the date of such service; and the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder shall, so far as may be, apply as if the assessment was made In the first instance. (1) (a) Such trustee may, within fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice under sub-S.(1) or under the proviso thereto or within such lurther time as may be granted by the Commissioner, prefer his obection thereto, if any, to the Commissioner in writing. Such objection may relate either to his liability to pay or to the amount specified in the notice. The Commissioner shall consider such objection and give his decision confirming, withdrawing or modifying his original notice. (b) Within one month from the date of the receipt of the notice of assessment, or when objection has been preferred, within one month, from the date of the decision of the Commissioner, or within such further time, as may be granted by him, such trustee shall pay the amount specified in the notice under sub-S.(1) or under the proviso thereto or the amount as fixed by the Commissioner on objection.” 6. A reading of the provisions afore quoted makes it clear that the Commissioner is required to serve a notice on the trustee assessing him to the portion of the contribu tion, costs, charges and expenses, as the case may be, due and demanding payment thereof within fifteen days from the date of such service. The trustee then is required to file objections, if any, within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice. The Com missioner, thereafter, shall consider the ob jections and give his decision. Facts mentioned above show that no notice was ever served upon the petitioner on 18.11.1972. His mother was shown to be the trustee, a fact which was in dispute at the relevant time, in O.A. No. 17 of 1972 and finally adjudicated in favour of the petitioner on 17, 8, 73. Even then, according to the petitioner, he filed objections on 30.11.1972 followed by a letter of his counsel on 7.3.1973 and by himself on 20.11.1973 When further demands were made, on 18.6.1974 a reply was sent through a counsel on 30.6.1974 which was followed by some sirt of enquiry by the Inspector, H.R. & C.E. Department, Nannilam and a revised demand was served upon the petitioner under the orders of the Assistant Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department, Nagapattinam Camp: Virgudi, which demand, the petitioner paid for faslis 1381 to 1385. All this was ignored and the letter under certificate of posting sent on 20.11.1973 alone was accepted by the Assistant Commissioner as the objection to the demand notice dated 18.11.1972 served upon the mother of the petitioner. It is, it seems, on that basis that the Assistant Commissioner came to the conclusion that the objections were filed much beyond the period of limitation. 7. There was no warrant to the petitioner to file any objections because the second respondent treated Meenakshi Achi as the trustee and served a demand notice upon her. Nothing could be said against the petitioner, if he ignored the notice Nonetheless if he had replied on 30-11-1982 by filing objections, it was well within the period of 15 days. Why then the respondents ignored the objections tiled on behalf of the petitioner and treated as if no objections were filed within the stipulated period of 15 days. Nothing could be said against the petitioner, if he ignored the notice Nonetheless if he had replied on 30-11-1982 by filing objections, it was well within the period of 15 days. Why then the respondents ignored the objections tiled on behalf of the petitioner and treated as if no objections were filed within the stipulated period of 15 days. Why the respondents, ignored the developments leading to a revised demand and deposit by the petitioner for the period faslis 1381 to 1385. These are disturbing facts, the Respondents were required to answer. They have not given any reason and since they have not answered these questions it is difficult to accept the finding that the objections were barred by limitation. 8. The Assistant Commissioner also stated in his order that the petitioner had not maintained the accounts of the Kattalai properly. Without knowing the nature of the objections filed by the petitioner, and without going into the objections filed by the petitioner no one could/can say that non-maintenance of proper accounts of kattalai could/can be a ground to reject the objections. S. 94(2) of the Act, quoted by me above, does not warrant filing of statement of accounts. If in the course of enquiry before passing the order upon the objections the Commissioner thought that examination of accounts was necessary he could call for such accounts and examine them. Nothing of this sort, however, was done. How and why then the Assistant Commissioner, who acted as the Commissioner under sub-S.(2) of S. 94 of the Act held that the petitioner had not maintained the Accounts of the Kattalai properly and why used it as a ground to reject the objections are not understandable. The Assistant Commissioner bad a duty to look into the objections and determine the case in accordance with law. Courts in India have repeatedly pointed out that all quasi-judicial authorities and Tribunals must conform to the rules of natural justice and give to the person aggrieved or who is likely to be visited with any civil consequences adequate opportunity of being heard and make speaking orders. Wherever there is a ‘ period prescribed for doing certain act, whether the act had been done within that period or not can be known only by examining the facts. Question of limitation is always a mixed question of fact and law. Wherever there is a ‘ period prescribed for doing certain act, whether the act had been done within that period or not can be known only by examining the facts. Question of limitation is always a mixed question of fact and law. Law of limitation cannot be applied without looking into the facts. The impugn ed order is so cryptic that it is difficult to know from it why it was said that the petitioners objections were barred by limitation. The facts, which I have noticed above and which appear to be indisputable, show that no notice was served upon the petitioner as a trustee and so no demand could be made as provided under sub-S.(3) of S. 94 of the Act from the petitioner. If the notice upon his mother is accepted as a notice to him then his objections filed an 30.11.1972 cannot be ignored, That objection evidently was filed within time. In either case, it is difficult to say that there was any material available to reject the objections filed on behalf of the petitioner/S. 94, sub-S,(2) never warranted production of books of accounts along with the objections. If in the course of the enquiry the Assistant Commissioner desired to look into the accounts he could do so by making such an order. He, however, never did any such thing. 9. The Governments order is vitiated by the vice of not providing the petitioner adequate opportunity of being heard as well as being cryptic and not one which satisfies the rule that such quasi judicial order should be a speaking order. It is high time that authorities vested with quasi judicial powers realise the importance of the rule that they must look into the facts, state the relevant facts in their orders, state the grounds and the reasons for not accepting a certain petition or objection. By not following these rules, they expose their orders to serious criticism and leave the persons aggrieved in a state of dissatisfaction. 10. Although the petitioner has asked for quashing the order of the first respondent only, since I have found that the order of the second respondent also suffers from a serious vice of being violative of the principles of natural justice, I propose to mould the relief and extend the relief to strike down the order of the second respondent as well. 11. 11. In the result the writ petition is allowed. The order of the first respondent in G.O.Rt. No. 424, CT & RE Department dated 4.6.1982 and that of the second respondent D. Dis. No. 6142 of 1976 dated 6.9.1976 are quashed. The case is remitted to the Assistant Commissioner concerned for a rehearing and disposal in accordance with law. No costs.