Judgment S. H. S. Abidi, J. 1. -both the appellants have come to this Court against the judgment and order of their conviotion and sentences for the offences under Sections 366-A and 376 of the Indian Penal Code by which the learned Ist Additional Sessions Judge, Nawadah has convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years under each of the counts. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the victim Urmila Devi was a female labour, usually going for her wages along with one Kari Devi of her mohalla Harish Chandra Talab, Nawadah, District, Nawadah. While she was returning to her house on 9-11-1987 at about 8 p. m the accused persons, appellants Sunil Kahar and Bachkun Manjhi took her awav forcibly in a taxi, standing nearby the Jail road, Harishchandra Talab, Nawadah. She was taken to Gaya railway station where they all boarded in a train for chananagar, Calcutta and got her in a hutment. She was made to work for several days at the brick kiln iioth the accused persons had got accommodation just by the side of the said hutment of the victim and had been committing rape on her forcibly against her wishes. After seven days both the accused persons went back to Nawadah leaving her alone in the brick kiln. The victim told her story to the Munshi of the brick kiln and others. Then after staying for about 8 days in the brick kiln, she returned to Nawadh. In the meantime, a first information report had been lodged about her disappearance at Nawadah police station on 11-11-1987 by her mother Sohri devi saying that on account of her association with one Kari Devi, the victim had disappeared. On enquiry, Kari Devi had told Sohri Devi to have sold the victim for a consideration of Rs.2000/-. On the basis of the first information report (Ext.2), investigation was going on. On 8-12-1087, the victim returned to Nawadah. Then the police on getting information about her arrival at Nawadah, recorded her statement in which she made specific allegations of her abduction and commission of rape by the accused persons, 3. The accused persons in their defence, have denied the allegations and alleged that they have been falsely implicated in this case. In defence, no witness has been examined. 4. The accused persons in their defence, have denied the allegations and alleged that they have been falsely implicated in this case. In defence, no witness has been examined. 4. The case was investigated by Bihar Yadav, S. I. (P. W.9) who after completing the investigation, submitted charge sheet against the appellants. 5. The prosecution in support of its case, examined nine witnesses out cf which P. W.2, Jamuna Manjhi, P. W.3, Mundrika Ram, father and brother of the victim respectively, are the tendered witnesses. P. W.8 baleshwar Prasad Yadav S. I. is the formal witness who has simply proved the F. I. R. (Ext.2) and the formal F. I. R. (Ext.3 ). P. W.1 Sohri Devi p. W.4, Lalita Devi, P. W.5, Jamuna Devi (mother, sister and sister-in-law of the victim respectively) are the hearsay witnesses. P. W.6 is Urmila Devi hereself. P. W.7 is Dr. Malti Sharma who had medically examined the victim urmila Devi and had given a report (Ext.1) giving her age as 17-19 years. P. W.9 is Bihari Yadav, the Investigating Officer of this case. 6. The learned trial court, after considering the entire material on record, has convicted the accused persons as said above. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants has urged that the order of the appellants conviction is bad as the victim girl has falsely implicated the appellants as she wanted to marry, that there is sole testimony of the victim herself and there is no corroboration about the same. Nobody from calcutta has been examined. No case was lodged at Calcutta by her but lodged at Nawadah after her return from Calcutta. No mark of rape had been detected by the doctor on her person who had examined her. It was lastly contended that the appellants have been found to be aged about 18-19 years and so they were minor at that time and that they have been in jail for the last about four years. To appreciate these contentions, the evidence of the case will have to be scrutinised with care and caution. 8. In this case, the evidence of P. Ws.1, 4 and 5, as stated above, is of hearsay witnesses. Jamuna Manjhi (P. W.2) and Mundrika Ram, (P. W.3) as stated above had been tendered. There remains only the evidence of P. W.6 Urmila Devi, the victim herself. 8. In this case, the evidence of P. Ws.1, 4 and 5, as stated above, is of hearsay witnesses. Jamuna Manjhi (P. W.2) and Mundrika Ram, (P. W.3) as stated above had been tendered. There remains only the evidence of P. W.6 Urmila Devi, the victim herself. The First Information report had been lodged on 11-11-1978 at 5.30 P. M. at P. S. Nawadah by sohri Devi, P. W.1 (mother of the victim) against on Kari Devi to the effect that the victim used to go for work with Kari Devi who had sold her for a consideration of Rs.2000/-. But when the girl returned on 8-12-1987, she gave her statement and which statement was supported by her in court. In her statement, she has stated that she had gone to work at Nawadah post office. Roof was being made where she worked as labourer and used to work daily upto 7 P. M. while she was returning and when reached near the (sic) lain Mandir, two boys met her who caught hold of her and gagged her. She was made to sit in a Taxi and was taken to Ghana Nagar, Calcutta where she was kept in a Bhathhi (kiln) tor 8 days. There, she was raped after catching hold of her hands and feet one by one by the accused persons continuously for 8 days. After 8 days, both the accused persons ran away leaving behind her there. According to her, she used to work as labourer. She told the people of the locality about her kidnapping and leaving. She also told so to one Karim of Nasirganj and was began to weep. She told to one parmeshwar Yadav of Hiswa, a Munshi (sic) of the brick kiln who brought her back home. Those who had committed rape had given out their names as Sunilwa and Bachkunwa, whom she identified in dock. On the day of occurrence, Kari Devi had taken her to work whose husbands name is parmeshwar. She came to know that Bachkun is son-in-law of Kari Devi and Sunil is his friend. In cross-examination, she has said that from before, she had got no acquaintance with the accused persons. She had seen bachkun at the house of Kari Devi one week before the occurrence. She always used to go to work with Kari Devi. She came to know that Bachkun is son-in-law of Kari Devi and Sunil is his friend. In cross-examination, she has said that from before, she had got no acquaintance with the accused persons. She had seen bachkun at the house of Kari Devi one week before the occurrence. She always used to go to work with Kari Devi. She was the only woman labourer while three men were the labourers, who always uied to work from 8 A. M. to 7 P. M. According to her, Jain Mandir is near the Hospital where crowd is found any time. But when she was caught, there was no crowd or traffic. The vehicle was by the side of Jain Mandir and when she was going, she was caught. She cried to be left but none came as it had became dark. She was got seated. The vehicle passed through Bazar which was open. Roomal (hand kerchief) was removed from her mouth in the bazar and she was threatened not to cry and so she could not cry. The police was near the prajatantra gate but at the crossing, she did not say anything to the police. After crossing Nawadah river bridge, she was taken to Gaya where also she did not raise alarm. Bachkun had got bhujali, about which she had told the police and her parents. They had given out threats to kill by that bhujali. In the way, no other person got in the vehicle. The taxi was stopped at the station where also she did not say anything to anyone. There, no bhujali was shown to her. She did not try to run away as the way was not known to her. From Gaya, they took her to Chana Nagar railway station by train. The accused told her that it was Chana Nagar station where also, she did cot raise alarm nor said anything to any police. From Chana Nagar railway station, the distance of brick kiln is about I kos (2 miles ). They took her to Bhathha. There she was not taken to any munsbi. From the next day, she started working on the Bhathha. Her wage was fixed at Rs.30/- per week and accommodation was also provided. In one room she was living while in the other room, the accused persons were living. They took her to Bhathha. There she was not taken to any munsbi. From the next day, she started working on the Bhathha. Her wage was fixed at Rs.30/- per week and accommodation was also provided. In one room she was living while in the other room, the accused persons were living. Both the accused uses to room about for the whole day and whatever she earned, they used to eat. When they have been moving around, she did not try to run away, as she could not run away alone. Whatever, food she prepared, they used to eat daily. She did not say anything to bhathha s people about the conduct of the accused persons. There was no door in the room. In the night both the accused used to sleep with her and in the morning they used to go away. In the night on the train, nothing was done by the appellants to her. She had not met any man eatlier than the raping by the appellants. She used to sleep on the ground. In course of rape by them, she had scratched their faces and bitten them also. She also bad got injuries. From the private parts, bleeding was there and her back was scratched. They had caught her breast also which got swelling and her clothes were soaked with blood. Bleeding was for three days and she did not go out for work at brick kiln for three days. She was lying in (be room and none came for seeing her. Before bleeding, the accused persons had ran away. Bleeding was on account of mensuration. The doctor had medically examined her and taken her X-ray Even after the running away of the accueed persons, she used to work at Bhathha for 8 days. She remained there alone. She had given her statement to the police where she had said that at 7 P. M. She was caught near the Jain Mandir. She had said that she was caught near the Harishchandra Stadium (sic) at 8. P. M. Harishchandra Stadium, via jail road, is about 1/2 mile from Jain Mandir. She further said that on asking, the accused had given out their names. She bad not said to the police that Karma bad told her that her aunt Kari Devi had gone to jail and then she came with Munsbi to home. P. M. Harishchandra Stadium, via jail road, is about 1/2 mile from Jain Mandir. She further said that on asking, the accused had given out their names. She bad not said to the police that Karma bad told her that her aunt Kari Devi had gone to jail and then she came with Munsbi to home. For about a month, she remained at Chana Magar. She bad not gene to lodge the report. But when the police asked her to gave out truth, then she said about the occurrence and gave out the names of the accused. Bachkun is of her oaste. After return, she did not meet Munshi and Karma. It was not correct that parmeshwar Mahto had taken her for work at Bhathha. She has said that she could get examined the Munshi and Parmeshwar Mabto. On the day on when she reached Nawadah. She had not gone to the police station to lodge any report. She further said that it was not correct that she used to live with Karma Manjhi ard when Bachkun went there, she wanted to marry him which he refused saying that she was a corrrept woman and so. she falsely implicated him after some days and said that (hey have committed rape on her and that Kari Devi got the case instituted in collusion with her and that Kari Devi gave out their names and home adresses. It is also not correct that she was not abducted by anyone and she bad gone willingly and had also falsely implicated the accused persons. It was not correct that she had not gone to work at post office. These statements of the women has been referred to in extenso as she is the only witness about the occurrence. Her evidence about her taken away is made out from the evidence of the mother who did not know that she had been taken away by the appellants and so, she lodged the report on 11-11-1987 under Sections 366-A of the indian Penal Code on suspicion against Kari Devi. But when she returned, she gave out the matter to the police. Her statement in detail gives out how she was taken. She had been medically examined by the lady doctor on 8-12-1987 at 5.30 P. M. , P. W.7, Dr. But when she returned, she gave out the matter to the police. Her statement in detail gives out how she was taken. She had been medically examined by the lady doctor on 8-12-1987 at 5.30 P. M. , P. W.7, Dr. Malti Sharma had found the following on the person of the victim : " (I) Height 5", weight 43 kgs, teeth 28, breast fully developed, auxiliary and pubic hairs present. No injury on external or internal part of the body found. Perenial laxed and admits two fingers loose. Hymen ruptured. No injury on internal part. Vaginal swab report shows : Spermatozoa not seen. X-ray pelvis. The ischial tubrosity has fused completely. The iliac crest has fused partially, (i) Her age according to above mentioned findings in my opinion is in between 17-19 years, (ii) She is habituated sexual intercourse. " In course of cross-examination P. W.7 has said that in case of rape a vergin girl for 8 to ten days by two persons continuously, there may be injury on valve majora and valve minora or may not. There may or may not be any injury in inter part of vagina in case of such rape, swelling may or may be on uterus. She did not find any swelling on nipples. The victim could not hav e walked freely. In case of rape and resistence injury on back, buttock and leg and hands are possible. The victim did not produce any cloth for her examination. 9. As regards the corroboration of her statement, it has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwar V/s. The State of Rajasthan, air 1952 SC at page 57 (para 19) as follows : "there is a class of cases which considers that (hough corroboration should ordinarily be required in the case of a child of tender years. Bishram V/s. Emperor, AIR 1944 Nag.363, in typical of that point of view. On the other hand, the Privy Council haa said in mohamed Sugal Esa. V/s. The King, AIR 1946 PC 3 at p.5, that as a matter of prudence a conviction should not ordinarily be based on the uncorroborated evidence of a child witness. In my opinion, the true rule is that in every case of this type the rule about the advisability of corroboration should be present to the mind of judge. V/s. The King, AIR 1946 PC 3 at p.5, that as a matter of prudence a conviction should not ordinarily be based on the uncorroborated evidence of a child witness. In my opinion, the true rule is that in every case of this type the rule about the advisability of corroboration should be present to the mind of judge. In a jury case he must tell the jury of it and in a non-jury case he must show that it is present to his mind by indicating that in his judgment. But he should also point out that corroboration can be dispensed with if, in the particular circumstances of the case before him, either the jury, or, when there is no jury, he himself, is satisfied that it is safe to do so. The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law. is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge, and in jury cases, must find place in the charge, before a conviction without corroboration can be sustained. The tender years of the child, coupled with other circumstances appearing ia the case, such, for example, as its demeanour, unlikelihood of tutoring and so forth, may render corroboration unnecessary but that is a question of fact in every case. The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the case, may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand. " In the case of Krishan Lal V/s. State of Haryana, AIR 1980 SC 1252 , the supreme Court, at page 1253 (para 4) has observed as follows :- "we must bear in mind human psychology and behavioural probability when assessing the testimonial potency of the victims version. " In the case of Krishan Lal V/s. State of Haryana, AIR 1980 SC 1252 , the supreme Court, at page 1253 (para 4) has observed as follows :- "we must bear in mind human psychology and behavioural probability when assessing the testimonial potency of the victims version. What girl would foist a rape charge on a stranger unless a remarkable set of facts or clearest motives were made out The inherent bashfulness, the innocent noivete and the feminine tendency to conceal the outrage of masculine sexual aggression are factors which are relevant to improbabilise the hypothesis of false implication. The injury on the person of the victim especially her private parts, has corroborative value. Her complaint to her parents and the presence of blood on her clothes are also testimony which warrants credence. More than all, it baffles belief in human nature that a girl sleeping with her mother and other children in the open will come by blood on her garments and injury in her private parts unless she has been subjected to the torture of rape. And if rape has been committed, as counsel more or less conceded, why, of all persons in the world, should the victim hunt up the petitioner acd point at him the accusing finger To forsake these vital considerations and go by obsolescent demands for substantial corroboration is to sacrifice common-sense in favour of an artificial concoction called judicial probability. Indeed, the court loses its credibility if it rebels against lealisra. The law court is not an unnatural world. " In another case of Rafiq V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1980 Cri. IJ.1344, at page 1345 in para 4, the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "xxx Corroboration as a condition for Judicial reliance on the testimony of a prosecutrix is not a matter of law, but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. Indeed, from place to place, from age to age, from varying life-styles and behavioural complexes, inferences from a given set of facts, oral and circumstantial, may have to be drawn not with deed uniformity but realistic diversity lest rigidity in the shape of rule of law in this area be introduced through a new type of precedential tyranny. Indeed, from place to place, from age to age, from varying life-styles and behavioural complexes, inferences from a given set of facts, oral and circumstantial, may have to be drawn not with deed uniformity but realistic diversity lest rigidity in the shape of rule of law in this area be introduced through a new type of precedential tyranny. " In the case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirijibhai V/s. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753 , the Supreme Court has further observed at page 757 (Paragraphs 10 and 11) as follows : "10. A girl or a women in the tradition bound non-expressive society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had even occurred, (2) She would be conscious of the danger of being obstracized by the society or being looked down by the society including by her own family members, friends, relatives and neighbours, (3) She would have to brave the whole world, (4)She would face risk of losing the love and respect of her own husband and near relatives, and of her matrimonial home and happiness being shattered. (5) If she is unmarried, she would apprehend that it would be difficult to secure an alliance with a suitable match from a respectable or an acceptable family. (6) It would almost inevitably and almost invariably result in mental torture and suffering to herself. (7) The fear of being taunted by others will always haunt her. (8) She would feel extremely embarrassed in relating the incident to others being overpowered by a feeling of shame on account of the upbringing in a tradition bound society where by and large sex in taboo. (9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family name and family honour is brought into controversy. (10) The parents of an unmarried girl as also the husband and members of the husbands family of a married woman, would also more often than not, want to avoid publicity on account of fear of social stigma on the family name and family honour. (11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to be promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of her innocence. (11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to be promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of her innocence. (12) The reluctance to face interrogatiort by the investigating agency, to face the court, to face the cress-examination by counsel for the culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved, act as a deterrent. " "11. In view of these factors the victims and their relatives are not too keen to bring the culprit to books. And when in the face of these factors the crime is brought to light there is a built in assurance that the charge is genuine rather than fabricated. On principle the evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands on par with evidence of an injured witness. Just as a witness who has sustained an injury (which is not shown or believed to be self inflicted) is the best witness in the sense that ho is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of a sex-offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. And while corroboration in the form of eye-witness account cf art independent witness may often be forthcoming in physical assault cases, such evidence cannot be expected in sex offences, having regard to the very nature of the offence. It would therefore be adding insult to injury to insist on corroboration drawing inspiration from the rules devised by the Courts in the western world (obeisance to which has perhaps become a habit presumably on account of the colonial hangover (sic ). We are therefore of the opinion that at if the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity, and the probabilities-factor does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from the medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming, subject to the following qualification : Corroboration may be insisted upon when a woman having attained majority is found in a compromising position and there is a likely-hoed cf her having levelled such an eccusation on account of the instinct of self-preservation Or when the probabilities factor* is fourd to he out of tune. " Further, in the case of Sheikh Zakir V/s. The Stale of Bihar, AIR 1983 sc 911 , at page 914 (para 9), the Supreme Court has observed as follows :- "even though a victim of rape cannot be treated as an accomplice, on account cf a long line of judicial decisions rendered in our country over a number of years, the evidence of the victim in a rape case is treated almost like the evidence of an accomplice requiring corroboration. (vide Rameshmar V/s. State of Rajasthan, 1952 SCR 377 ; AIR 1952 SC 54 ; Gurucharan Singh V/s. State of Haryana, (1973) 2 SCR ,97 ; AIR 1972 SC 2061 and Krishan lal V/s. State of Haryana, (1980) 3 SCR 305 ; AIR 1980 SC 1252 . It is accepted by the Indian Courts that the rule of corroboration in such cases ought to be as enunciated by Lord Reading c. J, in King V/s. Baskerville, (1916) , KB 658, where the case is tried with the aid of a jury as in England it is necessary that a judge should draw the attention of it e jury to the above rule of practice regarding corrobration wherever such corroboration is needed. But where a case is tried by and Judge alone, as it is now being done in India, there must be an indication in the course of the judgment that the judge had this rule in his mind when he prepared the judgment and if in a given case the judge finds that there is no need for such corroboration he should give reasons for dispensing with the necessity for such corroboration. But if a conviction is based on the evidence of a prosecutrix without any corroboration it will not be illegal on that sole ground. In the case of a grownup and married woman it is always safe to insist on such corroboration. Wherever corroboration is necessary it should be from an independent source but it is not necessary that every part cf the evidence of the victim should be confirmed in every detail by independent evidence. Such corroboration can be sought from either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence or from both. " Again in the case of State of Maharashtra V/s. Chandraprakash Kewalchand jain, AIR 1990 SC 658 , the Supreme Court has observed at page 663 (Paragraphs 15, 22 and 16) as follows : "15. Such corroboration can be sought from either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence or from both. " Again in the case of State of Maharashtra V/s. Chandraprakash Kewalchand jain, AIR 1990 SC 658 , the Supreme Court has observed at page 663 (Paragraphs 15, 22 and 16) as follows : "15. It is necessary at the outset to state what the approach of the court should be while evaluating the prosecution evidence, particularly the evidence cf the prosecutrix, in sex-offences. Is it essential that the evidence of the prosecutrix should be corroborated in material particulars before the Court basesa conviction on her testimony Does the rule of prudence demand that in all cases save the rarest of rare the court should look for corroboration before acting on the evidence of the prosecutrix. " "16. A prosecutix of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Sec.118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the csjse of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court Keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Sec.114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court ishesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the proseoutrix roust necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a proseoutrix is an adault and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. We have, therefore, no doubt in our minds, that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix who does not lack understanding must ba accepted The degree of proof required must not be higher than is expected of an injured witness. For the above reasons we think that exception has rightly been taken to the approach of the High Court as is reflected in the following passage : "it is only in the rarest of rare cases if the Court finds that the testimony of the prosecutrix is so trustworthy, truthful and reliable that other oorroboration may not be necessary. " With respect, the law is not correctly stated, if we may say so, it is just the reverse Ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix must carry the same weight as attached to an injured person who is a victim of violence, unless there are special circumstances which call for greater caution, in which case it would be safe to act on her testimony if there is independent evidence lending assurance to her accusation. " "22. As pointed cot earlier ordinarily an Indian woman would be most reluctant to level false accusation of rape involving her own reputation unless she has a very strong bias or reason to do so. In the present case although the couple had reason to be annoyed with the conduct of the respondent, the reason was not strong enough for Mohamad Shafi to involve his wife and soil her reputation nor for Shamimbanu to do so. An Indian woman (attaches) maximum importance to her chastity and would not easily be a party to any move which would jeopardise her reputation and lower her in the esteem of others. There are, therefore, no such strong circumstances which would make the court view her evidence with suspicion. " 10. Thus, an evidence of a prosecutrix a that of an injured and not as an accomplice. There are, therefore, no such strong circumstances which would make the court view her evidence with suspicion. " 10. Thus, an evidence of a prosecutrix a that of an injured and not as an accomplice. An Indian women will be the last to expose herself to shame and disgrace by levelling false charges against a man. The usual tendency is to try to conceal such shameful acts and save a victim of sex assault from further shame, disgrace and mental torture, A victim of sex assault besides getting an injury starts suffering from a deathlass shame which no woman is to invite to herself unless she has actually been subjected to such insult, cruslty, inhumanity and barbality. Besides injury, she further suffers, if she comes rut for redress under law, as she is made to suffer further insult or injury, especially when searching and cruel type of questions put to her in the witness box which is nothing but adding insult to injury to the victim. That is why a woman of whatever status or society, will definitely try to escape, rather refuse to face such sort of shameless mental torture, unless she has actually been subjected to such cruelty and for that reason she gets prepared to face the ordeals boldly. A person who is actually a victim of assault, will like the guilty to bo punished for the crime he has done to her and so if she gives out something which appears to be reasonable and probable in the circumstances of the case, then the court is bound to accept the same and pass orders in accordance with law. In the instant case, definitely, it was not known to her mother that the appellants had taken her away. She had suspected only Kari Devi and so the F. I. R. had been lodged. The girl herself, when she was taken away, on account of fear and other threats, was bound to be silent that is why, she did not give out the matter to the police though seeing in the way. On reaching Ghana Nagar in Calcutta, whatever physical and mental torture she had been subjected to by the appellants has been given out by her in detail to the police on return to Nawadah and has also supported the same in court. On return to Nawadah, it was her earliest version to the police. On reaching Ghana Nagar in Calcutta, whatever physical and mental torture she had been subjected to by the appellants has been given out by her in detail to the police on return to Nawadah and has also supported the same in court. On return to Nawadah, it was her earliest version to the police. There is nothing to show that there was any concoction, or manipulation on the part of anyone to falsely implicate the appellants. No motive has been suggested to her and whatever suggestions have been thrown to her. go to show that she has got no motive to falsely implicate the appellants. Her age has been found to be between 17 to 19 years by the doctor, so she was a minor, She has candidly said that she did not know the appellants from before nor was she related to any of the accused appellants nor was there any motive to her for implicating them falsely, when the knew it well that Bachkun Manjhi was a married man and was son-in-law of Kari Devi with whom she used to work. Under these circumstances, her evidence about taking her awy and sexual assault, inspires confidence and there it nothing to discard the same. Medical evidence also supports her version about the rape. As such, her evidence is believed and conviction of the appellants is being maintained on such trustworthy and reliable evidence. 11. Learned Counsel for the appellants has urged that the ages of the appellants were 18-19 years respectively in the year 1988 which shows that the appellants were grown-up and were not minor at that time. Benefit of Sec.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be given to them as under Sections 366-A and 376,i. P. C. , they are liable to be convicted for rigorous imprisonment for life, ten years or seven years. Benefit under section 360, Cr. P. C. cannot be given to any person aged less than 20 years, convicted for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. In this ease, the appellants have been found guilty under Sections 366-A and 376,i. P. C. which is punishable for life. In this case, further it appears that benefit of Sec.360, Cr. P. C. will not apply to an area where the probation of offenders Act is in operation. In this ease, the appellants have been found guilty under Sections 366-A and 376,i. P. C. which is punishable for life. In this case, further it appears that benefit of Sec.360, Cr. P. C. will not apply to an area where the probation of offenders Act is in operation. This Act has been enforced in the State of Bihar on 15-6-1959 vide Notification No. DPs-180 (Int, dt.) (Illegeble) 4-6-1969, In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh V/s. Lal Singh, 1990 Cri LJ 723, a Full Bench has held that provisions of Sec.360, cr. P. C will not apply if Probation Of Offenders Act has been made applicable to the area. The Probation Of Offenders Act does not apply to cases in which the death sentence has been given. But the fact remains that both the appellants have been in jail for a period of about four years. Keeping in view of the ages of the appellants at the time of occurrence, interest of justice will be served if, while maintaining their convictions under Sections 366-A and 76 Indian Penal Code their sentences are reduced to the period already undergone and a fine of Rs.2000/-, (two thousand) on each of the appellants and in default of payment of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. In case the fine is realised from the appellants the same amount will be paid -to the victim girl Urmila devi by way of compensation though it is not an adequate compensation to the shame and torture she has suffered. 12. With the above modification in the order of sentences of the appellants, this appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed