JUDGMENT - M.L. PENDSE, J.: ---The Central Government realized in the year 1975 that there still exists in different parts of the country a system of usury under which the debtor or his descendants or dependants have to work for the creditor without reasonable wages or with no wages in order to extinguish the debt. At times, several generations work under bondage for the repayment of a paltry sum, which had been taken by some remote ancestor. The interest rates were exorbitant and such bondage cannot be interpreted as the result of any legitimate contract or agreement. The system implies the infringement of the basic human rights and destruction of the dignity of human Labour. Article 23(1) of the Constitution prohibits forced Labour and further provides that any contravention of the said prohibition shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law. Article 35 of the Constitution confers power on Parliament to provide for punishment for the contravention of the provisions of Article 23(1) of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Ordinance, 1975 was promulgated by the President on October 24, 1975. By the Ordinance, the bonded Labour system was abolished and the bonded labourers were freed and discharged from any obligation to render any bonded labour and their bonded debts were also extinguished. The ordinance was replaced by the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, which came into force with retrospective effect from October 25, 1975. 2. The expression "bonded labour system" is defined under section 2(g) and means the system of forced or partly forced, labour under which a debtor enters, or has, or is presumed to have, enter, into an agreement with the creditor to the effect that in consideration of an advance obtained or in pursuance of any customary or social obligation, he would render, by himself or through any member of his family, or any person dependent on him, labour or service to the creditor for a specified period or for an unspecified period, and either without wages or for nominal wages. Section 4 of the Act provides that on the commencement of the Act, the bonded labour system shall stand abolished and every bonded labourer shall stand freed and discharged from any obligation to render any bonded labour. Section 4 of the Act provides that on the commencement of the Act, the bonded labour system shall stand abolished and every bonded labourer shall stand freed and discharged from any obligation to render any bonded labour. Section 13 of the Act provides that every State Government shall constitute Vigilance Committee shall consist of the District Magistrate, three persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, two social workers, one person to represent the financial and credit institutions and not more than three persons to represent the official or non-official agencies in the district connected with rural development. Section 14 of the Act defines the functions of the Vigilance Committee and one of the function is to keep eye on the number of offences of which recognizance has been taken under the Act and also to make a survey as to whether there is any offence of which recognizance ought to be taken. Section 15 provides that whenever any debt is claimed by the bonded labourer, or a Vigilance Committee, to be a bonded debt, then the burden of proof that such debt is not a bonded debt shall lie on the creditor. Chapter VI of the Act deals with Offences and Procedure for trial and section 16 provides that whoever compels any person to render any bonded labour shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and also a fine which may extend to RS. 2000/-. Section 22 prescribes that every offence under this Act shall be cognizable and bailable Section 21 reads as under: "Offences to be tried by Executive Magistrates ---(1) The State Government may confer, on an Executive Magistrate, the powers of a Judicial Magistrate of the first class or of the second class for the trial of the trial of the offences under this Act, and on such conferment of powers the Executive Magistrate, on whom the powers are so conferred, shall be deemed, for the purpose of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to be a Judicial Magistrate of the first class or of the second class as the case may be. (2) An offence under this Act may be tried summarily by a Magistrate." 3. (2) An offence under this Act may be tried summarily by a Magistrate." 3. The Government of Maharashtra, in exercise of powers under section 13 of the Act has constituted a Vigilance Committee for Thane District and one Vivek Pandit, who is a Social Workers and President of Shetkari Sanghatana, is the member of the said Vigilance Committee. Shri Pandit visited the village Gaurapure in Wada Taluka of Thane District and the petitioner complained to him about the slavery imposed upon him by respondent No. 1 In pursuance of the complain, statement dated June 11, 1985 was prepared by Shri Pandit and was duly signed by the petitioner and counter-signed by Shri Pandit. The complaint was addressed to the Collector and the District Magistrate, Thane. The petitioner mentioned in the complaint that he was married about 13 years before and at the time of his marriage, respondent No.1 gave him three sarees, blouses, a towel, a shirt and a trouser and two mounds of rice totally valued at about Rs. 600/- The petitioner complained that respondent No.1compelled the petitioner and his wife to work as servant for over 13 years and was paying only Nominal Wage for the services rendered. The petitioner complained that respondent No. 1 even after rendering service for 13 years is not willing to release the petitioner and his wife by asserting that the loan along with interest is not yet repaid. The petitioner claimed that he should be released from bonded labour and appropriate action should be taken against respondent No.1 The complaint was forwarded to the collector and District Magistrate and thereupon the Police recorded statements of various witnesses and then filed charge-sheet before the Executive Magistrate at Vasai and the case was registered as Criminal Case No.. 165 of 1985.. The Government of Maharashtra conferred on the Executive Magistrate, Vasai the powers of Judicial Magistrate, First Class or the Second Class of the trial of the offences under the Act in exercise of powers conferred by section 21 of the Act by Notification dated March 6, 1985. On September 15, 1987, on behalf of respondent No.1 an application was filed before the executive Magistrate seeking discharge on the ground that the member of the Vigilance Committee was not empowered to record statement of the petitioner under the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, the entire case deserves to be quashed. On September 15, 1987, on behalf of respondent No.1 an application was filed before the executive Magistrate seeking discharge on the ground that the member of the Vigilance Committee was not empowered to record statement of the petitioner under the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, the entire case deserves to be quashed. It was also claimed that the police had not recorded the statement of the petitioner and consequently there is not valid F.I.R. registered under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, respondent No. 1 is entitled to be discharged. The application was resisted on behalf of the State of Maharashtra by pointing out that is open for the Police to commence investigation after being aware of the commission of recognizable offence and the accused cannot be discharged merely because of non-registration of F.I.R. The Executive Magistrate by order dated October 13, 1987 held that section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code requires that the complaint must be reduced in writing and should bear the signature of the complainant before the Police Officer who has registered the offence. The Executive Magistrate held that the complaint was not recorded in the presence of the Police Officer and was also not signed in the presence of the Police Officer by the petitioner and consequently the offence cannot be tried and the accused is entitled to acquittal for an offence under section 16 of the Act. The order passed by the Executive Magistrate is under challenge in this petition. 4. Shri Pradhan, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the order passed by the Executive Magistrate suffers from serious infirmity and demonstrates lack of concept and knowledge of Criminal Procedure Code. It was contended that it is not necessary that the information of commission of recognizable offence must be given only by the complainant and the Police can undertake the investigation when an information is received. The submission is correct and deserves acceptance. The order passed by the Executive Magistrate is entirely unsustainable. The Executive Magistrate overlooked that the complaint was forwarded by the Member of the Vigilance Committee constituted under the Act to the Collector and the District Magistrate and in pursuance of the complaint which disclosed recognizable offence, the Police had undertaken investigation. The submission is correct and deserves acceptance. The order passed by the Executive Magistrate is entirely unsustainable. The Executive Magistrate overlooked that the complaint was forwarded by the Member of the Vigilance Committee constituted under the Act to the Collector and the District Magistrate and in pursuance of the complaint which disclosed recognizable offence, the Police had undertaken investigation. Section 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code requires a Police Officer to undertake investigation if on information received or otherwise, the Officer has reason to suspect the commission of an offence. The power to investigate conferred under section 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not necessarily flow from lodgment of First Information Report prescribed under section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Police Officer is entitled to undertake investigation from information received. In the present case, the Police authorities received information on the basis of a complaint filed by the petitioner and counter-signed by the member of the Vigilance Committee. The Executive Magistrate overlooked that it was one of the functions of the Vigilance Committee to ascertain whether any offence of which cognizance can be taken under the Act is commited and then to take requisite action for punishment of the offender. The order of the Executive Magistrate demonstrate unawareness of the basic concepts of the Criminal Procedure Code as well as the provisions of the Act and consequently the impugned order cannot be sustained. It was contended on behalf of the accused that the order of acquittal passed by the Executive Magistrate cannot be disturbed in exercise of writ jurisdiction and the remedy of the petitioner, if any, is to seek Special Leave to Appeal in accordance with sub-section (4) of section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We are unable to find any merit in the submission. The provisions of sub-section (4) of section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot oust extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court in correcting unsustainable order passed by the Executive Magistrate in violation of provisions of law. The Parliament had enacted the provisions of the Act to provide for abolition of bonded labour system with a view to prevent economical and physical exploitation of the weaker section of the people and the enforcement of the Act which is obviously a beneficial legislation cannot be permitted to be defeated by unsustainable order passed by the Executive Magistrate. The Parliament had enacted the provisions of the Act to provide for abolition of bonded labour system with a view to prevent economical and physical exploitation of the weaker section of the people and the enforcement of the Act which is obviously a beneficial legislation cannot be permitted to be defeated by unsustainable order passed by the Executive Magistrate. In our judgment, the exercise of writ jurisdiction on the facts and circumstances of the case is very appropriate and the proceedings are required to be remitted for proper trial of the offence with which the respondent No. 1 is charged. 5. A larger issue as to whether the State Government was entitled and justified to exercise powers conferred by section 21 of the Act and conferred powers of a Judicial Magistrate on the Execution Magistrate requires closer scrutiny and determination. The question of the separation of Judicial and executive power of the executive officers of Government was under consideration of Government of Bombay for a long time and on February 1, 1947, a high Powered Committee chaired by Mr. Justice N.S. Lokur was constituted. The members of the Committee included Mr. Daptary, Advocate General, Mr. Jahagirdar, Government Pleader, Mr. Y. B. Chavan and Mr. B.N. Datar. The Committee submitted exhaustive report on October 11, 1947 and noticed that the independence and detached mentality which is a necessary condition for the administration of justice is much affected by the existence of the executive control. The Committee felt that the Magistrate must be independent of any executive interferences and even a suspicion of control by the executive in judicial matters is undesirable. The Committee observed that where the executive is allowed freely to circumvent the courts then there will be a steady decline in the standard of Government that can only end in the deprivation of individual rights and in the ruin of the democratic way of life. The Committee noted that the executive appoints the Executive Magistrate under Sections 20 and 21 of the Criminal Procedure Code and controls their future career by retaining the power of posting and promotion and also removal, with the result that the Executive Magistrate tend to become servile to the executive bosses and tempted or constrained to do what is demanded, not by justice but by the whims of their superiors. The report recommended that there should be complete separation of the judiciary and the executive and the Collector will remain the District Magistrate and the head of the Police but only for the purpose of maintenance of law and order in the District and will not try cases or hear appeals and only the Judicial Magistrates will do Court work and these Judicial Magistrates will not be subordinate to the Collector but to the Sessions Judge and the High Court. The Collector and the Executive Magistrate will continue to possess magisterial powers but they will exercise these powers only for the purpose of maintaining peace and order. The report made by Lokur Committee was accepted by the Government and the Bombay Separation of Judicial and Executive Functions Act, 1951 was passed by the Legislature to provided for the separation of the performance of judicial and executive functions by officers in the State of Bombay. The Statement of Objects and Reasons sets out that after careful consideration, the Government has decided to accept the recommendations of the Committee (a), that Magistrates should be divided into two classes (i) Judicial and (ii) Executive , and (b) that wherever a judicial inquiry of judicial decision in required, the matter should be dealt with by Judicial Magistrate alone. The Government thereupon decided to amend the various enactments to give effect to the recommendation. The Act, inter-alia, amended provisions of section 6 and section 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to give effect to the separation of judicial and executive functions in the State of Bombay. From the year 1951 onwards, the State Government has consistently accepted the principle of separation of judicial and executive functions and all cases which require judicial Inquiry and judicial decisions are conducted only by the Judicial Magistrate and not by Executive Magistrate. The Magisterial powers conferred on Executive Magistrate are limited only for the purpose of maintenance of law and order. In view of the legislative provisions made in the year 1951, in the State of Maharashtra the powers of conducting judicial enquiry and recording judicial decisions in conferred exclusively on the Judicial Magistrates and who is under exclusive control of the Session Court and the High Court. In other words, the executive has no role to play in conducting judicial trials and recording judicial decisions. In other words, the executive has no role to play in conducting judicial trials and recording judicial decisions. It is exclusively within the control of the High Court to make appointments of the Judicial Magistrates and regulate their postings, transfers and removals if occasion arises and the Executive has no control or right to give direction as to how the judicial decision should be recorded. In face of this Legislative enactment, it is necessary to examine whether the Government of Maharashtra was entitled to publish Notification dated March 6, 1985 and confer on the Executive Magistrate, Vasai the powers of Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or of the Second Class for the trial of offences under the Act. 6. It is undoubtedly true that section 21 of the Act which is a Central Act enables the State Government to confer on the Executive Magistrate the powers of the Judicial Magistrate and on being conferred with such powers, the Executive Magistrate shall be deemed for the purpose of Code of Criminal Procedure to be a Judicial Magistrate. The plain reading of section 21 of the Act makes it clear that the provision is enabling one and does not compel the State Government to confer powers of the Judicial Magistrate on the Executive Magistrate. It is possible that the Central Act my have enacted the provisions of section 21 because there my be certain States in the country where the doctrine of separation of judicial and executive functions was not recognized. The conferment of enabling power surely cannot be exercised in the State in which the principle of separation of judicial and executive functions is well accepted for last over 40 years. The publication of notification is clear interference by executive in administration of justice and which cannot be permitted. Mr. Advocate General pointed out that the powers of Judicial Magistrate at Vasai but on the Executive Magistrate at Latur and at Gadchiroli by notification published on June 11, 1987. In our judgment, the exercise of powers by the State Government by publication of notifications cannot be sustained in the fact of Legislative enactment providing for separation of judicial and executive functions in this State. The Notifications issued by the State Government in exercise of powers under section 21 of the Act are, therefore, required to be struck down. In our judgment, the exercise of powers by the State Government by publication of notifications cannot be sustained in the fact of Legislative enactment providing for separation of judicial and executive functions in this State. The Notifications issued by the State Government in exercise of powers under section 21 of the Act are, therefore, required to be struck down. The State Government was not justified in exercising enabling powers of section 21 and conferring judicial powers upon the Executive Magistrate for conduct of trial of offences under the Act and which provides for imposition of punishment of duration of three years and fine to the extent of Rs. 2,000/- Mr. Advocate General submitted that through the action of the State Government is not sustainable and the Notifications are required to be struck down, the proceedings already concluded by the Executive Magistrates and the decisions recorded should not be nullified as such course would cause untold hardships to the parties concerned. The submission is correct and the proceeding which are already concluded by the Executive Magistrate will not be disturbed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but would be opened to challenge only on merits. The proceedings pending before any Executive Magistrates in the State under the powers conferred by any Notifications issued by the State Government under section 21 of the Act shall stand transferred to the Judicial Magistrate was in existence both at Vasai, and at Latur and Gadchiroli when the Government published notification in March 1985 and June 1987 respectively. 7. Accordingly, petition succeeds and the impugned order dated October 13, 1987 passed by the Executive Magistrate, Vasai in Criminal Case No. 165 of 1985 is set aside and the proceedings are remitted to the Court of Judicial Magistrate. First Class, for trial in accordance with law. It is also declared that all proceedings pending before any Executive Magistrates in the State for trial of offences under the Act on the strength of notifications published by Government of Maharashtra in exercise of powers under section 21 of the Act shall stand transferred to the Court of Judicial Magistrate at a particular station and the Executive Magistrate shall not hereafter exercise the powers to conduct trials of offences under the Act. The decisions already recorded by the Executive Magistrates shall not be reversed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but the validity of the same can be examined on merits. Order accordingly. -----