Judgment :- Action was taken against petitioners for violation of an order of temporary injunction. Munsiff s Court, on a motion made by plaintiffs, ordered that petitioners (who are defendants 1 to 3 in the case) be committed to civil prison for two months each in exercise of its powers under O.39 R.2A of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'the Code'). The District Court, in appeal, confirmed the order. Hence this revision. 2. Facts are the following: Suit has been instituted by two plaintiffs for permanent injunction restraining three defendants from encroaching into the plaint schedule properties, cutting open any pathway or doing any act of waste therein. In the schedule to the plaint, two items of land have been described as "A" and "B" properties. On 19-3-1987, an order of ad interim injunction was issued by the Munsiff restraining defendants from doing any of the aforesaid acts. A Commissioner visited the properties on 25-3-1987 and reported to the court about the lie of the properties and position of "Kayyala" walls as they stood then. Commissioner noted a small pathway, having a width of 5 feet, running in between "A" and "B" schedule properties. On 23-5-87 plaintiffs filed an interlocutory application complaining that defendants in violation of the order of injunction, damaged a number of rubber trees and demolished the kayyalas and widened the pathway. Petitioners in their written objections denied the allegations. The same Commissioner was deputed to visit the properties again in the light of those allegations. He visited the site on 17-6-87 and reported to the court that the pathway has been widened into 10 feet, some of the rubber trees in the "A" schedule property were seen destroyed, kayyala walls on the sides of the two properties were seen demolished at different stretches. Oral evidence was adduced by plaintiffs as the petitioners denied the allegations. 3. Learned Munsiff found that defendants, in violation of the injunction order, encroached upon the plaint schedule properties and demolished the kayyalas, widened the pathway and damaged the rubber trees. However, learned munsiff, while imposing punishment on the petitioners, provided a rider in the order that only if defendants fail to restore status quo ante within two months they would be committed to civil prison. But petitioners did not do anything so far to restore the properties to the original condition. 4. However, learned munsiff, while imposing punishment on the petitioners, provided a rider in the order that only if defendants fail to restore status quo ante within two months they would be committed to civil prison. But petitioners did not do anything so far to restore the properties to the original condition. 4. On appeal, learned District Judge observed that the rider provided in the order of munsiff is unwarranted and hence he deleted the same. However, he confirmed the order for committing petitioners to civil prison. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners raised two contentions. First is that the court has no jurisdiction to commit any person to civil prison under 0.39, R.2A of the Code without attaching the properties of the recalcitrant parties. Second point is that there is practically no evidence to prove that petitioners violated the injunction order. 6. Order 39 R.2A(1) reads thus: "In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under R.I or R.2or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, the Court granting the injunction or making the order, or any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to he attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release". Rule 2A has been inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 104 of 1976 in substitution of sub-rule (3) of R.2 as it stood earlier. The said sub-rule was similarly worded except in regard to certain aspects which are not germane in this case. The Rule confers power on the court to order attachment of properties of the person guilty of disobedience. It also confers power on the court to order such person to be detained in civil prison. But those two modes are not compulsory to each other, nor does the latter depend upon the former. The words "and may also order" do not mean that detention in civil prison can be ordered only after attaching his properties. It also confers power on the court to order such person to be detained in civil prison. But those two modes are not compulsory to each other, nor does the latter depend upon the former. The words "and may also order" do not mean that detention in civil prison can be ordered only after attaching his properties. If the rule is interpreted as insisting on attachment of properties as a condition precedent for detention of the party in prison, it would necessitate a two pronged punishment on a party as a matter of compulsion. There is no reason to think that legislature would have intended like that. A pragmatic interpretation would show that one of the modes can be adopted against the offending party. 7. Way back in 1914 Miller, J. has observed in Ottapurakal v. Alabi (AIR 1914 Mad. 141(2)) like this: "The phrase 'may also commit' means I think, shall also have the power to commit, that is to say, the rule gives two powers - power to attach and also power to commit; it does not expressly say that both may be exercised cumulatively". The said observation was made while interpreting sub-rule (3) as it stood before the amendment. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court has held in Thazath Suppi v. Kunhikoya (AIR 1917 Mad. 448) that inspite of the difference in language the court can in its discretion order either arrest or attachment of property "and is not bound in the first instance to attach property and then only order imprisonment". Similarly, in Mowazzam All Khan v. Shebash Chandra (AIR 1927 Cal. 598), the Calcutta High Court has disapproved the interpretation that the court is obliged to order an attachment of property first and that unless it is done court cannot order punishment. The same view was held by the Gujarat High Court (vide Thakorlal Parshottamdas v. Chandulal Chunnilai -AIR 1967 Guj.124). The Allahabad High Court has follows those decision (vide Niranjan v. Shanker -AIR 1972 Allahabad 556). Patna High Court has also adopted the same view (vide State of Bihar v. Sonabati Kumari - AIR 1954 Pat. 513 and Nawal Kishore v. Rajendra Prasad - AIR 1976 Pat. 56). 8. I think the preponderance of the judicial opinion is in favour of the interpretation that the two modes of punishments prescribed in the rule are only alternative and not complementary to each other. 513 and Nawal Kishore v. Rajendra Prasad - AIR 1976 Pat. 56). 8. I think the preponderance of the judicial opinion is in favour of the interpretation that the two modes of punishments prescribed in the rule are only alternative and not complementary to each other. 9. Regarding the contention that there is want of evidence, I have to go by the concurrent findings made by the two courts below. It cannot be said that there is total want of evidence to reach the conclusion that petitioners violated the injunction order. It is not proper for the revisional court to alter the finding on facts made by the two courts below, since such finding is based on evidence. 10. Learned counsel lastly made a plea that one more opportunity may be afforded to the petitioners to adduce evidence, since petitioners failed to adduce counter evidence due to some mistaken impression. According to the learned counsel, petitioners thought that proceedings under R.2A are just like proceedings in criminal prosecution in which accused are not, generally, obliged to adduce evidence. 11. Considering all aspects and in the interest of justice, I feel inclined to afford an opportunity to the petitioners to adduce counter evidence, on some terms. If petitioners pay a sum ofRs.1,000/- (one thousand) to the plaintiffs within three weeks from the date of receipt of records in the Munsiffs Court, the impugned order will stand set aside and learned munsiff will dispose of the interlocutory application (I.A.No. 630/ 87) afresh after affording an opportunity to the petitioners to adduce evidence untrammelled by any of the observations about the evidence. If, on the other hand, petitioners fail to pay the said sum (or deposit the amount in the trial court for disbursement to the plaintiffs) within the said period, the impugned order shall stand undisturbed. The Civil Revision Petition is disposed of accordingly.