Judgment :- This appeal by the State is against acquittal. 2. The respondent-accused is the owner of a grocery shop situate at No. 10-B, Imperial Road, Cuddalore O.T. on 10-7-1985 at about 10 a.m. P.W. 1, the Food Inspector, Cuddalore Municipality inspected the provision stores and took sample of Maida after complying with all formalities as prescribed in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short 'the Act') for the purpose of analysis. One such sample so taken had been sent to the Public Analyst and the other two samples to the Local Health Authority on the same day of the sampling. The Local Health Authority received the report of the Public Analyst on 31-7-1985 to the effect that the sample, on analysis, was found to be not confirming to the standard prescribed. The Food Inspector, on 16-8-1985 launched the prosecution against the accused-respondent after completing the other formalities which was taken on file as CC. No. 327 of 1985 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuddalore, for the alleged offences under sections 7(i) and 16(1)(a)(i) read with S. 2(ia)(a) and (1) of the Act. 3. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, on consideration of the materials placed before him, found the respondent-accused not guilty of the offences with which he stood charged and acquitted him thereof, giving rise to the present appeal. 4. The verdict of acquittal is based upon the following reasonings :- (i) There is no adequate material pointing out that Maida from which sample was taken was kept in the premises of the provision store for the purpose of sale for human consumption and not for pasting purposes; (ii) Non-compliance of the provisions of Section 11(c)(i) of the Act, in the sense of not sending an intimation to the Local Health Authority as respects the sending of one of the parts for analysis to the Public Analyst; (iii) No proper materials had been placed before the Local Health Authority for a proper application of mind before launching the prosecution. 5. The aforesaid reasonings, learned Government Advocate Mr. A. S. Chakravarthy would say are rather perverse calling for interference by setting aside the verdict of acquittal. 6. Mr. V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent - accused would however repel such a submission. He would further contend that the power to institute a prosecution is different from the power to give a written consent to file such prosecution. 6. Mr. V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent - accused would however repel such a submission. He would further contend that the power to institute a prosecution is different from the power to give a written consent to file such prosecution. He would amplify by stating that if a person empowered to launch prosecution launches a prosecution, without getting the consent of the Central or the State Government, then such a prosecution is incompetent, on the face of the salient provisions adumbrated under S. 20 of the Act. In the case on hand, he would say, that though the Food Inspector is having the authorization by the Government of Tamil Nadu to launch prosecution, he cannot do so, without getting the consent of the State Government and no material is placed before the Court on this aspect of the matter and therefore it is that the prosecution, as launched, is not sustainable. 7. I may now give my anxious considerations to the submissions of both the Counsel. 8. Admittedly, the respondent-accused is transacting business in groceries, namely, articles of human consumption. On the day of inspection, by the Food Inspector, Maida from which sample was taken, had been kept in a bag along with other articles of groceries sold by him. The sample had been taken for the purpose of analysis and this factor was not made known to the respondent-accused by the Food Inspector. No contemporaneous material is traceable to the records as to the respondent-accused even raising his little finger at the time of taking sample that Maida kept in his grocery shop was not at all intended for human consumption. Only during the course of trial, an attempt had been made by hurling a question in cross-examination, when the Food Inspector was examined as P.W. 1, that Maida kept in his shop was only intended for pasting purposes and not for human consumption. The suggestion so thrown remained as a shot in the dark, in the sense of the same categorically denied by him. Of course, P.W. 2, a witness for taking of sampling would state that Maida kept in the store was not for purposes of human consumption but only for pasting purposes. It is to be noted here that P.W. 2 turned hostile wholesale and in fact he had been treated as hostile by the prosecution. Of course, P.W. 2, a witness for taking of sampling would state that Maida kept in the store was not for purposes of human consumption but only for pasting purposes. It is to be noted here that P.W. 2 turned hostile wholesale and in fact he had been treated as hostile by the prosecution. The evidentiary value to the testimony of such a witness is practically 'nil', and in such state of affairs, the testimony of such a witness cannot at all advance the case of the defence to any extent whatever, apart from throwing a suggestion in projection of the defence theory, which had been denied as already indicated, no material whatever had been produced before Court by the defence to probabilise the defence version that Maida powder kept in the premises of the shop was for the purpose of pasting and not for human consumption. It is a special knowledge of the accused and it is for him only to prove such a knowledge by production of materials or adduction of such evidence and he having not done so, it cannot be stated that the burden, that was cast on him had been successfully discharged. In this view of the matter, the finding given by the Court below, that Maida from which sample was taken, was kept in his shop, only for purpose of pasting and not for human consumption, is rather perverse and deserves to be set aside. 9. No doubt true it is that P.W. 1, the Food Inspector did not at all send any intimation to the Local Health Authority as respects his having sent one of the parts for analysis to the Public Analyst as required under S. 11(c)(i) of the Act. But on the same day, on which one of the parts had been sent to the Public Analyst for purpose of analysis, the other two parts had been sent to the Local Health Authority. The sending of the other two parts to the Local Health Authority is by itself sufficient to serve as an intimation to the Local Health Authority without there being any separate intimation. Even otherwise, the non-sending of any intimation to the Local Health Authority, as required by the aforesaid provision, is of no consequence, when especially no prejudice is shown to have been caused to the respondent-accused of such non-compliance. Even otherwise, the non-sending of any intimation to the Local Health Authority, as required by the aforesaid provision, is of no consequence, when especially no prejudice is shown to have been caused to the respondent-accused of such non-compliance. In this view of the matter, the non-compliance of the aforesaid provision cannot at all be construed as mandatory and the consequence of non-compliance of such a provision cannot be said to be fatal to the case of the prosecution. As such, the finding given by the Court below on this aspect of the matter is also perverse deserving to be set aside. 10. As respects the application of mind of the Local Health Authority before launching of prosecution, it cannot be stated that all the materials were not at all available before the Local Health Authority before ever the prosecution had been launched. The evidence of the Food Inspector as P.W. 1 clearly reveals that on the date of sampling itself, namely, 10-7-1985, he had submitted all the contemporaneous records prepared at the time of taking sample and the two parts of the sample to the Local Health Authority, and all those materials were available with him till up to the launching of prosecution up to Authority received the report of the Public Analyst on 31-7-1985 and the report clearly pointed out that the sample was not conforming to the standard prescribed under the Act. Only after the perusal of the report as well as other records, which were in his possession, the prosecution had been launched and in such state of affairs, to say that necessary materials were not at all available for a proper application of mind before launching of prosecution cannot at all be countenanced. As such, the finding of the Court below on the aspect of application of mind does not appear to be sound and the same also deserves to be set aside. 11. The next question that delves for consideration revolves on the question of interpretation of the provisions adumbrated under S. 20 of the Act. As already indicated, learned Counsel Mr. As such, the finding of the Court below on the aspect of application of mind does not appear to be sound and the same also deserves to be set aside. 11. The next question that delves for consideration revolves on the question of interpretation of the provisions adumbrated under S. 20 of the Act. As already indicated, learned Counsel Mr. Prabhakar appearing for the respondent-accused would contend that the power to launch a prosecution is a distinct power and such a power should not be confused with the power to give consent for launching the prosecution and unless the person empowered to launch prosecution is also empowered with the written consent of the Central or State Government, such a person cannot at all launch the prosecution and the prosecution, if so launched, is a vitiating factor, which will throw the case of the prosecution lock, stock and barrel. Learned Government Advocate, Mr. Chakravarthy would counter such an argument and what he would state is that if a scanning of the provisions adumbrated under S. 20 of the Act is made with so much of care, circumspection and caution, with particular reference to the syntax and disjunctive conjunction 'or' used at different places would point out two sets of authorities or persons empowered to launch the prosecution under the section. According to him, the persons empowered to launch prosecutions are Central Government, State Government and a person authorised by general or special order by the Central Government or the State Government. This apart, the other category of person empowered to launch prosecution consists of persons with the written consent of the Central or State Government or the written consent of a person authorised by general or special order by the Central or State Government. The meaning, as ascribed by learned Government Advocate, appears to be a sound interpretation of the provisions of the section. 12. The meaning, as ascribed by learned Government Advocate, appears to be a sound interpretation of the provisions of the section. 12. Sub-section (1) of S. 20 of the Act is relevant for our purpose and it is couched in the following terms : "No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under S. 14 or S. 14A shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorized in this behalf by General or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government; "Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in S. 12, if he produces in Court a copy of the report of the Public Analyst along with the complaint." 13. The said sub-section (1), without the proviso for better understanding the meaning can be re-written by giving proper meaning to the syntax 'Comma' used in the section immediately after the words 'except by' and also the meaning to the word 'or' immediately following the 'comma'. "No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under S. 14 or S. 14-A shall be instituted except by the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorized in this behalf by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government." "No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under S. 14 or S. 14-A shall be instituted except with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government." 14. Sub-section (1) of the section can be understood by giving the necessary meaning to the syntax 'comma' and the disjunctive conjunction 'or', as indicated above only. Sub-section (1) of the section can be understood by giving the necessary meaning to the syntax 'comma' and the disjunctive conjunction 'or', as indicated above only. In this view of the matter, as rightly pointed out by learned Government Advocate, the prosecution shall be instituted by the Central or State Government or a person authorised in this behalf by the Central or the State Government by general or special order or by persons with the written consent of the Central or State Government or with the written consent of a person authorized by the Central or State Government by general or special order - under the proviso appended to the Sub-section even a purchaser or (sic) is given the power to launch prosecution without there being any authorization either from the Central or the State Government or the written consent of either the Central or the State Government. 15. In the case on hand, the Government of Tamil Nadu issued a notification in G.O. No. 1861 Health dated 6-6-1956 published in page 350 Part I-A of Fort St. George Gazette dated 20-6-1956, authorizing the Food Inspectors to institute prosecutions for offences under the Act as required in S. 20(1) of the Act. Admittedly, the prosecution having been launched by the Food Inspector, who is authorised by the State Government of Tamil Nadu to institute prosecutions for offences under the Act, it goes without saying that no consent of the Central or the State Government is necessary for launching of prosecution, as contended by learned counsel for the respondent - accused. 16. Having stated the position of law, I am however rather reluctant to interfere with the verdict of acquittal of the respondent - accused, on the facts and circumstances of the case. Admittedly, as referred to earlier, the sampling operation had been done on 10-7-1985, i.e. 5 1/2 years before and the verdict of acquittal had been rendered on 11-12-1985, i.e., more than five years hence. Admittedly, as referred to earlier, the sampling operation had been done on 10-7-1985, i.e. 5 1/2 years before and the verdict of acquittal had been rendered on 11-12-1985, i.e., more than five years hence. Having allowed the verdict of acquittal to remain for such a long time and making the respondent - accused to face the agony of prosecution for such a long time by the preference of appeal against acquittal by the State, I rather feel that the agony and anguish suffered all along by the respondent - accused would be sufficient and in this view of the matter, the verdict of acquittal rendered need not at all be disturbed. 17. Subject to the above observations, the appeal shall stand dismissed. Appeal dismissed.