JUDGMENT L.M Ghosh, J. The plaintiff filed an ejectment suit against the defendants on the grounds of default and conversion of the property. The defendants are the legal representatives of Late Tjlak Chand Arora. It was an admitted position that Late Tilak Chand Arora was a monthly tenant under the plaintiff at a monthly rent of Rs. 105/- per month. There was some controversy as to when •the rent was payable as per the contract of tenancy. Tilak Chand Arora died, leaving the defendants as his heirs. Thus the defendants became the tenants of the plaintiff. It was alleged that during the life time of Tilak Chand Arora, he without the consent of the plaintiff, covered the open varandah running from the covered varandah in front of the two bed rooms and began to use the same as a room. By subsequent amendment, the plaintiff also pleaded that the defendants raised partition walls by brick walls in the two rooms on the second floor of the premises, which were let out to Tllak Chand Arora. Then, the ground of default from January, 1980 was also pleaded. The plaintiff submitted that the tenancy of the defendants was terminated by a notice to quit served on them on 26.6.80 by registered post. As the defendants did not vacate, the suit for ejectment was filed. The plaintiff also mentioned that she reserved the right to file a separate suit for damages caused to her by covering the varandah. 2. The defendants submitted that there was no alteration in the suit property. It was denied that Tilak Chand Arora covered the open varandah. There was some controversy raised as to whether the covered varandah was included in their tenancy or whether they merely had permissive right in respect thereof. The defendants pointed out that Tilak Chand Arora was Inducted in the suit premises not by the plaintiff, but by one Sohan Devi Kothari. As regards the alleged constructions inside the two rooms, the defendants took a firm stand that all along there were partition walls on the back side of the two rooms. In short, the defendants denied that there was any material alteration or structural change. 3. The learned Judge, City Civil Court, Calcutta, decreed the suit on the ground of material alteration or conversion of the suit property. In short, the defendants denied that there was any material alteration or structural change. 3. The learned Judge, City Civil Court, Calcutta, decreed the suit on the ground of material alteration or conversion of the suit property. As regards the ground of default, the learned trial court held that the defendants were entitled to protection under the statute. 4. The defendants have preferred this appeal against the decree of the learned trial court. 5. It has become clear that the only point for consideration in this appeal is whether the defendants are liable to be evicted on the ground of structural alterations, as it has already been decided that the defendants are entitled to get protection against eviction on the ground of default. This allegation of structural alteration consists of two parts, the first part is covering the open varandah, running from the covered varandah in front of the two rooms of the suit premises, the second part is relating to the allegation that the defendants raised partition walls by bricks in the two rooms. 6. We would first come to the allegation regarding raising partition walls in the two rooms. 7. According to the plaintiff, though two rooms were let out, the defendants or their predecessor converted the two rooms into four by raising two partition walls. 8. Mr. Dasgupta, the learned Advocate for the appellants/defendants, has submitted that when the entire evidence, including the report of the Commissioner appointed by this Court is considered, there would be no doubt that the rooms are in the same position as before. Mr. R.G. Ram, the learned advocate appearing for the respondent, has referred to certain materials for his contention that originally, (here were two rooms, but sometime later after induction, the two rooms were converted into four rooms by raising partition walls. He has first referred to Exts. A Series for demonstrating that only two rooms were let out. Ext. A Series are the rent receipts in the name of Tilak Chand Arora. These receipts, indeed, disclose that there are two rooms on the second floor. The Commissioner's report, Ext. 1, however, indicates that there are now two bed rooms and the two small rooms at the back of the two bed rooms. Ext. A Series are the rent receipts in the name of Tilak Chand Arora. These receipts, indeed, disclose that there are two rooms on the second floor. The Commissioner's report, Ext. 1, however, indicates that there are now two bed rooms and the two small rooms at the back of the two bed rooms. If the receipts in favour of the original tenant disclose two rooms and if it now appears that there are four rooms, it might be a ground for the contention that there was structural change by constructing partition walls subsequently inside the two rooms. But the Court must decide the matter upon a conspectus of the entire materials. The description in the rent receipts might itself suggest that there were only two rooms, but that description alone cannot be conclusive. After all it is a mode of describing the property. The evidence led on behalf of the defendants is to the effect that they objected to the receipts being granted in that manner. But that by itself leads up nowhere. However, if on a deeper probe, we find that in fact there were four rooms, including the two ante rooms, the mere description in Ext. A Series cannot be exclusive. We find that the said two rooms on the back side, which may well be called ante rooms, are too small. The ante rooms, in these circumstances, might not be considered as independent units and so might not be described in the rent receipts. We get a clear picture about that from the report of the Commissioner, who was appointed by this Court. The Commissioner was appointed by this Court for elucidation on certain points and his report and the plan were marked High Court Ext. I. Additional evidence was taken and the Commissioner was examined. From his report, we get that on the ground floor and the first floor of the premises no. 24, Nayan Chand Dutta Street, there are corresponding vertical walls similar to the walls on the second floor, but the walls differ in thickness. The walls on the northern side of the first floor and the second floor rooms are about 15” in thickness, while that of the ground floor are about 25”. From the plan of the Commissioner, we get that there are corresponding small rooms on the ground floor and the first floor, as on the second floor. The walls on the northern side of the first floor and the second floor rooms are about 15” in thickness, while that of the ground floor are about 25”. From the plan of the Commissioner, we get that there are corresponding small rooms on the ground floor and the first floor, as on the second floor. It is also to be noticed that on all the floors, the said small rooms or ante rooms are only 3”x7” broad. Thus there is a complete symmetry as regards the physicality of all the rooms. If the defendants or their predecessor raised the walls and converted the two rooms into four rooms, there is no explanation why similar walls and similar rooms would be found on the other floors; admittedly, the defendants cannot have any control or access to the rooms on the other floors. That abundantly proves that the same person was responsible for raising walls and converting the two bed rooms into four rooms. That person could not be Tilak Chand Arora or any of his descendants; neither Tilak Chand nor the defendants could have any access or control over the other floors. It is also not understood why the walls should be 15” thick, if the defendants or their predecessor intended to put the partition walls merely. When we take into view of the whole situation, there cannot be any doubt that the rooms are in the same position as before. The allegation that the defendants converted the two rooms into four by raising partition walls are not substantiated. The defendants cannot be evicted on that supposed ground. 9. The next ground on which eviction is sought for is that the defendants or their predecessor covered the open varandah running from the covered varandah in front of the two bed rooms let out to the defendant's father. In this respect also, the plaint case is not as clear as it should have been. From the evidence and the body of the pleadings, it can be gathered that the plaintiff means that the varandah running from the covered varandah in front of the rooms was covered But in the schedule of the plaint, the offensive part has been described as the varandah in front of the said two rooms now converted into a room. From the evidence and the body of the pleadings, it can be gathered that the plaintiff means that the varandah running from the covered varandah in front of the rooms was covered But in the schedule of the plaint, the offensive part has been described as the varandah in front of the said two rooms now converted into a room. It might have been overlooked on the ground of mere mistake, but it is not possible to ignore this description because the specific description itself was introduced by amendment. By amendment of the schedule, it is made clear that the varandah in front of the two bed rooms is referred to. But elsewhere, the plaintiff has consistently pointed out that it is the other varandah, running from the varandah in front of the rooms, that has been covered. It would suggest that the plaintiff is not very sure as to what was done precisely at what point of time. 10. Ignoring this position arising out of the schedule of the plaint, we proceed to consider whether the defendants or, their predecessor covered the other varandah by making substantial structures. The allegation of the plaintiff now appears to be confined to the other varandah i.e. varandah running from the covered varandah in front of the rooms of the tenanted premises. The Commissioner was appointed in the Court below and he submitted his report with a plan. Ext. 1 is the report of the Commissioner along with his plan. The Commissioner has described the other varandah as “B” Varandah. The “A” varandah is, in the Commissioners plan, the varandah in front of the rooms. We arc at this stage concerned with the "B" Varandah. As per the report of the Commissioner, the covered varandah or the passage as marked "B" is of small size, approximately 6’ x 3’, covered by asbestos sheet PW-2, deposing for the plaintiff, has asserted that he saw the open varandah in the occupation of the defendants upto the last of March, 1979. According to him, the defendants have raised walls of brick on the east and west sides of the said open varandah fixing two windows in the east wall and one window in the west wall and have also fixed a door on north and one on south and made the roof of asbestos sheet without the knowledge of the plaintiff in March, 1979. Now, this statement has come out in cross examination. In his chief he has stated that he saw the open varandah upto the last of March, 1979. Then when exactly PW-2 came to know about the raising of the walls cannot be ascertained. If he saw the varandah open upto the last of March, 1979, he could not have also noticed that it was covered in March, 1979. Now, according to PW-2, walls were raised on the east and on the west. That means, he suggests that earlier there were no walls on the east and the west. That appears to be an impossibility, because there cannot be any passage without walls, the position of the persons negotiating that passage would then have been very precarious. Therefore, there must have been some walls at least upto a certain height. It is true that the plaintiff issued a notice dated 29.3.79 to Tilak Chand Arora complaining of conversion of the passage into a brick built room But it has not been set out in what manner the passage was converted into a brick built room. The extent and the nature of the alleged construction must be disclosed. For, if there be any additional construction upon an existing construction, the same may or may not amount to substantial change so as to come within the provisions of ‘M’, ‘O’ and ‘P’ of s. 108 of the T.P Act. Moreover, the tenant was asked to demolish the said unauthorised structure but no follow-up action was taken. In the ejectment notice also, the same allegation was repeated, but it is simply set out that Tilak Chand Arora covered the open varandah. There is no allegation that the open varandah was covered by constructing brick walls. Ext. 3 (a) Is the copy of the notice It appears that the plaintiff is not aware of the actual physical position in which the house remained, but simply made allegations from time to time, as she thought advisable. It is likely that the plaintiff herself had no idea about the position of the building as admittedly, the property was leased out to one Mrs. Kothari. Without knowing the position, the plaintiff has been introducing different cases at different times. We have pointed out that it cannot be that the passage of the second floor was left open completely. There must have been walls. Kothari. Without knowing the position, the plaintiff has been introducing different cases at different times. We have pointed out that it cannot be that the passage of the second floor was left open completely. There must have been walls. Even assuming that the defendants covered the varandab with asbestos sheets and fixed some grills and doors and windows, that cannot be said to be a construction of the nature of a permanent character so as to come within the inhibition of clause (b) of s. 13(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The defendants have been examined as DWs.-1 and 2. DW-1 is the defendant no. 3. DW-2 is the defendant no. 2. Both of them have firmly denied that they made any addition or alteration in the rooms or any part of the premises. Now even assuming some construction was made over the passage or varandah by placing asbestos roof, fixing grills, etc., we feel that the same cannot be offensive under Clause (p) of s. 108 of the T.P. Act. The structure raised must be a permanent structure. What is permanent is not always easy to define. But one primary test is that it should be some structure which would have some impact on the physicality of the property in the sense that it would not be easily removable. Mr. Dasgupta, the learned advocate for the appellants, has, in this connection, relied upon certain decisions. The case reported in 1987(2) CLH 41 merely decides that the structure will have to be a permanent structure. Ratnamala’s Case reported in 1988(1) CLJ 468 , also cited by Mr. Dasgupta, furnishes some guidelines. It lays down that the structure should be permanent or that which is destructive or permanently injurious to the tenanted premises ; but he can add to the premises and make alterations thereto to suit his necessities. Brijendra Nath Bhargava’s case ( AIR 1988 SC 293 ) has decided that if the tenant constructs wooden cabin inside show room of the demised premises; that construction cannot be said to be material alteration. In Pitnmbar Das's case (AIR 1281 Bombay 388), construction of a kitchen platform with bricks, cement and Sahabad floor on the wooden plank of the premises, was not considered a permanent structure taking into consideration the measurement of the platform. In Pitnmbar Das's case (AIR 1281 Bombay 388), construction of a kitchen platform with bricks, cement and Sahabad floor on the wooden plank of the premises, was not considered a permanent structure taking into consideration the measurement of the platform. It thus appears that the principle is that there should not be any construction which would substantially affect the demised property, or which would render removal of the added construction difficult. We have also to take into consideration that the varandah is not long. Covering with asbestos shed and fixing some grills, etc., would not come within the description of construction of a permanent nature. Mr. Ram, the learned advocate for the respondent, has relied on certain decisions. He has cited the decision reported in AIR 1965 Calcutta 408. That very decision makes it clear that the word “permanent” is a relative term. In that decision, some stress is laid on the intention. However, the intention cannot always be gathered clearly. The decision cited does not advance the case of the respondent in any way. The next case cited by Mr. Ram is reported in AIR 1975 Kerala 175 That decision merely lays down that if the lessee erects a permanent structure in violation of the provision of Clause (p) of s. 108 of the T.P. Act, the lessor would be en titled to get a decree for mandatory injunction. The consideration as to when a party can get an order for mandatory injunction would be different from the consideration as to whether the tenant is liable to be evicted on the ground of violation of the terms of the tenancy. Moreover, that decision simply says that if a permanent structure is raised in violation, then the tenant makes himself liable. Whether a permanent structure has been raised at all or not is the question to be answered in this appeal. We have found that there is no clear evidence that the tenant covered the varandah at all. We have also found that even if the tenant placed an asbestos roofing, that would not come within the description of permanent structure. This allegation of the plaintiff also fails. 11. We have found that there is no clear evidence that the tenant covered the varandah at all. We have also found that even if the tenant placed an asbestos roofing, that would not come within the description of permanent structure. This allegation of the plaintiff also fails. 11. Upon a consideration of all the materials and the circumstances of the case, we are of the firm view that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendants or their predecessor violated the provisions of 13 (1) (b) of the West Bengal Premises Act. Such being the position, the tenant is not liable to be evicted. The learned Trial Court was not justified in granting a decree for eviction. 12. The appeal succeeds. 13. The appeal is allowed on contest. The judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court, granting a decree for eviction and mesne profits, are hereby set aside. _ 14. The suit is dismissed on contest. We make no order as to costs of the suit and of this appeal. Amarabha Sengupta J. I agree Appeal allowed; decree for eviction set aside.