JUDGMENT 1. By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks to challenge an order dated June 29, 1990 passed by respondent No. 1, thereby holding that respondent No. 2 was illegally removed from service and directing the petitioner-bank to pay him costs of Rs. 250. 2. Respondent No.2 was appointed on probation for a period of six months as peon in the scale of pay of Rs. 75-2 1/2-90 EB-3-120 with clearness allowance and other allowance admissible in the bank, vide appointment order dated December 29, 1983, filed as Annexure P-1 to the petition. The period of probation was to commence from January 1, 1984. Even before this period of probation could expire, the petitioner-bank by order (Annexure P-2), dated April 20, 1984 (just within four months of the appointment), terminated his services on and from April 30, 1984, as not required. 3. By another order dated June 21, 1984 (Annexure P-3) issued just the next day of the date of issuing the termination order, respondent No.2 was appointed on the same post on daily wages. Respondent No.2, therefore, moved the Labour Court, under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. His application is on record as Annexure P-4. The reply filed by the petitioner-bank is Annexure P-5 and Annexure P- 6 is the impugned order. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. According to him, the petitioner-bank having terminated the services of respondent No.2, vide Annexure P-2, the employment came to an end and there was no continuation of that order. Respondent No. 2 was given fresh appointment with effect from May 1, 1984, on daily wages. It was urged that the Labour Court has acted without jurisdiction by holding that it was a case of deduction of wages. He also referred to the following decisions: Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan, 1963-II-LLJ-89; Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Their Workmen 1974 (29) FLR 56 (SC); P.K. Singh v. Presiding Officer 1988-II-LLJ-363; Divisional Superintendent, South Eastern Railway, Bilaspur v. S. Shankaran (1980) JLJ 842 and Divisional Superintendent, South Eastern Railway v. Annajikumar. (1980) JLJ 897. 5. He also referred to the following decisions: Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan, 1963-II-LLJ-89; Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Their Workmen 1974 (29) FLR 56 (SC); P.K. Singh v. Presiding Officer 1988-II-LLJ-363; Divisional Superintendent, South Eastern Railway, Bilaspur v. S. Shankaran (1980) JLJ 842 and Divisional Superintendent, South Eastern Railway v. Annajikumar. (1980) JLJ 897. 5. The Supreme Court in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan, (supra) itself had held that the extent and scope of Section 33-C(2) is undoubtedly wider than that of Section 33-C(2), Explaining further, the Supreme Court has observed that it was unnecessary in the appeals before it either to state exhaustively or even to indicate broadly what other categories of claims can fall under Section 33-C(2). Apart from the three categories of claims mentioned in Section 33-C(2), the Supreme Court has also held that Section 33-C(2) can itself be deemed to be a kind of execution proceeding, but it is possible that claims not based on settlements, awards made under the provisions of Chapter V-A may also be competent under Section 33-C(2) and that may illustrate its wider scope. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, strongly relied on the following passage (1963-II-LLJ-89 at 97): "If an employee is dismissed or demoted and it is his case that the dismissal or demotion is wrongful, it would not be open to him to make a claim for the recovery of his salary or wages under Section 33-C(2). His demotion or dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which may be appropriately tried, but once it is shown that the employer has dismissed or demoted him, a claim that the dismissal or demotion is unlawful and, therefore, the employee continues to be the workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits due to him under a pre-existing contract, cannot be made under Section 33-C(2)." 6. The instant case is not a case of dismissal or demotion. Respondent No.2 was appointed on a monthly salary on probation for a period of six months, but even before this period could expire, his services were terminated by order dated April 20, 1984 (Annexure P-2), and just the next day on April 21, 1984, another order (Annexure P-3) was passed appointing respondent No.2 on daily wages. This glaring fact cannot be overlooked. 7. This glaring fact cannot be overlooked. 7. The other cases cited by the petitioner's counsel are substantially on similar lines and need not be discussed in an order passed in motion hearing. 8. The petitioner-bank constituted and created under a statute has come forward invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. One cannot overlook a very recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Rabinarayan Mohapatra v. State of Orissa, 1991-II-LLJ-62, deprecating the practice of appointing employees for 89 days, so as to deprive them of their legitimate right, which may otherwise accrue to them as regular employees. This is exactly what has happened in the present case. Upholding the contention advanced by the petitioner would be nothing short of putting a premium on a practice which has been deprecated by the Supreme Court. 9. The larger question involved is whether the extraordinary power of this Court should be invoked for such a purpose? More so in the face of the fact that the Labour Court, respondent No. 1, has, on proper consideration of evidence produced before it, recorded a categorical finding that the employer bank, with a view to reduce the pay, passed the termination order, while in reality the services were never terminated nor any fresh appointment given. The Labour Court has finally come to the conclusion and rightly so that it was a case of illegal deduction of Rs. 12,643.75 from May 1984, to January, 1987. It has also been held by the Labour Court that no justification for such deduction was established before it. In face of these categorical findings recorded by the Labour Court, on the basis of evidence produced before it, the criticism that impugned order, Annexure P-6, is perverse or without jurisdiction is wholly unfounded and rather uncharitable to learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, 10. An order does not become perverse by merely denouncing it to be so. The scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is extremely narrow and, as discussed above, no grounds for interference have been made out. In the result, this petition deserves summary dismissal. It is, accordingly, dismissed without notice to the opposite party.