ORDER In SLP (C) Nos. 8280/79, 7276-78/79 and 4607/86 1. Special leave granted in these petitions. 2. The Registry to assign numbers to these appeals. 3. These appeals as well as Civil Appeal Nos. 739-40 of 1979, 285 of 1979, 777-83 of 1979 and 1274-75 of 1986 form a bunch and can conveniently be disposed of by a common order. 4. The common facts in each of these appeals are that the respondents in each case owned a vehicle fit either for passenger transport or goods transport. The respondents vehicles carry Certificates of Registration depending on the kind of vehicle. The respective Certificates of Registration were deposited by the respondents before the Regional Transport Taxing Officer claiming exemption from tax payable under Section 3 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Taxation Act). The certificates of fitness related to those Certificates of Registration were non-existent, either by efflux of time or otherwise. On the factum of certificates of fitness being non-existent the respondents claimed that the Certificates of Registration had lost currency and, therefore, the Explanation to Section 3(1) of the Taxation Act ceased to apply leaving it open to the Regional Transport Officer to devise other methods to fix liability on the respondents for payment of tax under the Taxation Act if it was established that the vehicles were suitable for use on roads during the relevant period. The prayer of the respondents was rejected. The Explanation to Section 3(1) of the Taxation Act was employed to bring the respondents within the Taxation Act. That Explanation reads as follows: "A motor vehicle of which the certificate of registration is current shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be a vehicle suitable for use on roads." 5. The respective appeals of the respondents before the appellate authority were dismissed which led to writ petitions at their instance being filed in the High Court of Karnataka. Two of such petitions being subject matters of Civil Appeal Nos. 739-40 of 1979 were referred to a Full Bench for decision since there appeared to be a conflict of authority in that court. Two of such petitions being subject matters of Civil Appeal Nos. 739-40 of 1979 were referred to a Full Bench for decision since there appeared to be a conflict of authority in that court. The Full Bench taking note of the relevant provisions of the Taxation Act and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as also the interpretations and inter-relationships deduced in various decisions of that Court finally overruled V. Naraina Reddy v. Commissioner for Transport in Mysore{(1971) 2 Mysore LJ 319} approving State of Karnataka v. Boodi Reddappa{(1975) 1 Kant LJ 206}. The Full Bench observed as follows: "The fiction embodied in the Explanation to Section 3( 1) of the Taxation Act comes into play only when a certificate of registration is obtained under Chapter II of the Motor Vehicles Act and continues to operate as long as the said certificate is current. The said certificate ceases to be current only by operation of the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is not in any way affected by any of the provisions of the Taxation Act. Hence in order to find out whether a certificate of registration is current or not, we have to look to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act only. It follows that there cannot be a certificate of registration which is not current for purposes of the Motor Vehicles Act, but current for purposes of the Taxation Act. Under the Motor Vehicles Act a certificate of registration may cease to be current in several ways. It comes to an end on the expiry of the prescribed period under Section 25 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It ceases to be current by an order of suspension passed under Section 33 of the Motor Vehicles Act or by an order of cancellation under Section 34 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In the case of a transport vehicle, when it does not carry a fitness certificate, Section 38(1) states that it shall not be deemed to have been validly registered for purposes of Section 22 of the Motor Vehicles Act. That means that during the period when the transport vehicle is not carrying a fitness certificate, its certificate of registration will be inoperative or non-existent and it cannot be used for carrying passengers or goods." 6. That means that during the period when the transport vehicle is not carrying a fitness certificate, its certificate of registration will be inoperative or non-existent and it cannot be used for carrying passengers or goods." 6. Following the Full Bench decision, various benches of the High Court allowed the writ petitions which have led to these appeals. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The matter is not res integra. This Court in State of Karnataka v. K. Gopalakrishna Shenoy{ (1987) 3 SCC 655 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 653} has examined the matter from all possible angles. It has taken a view opposite to the one taken by the Full Bench of the High Court. It has approved Naraina Reddy case{(1971) 2 Mysore LJ 319} and held the decision rendered in Reddappa case{(1975) 1 Kant LJ 206} as not correct law. It has taken the view that the terms of Section 38 of the Motor Vehicles Act by themselves limit the deeming effect caused by the absence of a certificate of fitness to the rights conferred under Section 22 pursuant to the registration of a vehicle, leaving no scope for extending the deeming provisions of Section 38 to Section 3(1), and the Explanation thereto to the Taxation Act. In other words, it the certificate of fitness, for whatever reason, becomes inoperative or non-existent it may have the effect of putting to dormancy the certificate of registration granted under Section 22 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Still the dormancy so occurring can in no event have the currency of the registration certificate affected or the operability of Section 3(1) and the Explanation added thereto of the Taxation Act. This Court specifically said in Shenoy case{ (1987) 3 SCC 655 }: (SCC p. 667, para 12) "[I]t follows that Section 3(1) of the Taxation Act and its Explanation have to be construed on their own force and not with reference to Section 38 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The combined effect of Sections 3, 4 and 7 of the Act is that the State is empowered to levy tax on all motor vehicles which are suitably designed and manufactured for use on the roads. The combined effect of Sections 3, 4 and 7 of the Act is that the State is empowered to levy tax on all motor vehicles which are suitably designed and manufactured for use on the roads. The Explanation provides that every motor vehicle of which a Certificate of Registration is current shall be deemed to be a vehicle suitable for use on roads and liable to pay tax as a potential user of the roads at the rates prescribed by the government." 8. We were suggested by the learned counsel for the respondents to have the matter examined by a three member bench. We find no scope to entertain such a suggestion. It is patent from Shenoy case{ (1987) 3 SCC 655 } that it commended to this Court to put the relevant provisions of the Taxation Act distinct and on a separate pedestal not assigning them a subservient position as was done by the Full Bench of the High Court. There evidently was no scope for extending the legal fiction created by Section 38 of the Motor Vehicles Act beyond the purposes of Section 22 of the said Act and in no event eclipse Section 3(1) and the Explanation thereto of the Taxation Act. There was no scope thus for holding that the respondents vehicles should be taken to have been held unsuitable for use on roads by the mere fact of deposit of registration documents. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that Shenoy case{ (1987) 3 SCC 655 } must govern the fate of these cases. 9. In the result, these appeals are allowed. The respective judgments and orders of the High Court are quashed leaving it open to the respondents to take shelter of the remedies as and where available in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, however, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. For Citation : 1992 Supp (2) SCC 441.