Sat Pal, J. ( 1 ) THESE appeals are directed against the order dated 9/03/1989 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing theapplications of the appellants filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act intheir respective suits. Since the point of law raised in all these appeals iscommon, these appeals are being decided by this common judgment. ( 2 ) THE facts pertaining to one of the appeals viz FAO (OS) 176/89briefly stated are that the State Trading Corporation (hereinafter REFERRED TO to asstc) which is the respondent in all these appeals, entered into an agreement on 26/02/1982 with the appellant whereby it agreed to purchase from theappellant 1850 M. T. of D-30 grade white crystal sugar of 1981-82 crushingseason to be exported by STC. Admittedly the appellant supplied 1406 M. T. of said sugar. Before the contract could be completed, the Government ofindia imposed an embargo on the export of sugar from India. According tothe respondent, it was not under any obligation to lift the balance quantity ofsugar in view of clause 10 (d) of the agreement between the parties which readsas under :- "this contract is at all times subject to Government of India spermission to STC to export sugar out of India. If at any time, thegovernment of India disallow, defer, postpone or cancel any exportcommitment and/or reduce the quantity of sugar to be exported bystc, STC shall have the right, at its discretion, to cancel this contractand/or defer, postpone or reduce the quantity of sugar to be exportedunder this contract without incurring any liability to the factory, onany account whatsoever. Similarly, if for any reason whatsoeverincluding any default on the part of the foreign buyer (s) of STC,stc is not able to export sugar, STC without incurring any liabilityto the factory shall be entitled to cancel the quantities yet to bedespatched by the Factory. " ( 3 ) THEREAFTER Indian Sugar Mills Association, New Delhi and Nationalfederation Co-opeative Sugar Factories Limited, New Delhi, which were defendants No. 2 and 3 in the suit as representatives of the appellant and other sugarmanufacturer approached the STC and asked it to lift the balance quantity ofsugar. It was represented on behalf of the appellant and other sugar manufacturers who are appellants in other appeals that if the balance quantity ofsugar was not lifted, the manufacturers will sell the sugar at the risk and costof STC. It was represented on behalf of the appellant and other sugar manufacturers who are appellants in other appeals that if the balance quantity ofsugar was not lifted, the manufacturers will sell the sugar at the risk and costof STC. According to STC in order to avoid hardship to the appellate andother sugar manufacturers, it entered into an independent agreement withindian Sugar Mills Association and National Federation of Co-operative Sugarfactories Limited wherein it was agreed that sugar manufacturers may disposeof the balance unlifted quantity of free sale sugar of D-30 grade in the openmarket and STC would pay to the sugar manufacturers the difference betweenthe actual sale price and the contract price. This decision was conveyed bystc to the above mentioned Association vide their letters dated 10/02/1983 and 22/04/1983. It was further agreed that the manufacturersincluding the appellant after disposal of the said sugar would prefer a claimon STC for the payment of difference in price. The STC had agreed to payprovisionally 90% of the difference in the price upon the submssion of theclaim and balance 10% was to be paid after due verification of the invoices andthe other documents in respect of the sale of the said sugar. ( 4 ) THE case of STC in the main suit was that the appellant had submitted a claim of Rs. 33,57,338. 00 alleged to be the difference in price of theunlifted quantity of 444 M. T. of sugar and the appellant was paid by STC asum of Rs. 2,88,357. 48 representing 90% of the amount claimed by the appellant. On the examination of the documents it was, however, found that theappellant had in fact sold 269. 2 M. T. of E-30 grade of sugar instead of D-30grade, and was therefore, not entitled to claim any amount in respect thereof. After giving the appellant credit in respect of D-30 grade sugar, STC filed thesuit for refund of Rs. 1,47,016. 74 plus interest of Rs. 72,561. 25 at the rate of18% per annum calculated upto 10/08/1986. ( 5 ) MR. Ghosh, the learned Counsel for the appellant submitted thatthe learned Single Judge erred in holding that the arrangement entered intobetween the parties by virtue of letters dated 10/02/1983 and 2 2/04/1983 was a fresh agreement and wholly independent of the originalagreement dated 26/02/1982. 72,561. 25 at the rate of18% per annum calculated upto 10/08/1986. ( 5 ) MR. Ghosh, the learned Counsel for the appellant submitted thatthe learned Single Judge erred in holding that the arrangement entered intobetween the parties by virtue of letters dated 10/02/1983 and 2 2/04/1983 was a fresh agreement and wholly independent of the originalagreement dated 26/02/1982. The learned Counsel further submittedthat the arrangement regarding the sale of sugar in free market and paymentof differential price between the parties was a transaction intrinsically arisingout of and forming part of the agreement dated 26/02/1982 andtherefore, the arbitration clause in the said agreemeat applied to the disputebetween the parties. ( 6 ) IN support of his submission the learned Counsel REFERRED TO to asupreme Court judgment in Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pearey Lalkumar and Another, AIR 1952 SC 119 . In this case the Hon ble Supreme Courtwhile approving the judgment in the case of Heyman v. Darwins Ltd, 1982 (1)AER 337 held that an arbitration clause is a written submission, agreed to bythe parties to the contract, and, like other written submissions to arbitration,must be construed according to its language and in the light of the circumstances in which It is made. It was held in this case that the test for determining the question whether the point in dispute fell to be decided by thearbitrator is whether recourse to the contract by which the parties are bound isnecessary for the parposes of determing the matter in dispute between them. If such recourse to the contrast is necessary then the matter must come withinarbitrator s jurisdiction. ( 7 ) IN the present case the point in issue is whether for the decision ofthe dispute in question, recourse to the contract dated 26/02/1982 isnecessary. It will be seen from clause 10 (d) of the aforesaid agreement whichhas been reproduced hereinabove that there was no provision for the sale ofsugar in the local market in case the Government of India disallows STC toexport sugar and/or ask STC to defer, postpone or cancel any export commitment. In fact in terms of the said clause 10 (d), in case the Government ofindia disallows STC to export sugar, STC shall have the right at its discretion,to cancel the contract and/or defer, postpone or reduce the quantity of sugar tobe exported under this contract without incurring any liability to the factory,on any account whatsoever. In fact in terms of the said clause 10 (d), in case the Government ofindia disallows STC to export sugar, STC shall have the right at its discretion,to cancel the contract and/or defer, postpone or reduce the quantity of sugar tobe exported under this contract without incurring any liability to the factory,on any account whatsoever. It was only with a view to avoid hardship to thesugar manufacturers that STC entered into an agreement with the Associationrepresenting the sugar manufacturers wherein it was agreed that the sugarmanufacturers may dispose of the balance unlifted quantity of free sale sugarof D-30 grade in the open market and -STC would pay to the sugar manufacturers the difference between the actual sale price and the contract price. Theletters dated 10/02/1983 and 22/04/1983, therefore, constituteda fresh agreement wholly independent of the agreement dated 26/02/1982, and, therefore, the fresh agreement was not covered by the arbitrationclause. In this connection it will be relevant to refer to a Supreme Courtjudgment reported as The Union of India v. Kishori Lal Gupta and Bros. , air 1959 SC 1362 . In this case the Hon ble Supreme Court held that if theparties substituted a new contract for the contract which they have abrogated,the arbitration clause in the abrogated contract cannot be invoked for thedetermination of questions under the new agreement. ( 8 ) IN view of the above discussion, we find no merit in the appeals andthe same are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, thepartics shall bear their own costs.