Judgment :- This is an application filed under O. 14, R. 8 of the Original Side Rules read with Order 40, Rule 1, Clause(d)of the Civil procedure Code, seeking the relief of appointment of a Receiver to manage and take charge of the daily collections of the theatre complex, Sathyam, Shantham and Sub-ham, at No. 16, Whites Road, Royapettah, Madras-600 014, pending disposal of the suit. 2. The short facts of the plaintiff/applicants case is as follows: The plaintiff is carrying on financial business and in such capacity, he advanced moneys to the first respondent which is a firm and the respondents-2 to 12 are the partners of the same and that in respect of the said advances made to the first respondent firm, represented by the 3rd respondent herein who is the Managing Partner and in such capacity, executed an equitable mortgage in favour of the applicant/plaintiff by depositing the M/s. A.S. Chandrasekaran, and T.V. Ramanujam C. Manishankar Applicants/Paintiffs, for Respondents/Defendants. M/s. S.C.A.S. Sundaram, B. Giridhar Rao and S. Raghunathan for title deeds of the property situated at No. 16, whites Road, Madras-600 014 as security with an intent to create a mortgage of the said property towards the due repayment of the amounts advanced to him by the applicant, and that on executing the said equitable mortgage, the first respondent obtained further advances as loan and that the 3rd respondent as the Joint Managing Partner, executed several Demand Promissory Notes on 21- 5-1988 and 17-7-1988 to the extent of Rs. 6,50,000/- and that except a sum of Rs. 27,500/- paid towards the said loan on 21-7-1988 and Rs, 7,500/- on 17-10-1988 made towards the interest, no amount was paid by the first respondent and that therefore, for the balance of the amount including the principal and interest outstanding to the extent of Rs. 11,81,216/- has since not been paid, the present suit was filed by the plaintiff against the first respondent firm and the respondents-2 12 who are the partners of the said to firm, for the recovery of the said amount. 3. 11,81,216/- has since not been paid, the present suit was filed by the plaintiff against the first respondent firm and the respondents-2 12 who are the partners of the said to firm, for the recovery of the said amount. 3. The further case of the applicant/plaintiff was that though the first respondent firm is doing business in running the theatre complex under the name and style of Sathyam, Shantham and Sub-ham and collecting the rents, several loans ob tained by the firm have not been paid and the collections being derived from the running of the theatre are taken by the respondents and that as such, the respondentsare heavily indebted and not in a position to make the payments to various creditors and that further, the respondents had no property except the daily collections being derived from the theatre complex and that without paying the debts, due to various creditors, they are continuing to incur more debts and liabilities and that in fact, the first respondent firm has suspended making payments through its creditors and that therefore, the applicant is contemplating suitable insolvency proceedings and that because of the said position, it has become imperative that the Receiver be appointed to safeguard the interest of the applicant as he apprehended that he would not be able to realise his moneys the respondents, if they are allowed to run their business as they are doing so now and not able to pay any of the creditors. It was further avered tnat apart from this, the respondents are frittering and secreting away the moneys received by way of collection, with a view to delay and defeat their creditors which is evident from the fact that the equitable mortgage created in favour of the plaintiff, is still subsistmg and that due to the default, the interest and principal alone will come to the extent of one crore of rupees by the respondents for which the plaintiff is contemplating separate action. It was further averred that in the event of a decree being passed in this favour, he will not be able to realise any amount from the respondents, if they are allowed to run the three theatres and have the collections as usual and that only with a view to safeguard the interest of the plaintiff, it was prayed that the Receiver is to be appointed to manage the theatre complex, Sathyam, Shantham and Subham situate at No. 16, whites Road, Royapettah, Madras-600 014. 4. On 29.4.1991, this Court was pleased to appoint an Advocate as Receiver ex-parte for the purpose of managing the three theatres in the suit property and take the daily collections without hearing the other side and that accordingly, the Advocate Receiver, pursuant to the order passed by this court on 29.4.1991, had been to the theatre complex on 5.6.1991 at about 11.15 a.m. and executed the warrant till 2.15 p.m. and that from the said date onwards, he continues to check up and sign the daily collection reports of the three theatres till today as evident from his Report dated 26.6.1991. It was also represented by the learned counsel appearing for the applicant/plaintiff that even today, the receiver is checking up and signing the daily collection reports by visiting everyday to the theatre. 5. The claim of the plaintiff was being challenged by the defendants-1 and 10 to 12 by filing a sworn affidavit on behalf of the abovesaid respondents with the following main contentions. 6. The first respondent firm is carrying on film exhibition business under the name and style of SATHYAM, SANTHAM AND SHUBAM, the three theatres situated in a single complex at No. 8 Thiruvika. 6. The first respondent firm is carrying on film exhibition business under the name and style of SATHYAM, SANTHAM AND SHUBAM, the three theatres situated in a single complex at No. 8 Thiruvika. Road, Madras-14 and that it was contended therein that the suit claim made by the applicant/plaintiff himself is not binding on the firm, viz., the first respondent and that as such, the suit as well as the application for appointment of a Receiver is not maintainable in law and that contending interalia that the first respondent firm though initially consisted of respondents-2 to 9 as partners, it was re-constituted on 20.3.1986, by adding respondents-10 to 12 into the partnership business of the first respondent and that by virtue of Clause-18, she has become the sole Managing Partner and that under Clause-21 of the Partition Deed, none of the partners were entitled to borrow money on behalf of the first respondent firm without the consent of all the partners in writing and that inasmuch as the applicant/plaintiff has admitted the re-constitution of the partnership firm in the plaint, it has to be seen that the plaintiff had every knowledge of the stipulations made in the Partnership Deed. It was further contended that the suit promissory note transaction between 21.5.1988 and 17.7.1988 and 15 promissory notes alleged to have been executed by the third respondent representing himself as the Joint Managing Partner of the first respondent firma and without any authority and not binding on the firm or any other partners, since the 3rd respondent has no manner of any right to make the borrowings on behalf of the firm not had he any capacity to represent himself as a Joint Managing Partner of the first respondent firm and that for the said reason of the borrowings or if any, incurred by the third respondent on behalf of the firm. Then the factum of the equitable mortgage created in favour of the plaintiff for over a sum of Rs. Then the factum of the equitable mortgage created in favour of the plaintiff for over a sum of Rs. 90,00,000/-has been denied in the context that the respondents 10 to 12 have not participated in the said borrowings and that even assuming the same is true, it was contended that the application/plaintiff has got ample Security in his hands, viz., the theatre complex which would fetch a value much more than the exaggerated suit claim and that in view of the said mortgage, the first respondent cannot dispose of otherwise alienate the said theatre property which has considerable value and that in case of the plaintiff even obtaining a decree against the first defendant/first respondent firm and that he can always recover the decreed amount from the property in question. 7. It was further contended that there was no allegations made by the applicant that the firm is attempting to dispose of any of the assets in the theatre complex and that even so, the said three theatres are functioning in full swing and that as such, there was no question of closing down the same and that the collections from the dues are shown in what is known as Daily Collection Report, maintained by the theatres m quadruplicate which reports have to be submitted to the Commercial Tax Authorities and the Licensing Authorities, viz., the Commissioner of Police and the Corporation of Madras and kept the same open for inspection and verification and that therefore, no question of any manipulation of any figures in the report pertaining to the collections derived from exhibiting the films at all the theatres. It was also contended that the dues to the electricity charges, maintenance and other establishment charges, dues to the Municipal Authorities and Commercial Tax purposes are also being paid out of the daily collections including the creditors and if the collections are being taken by the Receiver, it has become highly impossible for the defendants-1 and 10 to 12 to carry on the exhibition business and that more particularly, no Receiver can be appointed in a money suit and especially in this suit, no extraordinary circumstances were pleaded by the applicant/plaintiff herein. By contending as hereinbefore referred, the respondents-1 and 10 to 12 prays that the ex-parte order passed on 29.4.1991 in the Original Application No. 404 of 1991 appointing the Receiver in respect of the 3 theatres belonging to this respondent, is to be set aside and cancelled immediately and for the said relief, the defendants/respondents-1 and 10 to 12 has filed an Application No. 3004 of 1991 against the application/plaintiff, the affidavit filed in support of which is taken as a counter-statement for the Original Application No. 404 of 1991. 8. Upon the same grounds and contentions urged in the affidavit filed in support of the Application No. 3005 of 1991, the respondents-1, 10 to 12 also pray for the suspension of the ex-parte order passed by this Court on 29.4.1991 in the Original Application No. 404 of 1991 appointing the Second respondent as Receiver to manage and take charge of the daily collections of the theatre complex known as, SATHYAM, SANTHAM and SUBHAM. 9. The applicant/plaintiff has filed a counter-affidavit for Application No. 3004 and 3005 of 1991 with the following main contentions. 10. The claim made that one Mrs. M. Snehalatha as the Joint Managing Partner of the first respondent firm was denied by the plaintiff. The further claim that the suit itself is a money suit, no Receiver can be appointed in respect of the property belonging to the defendants is denied. It was averred that the defendants-1 and 10 to 12 are jointly and severally liable, to make good of all the moneys due and payable to the plaintiff and that without impleading the other defendants, viz., the other partners, they cannot seek to vacate the order passed by this Court which already appointed the Receiver in order to safeguard the interest and rights of the plaintiff as a creditor. He contends that all the moneys were received by the third defendant as the Joint Managing Partner of the first defendant firm and that with the moneys received by him, all the partners of the firm had been benefited and that as such, it was not open for the defendants-1 and 10 to 12 to challenge the same. He contends further that the suit as well as the petitions are purely maintainable and that the defendants-1, 10 to 12 also jointly and severally liable for the suit claim. He contends further that the suit as well as the petitions are purely maintainable and that the defendants-1, 10 to 12 also jointly and severally liable for the suit claim. The alleged re-constitution of the first respondent firm inducting the defendants-10 to 12 are denied by the applicant/plaintiff on the ground that no notice of the re-constitution was given to him at any time and that as such, he states that all the partners of the first defendant firm are equally and jointly liable to the suit claim and that since the third defendant had every power to borrow on behalf of the firm and other partners, It is binding on everyone. Several other contentions and facts have been pleaded in paras- 7 to 14 of the counter-affidavit needs no introduction and narration for the purpose of this application as the same are to be canvassed during the course of the trial of the suit. It was contended further that everyone of the claim made by the defendants-10 to 12. and the first defendant in their affidavit as untenable in law, the plaintiff/applicant has established a strong prima facie case as specially pleaded in the plaint. 11. Then it was contended in the counter-affidavit that several creditors are contemplating the legal proceedings against the first defendant which goes upto the extent of several lakhs and that if so, he may not be able to recover the suit claim in the event of a decree being passed in his favour and that further, the claim of functioning of the theatres in full swing is not a decisive factor for the non-appointment of a Receiver in the context that no money has been paid in discharge of the suit claim of the plaintiff and that under the said circumstances, it was claimed that there was every justification in appointing the Receiver on 29.4.1991 to manage the said dues and take charge of the daily collections thereof. Raising so many other contentions, the plaintiff/applicant wants the order of appointing the Receiver, ex parte on 29.4.1991 is to be made absolute. 12. Raising so many other contentions, the plaintiff/applicant wants the order of appointing the Receiver, ex parte on 29.4.1991 is to be made absolute. 12. Upon the pleas hereinbefore referred, on behalf of the respective parties, the only question which arises for consideration is, “Whether the applicant/plaintiff has established a prima facie case for the appointment of a Receiver to manage and take charge of the daily collections of the defendants theatre complex, which is a running concern?” 13. The Plaintiff/Applicant filed the suit against the respondents-1 to 12 for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 11,81,216/- with interest at 30% per annum on Rs. 6,50,000/- from the date of plaint till the date of realization with costs, on the basis of the fifteen promissory notes alleged to have been executed by on behalf of the first defendant firm and that it appears that a sum of Rs. 35,000/- was paid by way of interest on two occasions to the plaintiff and that except that said payment, noth ing was paid towards the suit loan in spite of the repeated demands and requests and even after the exchange of the legal notices. It may be noted in para-7 of the plaint that besides the said loan, the respondents/defendants had created an equitable mortgage in favour of the plaintiff bv depositing the title deeds relating to the property situate at Door No. 16, Whites Road, Royapettah, viz, the theatre com plex and that it was made clear a sum of Rs. 90,00,000/- is due on that score and that it was made clear that there was an eqitable mortgagecreated by all the defendants herein and that consequently, all the title deeds relating to the property in question in the suit are with the plaintiff and for the recovery of the same, the plaintiff reserves his right to take separate action subsequently. Therefore, the suit transac tion reflecting the suit claim is totally independent of the mortgage created in favour of the plaintiff and that upon which, the present claim is not based and that it was admitted further that the theatre by name, SATHYAM, SANTHAM and SUBHAM are situate in one building in Whites Road and it is a running concern by exhibiting and screening the films in all the three theatres making daily collections to a considerable amount to all the defendants herein. 14. 14. With regard to the equitable mortgage hereinbefore referred, the applicant has admitted the same even in para-2 of the affidavit filed in support of this petition. I may extract at this stage the relevant pleadings made in paras-4 of the affidavit, “that the theatre complex being run under the name of SATHYAM, SHANTHAM and SUBHAM, that the only moneys that the first respondent firm receives is by way of daily collections from the said theatre complex, that if the said moneys are not safeguarded, it wil l not be possible for the applicant to realize any moneys from the respondent herein as they are continuing to incur more debts and the liabilities on behalf of the firm and that the very fact they had suspended making of any payments to its creditors precipitate the creditors as well the applicant to take insolvency proceedings and for the appointment of a Receiver and that if any such contigency is allowed, then the applicant may not be in a position to recover the moneys due to him under the suit promissory notes. The further allegations in the said affidavit are that the defendant care secreting all the moneys received by way of collections and withholding the payment of loans including equitable mortgage and that as such, the applicant is contemplating to take necessary action by way of taking necessary separate proceedings in this regard and that his apprehension as made out in the affidavit was that in the event of a decree passed in his favour, he will not be able to realize any amounts from the respondents and that therefore, he wants that a Receiver is to be appointed to manage and take charge of the daily collections of the theatre complex, SATHYAM, SHANTHAM and SUBHAM which is a running concern of all the respondents/defendants herein, during the pendency of the suit. Of course, after the exchanges of the notice and reply among the parties herein through the counsels, the present suit was filed and that in the above petition, on 26.4.1991 itself, when the suit was presented, a Receiver was appointed ex-parte by this Court as prayed for and that as I have already adverted to, that the Receiver appointed, had been to the theatre complex and took charge of the daily collections and continuing to put his signatures in the daily collections and so on till today. It is not the report of the Receiver that even after he took charge of the entire theatre complex and since then onwards, she has been managing the same and collecting of the daily collections, as directed. 14-A It was contended on behalf of the respondents-1, 10 to 12 who have come forward with an application to cancel the appointment of a Receiver on the ground that the petition itself is not at all maintainable as it does not contain any legal norms and material facts warranting the appointment of a Receiver to the running concern and that so much so, the petition itself is to dismissed in limine and that secondly, the appointment of the ex-parte Receiver to take charge of the three theatres situate in a complex which is a running concern without hearing the persons who are administrating the said theatre complex, is against the concept and norms envisaged in O. 40, R. 1, C.P.C., and that thirdly, the appointment of a Receiver was unwarranted in the eye of law as well as on the facts brought by the applicant in the affidavit in support of the petition and that even so, the said appointment of a Receiver is totally against the legal norms and principles specified in various case laws decided and now followed and that lastly, since the entire documents of the title to the property in question are in the hands of the applicant in furtherance of the equitable mortgage created and that inasmuch as no imminent danger or waste to the theatre complex has been pleaded and placed before the Court, the prayer for appointment of a Receiver is to be rejected in limine and that on the abovesaid grounds, the petition is being resisted on behalf of the contesting respondents. The relief made in the application was claimed under O. 40, R. 1(d), C.P.C., which reads as follows:— “1.(1) Where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient, the Court may by order:— (a) appoint a receiver of any property, whether before or after decree; (b) remove any person from the possession or custody of the property; (c) commit the same to the possession, custody, or management of the receiver, and (d) confer upon the receiver all such powers as to bringing and defending suits and for realization, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and profits, and the execution of the documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the Court thinks fit. (2) Nothing in this rule shall authorise the Court to remove from the possession or custody of property and person whom any party to the suit has not a present right so to remove.” 14-B. A mere reading of the above provision would make it clear that a Court can if the circumstances so warrant, pass an ex parte interim order appointing a Receiver, but for which, a notice should be issued to the party affected, thereby giving a chance to show cause against the order passed The above rule provides that the Court may appoint a Receiver, “where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient”, far from ruling out the applicability of that elementary rule of natural justice of hearing the affected party, embraces that concept within the expression ‘just’, as an order, unless expressly provided to the contrary, cannot be said to have been justly made without affording the party affected or likely to be affected by the order, a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The words, ‘just’ and ‘convenient’ stipulated in the above rule is so envisaged the vesting of the mandatory obligation to the Court while exercising that obligation into a discretionary one with the condition that to the satisfaction of the Court is sufficient cause. This would virtually mean that the affecting party must be heard before the appointment of a Receiver is made. This would virtually mean that the affecting party must be heard before the appointment of a Receiver is made. Keeping in view of the main ingredients which are necessarily to be placed and proved before the Court, so as to bring the case with the word, ‘just’ and ‘convenient’, the party who asked for the appointment of Receiver is necessarily expected to prove the basic ingredients as contemplated under the said R. 1(d), O. 40, C.P.C., because to confer up on the Receiver all such powers for realization, management and gathering the collections which are the vital rights to be made against the person who is in actual possession of the property of whatever nature and managing the same and that was the reason why it was decided that the affecting party must be heard first by providing an opportunity before invoking the powers given under this rule. For this proposition, Thiru Habibulla Badsha, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents-1, and 10 to 12 has placed his strong reliance on a decision reported in T. Krishnaswamy Chetty v. C. Thangavelu Chetty and others AIR 1955 Madras 430 wherein it was held as Follows:— “The appointment of a receiver is recognized as one of the harshest remedies which the law provides for the enforcement of rights and is allowable only in extreme cases and in circumstances where the interest of the person seeking the appointment of a receiver is exposed to manifest peril. Therefore, this exceedingly delicate and responsible duty has to be discharged by the Court with the utmost caution and only when the five requirements embodied in the words, ‘just and convenient’ in O. 40, R. 1 are fulfiled by the facts of the case under consideration. These five requirements are: 1. The appointment of a receiver pending a suit is a matter resting in the discretion of the Court. 2. The Court should not appoint a Receiver except upon proof by the plaintiff that prima facie he has a very excellent chance of succeeding in the suit. 3. Not only must the plaintiff show a case of adverse and conflicting claims to property, but, he must show some emergency or danger or loss demanding immediate action and of his own right he must be reasonably clear and free from doubt. The element of danger is an important consideration. 4. 3. Not only must the plaintiff show a case of adverse and conflicting claims to property, but, he must show some emergency or danger or loss demanding immediate action and of his own right he must be reasonably clear and free from doubt. The element of danger is an important consideration. 4. An order appointing a Receiver will not be made where it has the effect of depriving a defendant of a de facto possession since that might cause irreparable wrong. It would be different where the property is shown to be in medio , that is to say, in the enjoyment of no one. And lastly, 5. The Court, on the application made for the appointment of a Receiver, looks to the conduct of the party who makes the application and will usually refuse to interfere unless his conduct has been free from blame. 14-C. Then in the same citation at page-572 in as held between Muniammal v. Ranganatha Nayagar and another 67 L.W. 1186 = AIR 1955 Madras 430, this Court has held as follows:— “The principles which should guide Courts in the appointment of a Receiver are three in number. First of all, a plaintiff applying for the appointment of a Receiver must show prima facie that he has a strong case and good title to the property or a special case and good title to the property or a special equity in his favour and the the property in the hands of the defendant is in danger of being wasted.” Then the learned Senior Counsel has placed his reliance in a case law reported in Syed Azzdulla v. Syed Rosltan Sahib and others 67 L.W. 1186 = AIR 1955 Madras 430 for the proposition that, ‘Poverty of the defendant is no ground for appointment of a Receiver and that allegation as to waste and some prima facie proof as to detriment to property is to be established and that further, the person in possession under a prima facie title to the property ought not to be disturbed not to be pending the suit. It has to be seen from the judgment above cited that it was held that poverty or insolvency of a trustee is not a ground for the appointment of a Receiver unless there be in addition thereof some danger or loss to the estate and that as such, the Receivers over suit properties ought not to be appointed for the mere asking by one or other of the parties to the litigation unless some allegation as to waste or some prima facie proof as to detriment to property is established. 14-1. Then he placed his reliance on a case law reported in Dilman Rai v. Srinarayan AIR 1983 Sikkim 11 for the legal proposition that a mere averment relating to the asking of the prayer and possible apprehension will not suffice for the appointment of a Receiver by the Court. It was held in the said ruling that the Court will not act on possible ‘danger only and ‘remote or part damage will not suffice as a ground’, ‘but there must Be a well-grounded apprehension of immediate injury” and ‘danger of suffering irreparable loss’ and that further the charges must be specific, ‘specific acts capable of being tested should be alleged’, for ‘violently stated vague allegations constitute no substitute for vacuum of facts and that above all, the general almost overriding principle is that an application for the appointment of the receiver should always be promptly made and delay in making it is a circumstance unfavourable to such an appointment. 15. The same view was found to be reported and followed in a case reported in Subbalakshmi Animal and three others v. M. Rajalakshmi Animal and three others 1988 T.L.N.J. 358 held by this Court. 16. Therefore, it has become imperative for the Court to see the imminent danger or waste to the property in question before appointing a Receiver to the suit property and to deprive the person who is in actual possession of the same. 17. 16. Therefore, it has become imperative for the Court to see the imminent danger or waste to the property in question before appointing a Receiver to the suit property and to deprive the person who is in actual possession of the same. 17. Keeping the ratios held in all the above citations referred to under O. 40, R. 1, C.P.C., to the facts of the present case, I am able to see that either in the plaint or in the affidavit filed ink support of the above petition filed on 26.4.1991, no pleadings were taken up by the applicant/plaintiff with regard to the imminent danger or possible acts of waste being expected to the theatre complex which is a running concern by the defendants nerein by screening the films everyday in all the shows and making collections thereby. It is true that the suit transaction by way of equitable mortgage and execution of promissory notes are in existence and that the disputes relating to the said transactions are now pending disposal in the suit and that the respondents herein are contesting the same by virtue of several clauses stipulated in the Partnership Deed of the re-constituted firm and that through which the 10th defendant became the Managing Partner. It may be noted that though several clauses were stipulated confining the power of the partners in borrowing the money without the consent of the others, whether the liability of the contesting defendants to the suit claim is in existence or not is not a matter to be decided at this stage, but it has to be looked into detail during the trial of the suit itself and it is always open for the respective parties to put forth their cases before this Court during the trial, upon the basis of the suit promissory notes and the partnership Deed as was reconstituted. 18. But, in so far as the application for the appointment of a Receiver is concerned, admittedly, the theatre complex is a running concern deriving daily collections and it is in the actual management and administration of the respondents herein and that there Was no imminent danger to the building of the theatre complex or the land in question either by way of imminent waste or danger by the respondents herein who are admittedly, in possession of the same. Accordingly, it is a running business concern. Accordingly, it is a running business concern. It is true that the allegation of the plaint was that except one or two part payments, nothing has been paid on behalf of them and that they have suspended the payment of the loan amounts due to the plaintiff and that was the reason why the plaintiff has filed the suit for the necessary relief. Further, it was true that the title deeds of the theatre complex were deposited with the plaintiff by way of equitable mortgage and that on that score also, heavy amount is due according to the plaintiff. It was alleged by the plaintiff that there are several creditors who ar contemplating to take legal actions against the respondents herein for the recovery of the loan amounts. He has not enumerated the details of the creditors, though some names were given in the additional affidavit filed by him, but significantly, it has to be seen that except the plaintiff, no one has come forward with the suit for recovery of any amounts from the respondents so far. The relief asked for in this application is not one under the Indian Partnership Act or Insolvency Act though the Applicant/Plaintiff has referred the insolvency proceedings against the respondents. In this context, I am of the firm view that even if the amount claimed in the suit is due by the respondent herein, it is open for him to take the appropriate steps against the property in question, viz., the theatre complex as provided under the Code of Civil Procedure for the immediate relief. The other significant aspect of this case is that the applicant/plaintiff has got all the title deeds of the properties in question in his custody over an equitable mortgage created by the respondents herein. Therefore, I am able to see that except expressing his mere apprehension of that the collections are being wasted in the theatre complex by the respondents, no other averments or materials are placed by the plaintiff in support of his petition or his plaint. The basic norms as enunciated by the case laws hereinbefore referred to, have not been followed and that those aspects are totally lacking in this case. The basic norms as enunciated by the case laws hereinbefore referred to, have not been followed and that those aspects are totally lacking in this case. That apart, it has become very clear that by appointing a Receiver ex parte without hearing the respondents herein, the petitioner has intended to take the collection through the Receiver and if that is allowed, it is not known how the business of the theatre can be run by the Receiver without any direction on that aspect. There cannot be any two views that this is a business which requires special skill in selecting the films which are to be screened after getting the same from the distributors by making advances and entering into agreement and so on and that for the said purpose, huge finance is always necessary to be handled. If that being so, the mere asking for appointment of a Receiver to take the management of the theatre complex and also to take charge of the daily collections would merely amount to depriving of the valuable rights of the respondents herein under the name of the suit for the recovery of the money which the law would not recognize the same in the context of the total absence of any plea or allegations pertaining to the imminent danger or waste to the property of the theatre complex. 19. Thiru C.A. Sundaram, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff by placing the case law cited in the first reference above, vehemently urged before me that since the respondents are heavily indebted to various creditors who are expected to take legal actions and that in such case, the property in question may not be worthwhile to meet all the creditors and that even so, in spite of the heavy daily collections, the nonpayment of any amount to the applicant by the respondents amounts to imminent danger and possible waste of the property in question and that therefore, the plaintiff is right in asking for the relief of appointing the Receiver. He placed his reliance on the basis of the pleas raised in the counter-affidavit which are merely argumentative in nature, but counts no legal credence in the context of no pleadings were set out in the affidavit filed in support of the application or in the plaint and that in this regard, I may treat his contentions raised in the reply-affidavit as merely an after-thought, based on mere conjectures. 20. Having considered his contentions, in the context of the inadequate materials found in the affidavit, I am not in a position to countenance his pleas and arguments which have no force at all and that accordingly, his arguments must fail. 21. Even assuming so, I am of the firm view that the appointment of a Receiver for the running concern ofthe theatre complex situate in the heart of the city of Madras, cannot be made ex-parte on the basis of mere apprehensions conjectures and that without satisfying the legal norms and concept enunciated time and again by the courts of law, no person can have the relief of appointing a Receiver with a view to deprive the person who is lawfully in possession and occupation of the property under his own right, through a simple money claim. 22. Haying considered the entire pleadings made on behalf of the respective parties herein and the rival contentions and the established circumstances, I am fully satisfied to hold that the plaintiff/applicant has miserably failed to establish the prima facie case and the eminent danger and waste to the property in question and that therefore, he is not entitled to the indulgence of this Court in granting the remedy under O. 40, R. 1, C.P.C. Accordingly, the application must fail and should be dismissed. 23. In the result, the petition is dismissed and consequently, the order passed on 26.4.1991 ap pointing the Receiver ex-parte is hereby cancelled and the Receiver so appointed is hereby directed to hand over all the records and moneys to the respondents herein, if so collected, immediately to the respondents herein. There will be no orders as to costs.