K. RAMACHANDRIAH, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER-TENANT having suffered an order of eviction in the trial court and being unsuccessful in the revision filed by him in the district court against the order of the trial court has filed this revision petition under Section 115, C. P. C. questioning the correctness and legality of the concurrent orders of the two courts-bclow directing his eviction from the ground floor of a building in hubli in which he is running an ent nursing home from about 1974. ( 2 ) THIS revision petition filed on 27-7-1986 was dismissed on 16-4-1987 on the ground that no second revision lies under Section 115, C. P. C. against the order of the first revisional court. In view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court that a second revision under Section 115, C. P. C. lies against the revisional order of the district judge, the revision petition is again revived on 21-1-1991. Learned counsel previously appearing for the petitioner was late Sri Shirgurkar. He died on 29-7-1988. Sri Shirgurkar himself had filed W. P. No. 8282/1987 in June, 1987 after the revision petition was dismissed on 16-4-1987. This aspect deserves to be noticed at the outset in the light of the stand taken by the petitioner justifying non-payment of rent admittedly payable by him to the respondents at Rs. 350/- per month continuously for about 49 months from February 1987 to 14-2-1991 amounting to Rs. 17,150/- which is paid on 27-2-1991. ( 3 ) AFTER the revival of the revision petition on 21-1-1991, petitioner has filed la. No. Iv under Section 151, C. P. C. read with Rule 35 of the Karnataka rent control rules, 1961 (for short 'the rules') on 14-2-1991 praying for dismissal of the revision petition by taking into consideration certain subsequent events emerging from certain documents and photographs produced with it for the reasons stated in his affidavit. The said prayer of the petitioner is opposed by the respondents by filing counter to the same. About one month after filing i. a. No. Iv, petitioner has filed i. a. No. V under order 26, Rule 9 read with Section 151, CPC and Rule 35 of the rules praying that a commissioner be appointed for making local inspection of house built on plot No. 94 bearing sy. About one month after filing i. a. No. Iv, petitioner has filed i. a. No. V under order 26, Rule 9 read with Section 151, CPC and Rule 35 of the rules praying that a commissioner be appointed for making local inspection of house built on plot No. 94 bearing sy. No. 75/2 at m. h. b. colony, nagashettikoppa extension, visveswara nagar, hubli-29 subsequently acquired and owned by the 1st respondent and to draw a sketch of the premises of that house in order to know the accommodation available in that house. Even the said prayer of the petitioner is opposed by the respondents by filing counter to the same. ( 4 ) THE matrix of the case is as follows: (A) respondents are husband and wife. First respondent is an officer in the commercial tax department. Both the respondents will hereinafter be referred to collectively as the 'landlords and the petitioner', who is a foreign returned specialist in ent and who is running an ent nursing home in the premises, will hereinafter be referred to as the 'tenant'. The tenant had taken the premises on lease from its previous owner on a rent of Rs. 350/- per month sometime in 1974. Landlords purchased the building consisting of the ground floor in which the tenant is running the nursing home and the first floor which was in the occupation of national insurance company as a tenant. sometime in 1982. First respondent was transferred to hubli in the early part of 1982. Even prior to that, his family consisting of his wife-second respondent, four sons and a daughter studying in colleges and schools were residing in a tenaled premises of one s. b. desai paying rent of Rs. 650/- per month and an advance of Rs. 10,000/- which was not to carry any interest. After his transfer to hubli, first respondent requested the tenant to vacate the premises as he was in reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises for his own use and occupation. 650/- per month and an advance of Rs. 10,000/- which was not to carry any interest. After his transfer to hubli, first respondent requested the tenant to vacate the premises as he was in reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises for his own use and occupation. Since the tenant failed to comply with the said demand of the first respondent, both the respondents jointly filed an eviction petition against the tenant under clauses (h) and (p) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the act') on 2-8-1982 in h. r. c. No. 187/1982 in the court of the munsiff, hubli (for short 'trial court' or 'the trial judge') praying for an order of eviction against the tenant on the ground that they were in reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises for their own use and occupation as they were residing in a rented house paying heavy advance of Rs. 10,000 and higher rent of 650/- p. m. as against the rent of Rs. 350/- that was being paid by the tenant for their own premises in his occupation and they had no other premises of their own at hubli for their residence and also on the additional ground that the tenant had acquired another suitable premises of his own to which he can conveniently shift his nursing home. But, the tenant resisted the said prayer of the landlords by raising all conceivable objections in his objection statement and denying the claim of the landlords that they were entitled to an order of eviction against him on the aforesaid two grounds. (B) some lime after the eviction petition was filed, the first floor of the building occupied by the national insurance co. , Became vacant on 30-9-1982. On that very day, first respondent sent a letter dated 30-9-1982 as per ex. P. 1 to the tenant informing him that the first floor of the building had become vacant as it was vacated by the national insurance co. , Which was paying a rent of Rs. , Became vacant on 30-9-1982. On that very day, first respondent sent a letter dated 30-9-1982 as per ex. P. 1 to the tenant informing him that the first floor of the building had become vacant as it was vacated by the national insurance co. , Which was paying a rent of Rs. 1,290/- per month and since it was not suitable for their residential purpose, he may inspect the same if he was interested to occupy it for the purpose for which he was in occupation of the ground floor of the same building and hand-over vacant possession of the premises in his occupation and requesting him to intimate his willingness to accept the offer within three days from the date of receipt of that notice and further informing him that if no reply was received within three days it would be considered that he was not interested to occupy the first floor and the same would be let out. The said letter sent by rpad was received by the tenant on 5-10-1982. But, he sent his reply ex. P. 2 dated nil in which he denied some of the factual statements made in ex. P. i and further requested the first respondent to intimate him the time and date on which he could inspect the first floor. The said letter-ex. P. 2 purports to have been sent on 12-10-1982 as could be gathered from the dates of the postal seals found on the cover in which it was sent was received by the first respondent on 16-10-1982. But, the landlords had by then leased out the first floor to one Dr. V. m. kalyanpurkar on 11-10-1982 on a rent of Rs. 1,200/- per month for the purpose of running a nursing home (vide ex. P. 4 ). After the receipt of tenant's reply ex. P. 2, first respondent wrote to the tenant a letter dated 19-10-1982 as per ex. P. 14 stating that he received his reply letter on 16-10-1982 and to whom he had already let out the first floor to Dr. Kalyanpurkar on 11-10-1982. (C) at the trial, both parlies adduced oral and documentary evidence. An Advocate was also appointed as commissioner to inspect the building and submit his report regarding the nature of accommodation available in the premises in ground floor as well as the first floor of the building. Kalyanpurkar on 11-10-1982. (C) at the trial, both parlies adduced oral and documentary evidence. An Advocate was also appointed as commissioner to inspect the building and submit his report regarding the nature of accommodation available in the premises in ground floor as well as the first floor of the building. ( 5 ) ON a careful assessment of the entire evidence on record, the trial judge by order dated 27-3-1985 formulated four points for determination and held on point No. (1) that the petitioners-landlords were in reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises for their own use and occupation; on point No. (2) that they would be subjected to greater hardship than the respondent-tenant if an order of eviction was not made in their favour having regard to the size of their family and also the fact that they had no other residential premises at hubli for their residence and on point (3) that the case of the petitioners that the tenant was in possession of a suitable building for his clinic cannot be-accepted for the reason that there was no clinching evidence on that aspect although the tenant was in possession of a building in which he is residing with his family and consequently, passed an order of eviction against the tenant under clause (h) only giving him one month's time to vacate the premises. ( 6 ) FEELING aggrieved by the said order of the trial court, the tenant filed arevision petition in the court of the district judge, dharwad at hubu in revision (rent) No. 97/1985. By order dated 19-4-1986, the learned district judge on re-assessment of the entire evidence, agreed with the conclusions reached by the trial court on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlords and also on the point of comparative hardship and, therefore, dismissed the revision petition granting time to the tenant till the end of July 1986 to vacate the premises. ( 7 ) IT is against the said concurrent orders of the two courts-below that the tenanhas filed this revision petition under Section 115, C. P. C. as already mentionec above. ( 7 ) IT is against the said concurrent orders of the two courts-below that the tenanhas filed this revision petition under Section 115, C. P. C. as already mentionec above. ( 8 ) THE points that arise for determination in the light of the lengthy argument submitted by Sri B. P. Holla and supplemented by Sri ashok b patil, learned counse for the tenant and Sri V. T. Rayaraddi, learned counsel for the landlords, are: (1) whether the revision petition is liable to be dismissed as not maintainabl for non-compliance with the requirements of Section 29 (1) of the act b the tenant? (2) whether the concurrcnl findings recorded by the trial court and the first rcvisional court on points (1) and (2) call for interference in exercise of the rcvistonal powers under Section 115, c. p. c. ? (3) whether the prayers made by the tenant in i. a. Nos. IV and v deserve to be granted? And (4) to what reliefs or order the parties are entitled? ( 9 ) THIS court has held in E. Nanje Gowda v B. K. Channe Gowda, CRP No. 1812/1991, dd: 8-/-1991 that the tenant has to comply with the requirements of Section 29 (1) of the act even in revision petitions filed under Section 115, C. P. C. Section 29 (1) of the act provides that no tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 21, shall be entitled to. . . . . . Prefer or prosecute a revision petition under Section 50 against an order made by the court on application under Section 21 unless he has paid or pays to the landlord or deposits with the high court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . all arrears of rent due in respect of the premises uplo the date of payment or deposits and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the premises at the rate at which it was last paid or agreed to be paid, until the termination of the proceedings before the court or the district judge or the high court. It is further provided under sub-section (4) of Section 29 of the act that if any tenant fails to pay or deposit the rent as aforesaid,. . . . . . . . . . . the high court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . shall unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary. . . . . . dismiss the appeal or revision petition ( 10 ) A division bench of this court has held in Shiva v B. Devamma, ILR 1980 (1) Karnataka 706 that the requirement of deposit of arrears of rent in terms of Section 29 (1) is mandatory and a tenant who fails to fulfill, the said statutory requirement has no right to contest an eviction petition and is not entitled to prefer a revision petition under Section 50 of the act against an eviction order. Except to the extent of protection given in Section 29 (4) of the act and subject to the right to deposit only such arrears of tent as determined summarily by the court under sub-section (3) of Section 29, the consequence of non-compliance of Section 29 (1) by a tenant would be he stands deprived of his right to contest an eviction petition or to prefer a revision petition against an order of eviction and he has to suffer an order of eviction. ( 11 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, a learned single judge of this court made a reference to adivision bench in view of conflict of views regarding the scope and interpretation of Section 29 (1) of the act. Thereupon, another division bench of this court has on a review of the entire case law including the law lald down in the case of Shiva v B. Devamma, has held in Medical research laboratory Pvt. Ltd. V K. C. Ajit, ILR 1984 Karnataka 510; that if a tenant fails to deposit the arrears of rent while preferring a revision petition, an opportunity to show cause does not arise and his revision petition is liable to be dismissed under Section 29 (4) of the act as not maintaipable. ( 12 ) IN the instant case, a perusal of the particulars of remittance of rent furnished by the tenant in his counter affidavit dated 14-2-1991 would show that he was irregular in the payment of rent right from September 1983 to January 1987 (41 months) amounting to Rs. 14,350/- which he clalms to have made good by making payments at irregular intervals. Even ignoring the said default of the tenant, the question to be considered is whether the tenant has complied with the requirements of Section 29 (1) of the act at the time of filing this revision petition on 2/-2-1986 and subsequently. He has stated in paragraph 8 of his affidavit that he was paying on 14- 2-1991 a sum of Rs. 17,150/- towards rent which had become due for a period of 49 months from February 1987 to February 1991. The explanation offered by him in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the same affidavit for not paying or depositing the arrears of rent right from February 1987 to February 1991 was that by then this revision petition was filed and pending in the high court, that he did not receive any communication from his Bangalore Advocate Sri G. D. Shirgurkar and he was also not properly advised regarding the mode of payment and, therefore, he bona fide believed that he can pay the rent as soon as the proceedings are completed by the high court and subsequently he received to his surprise a communication from the registry of this court that his previous Advocate Sri G. D. Shirgurkar was no more and he should make alternate arrangements for prosecuting W. P. No. 8882/1987 which was pending. It is further averred in paragraph 7 that in response to the court notice issued to him, he instructed his present counsel that his revision petition dismissed as not maintainable has to be revived in view of the change in the position of law that W. P. No. 8282/1987 was not maintainable and he took steps to revive the revision petition which was revived by order dated 21-1-1991 and that was the reason why he could not deposit the arrears of rent from February 1987 to February 1991. Landlords have denied the truth and sustainability of the said explanation of the tenant by stating in the affidavit by their son arun dated 26-2-1991 that the tenant was deliberately avoiding service of notices issued to him by this court and it is only when substituted service was ordered to him at their instance that the tenant chose to appear and he had even received letters from the colleague of Sri G. D. Shirgurkar to send a fresh vakalath in view of the death of Sri D. G. Shirgurkar. Whatever that may be, the above explanation offered by the tenant cannot be regarded as an acceptable explanation as he is not an illiterate or an ignorant villager. He clalms to be a foreign returned ent specialist having, good reputation regarding the profession he has been carrying on in hubli city. Therefore, he should have made proper inquiries and deposited the arrears of rent as and when : the rent became due either in this court or atleast in the trial court or he should have sent the rent by m. o. every month directly to the landlords after deducting the M. O. Commission. But, he has not done so. However, Sri Ashok B. Patil argued that the penal Provisions of Section 29 (1) of the act cannot be applied against the tenant as he has subsequently paid the entire arrears of rent up-to-date. Sri V. T. Rayaraddi, learned counsel for the landlords, submiitcd on 3-9-1991 that although the tenant has deposited or paid the rents up-to-date, this revision petition is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable under Section 29 (4) of the act in the light of the law lald down by this court in the above mentioned two decisions. However, Sri Ashok B. Patil argued that since the rents arc paid up-to-date and received by the other side, the revision petition is not liable to be dismissed. He placed reliance in support of his said argument on the following decisions of the Supreme Court: (a) Mohan Laxman Hede v Noonnohammed Adam Shaik, AIR 1988 SC 1111 ; (b) Manmohan Kaur v Sutya Kant Bhagwani, AIR 1989 SC 291 ; and (c) Rashiklal and others v Shah Gokuldas, AIR 1989 SC 920 . He placed reliance in support of his said argument on the following decisions of the Supreme Court: (a) Mohan Laxman Hede v Noonnohammed Adam Shaik, AIR 1988 SC 1111 ; (b) Manmohan Kaur v Sutya Kant Bhagwani, AIR 1989 SC 291 ; and (c) Rashiklal and others v Shah Gokuldas, AIR 1989 SC 920 . In the case of mohan laxman dede, the tenant had deposited the rent for most of the months in advance and there was some delay ranging from 2 or 3 days upto a maximum of 23 days as could be seen from the table regarding the particulars of deposit of rent set out at page 1113. It is, therefore, held on an interpretation of the Provisions of Section 12 (3) (b) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 that the expression "regularly" used in that Section does not mean with exact or mathematical punctuality and, therefore, the tenant can be regarded as having deposited the rent regularly as contemplated under Section 12 (3) (b) of the Bombay Act inasmuch as the delay committed by him in the payment of rent for a few months ranged from 2 to 3 days upto a maximum of 23 days. In that decision, reference is made to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Mranalini M. Shah v Bapalal Mohanlal Shah, AIR 1980 SC 954 , in which is observed as under:". . . . . . . WHERE the rent is payable by the month, the tenant must, if he wants to avail the benefit of the latter part of clause (b), tender or pay every month as it falls due, or at his discretion in advance. If he persistently defaults during the pendency of the suit or appeal in paying the rent, such as where he pays it at irregular intervals of 2 or 3 or 4 months - as is the case before us - the court has no discretion to treat what were manifestly irregular payments, as substantial compliance with the mandate of this clause, irrespective of the fact that by the time the judgment was pronounced all the arrears had been cleared by the tenant". in my opinion, rigour of the said observations becomes attracted to the facts of the case on hand having regard to the fact that the tenant has not paid or deposited the rent continuously for a period of 4 years and one month and the explanation offered by him cannot be accepted for the reasons already mentioned above. ( 13 ) IN manmohan kaur's case, the Supreme Court while considering the corresponding Provisions of Section 15 of the Bihar buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control Act, 1983, has held that"the court should consider whether the delay had been reasonably explalned or not. In construing that question, the court in the scheme of the administration of Justice must take a constructive and purpose- oriented approach. If it does, then the element of discretion comes into play though not in the form of directory or mandatory provision but in considering whether the delay was properly explalned or not and thus, if the delay is explalned, then there is no delay and the court in such a case cannot strike off the defence and if, on the other hand, the delay is not explalned or the explanation is one which is not acceptable to the court, then the court must strike out the defence and there is no discretion". ( 14 ) THE Supreme Court has also referred in that decision to the observations made in the case of M/s. B. P. Kemka Pvt. Ltd. V Birendra Kumar Bowmick, AIR 1987 SC 1010 , in which it is held that the delay of 2 months in payment of rent being of technical nature, the court should have exercised discretion and refused to strike off the defence. Therefore, Sri Ashok B. Patil, argued that since in the case on hand, the landlords have accepted the accumulated rent subsequently deposited by the tenant without any objection, the revision petition cannot be dismissed as not maintainable under Section 29 (4) of the act. He placed reliance in support of his said contention on the decision of the Supreme Court in rashiklal's case. He placed reliance in support of his said contention on the decision of the Supreme Court in rashiklal's case. It is held in the said decision on a consideration of the Provisions of clause 13 in c. p. and berar letting of houses and rent control Order, 1949 that if the landlord accepts accumulated rents without any objection, eviction of the tenant on the ground of default in the payment of rent is not permissible. But, there is absolutely no material in the instant case, to hold that the landlords have accepted the rents from the tenant without any objection. On the other hand, this is a case in which the landlords have only withdrawn the rents belatedly deposited by the tenants. In this court, Sri V. T. Rayaraddi further submitted that whatever rents that are directly paid to him are received by him under protest and without prejudice to the contentions to be urged by the landlords regarding the non-payment of rents regularly by the tenant. Therefore, the observations made in the above decision are of no avail to the tenant. ( 15 ) IN the light of my above conclusion, point No. (1) is answered in the affirmative. Point No. (2) ( 16 ) BOTH the courts-below have concurrently held that the landlords were in reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises for their own use and occupation and they would be subjected to greater hardship than the tenant if an order on eviction is not made in their favour. Therefore, Sri V. T. Rayaraddi argued that this revision petition filed under Section 115, C. P. C. against the concurrent orders of the cpurts-belowis liable to be dism/ssed in limine. He placed reliance in support of his said contention on a few decisions of the Supreme Court. The first decision cited by him is one reported in hindustan aeronautics vajit prasad, AIR 1973 SC 76 . That was a case in which a revision had been filed against the order of the first appellate court which had affirmed the order of the trial court. In that context, the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 5 at page 77 as under:-"in our opinion, the high court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate court. In that context, the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 5 at page 77 as under:-"in our opinion, the high court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate court. It is not the conclusion of the high court that the first appellate court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it made. The order of the first appellate court may be right or wrong; may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law; but one thing is clear that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It is not the case that the first appellate court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the high court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code". the second decision on which reliance was placed by Sri V. T. rayaraddi is Mattulal v Radhelal, AIR 1974 SC 1596 , in which it is held that "the findings reached by the first appellate court on appreciation of the evidence that the landlord does not bona fide require the prem/ses in question for the purpose of starting business as a dealer in iron and steel materials is a finding of fact and not a finding of mixed law and fact and it cannot be interfered with by the high court in second appeal unless il is shown that in reaching it a M/s. take of law is committed by the additional district judge or it is based on no evidence or is such as no reasonable man can reach ( 17 ) THE next decision on which reliance was placed by Sri V. T. Rayaraddi is the one reported in M/s. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and others v Rangaswamy Chettiar, AIR 1980 SC 1253, in which the Supreme Court has held on a consideration of the Provisions of Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu buildings (lease and rent control) Act, 1960 that a concurrent finding, based on evidence, that the landlord did not bonafide require the prem/ses for his own use and occupation is not a finding which can be touched by the high court exercising jurisdiction under Section 25 and in such a case, merely to hold that a question is a mixed question of fact and law is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of revisional power. The Supreme Court has again observed in Smt. Rajbir kaur and another v M/s. S. Chokosiri and co. , Air 1988 SC 1845 in paragraph-16 that "when the findings of fact recorded by the courts-below are supportable on the evidence on record, the revisional court must, indeed, be reluctant to embark upon an independent re-assessment of the evidence and to supplant a conclusion of its own, so long as the evidence on record admitted and supported the one reached by the courts-below and, therefore, the concurrent finding as to exclusive possession of sub-tenant was not amenable to reversal in revision by the high court". The said observations are made after observing that it is so even where the language of the provision of the concerned act in which revisional powers are conferred is wider than the revisional powers under Section 115, C. P. C. inasmuch as revisional court is not a second or first appellate court. Wilhoul multiplying authorities on this point, I consider it necessary to refer to only to two other recent decisions of the Supreme Court. It is held by the Supreme Court in Masjid Kacha Tank, Nahan v Tuffaul Mohammed, AIR 1991 SC 455 , in paragraph 3 at page 456 as under:"3. It is well settled position in law that under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the high court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and cannot set aside the concurrent findings of the courts-below by taking a different view of the evidence. The higfi court is empowered only to interfere with the findings of fact if the findings are perverse or there has been a non-appreciation or non- consideration of the material evidence on record by the courts-below. Simply because another view of the evidence may be taken is no ground for the high court to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction". in Chandmal v Firm Ram Chandra and Vishwanath, AIR 1991 SC 1594 , the Supreme Court while considering the revisional jurisdiction of the high court under Section 26 of the Hyderabad house (rent, eviction and lease) control Act, 1954 has observed that revisional jurisdiction of the high court under Section 26 of the Hyderabad house (rent, eviction and lease) control Act, 1954 is a limited one and it is almost pari-materia with Section 115, CPC. It is then observed in paragraph- 13 at page 1597 as under:"13. It is then observed in paragraph- 13 at page 1597 as under:"13. The revisional jurisdiction of the high court under Section 26 of the said act is confined strictly to the jurisdictionai error or illegal exercise of jurisdiction. The finding of the high court to the effect that it was the duty of the court in the interest of Justice to interfere even with the concurrent finding of facts because on the record, high court found that there was not a single factor to come to the conclusion that the clalm was mala fide or was not bona fide as required by the statute, is entirely baseless and not in accordance with the Provisions of Section 26 of the said act which confers revisional jurisdiction on the high court. " ( 18 ) SRI B. P. Holla, learned senior counsel for the tenant, tried to overcome the effect of the above mentioned observations of the Supreme Court regarding the scope of the tenant's revision filed under Section 115, C. P. C. by contending that this is a fit case in which it is necessary to interfere with the impugned orders of the trial court as well as the district court, as according to him, the district judge has erroneously observed in the course of his order that the area in the first floor formerly occupied by the national insurance co. , And subsequently let out by the landlords is more than the area of the prem/ses in question as the said observation is contrary to the finding on record inasmuch as it is clear from the comm/ssioner's report and sketch that the area in the first floor is less than the area of the prem/ses and the further observations of the district judge that occupation of the first floor the landlords would have resulted in loss of rent to them, are not warranted in an eviction case. ( 19 ) WITH great respect, the said circumstances, even if true, are not sufficient to warrant interference under Section 115, C. P. C. with the concurrent findings of the courts-below. It is clear from the facts already mentioned above, that the landlords were fair enough to intimate the tenant on the very day the first floor became vacant requesting him to inform them if he was willing to occupy the first floor. It is clear from the facts already mentioned above, that the landlords were fair enough to intimate the tenant on the very day the first floor became vacant requesting him to inform them if he was willing to occupy the first floor. But, the tenant failed to send any reply within the stipulated time and, therefore, the landlords let out the first floor to Dr. Kalyanapurkar on 11-10-1982. Sri B. P. Holla further argued that the first floor offered by the landlords is not convenient for the tenant to run a nursing home inasmuch as he has installed operating machine and other costly equipments in the ground floor. Even the said argument cannot be regarded as sound one as this court can take judicial notice of the fact that nursing homes having operation theatres are being run even in multistoreyed buildings. In my opinion, there is nothing wrong if the landlords residing in a rented house and having a large family consisting of wife, four sons and a daughter desire to occupy the ground floor of a building purchased by them for the purpose of their residence. Such a requirement cannot be brushed aside as a mere desire and not a genuine need. The trial court as well as the first revisional court have taken all these relevant aspects into consideration for recording the findings on the two vital aspects mentioned above in favour of the landlords and against the tenant. In my opinion, such findings cannot be termed as unreasonable or perverse so as to call for interference under Section 115, C. P. C. therefore, point No. (2) is answered in the negative. Point No. (3) ( 20 ) SRI B. P. Holla, argued that a tenant is entitled to bring to the notice of even arevisional court certain subsequent events which if duly taken note of would disentitle the landlords from seeking an order of eviction against the tenant. Point No. (3) ( 20 ) SRI B. P. Holla, argued that a tenant is entitled to bring to the notice of even arevisional court certain subsequent events which if duly taken note of would disentitle the landlords from seeking an order of eviction against the tenant. He placed reliance in support of his said contention on a few decisions and in particular on a decision of the Supreme Court in Hasmat RAJ and another v Taghunath prasad, 1981 (3) SC reporter 605, in which it is observed that "in a proceeding for the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement under a statute controlling the eviction of tenants, unless the statute prescribes the contrary the requirement must continue to exist on the date when the proceeding is finally disposed of, either in appeal or revision, by the relevant authority". He lald considerable stress on the observations made in the above said decision at page 616 as under:". . . . . DURING the progress and passage of proceedings from court to court if subsequent events occur which if noticed would non-suit the plalntiff, the court has to examine and evaluate the same and mould the decree accordingly. . . . . . . "it is recently observed in the case of Gulabbai v Nalin Narsi Vohra and others, 1991 (3) SCC 483 , that in appropriate cases, events subsequent to the filing of the suit can be taken notice of and can be duly considered provided the same is relevant in determining the question of bona fide requirement. But, the question is whether the prayers made by the tenant in i. a. Nos. Iv and v mentioned above, deserve to be granted in this revision petition. I have already held on points (1) and (2) that this revision petition is liable to be dism/ssed as not maintainable and the concurrent findings of the two courts-below do not call for interference in exercise of the rcvisional powers under Section 115, C. P. C. therefore, I hold that the tenant is not entitled to the reliefs he has sought in i. a. nos. . Iv and v belatedly filed by him in this court inasmuch as they are filed five years after filing of the revision petition. . Iv and v belatedly filed by him in this court inasmuch as they are filed five years after filing of the revision petition. Even otherwise, the subsequent event of the landlords purchasing another house on 28-10-1987 under the original of document No. 1 produced with i. a. No. Iv would not lilt the balance in favour of the tenant in any manner. A perusal of that document would show that the first respondent has purchased a house built on an open space measuring 60' x 46' for a sum of Rs. 17,630/~. First respondent as well as his son arun have stated in their affidavits that the said house is not at all sufficient for their use and occupation as it is a small house consisting of only two bed rooms whereas, their family consists of both the respondents, their four sons and a daughter of whom the first two sons have attained marriageable age and they are to married soon. The tenant who had an opportunity to file a counter-affidavit has not chosen to furnish the particulars of accommodation available in that house or to deny the statement made on oath both by the first respondent and his son arun that the said house is a small one consisting of two bed rooms only and it is insufficient for their accommodation. That being so, there was no need to appoint a commissioner for ascertaining the accommodation available in that house as prayed in La. No. V. therefore, Sri V. T. Rayaraddi was perfectly justified in contending that the tenant has filed La. Nos, iv and v with the obvious intention of protracting the proceedings as long as possible and not with any bona fide intention of advancing the cause of justice. Therefore, I hold that the tenant is not entitled to the reliefs he has sought in i. a. Nos. IV and V. ( 21 ) BEFORE concluding, I consider it necessary to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Sheela Chadha and others v Dr. Achharaj Ram Seghal, 1990 (supp.) Scc 736. In that case, the landlord was able to secure a larger portion of a building in an eviction petition against another tenant. It was argued that the landlord could have accommodated his daughter in that portion to carry on her profession as held by the first court. Achharaj Ram Seghal, 1990 (supp.) Scc 736. In that case, the landlord was able to secure a larger portion of a building in an eviction petition against another tenant. It was argued that the landlord could have accommodated his daughter in that portion to carry on her profession as held by the first court. The Supreme Court has rejected the said contention as one that does not appeal to them and has further observed as under:-"the law grants a fair amount of discretion to the landlord to determine his needs when asking the vacation of tenanted premises. The only check on that is that must have the ground and the need should be bona fide. No precedent is needed to elaborate this view"in the instant case, the tenant has not placed any material to hold that the landlords had sought his eviction not on the ground of bonafide need but with an ulterior motive. In my opinion, the very fact that the landlords have given an opportunity to the tenant to inform them if he was prepared to occupy the first floor which had become vacant and which was not suitable for their residence would amply demonstrate their bona fides. Point No. (4) ( 22 ) IT follows from my above findings on point Nos. (1) to (3), that i. a. Nos. Iv and v as well as the revision petition are liable to be dism/ssed. ( 23 ) SO, the only other aspect that remains to be considered is whether the petitioner-tenant is entitled to any time to vacate the premises. According to the landlords, the tenant has practically closed the nursing home running in the prem/ses and he is running the same in the house he has purchased as could be gathered from the photographs produced with the counter affidavits of the first respondent and his son. Even then, I am of the opinion that the tenant requires some tune to secure alternative accommodation for shifting his nursing home. Sri V. T. Rayaraddi fairly submitted that he has no objection for granting about a year's time to the tenant to vacate the prem/ses. Taking all aspects of the matter into consideration, I consider it necessary in the ends of Justice to give time to the petitioner-tenant till 31-12-1992 to vacate the prem/ses. Sri V. T. Rayaraddi fairly submitted that he has no objection for granting about a year's time to the tenant to vacate the prem/ses. Taking all aspects of the matter into consideration, I consider it necessary in the ends of Justice to give time to the petitioner-tenant till 31-12-1992 to vacate the prem/ses. ( 24 ) IN the result, the revision petition is dism/ssed with costs granting time to the petitioner-tenant till 31-12-1992 (thirty-first day of december, ninteen ninety two) to voluntarily vacate and deliver vacant possession of the eviction petition schedule premises to the respondents-landlords without pulling them to the ordeal of filing an execution petition and also without inducting any third party into the premises and also subject to payment of rents regularly every month till then. ( 25 ) PETITIONER is given four weeks' time from this day to file his affidavit undertakingto comply with the above directions. --- *** --- .