Judgment S. Hoda, J. 1. This application under Secuona 597 and 101 of the Code of Criminal procedure (thereinafter referred to as the Code) is directed against the judgment and order dated 12-6-1990 passed In Session trial No.345/83 by which 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Munger has acquitted opposite party No.1 of the charge levelled against him. 2. The prosecution case is that the informants grand son, Niraj Kumar (deceased) was returning on 20-6-1981 from Tenughat to village Rautiia along with the petitioner who is the informants daughter-in-law. On the way, two persons surrounded them and asked them to part with their belongings. The deceased protested the culprits who tried to snatch away the belongings and when they were obstructed, one of them shot at the deceased. Thereafter culprits asked the petitioner to part with the belongings and the petitioner gave them golden ear-ring valued at Rs.1,000/-. On the basis of the aforesaid fact a First Information Report was lodged at the police station by one jamuna Yadav against unknown person at 8 p. m. It appears that during the course of investigation, the petitioner was arrested on suspicion and is said to have been identified by the petitioner. The police after completion of investigation submitted charge sheet against the petitioner under Sections 302, 392 of the Indian Penal Code. After taking cognizance, the case was committed to the court of session. It also appears that in the year 1989, the informant died and as such the petitioner is prosecuting the application. The learnf d trial court acquitted opposite party No.1 as no witness turned up to support the case inspite of all possible steps taken by the court. 3. From the order-sheet, it will appear that on 14-2-1990 charges under sections 302/392 I. P. C. were framed against the petitioner and summons were issued to the informant to produce witnesses on 15-3-1990. On 15-3-1990 accused was present but no witness turned up as such the court directed the additional Public Prosecutor to produce the prosecution witness. On 4-4-1990 for evidence. Again on 4-4-1990, accused was present but no witness turned up and the case was adjourned to 3-5-1990 for evidence. On 3-5-1990, accused was present but no witness turned up and as such, the court passed order for issuance of warrant of arrest (bailable) against the prosecution witnesses fixing 18-5-1990 for evidence. On 4-4-1990 for evidence. Again on 4-4-1990, accused was present but no witness turned up and the case was adjourned to 3-5-1990 for evidence. On 3-5-1990, accused was present but no witness turned up and as such, the court passed order for issuance of warrant of arrest (bailable) against the prosecution witnesses fixing 18-5-1990 for evidence. Again on 18-5-1990, accused was present but no witness turned up and court directed for issuance of warrant of arrest (aon-bailable) against non-official witness fixing 4-6 -1990 for evidence. It appears that on 4-6-1990, the accused was present but no witness turned up, the court ordered for issuance of summons to official witness fixing 12-6-1990 for evidence and also A. P. P. was directed to produce witness on the said date. On 12-6-1990 also no witness turned up and as such the trial court recorded the statement of the accused under section 313 of the Code and acquitted him of the charge on the ground that no witness has come forward to support the prosecution case irspite of steps taken by the court. 4. Mr. Ashwani Kumar Sinha. learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court is fit to be set aside as there has been no compliance of the provisions contained in sections 62, 66 and 68 of the Code inasmuch as that the court took step for production of the witness but without waiting for service report proceeded with the matter and acquitted opposite party No.1. It has been submitted that the court after issuing summon to the prosecution witnesses ought to have seen whether the summons has been served on the witness or not. 5. It will be relevant at this stage to examine the relevant provisions relating to service of summons. Chapter VI of the Code deals with the process to compel appearance and Sec.61 to 90 fall within this Chapter. 5. It will be relevant at this stage to examine the relevant provisions relating to service of summons. Chapter VI of the Code deals with the process to compel appearance and Sec.61 to 90 fall within this Chapter. Sec.62 provides as to how summon ia to be served which says that every summons shall be served by a police officer, or subject to such rules as the state Government may make in this behalf, by an officer of the court issuing it or other public servant and the summon shall is, practicable, be served personally on the person summoned, by delivering or tendering to him one of the dupicates of the summons and further every person on whom a summon is so, served, shall if so required by the serving officer, sign a receipt therefore on the back of the other duplicate, Sec.66 provides provisions for service on Government servant and it lays down that where the person summoned is in the active service of the Government, the court issuing the summons shall ordinarily send it in duplicate to the head of the office. In which such person is employed ; and such head shall thereupon cause the summons to be served in the manner provided by Sec.62, and shall return it to the court under his signature with the endorsement required by that section. Such signature shall be evidence of due service, Sec.68 provides for requirement in proof of service in such case when serving officer is not present. 6. The learned counsel has, therefore, submitted that the learned magistrate has erred in passing the impugned order/judgment as there is nothing on the record to show that the summons were served on the witnesses as envisaged under the aforesaid provisions nor there is affidavit on the record to show that the summons was served as required by Sec.68 of the code. In support of his contention learned counsel has referred to the decision reported in l979 BBCJ 306 Babuchand Prasad V/s. Rambabu Gope and others. In the said case the occurrence took place on 17-8-1973 and on 19-8-1976, charges were framed and summons issued for appearance of the witnesses on l6th, 17th, 18th and 20th August, 1976. From the order-sheet of the said case, it was noticed that even accused were not present on all dates, nor witnesses appeared. On an application by A. P. P. on s6-9-1976. From the order-sheet of the said case, it was noticed that even accused were not present on all dates, nor witnesses appeared. On an application by A. P. P. on s6-9-1976. court ordered for issuance of fresh summons for appearance on 5th, 8th, 9th and 10th November, 1976 and also warrant of arrest on the request of the a. P. P. was issued. On 5-11-1976, no witness turned up although the accused were present. The Additional Public Prc secutur filed fresh petition praying therein for issuance of non bailable warrant of arrest against all the local witnesses. This prayer was refused by the court on the ground that bailable warrant of arrest had already been issued. Again on 8th and 9th november, 1976 no prosecution witness turned up and ultimately on 10-11-1976, court acquitted the accused person. In that view of the matter, the court held as follows :- "we are, of course, aware that the condition prevailding in the subordinate courts regarding the production of witnesses is not very satisfactory, and inspite of repeated efforts by the courts below, the witnesses either non-official or even official do not turn up for years together. In many cases, the Investigating officers also do not tarn up, But that does not mean that the accused psrsons should escape their trial so conveniently. In order to bring discipline in the matter of production of witnesses, in our opinion, the need of the hour is to deal with the offenders more firmly. The Parliament has, therefore, now specifically provided for giving all possible assistance to the prosecution, and a duty is now cast on the courts of session under the statute itself to try their best to secure the attendance of the witnesses and to issue appropriate process for appearance of the witnesses. Of course, even after exhausting the processes and making the best efforts, they fail to secure the attendance of the witnesses the inevitable cannot be avoided and the cases are bound to suffer. But. the facts of this case, as stated by us, did not not justify such an action namely the acquittal of the accused persons as neither the case was too old, nor any undue delay had occurred in this case, and the prosecution instead of showing any laches was taking all possible steps to secure the attendance of the witnesses. But. the facts of this case, as stated by us, did not not justify such an action namely the acquittal of the accused persons as neither the case was too old, nor any undue delay had occurred in this case, and the prosecution instead of showing any laches was taking all possible steps to secure the attendance of the witnesses. Acquittal in such circumstances would encourage undesirable elements to screen and withhold t he witnesses. On the other hand if an impression is created that they will not be spared and the long arms of the court will compel them to appear in the case, then then attitude of avoidance will change. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, would have done better not to such a haste which resulted is the miscarriage of justice and should not have hesitated in issuiag aon-bailable warrants of arrest as repuested on behalf of the prosecution, particularly whca the offence alleged to have been committed by the opposite party is one of murder. " 7. Mr. Raza, learaed cousel appearing for opposite party no.1 has submitted that the trial coatl took all steps that was possible for the appearance of the witness as envisaged under the provisions of the Code. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of opposite party no, 1 in which it has been stated that the opposite party no.1 was not named in the FIR but was identified only by the petitioner i. a the test identification parade which was held on 29-8-1981 ie. more than two months after the date of occurrence and prior 10 the test identification parade the opposite party no.1 was shown to the petitioner. it has been further stated that summon/warrant was sent to the concerned police station by DAK and the police station in turn served them on the informant/witnesses. It has been further stated that from the order-sheet of the trial court, it will appear that pursuant to the order dated 15-2-1990, summon wns issued and the remark column of the order-sheet shows that summon was issued vide DB no 127 dated 16-2-1990. Again pursuant to the order dated 3-5-1990, warrant of arrest (bailable) was issued and the same is mentioned in the remark column showing DB no.503 dated 5-5-1990. Again pursuant to the order dated 3-5-1990, warrant of arrest (bailable) was issued and the same is mentioned in the remark column showing DB no.503 dated 5-5-1990. Pursuant to the order dated 18-5-1990, warrant of arrest (non-bailable) was issued and the same is mentioned in remark column as db no.557 dated 19-5-1990 and again on 4-6-1990, the court directed for issuance of summon to official witiness which was issued vide DB no.586 dated 5-6-1990. Thus, it has been, submitted that nothing further was left by the court to be done and as no witness turned up, trial couit had ao option but to pass the impugned order judgment. 8. Learned counsel forthe opposite party no.1 has further submitted that there being no procedural or legal infirmity in passing the impugned order/judgment the High Court should not interfere in revision tiled on behalf of informant more so, when the occurrence is said to have taken place ten years back in support of his contention learned counsel has relied on the case of S. Guin and others V/s. Grindlays Bank Ltd, 1986 SC 289. In the said case, it was held that in view of the inordinate delay and nature of the offence involved, re-trial should not have been ordered even though acquittal was improper, Learaed counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand submitted that principle laid down in the aforesaid Supreme Court will not apply in this case as in the said case, the nature of offence was not as grave as in the present, case. 9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the decision relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case. In the ease of Babuchand prasad (supra) the facts are quite different. In the said case the court did not take all possible steps that was available. In the pr sent case as mentioned above, the court exhausted all the remedies available but inspite of that witnesses did not turn up and in such a situation, trial court had no option but to acquit opposite party no.1. Further the occurrence is said to have taken place in the year i981 and after a lapse of 10 years it will not be in the interest of justice to interfere in revision against acquittal filed on behalf of the informant. 10. Further the occurrence is said to have taken place in the year i981 and after a lapse of 10 years it will not be in the interest of justice to interfere in revision against acquittal filed on behalf of the informant. 10. In the light of the discussion made above, I find no merit in this application. It is, accordingly dismissed. Revision dismissed.