JUDGMENT - SAMBRE W.M., J.:—The petitioner came to be appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the Rashtriya Vidyalaya, Chimur, run by the respondent No. 2, on 14-8-1963. Subsequently, he was appointed as Head Master in the said school on 30-5-1965. He worked upto 1977 as Head Master and, thereafter, he was reverted from the post of Head Master for a charge of misconduct and misappropriation of money on the basis of an enquiry held by the Enquiry Committee, vide Order dated 6-9-1977 at Annexure-C. The petitioner was directed to handover the charge of Head Master to one P.M. Dhadse, Assistant Teacher, in the said School. In the meanwhile, there were correspondence with the Education Officer about the seniority and, after due determination by an order dated 4-8-1978 at Annexure-D, the respondent No. 3 Panchabhai came to be appointed as the Head Master. The said appointment order clearly states that the appointment of the respondent No. 3 is on a probation for a period of one year and that further extension is subject to the satisfactory performance of the duties as Head Master. After a. period of one year, vide Order dated 31-8-1979, the respondent No. 3 came to be reverted back to his substantive post as Assistant Teacher and in that place the petitioner came to be appointed as the Head Master and the respondent No. 3 was directed to hand over the charge to the petitioner on 31-8-1979. Without mentioning the reversion of the respondent No. 3, he was directed to hand over the charge to the petitioner and join as Assistant Teacher in the same School on 1- 7-1979. This order of reversion came to be challenged before the authorities. Various litigations have taken place with the Education Officer, Deputy Director of Education and Director of Education and out of the same 3 to 4 writ petitions came to be filed before the High Court culminating the present litigation as the various orders passed by the authorities were quashed and the matters were remanded back for fresh decision on merits after hearing the parties. 2. The only issue before us is about the reversion order of the respondent No. 3 and the appointment of the petitioner as Head Master. 2. The only issue before us is about the reversion order of the respondent No. 3 and the appointment of the petitioner as Head Master. After the reversion of the respondent No. 3, it has come on record that the Education Officer, vide his letter dated 1-9-1979 informed the management that the claim of the petitioner-Nandanwar is barred due to charges of misconduct and defalcation of money proved against him in the enquiry and, therefore, no approval can be granted for his appointment and further that the arbitrary reversion of the respondent No. 3 is required to be quashed. This letter was replied to by the President of the Management, wherein it has been agitated that the respondent No. 3 was appointed purely, on probation basis for a period of one year upto 4-8-1979 and considering the conduct of the petitioner during this period, the Management is fully satisfied that the charges levelled against him were minor and, therefore, reconsidered the issue about his reversion and decided to appoint him as Head Master. Therefore, it is contended that, the directions issued by the Education Officer vide his letter dated 1-9-1979, are ex parte and are not binding against the management. Again a letter was written by the Management to the Deputy Director of Education on 30-9-1979; wherein it was prayed that the appointment of the petitioner as the Head Master is to be approved and the Deputy Director of Education. Vide his reply dated 16-11-1979, granted approval to the appointment of the petitioner as Head Master on probation afresh. 3. Against the approval granted by the Deputy Director of Education to the appointment of the petitioner as Head Master on probation, an appeal came to be filed by the respondent No. 3 on 1-12-1979. which came to be decided by the point Director of Education on 15-3-1982. By the said order, the order passed by the Deputy Director of Education appointing the petitioner as the Head Master was affirmed. 4. It is pertinent to note that during the pendency of the appeal before the Director of Education, the School Tribunal has come into existence and all the matters pending before the Education authorities as on 16-7- 1981 were to be transferred to the concerned Divisional School Tribunals. 4. It is pertinent to note that during the pendency of the appeal before the Director of Education, the School Tribunal has come into existence and all the matters pending before the Education authorities as on 16-7- 1981 were to be transferred to the concerned Divisional School Tribunals. On 15 - 7 -1981, the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 came into existence and, thereafter, on 16-7-1981 the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 came into force. As such, the service conditions of the teachers, including the Head Masters, working in the private schools, are governed by the said Act and Rules. Thus, this new Act has ousted the jurisdiction of the Director of Education to decide the appeal or revision and has declared that it is the sole domain of the School Tribunal to hear the appeals filed by the teachers against the orders passed by the management as the case may be. Therefore, the decision given by the Joint Director of Education on 15-3-1982 has become a nullity. 5. The respondent No. 3, during the pendency of the appeal before the Director of Education, has filed an appeal before the School Tribunal on 18-11-1981. The School Tribunal vide order dated 13-5-1983 allowed the appeal filed by the respondent No.3. This order dated 13-5-1983 passed by the School Tribunal in Appeal No. 13/1982 was under challenge before the High Court vide Writ Petition No. 1949/1983. The said Writ Petition came to be decided on 12-10-1983 with certain directions. The order passed by the School Tribunal was quashed and by consent of the parties, the petitioner-Nandanwar was allowed to join as respondent No. 2 to the said appeal and the appeal was remanded back to the School Tribunal for disposal of the appeal according to law after hearing the parties. The present petitioner, respondent No. 2 in the said appeal, filed his written statement before the School Tribunal. The School Tribunal vide its Order dated 28-2-1984, after hearing the parties, allowed the appeal in favour of the respondent No. 3 Panchabhai. 6. Thereafter, a writ petition came to be filed by the respondent No. 3 Panchabhai challenging the order passed by the Director of Education affirming the appointment of the petitioner as Head Master, having Writ Petition No. 806 of 1982. 6. Thereafter, a writ petition came to be filed by the respondent No. 3 Panchabhai challenging the order passed by the Director of Education affirming the appointment of the petitioner as Head Master, having Writ Petition No. 806 of 1982. The High Court, vide Judgment dated 15-3-1982, quashed the order passed by the Director of Education on the ground that it was without jurisdiction and again the matter was remanded back to the School Tribunal for decision according to law. The parties were directed to remain present before the School Tribunal on 17-3-1986. 7. Thereafter, the present petitioner filed a writ petition having W. P. No. 1182/1984 wherein he sought directions from this Court that pending decision of the writ petition, respondent No. 3 be restrained by an ad interim injunction from taking over the charge as Head Master. He also prayed in the said petition that the order dated 28-2-1984 passed by the School Tribunal in Appeal No. 13/1982 be quashed. This Court, by order dated 23 -1-1986, by consent quashed the Order dated 28-2-1984 in terms of prayer Clause (1) thereof. 8. Similar petition came to be filed by the Management having Writ Petition No. 1963/1984 seeking stay of the order passed by the School Tribunal dated 28-2-1984. This petition also came to be disposed of on 23-1-986 on the ground that Writ Petition No. 1182/1984 has already been decided and, therefore, the Writ Petition No. 1963/1984 has become infructuous. Thus, it can be seen that from time to time, this Court has remanded back the matter to the School Tribunal and, ultimately, the said Appeal No. 13/1982 came to be decided on 16-2-1987. The learned School Tribunal, after due consideration of all the facts and after hearing the parties, allowed the appeal filed by the respondent No. 3- Panchbhai, which is under challenge in this petition. 9. Mr. M.N. Belekar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has contended that the order passed by the Education Officer, refusing to grant approval to the appointment of the petitioner as Head Master is a nullity. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decision reported in 1984 Mh.L.J. 785 (Keshao Yeshwantrao Kotwal v. The Director of Education and others)1, and contended that the Education Officer has no jurisdiction to grant approval under the Secondary School Code and therefore, the order of refusal passed by him is a nullity. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decision reported in 1984 Mh.L.J. 785 (Keshao Yeshwantrao Kotwal v. The Director of Education and others)1, and contended that the Education Officer has no jurisdiction to grant approval under the Secondary School Code and therefore, the order of refusal passed by him is a nullity. It has been held in the above case that: “...there is no specific provision in the Secondary Schools Code which empowers the officers under the Schools Code to sanction or approve the action of the management of a Secondary School repatriating, transferring or sending back a teacher who has been under it, to another education institution. Whenever it was intended that the management should obtain approval for any of its actions, specific provision has been made under the Schools Code. The authorities under the Schools Code are not invested with general or overall powers of supervision over the management of non-Government aided secondary schools by the institutions which run them. These institutions are autonomous bodies and have to function with the least amount of interference from the educational authorities. That is why while framing the rules the State Government has not invested the said authorities with all pervading powers, but has limited them to specific instances and actions on the part of the Management........” Mr. Belekar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, contended that the approval refused by the Education Officer is not binding on the management as it is a nullity. 10. Mr. Bclekar also placed reliance on a judgment of this Court, reported in 1984 Mh.L.J. 520 (Vivekanand Atmaram Chitale and another v. Vidyavardhini Sabha and others)2. The ratio of this case is that the order without jurisdiction is a nullity. He also placed reliance on the decision reported in 1983 Mh.L.J. 961 (Yeshwant Prasad Popular Education Society and another v. Shashikala D. Vaidya and others)3, wherein it has been held that: “..the Regulation Act came into force on 15th of July, 1981 and the matters which were finally decided by the Deputy Director or Joint Director of Education were not covered by section 9 of the Act. The decision of the Director was binding on both the parties and once the appeals were filed under the provisions of the Secondary Schools Code and were heard and decided by the Deputy Director and the Joint Director on the merits of the matter, then obviously the order by the management stood merged in the Appellate Order of the Deputy Director or the Joint Director. This being the position in law, the order passed by the manager. “..the Regulation Act came into force on 15th of July, 1981 and the matters which were finally decided by the Deputy Director or Joint Director of Education were not covered by section 9 of the Act. The decision of the Director was binding on both the parties and once the appeals were filed under the provisions of the Secondary Schools Code and were heard and decided by the Deputy Director and the Joint Director on the merits of the matter, then obviously the order by the management stood merged in the appellate order of the Deputy Director or the Joint Director. This being the position in law, the order passed by the management removing the teacher from service stood merged initially in the order of the Education Officer and then in the order passed of the Deputy Director of Education and then in the order passed by the Joint Director of Education....” Relying upon the ratio of the above case, Mr. Belekar contended that the order passed by the Education Officer has already been merged in the appellate order passed by the Deputy Director and Joint Director of Education. Therefore, the order of refusal passed by the Education Officer was not in existence. 11. Mr. Belekar further placed reliance on a case reported in 1982(2) Bom.C.R. 352 , (Bhikamsingh and others v. M.S.R.T.C.)4, which deals with the right of a probationer even after the period of continuation. It has been held that: “... the law about rights of a probationer is well settled and crystallised due to many judicial pronouncements made from time to time ..... ..... ..... It has been held that: “... the law about rights of a probationer is well settled and crystallised due to many judicial pronouncements made from time to time ..... ..... ..... Therefore, even though a probationer may have continued to act in the post to which he is appointed on probation for more than the initial period of probation, he cannot become a permanent servant merely because of efflux of time, unless the rules of service which govern him specifically lay down that the probationer will be automatically confirmed after the initial period of probation is over ....” Relying upon the above decision, Mr. Belekar contended that even after the probationary period of one year was over, the respondent No.3 continued to hold the post of Head Master for near about 26 days and that does not confer any right to the respondent No. 3 to be declared as the Head Master against the said vacancy unless and until a specific order is issued in his favour in that regard. 12. Mr. Belekar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, further contended that the order came to be passed on 16-11-1979 while the appeal came to be filed on 18-11-1981, when the appointed date was 15-7-1981 and that the limitation prescribed for filing an appeal was 60 days. Therefore, the appeal filed by the respondent No. 3 before the School Tribunal itself was beyond limitation. The School Tribunal did not consider this aspect nor did it discuss this point anywhere. As such, this aspect about the limitation remained to be decided. In case it is held that the limitation provided is only 60 days, which is the statutory requirement, then the appeal filed by the respondent No. 3 before the School Tribunal is beyond limitation. 13. In reply, Mr. A.P. Deshpande, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 contended that the question of limitation was not the issue before the School Tribunal for the reason that the appeal filed by the respondent No. 3 was already pending before the Director of Education. During the pendency of the appeal, Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (for short “the Regulation Act”) was given effect and the jurisdiction of the Director of Education to decide the appeal was taken away. During the pendency of the appeal, Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (for short “the Regulation Act”) was given effect and the jurisdiction of the Director of Education to decide the appeal was taken away. The appointed date for the aforesaid transfer was 15-7-1981 and from 16-7-1981 the School Tribunal was to assume the jurisdiction in respect of the appeals against the Order passed by the management. Therefore, the question about the limitation cannot be raised in the present dispute. Even it will be seen that after the decision given by the Joint Director, an appeal came to be filed by the respondent No. 3 before the School Tribunal. Moreover, the School Tribunal is invested with the power to condone the delay in filing the appeal. 14. Mr. Deshpande, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3, further contended that as per section 8 of the Regulation Act, the State Government was empowered by notification in the Official Gazette, to constitute one or more Tribunals to be called “School Tribunal”, and to define the jurisdiction of each Tribunal in such notification. Such a notification has been issued by the State Government constituting a School Tribunal for the Vidarbha region and the appointed date for the transfer of powers and cases was 16-7-81. Moreover, it is contended that, in the present case the School Tribunal has assumed powers in view of the directions given by the High Court) in various, writ petitions from time to time. As such, the issue about the limitation does not exist in the present case. The parties have consented to pass an order before the High Court in writ jurisdiction. Considering all these points, the point of limitation does not exist in the present case. Mr. Deshpande further contended that even in cases of delay, there are provisions under the Regulation Act to condone the same. 15. The parties have consented to pass an order before the High Court in writ jurisdiction. Considering all these points, the point of limitation does not exist in the present case. Mr. Deshpande further contended that even in cases of delay, there are provisions under the Regulation Act to condone the same. 15. As regards the jurisdiction of the Education Officer, Deputy Director and Joint Director of Education, as a theory of merger canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it is contended that this merger theory does not exist for the reason that this Court in writ jurisdiction has specifically held that the Orders passed by the Education Officer, Deputy Director and the Joint Director of Education are without jurisdiction as on 16-7-1981 and when the matter was pending before the Director on 16- 7-1981, the same was deemed to have been transferred to the School Tribunal. On the basis of the provisions of the Regulation Act, this Court has quashed and set aside the orders passed by the Deputy Director and Joint Director and directed the School Tribunal to decide the appeal filed by the respondent No. 3 after giving opportunity to the petitioner on merits. The School Tribunal was to consider the order passed by the management about the appointment of Head Master as well as the order of the management reverting the respondent No. 3. The main contention of the respondent No. 3 was that he has been wrongly demoted even though his appointment was against a clear vacancy as a Head Master. Therefore, there was no question of any reversion of the respondent No. 3 and appointment of the petitioner as Head Master when he was reverted after holding enquiry into his misconduct. In fact, there is no mention in the finding of the Enquiry Committee that the reversion itself was temporary. 16. Section 5 of the Regulation Act deals with certain obligations of the Management of private schools in the matter of appointments of persons duly qualified to fill such vacancies. Section 5(2) provides that every person appointed to fill a permanent vacancy shall be on probation for a period of two years. This section also provides that subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) he shall, on completion of this probation period of two years, be deemed to have been confirmed. Section 5(2) provides that every person appointed to fill a permanent vacancy shall be on probation for a period of two years. This section also provides that subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) he shall, on completion of this probation period of two years, be deemed to have been confirmed. In section 5, a proviso has been added by an amendment, which reads as under: “Provided that, unless such vacancies to be filled in by promotion, the Management shall, before proceeding to fill such vacancy, ascertain from the Educational Inspector, Greater Bombay, or as the case may be, the Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, whether there is any suitable person available on the list of surplus persons maintained by him, for absorption in other schools, and in that event of such person being available, the Management shall appoint that person in such vacancy.” Section 6 deals with obligations of the Head of Private schools. 17. It is further contended that once this post of Head Master is to be filled in by promotion, then the question of probation for such promotion does not exist. Mr. Deshpande further contended that there is no provision to give appointment on probation as Head Master and even the form prescribed for issuance of the appointment Order does not provide for any probation. He contended that the probation is only for the newly appointed candidates and not for the persons who are promoted. Therefore, the Management was under obligation to regularise the services of the respondent No. 3 as Head Master. Mr. Deshpande further claimed that the petitioner had no right to continue in the post of Head Master once he had already been reverted from that post on the basis of an enquiry held by the Enquiry Committee holding him guilty of misconduct. In fact, this respondent No. 3 has held the post of Head Master on a regular substantive post and that there is no provision for probation in such case. Therefore, the Order appointing the respondent No. 3 on probation itself is a nullity. Considering all these facts, he contended that the respondent No. 3 was holding a regular post in a clear and permanent vacancy and, as such, he has acquired right on the said post on permanent basis unless otherwise held by the Court. Therefore, the Order appointing the respondent No. 3 on probation itself is a nullity. Considering all these facts, he contended that the respondent No. 3 was holding a regular post in a clear and permanent vacancy and, as such, he has acquired right on the said post on permanent basis unless otherwise held by the Court. He further contended that there was no complaint against the respondent No. 3 during the said probation period by the Management and that the period of probation either can be curtailed or can be waived considering the circumstances of each case. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the decision reported in 1983(2) S.C.C. 217 (Ajit Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another)5, and contended that without assigning any reason either in writing or oral, this respondent No. 3 any reason either in writing or oral, this respondent No. 3 has been reduced in rank which amounts to punishment. He also placed reliance on the decision reported in A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36, (Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India)6. The ratio of this case is that when a servant has right to a post or to a rank either under the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, or under the rules governing the conditions of his service, the termination of the service of such a servant or his reduction to a lower post is by itself and prima facie a punishment for it operates as a forfeiture of his right to hold that post or that rank and to get the emoluments and other benefits attached thereto. 18. From the above arguments advanced by both the sides, the point to be determined is as to whether the appointment of Nandanwar, the petitioner, was proper or not. It is pertinent to note that the finding given by the learned School Tribunal by its reasoned order appears to be perfectly right. The matter was remanded back by the High Court thrice and finally the School Tribunal has given a finding in favour of the respondent No. 3-Panchbhai holding that the reversion of Panchbhai is illegal. The reason given for this is that the petitioner came to be reverted after due enquiry in respect of his misconduct and misappropriation of money. The matter was remanded back by the High Court thrice and finally the School Tribunal has given a finding in favour of the respondent No. 3-Panchbhai holding that the reversion of Panchbhai is illegal. The reason given for this is that the petitioner came to be reverted after due enquiry in respect of his misconduct and misappropriation of money. The finding given by the Enquiry Committee does not mention that the said reversion was for a temporary period and, therefore, the view taken by the respondent No. 2- Management that after observing the conduct of the petitioner, the Management has taken a decision to post him as Head Master directing the respondent No. 3 to join back as Assistant Teacher in the said School is not correct. It is pertinent to note that the seniority of the respondent No. 3 has been determined on a reference made by the Management to the Education Officer and only thereafter the approval was granted for his appointment as Head Master. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the action taken by the Management in reverting the respondent No. 3 from the post of Head Master and appointing the petitioner as Head Master is proper. 19. Another aspect is that the appointment order issued in favour of the respondent No. 3, appointing him on probation for a period of one year, also has been assailed by Mr. Deshpande, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3. Mr. Deshpande, as already mentioned, has contended that the appointment of a fresh candidate can be made on probation, but there is no provision either in the Rule or in the Act to appoint a seniormost teacher as Head Master on probation. Our attention was invited to the proforma as regards the order of appointment given in the Code for Recognition of and Grant-in-Aid to Secondary Schools. The proforma is provided under Rule 67 in Chapter II, section X of the said Code, which specifies that the appointment can be made purely on temporary or permanent basis on probation. As discussed above section 5(2) of the Regulation Act also provides that every person appointed to fill a permanent vacancy shall be on probation for a period of two years. As discussed above section 5(2) of the Regulation Act also provides that every person appointed to fill a permanent vacancy shall be on probation for a period of two years. Sub-sections (4) and (5) of the said section further provide that on completion of this probation period of two years, the person concerned shall be deemed to have been confirmed. Apart from all these facts, Mr. Deshpande, contended that the action on the part of the respondent No. 2-Management to appoint the respondent No. 3 on probation itself is illegal for the reason that the respondent No. 3 was holding the post of Head Master in a clear and permanent vacancy and, therefore, the Order of probation itself was illegal, particularly when the appointment of the respondent No. 3 was done after due consideration of the seniority on a reference to the Education Officer. 20. As regards the point of limitation as raised by Mr. Belekar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, as discussed above, the same cannot be sustained for the reason that the order passed by the Education Officer came to be challenged before the Deputy Director and thereafter before the Director of Education. During the pendency of the appeal before the Director, the School Tribunal came into existence. In fact the appeal before the School Tribunal is required to be filed within a period of 60 days and it is contended that this appeal came to be filed beyond limitation. Against the Order passed by the Joint Director of Education, writ petitions came to be filed - one by the respondent No. 3, another by the petitioner and third one by the respondent No. 2-Management. All these matters came to be decided by this Court with consent of all the parties and the same came to be remanded back to the School Tribunal for decision on merits after hearing all the parties. This Order of the High Court clearly shows that the question of limitation raised by the petitioner has been completely discussed and considered by the Court while deciding the petitions by consent. Therefore, the learned School Tribunal was right in not discussing the issue about the limitation raised by the petitioner. 21. Similarly, as discussed above, the issue raised by Mr. Belekar that the order passed by the School Tribunal is without jurisdiction, under no circumstances can be sustained. Therefore, the learned School Tribunal was right in not discussing the issue about the limitation raised by the petitioner. 21. Similarly, as discussed above, the issue raised by Mr. Belekar that the order passed by the School Tribunal is without jurisdiction, under no circumstances can be sustained. The School Tribunal has assumed the power to decide the appeal and this was also done with the consent of all the parties as the matter was remanded back by this Court. As discussed above, the cases cited by Mr. Belekar—Keshav Yeshwantrao Kotal v. Director of Education, 1984 Mh.L.J. 785 as well as vivekanand Atmaram Chitale v. Vidyavardhini Sabha, 1984 Mh.L.J. 520, on the point of jurisdiction also will not be applicable to the present case for the reason that the School Tribunal has come into existence when the appeal before the Director of Education was pending and the Order came to be passed by the School Tribunal after hearing the parties. The contention of Mr. Belekar that the Order passed by the School Tribunal was without jurisdiction and that the same is a nullity while placing reliance on a decision reported in Yeshwant Prasad Popular Education Society v. Shashikala D. Vaidya, 1983 Mh.L.J. 961, also is not available to him for the reason that the decision taken by the learned School Tribunal is perfectly right as discussed above. As regards the contention of Mr. Belekar on the point of probation period relying upon the decision reported in Bhikamsingh v. M.S.T.R.C., 1982(2) Bom.C.R. 352 , cited above, it is pertinent to note that ratio of this decision is also not attracted to the present case in view of the fact that the respondent No. 3 was holding the post of Head Master in a clear and permanent vacancy. We have already taken a view that the action on the part of the respondent No. 2-Management itself was illegal for the reasons discussed above. 22. Under these circumstances, the view taken by the learned School Tribunal quashing the appointment of the petitioner-Nandanwar made by the Management is perfectly right. However, it is pertinent to note that the petitioner was holding the post of Head Master second time on the basis of the stay granted by this Court on 6-3-1987. The matter could not be decided early. However, it is pertinent to note that the petitioner was holding the post of Head Master second time on the basis of the stay granted by this Court on 6-3-1987. The matter could not be decided early. In the meanwhile, the petitioner-Nandanwar sought voluntary retirement and this Court vide order dated 21-11-1988 vacated the interim stay already granted on 6-3-1987. Mr. Belekar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that in view of the fact that the petitioner had worked as Head Master upto the date of retirement, he should be deemed to have continued the said post till his retirement. Considering the fact that the petitioner has already retired from service, we do not want to pass any order about recovery of any amount from him. But, in view of the above discussion, we are of the view that the respondent No. 3 is entitled to hold the post of Head Master from the date of his appointment. In case he has not been appointed as Head Master, the respondent No. 2 is directed to appoint him as Head Master forthwith. The respondent No. 3 is entitled to get a deemed date of promotion from the date of his appointment as Head Master for the first time with continuity. He is entitled for monetary benefits from the date of retirement of the petitioner. The respondent No. 2 - Management is directed to pay the arrears to the respondent No. 3 within a period of four months from the date of this judgment. The respondent No. 2 is further directed that in case the respondent No. 3 is not appointed as Head Master after the retirement of the petitioner, the respondent No. 3 be appointed as Head Master within a period of one month from the date of this judgment. 23. With the above directions, the petition stands dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----