JUDGMENT 1. - These two revision petitions filed by the petitioner, Nemi Chand Gupta, arise out of two same dated 17.2.1991 order of the Sessions Judge, Kota in two F. I. Rs. No 209/90 and 202/90 Police Station Udyog Nagar, Kota whereby he cancelled bail granted on 4.1.1991 to the petitioner, exercising powers under Section 439(2), Cr. P.C. in cr. case Nos. 30/91 & 31/91.Factual Matrix: 2. Two F.l.Rs came to be lodged at the instance of the complainant-D.C.M. consolidated Ltd. against Nemi Chand Gupta (petitioner). 3. A complaint was filed by the complainant in the Court of Judicial Magistrate No 3, Kota which was sent for investigation under Section 156(3). Cr. P.C. and F. I. R No. 202/90 was registered on 8.12.1990 for misappropriation of Rs. 45 36,919/-, criminal breach of trust forgery, and cheating etc. Offences alleged are of Sections 418, 419, 467, , 471,477-A', 120-B, & 403, IPC. Petitioner, Nemi Chand Gupta, was arrested on 14.12.1990. 4. Second report was lodged by the complainant on 18.12.1990 and F.I.R. No. 209/90 was registered at P.S. Udyog Nagar Kota for his act of misappropriation of Rs. 7,98,562 resulting in commission of offences punishable under Sections 403, 408, 418, 419, 420, 467, 477A, and 471, IPC. 5. The petitioner moved for pott-arrest bail which was granted on 4.1.1991 in both the criminal cases, referred to above. However, the complainant, moved for cancellation of bail and the bail granted to the petitioner on 4.1.1991 was cancelled by the Sessions Judge, Kota vide impugned orders dated 17.2.1991. Hence these petitions. 6. At the very inception, Mr. Mehrish, appearing for the complainant raised preliminary objection that the present revision petitions are not maintainable because the orders assailed therein are interlocutory orders and the revision petition against interlocutory orders is barred by the provisions contained in Section 397(2), Cr. P C. 7. Mr. Gupta, appearing on behalf of the complainant & expertise in legal illegible, contended vociforcely that even if assuming for the sake of arguments, the impugned orders cancelling petitioners bail are interlocutory & by virtue of Section 397 (2), Cr. P. C. revision petition against such order albeit does not lie, but he submitted that application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. has also been filed on 2.4.1991 praying therein for treating the revision petitions as criminal misc. petitions under Section 482, Cr. P. C. against such interlocutory orders. 8. P. C. revision petition against such order albeit does not lie, but he submitted that application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. has also been filed on 2.4.1991 praying therein for treating the revision petitions as criminal misc. petitions under Section 482, Cr. P. C. against such interlocutory orders. 8. Now, it is to be seen as to whether impugned orders can be termed as interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order has not been defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, itself, but. having been hence filed by the enlightments derived from the catena of decisions of the Apex Court, it can be defined as under:- "An order which does not decide any of the matters in dispute, or substantially, decide any vital issue in the case against the accused touching the merits of the case or the rights of the parties, will be an interlocutory order." 9. Whether an order is interlocutory or not, can be adjudged keeping in view its effect on the questions or rights of the parties. Taking the aid of the land laid down by Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Bhola v. State (1979 Cr. L.J. 718) , an order cancelling bail granted to an accused does not in any way effect the questions involved in criminal case pending against him or the rights of the parties in relation to any of the questions, that may be involved in that case. Therefore, no revision lay against such an order as it is an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2), Cr. P C. 10. Grant of bail or its cancellation does not decide the case finally. Such an order is passed at an intermediate stage, between the commencement and the end of the trial and while passing such order, the Court passing order never enters into merits of the case and while deciding such issue the Court is not obliged to go into merits of the case. Grant or cancellation of bail is discretionary exercise of the powers after looking into the facts of the case and under the guiding principles of law of Bail, specially the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It does not determine the innocence or the guilt of the offender. Grant or cancellation of bail is discretionary exercise of the powers after looking into the facts of the case and under the guiding principles of law of Bail, specially the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It does not determine the innocence or the guilt of the offender. Therefore, order cancelling or granting bail is tritely an interlocutory order and a revision therefore, does not lie against such an order in view of Section 397(2). Cr. P.C. as would be fortified by the decisions in AIR 1967 SC 799 , AIR 1977 SC 2185 and AIR 1978 SC p. 47. Wherein it has been held that passing orders for bail would include "granting, rejecting or cancelling bail and an order of cancelling bail may deprive an accused of his liberty and for him it may be a matter of moment but it cannot escape the bar imposed by Section 397(2) Cr. P.C. and it is an interlocutory order. 11. In the case at hand, it has also not been brought to the notice of this Court so as to infer that the impugned order was parsed substantially touching some aspect or this merits or affecting vital questions involved in 'he case against the accused. In this view of the matter, no revision lay against the impugned orders being interlocutory one within the meaning of S. 397(2), Cr. P.C. and by virtue of the bar imposed by Section 397(2), Cr. P.C. The revision petition referred to above, are dismissed. 12. Now, I advert to the application for treating the revision petition as criminal misc. petition under Section 482, Cr. P.C. 13. Learned counsel for the complainant against raised another preliminary objection by contending that no relief can be granted under Section 482, Cr. P.C. merely by filing application for treating unsuccessful and barred revision petition as misc. petition, inasmuch as no grounds have been stated out nor taken as to in what circumstances the impugned order can be quashed under Section 482, Cr. P.C Further, merely filing an application for treating barred revision petition as misc. petition does not mean that the impugned order is liable to be quashed on the grounds stated in the memo of barred revision petition. 14. Shri Mehrish then stressed that an alternative remedy is available to the petitioner either by moving application for anticipatory bail or application for bail under Section 439, Cr. petition does not mean that the impugned order is liable to be quashed on the grounds stated in the memo of barred revision petition. 14. Shri Mehrish then stressed that an alternative remedy is available to the petitioner either by moving application for anticipatory bail or application for bail under Section 439, Cr. P.C. by complying with his solemn bond on the basis of which he had been released on bail. But, powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. cannot be invoked. Shri Mehrish added. 15. Both the learned counsel cited some of the decisions of this Court. All these decisions cited by the parties have been perused by me and I find that the decisions cited albeit settled the principle of law on the question of exercise of the powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. but they are not direct on the matter of cancellation of bail or its revocation under Section 482. Cr. P.C. and they have different sets of circumstances either in the matter of quashing of criminal prosecution initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction Therefore, I need not proceed to discuss and deal with except to detail out the principle of law enunciated therein which govern the guiding principle for the exercise of powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. 16. Inherent powers are vested in the Court to step in wherever there is abuse of the process of the Court or there is a need to secure the ends of justice or to give effect to any order under Code of Criminal Procedure. And. while doing so, the Court cannot do what the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly prohibits it from doing nor can it make an order which is in contravention of or in direct conflict with any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 17. A look at Section 439(2), Cr. P.C. show that the High Court or the Sessions Judge have jurisdiction for cancelling the bail granted to an accuse. Thus, it cannot be said that the Sessions Judge was not competent 10 exercise the powers under Section 439(2), Cr.P.C. for cancelling the bail nor can it be said that cancelling the bail is an abuse of process of law, nor does the impugned order bring about a situation of an abuse of the process of the Court. 18. Thus, it cannot be said that the Sessions Judge was not competent 10 exercise the powers under Section 439(2), Cr.P.C. for cancelling the bail nor can it be said that cancelling the bail is an abuse of process of law, nor does the impugned order bring about a situation of an abuse of the process of the Court. 18. Having considered the contentions raised by (he petitioner, I find that the petitioner seeks to invoke Section 482. Cr. P.C so as to quash the cancellation of the bail and in other words, to affirm his bail granted on 4.1.1991. 19. The questions whether the Sessions Judge has fallen into some basic error or infirmity while granting the bail on 4.1.1991 or while cancelling the bail on 27.2.991, can be gone into while considering the grant of bail either in exercise of special powers under Section 43 (1). Cr. P.C. or under Section 4 8, Cr. P C. but, not under inherent jurisdiction which can be exercised sparingly in rarest of tare cases. In the case at hand, I make no comments in the circumstances of this case beyond saying that the learned Sessions Judge had power to cancel the bail which power he exercised by disposing of the application made by the complainant and he was competent to invoke Section 439(2), Cr. P.C. after hearing the accused. Obviously the instant case is not one of the rarest of rare cases in view of the law laid down in catena of decisions of Apex Court including (1) AIR 1977 SC pp. 2229 2185; (2 AIR 1978 SC p. 47, and AIR 1980 SC 258 . 20. In older to avoid surrender to judicial custody the petitioner filed this application under the cloak of Section 482, Cr. P.C. for a relief which in substance is the relief of bail. 21. If on merits, the impugned order is examined though 1 am not doing so, entertaining application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. and finally, it not interfered with then certainly it may cause prejudice to either of the parties, at the time of considering application under Section 439(1), Cr. P.C. or S. 438, 22. So, while adopting from the decision in Phool Chand v. State (1983 R. Cr. P.C. and finally, it not interfered with then certainly it may cause prejudice to either of the parties, at the time of considering application under Section 439(1), Cr. P.C. or S. 438, 22. So, while adopting from the decision in Phool Chand v. State (1983 R. Cr. cases p. 190 ) which was based on the decision in Madhu Limave v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1978 SC p. 47 , supra), powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. cannot be allowed to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party which in the instant case is grant of bail either pre-arrest or post-arrest. It is always open to the petitioner to invoke special powers either under Section 438 or 439(1) Cr.P.C. If he surrenders himself to custody will not only be paving the way for filing an application under Section 439. Cr. P.C. but would also be complying though belatedly, with his solemn bonds on the basis of which he had been released on bail to appear before the Court as and when called upon. 23. Orders granting or refusing or cancelling bail to accused are "interlocutory orders" which cannot be revised by the Superior courts either under Section 397 being barred by Section 397(2), Cr. P C. or Section 482, Cr. P.C. and in any case, where the Sessions judge chancels it illegally and unjustly in exercise of his power under Section 439(2), Cr. P.C. the High Court has every power to grant bail to such person under Section 439(1), Cr. P.C. 24. Since I have dealt with these petitions on their maintainability either under Section 39)7 or 482, Cr. P.C and though the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued on the merits of the order at considerable length, 1 refrain myself from expressing any opinion on the merits or demerits of the impugned orders cancelling the bail as it may cause prejudice to either of the parties in appropriate forum which the petitioner will choose hereafter. 25. My view is fortified by the decision of this Court in Gheesya & others v. State of Rajasthan (1988 Raj Cr. Cases p 514 ) wherein it has been held that an order cancelling bail under section 437(5) or 439(2), Cr. 25. My view is fortified by the decision of this Court in Gheesya & others v. State of Rajasthan (1988 Raj Cr. Cases p 514 ) wherein it has been held that an order cancelling bail under section 437(5) or 439(2), Cr. P.C. can be challenged in application moved for anticipatory bail and that it would be unfit that revision or petition under section 482, Cr. P C. be filed, and thus, the application under Section 438. Cr. P.C. cannot be said to be in appropriate. 26. In the result, these revision petitions are dismissed so also the applications under Section 482, Cr. P.C. being not maintainable. Fifteen days time is allowed to avail of alternate remedy for grant of bail either under Section 438 or 439, (1), Cr. P.C. against the impugned order during which he will be on interim bail. *******