Judgment S.N. Jha, J. This appeal by the defendant 1st party arises out of a suit seeking ejectment of defendants 1st and 2nd parties and arrears of rent and damages as also mesne profits with respect to property situate in the town of Patna. 2. According to the plaintiff's case, the suit property was formerly owned by proforma defendants 3 to 6, who sold the same under four registered sale deeds dated 22nd March 1982 to the plaintiffs. The suit property was in possession of M/s Caltex (India) Limited predecessor-in-interest of defendant 1st party as lessee under registered deed of lease dated 15.2.1968 for a term of 20 years, determinable on the breach of any term of the lease even prior to the expiry of the said period, commencing from lit July 1955, for the purpose of installation and erection upon the demised land underground petrol tanks and shelter for attendants and any other buildings, erection and equipment for the purpose of storing, selling or otherwise carrying on trade in petrol, petroleum products, oil and kindred motor accessories on a monthly rental fixed at Rs.500/- upto June 1975 and, thereafter, at Rs.650/- payable on or before 5th day of the succeeding English calendar month. Defendant nos. 3 to 6, after the aforesaid transfer of the property in favour of the plaintiffs, informed defendants 1st party by letter of attornment dated 22nd March 1982, reiterated in letter dated 2nd April 1982, about the said sale directing them to pay the monthly rental from April 1982 to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also by registered letter dated 30th March 1982, enclosing therewith copies of the aforesaid letter of attornment, requested defendants 1st party to make payment of the rental in respect of the suit premises from April 1982 to them directly in view of the purchase of the property by them. The defendant 1st party in spite of receipt of the aforesaid letters deliberately failed to make payment of the rental from April 1982 on false and untenable pretext. According to the terms of the lease, municipal taxes, as and when assessed in respect of the premises, are to be paid by the lessee, but the defendants first party had failed to make payments of the full amount of municipal taxes for the last four years. According to the terms of the lease, municipal taxes, as and when assessed in respect of the premises, are to be paid by the lessee, but the defendants first party had failed to make payments of the full amount of municipal taxes for the last four years. According to the plaintiffs further, defendants first party had committed yet another breach of the term of lease by utilising the premises for a purpose not specified in the deed of lease, namely, sale of scooters etc. manufactured by Scooters India Limited, making the defendants liable to forfeiture of the lease. Thus, according to the plaintiff, the defendant 1st party on the ground of tile aforesaid throe breaches of the terms of lease namely, non-payment of rent for more than 60 days non-payment of full amount of municipal taxes and utilisation of the promises for a purpose other than specified in the deed forfeited their rights under the deed of lease to remain in occupation of the premises and the plaintiffs are entitled to re-enter upon the same prior to the expiry of the period in terms of express convenants of the deed. The plaintiffs impleaded M/s Bidasaria Auto Service as defendant 2nd party since they are in actual occupation of the premises either as subtenant or agent of the defendant 1st party. 3. The plaintiffs requested the defendant 1st party to deliver vacant possession of the suit premises and also served notices through their Advocate determining the tenancy by 30th September 1982. Since the principal defendants railed to deliver vacant possession of the premises, the suit was instituted. The plaintiffs have also averred that they are businessmen and are in bona fide need of the premises for their own occupation. 4. Although separate written statements were filed on behalf of the two principal defendants taking identical stand, the suit was contested only by defendant 1st party. The lessor-lessee relationship between the proforma defendants 3 to 6 and M/s Caltex (India) Limited was not denied. The right, title and interest of Caltex (India) Limited having vested in the Central Government by virtue of the Caltex [Acquisition of Shares of Calrex Oil Refining (India) Limited and of the Undertakings in India of Caltex: (India) Limited] Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Caltex Act') and made over to M/s Hindustan Petroleum Company Limited i.e. Defendant. The right, title and interest of Caltex (India) Limited having vested in the Central Government by virtue of the Caltex [Acquisition of Shares of Calrex Oil Refining (India) Limited and of the Undertakings in India of Caltex: (India) Limited] Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Caltex Act') and made over to M/s Hindustan Petroleum Company Limited i.e. Defendant. 1st party, a Government Company, they are the successors-in-interest of the erstwhile Caltex (India) Limited and are, accordingly, entitled to all rights and interest including the right of renewal and continuance of the lease on its expiry on the same terms and conditions. They admitted to have received letter dated 2nd April 1982 from defendant no. 5 Paritosh Mazumdar informing that the property in question had been sold by the lessors i.e. proforma defendants but no copy of the sale deed was ever sent in spite of several requests. They also admitted to have received letter from the Advocate on behalf of the plaintiffs informing them about the purchase of the suit property but, according to them, the quantum of share of the alleged purchasers or certified copy of the sale deed was not communicated. According to the defendants, in those circumstances, there was some confusion in regard to payment of rent and therefore, an inter-Pleader suit being Title Suit No. 118 of 1982 was filed in the court of 3rd Munsif, Patna. Since the said suit was pending on the date of filing of the written statement, a plea was also taken that the instant suit deserves to be stayed pending the disposal of the said inter-Pleader Suit. As regards the status of M/s Bidasaria Auto Service, it was stated that they are neither sub-tenant nor agent but dealer of defendant 1st party M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited. The plaintiff's case regarding utilisation of the part of the premises for the sale of scooters was not denied. It was, however, stated that carrying on the aforesaid business was being done since much prior to 1982 and was in consonance with the terms of the lease. They did not admit that any amount by way of municipal tax was due but took the plea that any such due can never be ground for establishing the breach of the terms of the lease. They did not admit that any amount by way of municipal tax was due but took the plea that any such due can never be ground for establishing the breach of the terms of the lease. The defendants admitted to have received the notices dated 10th July 1982 and 14th August 1982 sent by the plaintiffs through their lawyer but took the stand that they are not valid. 5. The trial Court framed as many as seven issues, the material issues being issue nos. 4 to 6 to the effect as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled to decree for ejectment of defendant 1st party and 2nd party and further entitled to decree for arrears of rent, damages and future mesne profits. On the basis of the evidence both oral and documentary adduced on behalf of the parties, the court held, as regards the question of default in payment of monthly rent, that the plea of defendant 1st party for not making payments was not .tenable inasmuch as the insistence on the part of defendant 1st party to furnish the quantum of shares of each, plaintiffs as also supply of copy of the sale deeds was neither bonafide nor essential; and, accordingly held that the defendant 1st party had deliberately failed to pay the monthly rent of the premises from April 1982 till the filing of the suit in spite of full knowledge of the transfer of the suit property by the original lessors in favour of the plaintiffs and have, thus, committed breach of the terms of the tenancy in that regard, as contained in paragraph 4 (d) of the lease deed (Exhibit 7). The court also held that the use of the suit premises for the sale of scooters etc. being for a purpose other than the sale of the products of defendant 1st party constituted breach of the terms and the principal defendants had made the lease liable for forfeiture and made themselves liable to ejectment. On the question of default in payment of the municipal taxes also the court held that the full amount of municipal taxes had not been paid. It also refused to accept the deposit of the entire arrears of municipal taxes during pendency of the suit as a valid deposit in terms of the provisions of section 114A of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). It also refused to accept the deposit of the entire arrears of municipal taxes during pendency of the suit as a valid deposit in terms of the provisions of section 114A of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Accordingly, the court held that the defendants are liable to ejectment on the ground of non-payment of municipal taxes in terms of clause 2 (C) of the lease deed also. The court also held that the defendants are not entitled to any so called unilateral renewal of the lease in terms of the provisions of the Caltex Act. On the aforesaid findings the trial court held that the plaintiffs are entitled to decree for ejectment of the principal defendants from the suit premises. The trial court also granted them decree for arrears of rent amounting to Rs.3900/- for the period from April to September 1982, damages amounting to Rs.14,000/- from 1st October 1982 upto filing of the suit and also decree for mesne profits to be ascertained in a separate proceeding. 6. Mr. N.K.P. Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant, has asserted the findings of the trial court holding that the plaintiffs arc entitled to decree for ejectment on all the three grounds, submitting further that in terms of the relevant provisions of the Caltex Act the defendant-appellant is entitled to renewal of the lease and, therefore, no such decree can be passed. He also submitted that in any view, the suit was fit to be dismissed on the ground that the notice determining tenancy is not in conformity with section 106 of the Act. 7. As regards the first ground of ejectment, namely, arrears of rent the relevant term of lease deed is contained in clause 4 (d) of the deed which says 'if any rent shall be 60 days in arrears (whether legally demanded or not)...and shall continue for 30 days after notice thereof to the lessee...... and the tenancy shall thereupon determine......". In the instant case non-payment of rent is admitted. During pendency of the suit, however, the defendant filed a petition on 29th March, 1984 seeking reliefs against forfeiture by permitting it to deposit the amount of rent from April, 1982 to March, 1984 along with interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum and cost of the suit in terms of section 114 of the Act. During pendency of the suit, however, the defendant filed a petition on 29th March, 1984 seeking reliefs against forfeiture by permitting it to deposit the amount of rent from April, 1982 to March, 1984 along with interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum and cost of the suit in terms of section 114 of the Act. The trial court rejected the said petition by order dated 24th August, 1985 holding that "since the suit is based on other grounds also than nonpayment of rent hence the defendant no. 1 cannot take the benefit of section 114 of the Act". This Court by its order dated 18.12.1985 in Civil Revision No. 1916 of 1985 observed that the aforesaid observation of the trial court should not stand in the way of the defendants in raising the question of granting any relief in terms of section 114 of the Act, subject to their depositing the rent upto December 1985 along with cost and further depositing the current month to month rent. Accordingly, it appears that a sum of Rs.42,948 was deposited on 7th January 1986. It would appear from the impugned judgment that the trial court considered the question of granting relief in terms of sections 114 of the Act and negatived the same relying on a decision of this Court reported in AIR 1936 Patna 493 and observing further that since the possession of defendants 1 and 2 after the termination of the lease from 1.10.1982 is illegal, defendant no. 1 will not get any benefit on the basis of the aforesaid deposit of rent along with interest and cost of the suit. Nonetheless the court has taken pains to scan the evidences and has found as a fact that the conduct of the defendant no. 1 in not paying the rent was not bonafide and did not inspire confidence. Mr. Mazumdar, appearing for defendant no. 2, has, therefore, submitted that the exercise of discretion in terms of sections 114 of the Act on merits one way or the other having been refused by the trial court, this Court has to consider the question for the first time since the appeal is constitution of the suit. 8. Having regard to the significance of the question it would be appropriate to quote section 114 in extenso :- "114. 8. Having regard to the significance of the question it would be appropriate to quote section 114 in extenso :- "114. Relief against forfeiture for nonpayment of rent.-Where a lease of immovable property has been determined by forfeiture for non-payment of rent, and the lessor sues to eject the lessee, if, at the hearing of the suit, the lessee pays or tenders to the 1essor the rent in arrear, together with interest thereon and his full costs of the suit, or gives such security as the Court thinks sufficient for making such payment within fifteen days, the Court may, in lieu of making a decree for ejectment, pass an order relieving the lessee against the forfeiture; and thereupon the lessee shall hold the property leased as if the forfeiture had not occurred." Before I proceed to examine the question as to whether discretion in the matter of relief against forfeiture in terms of section 114 should be exercised in favour of the defendants, I would briefly refer to the decision of this Court in Thakur Deyal Singh v. Rai Promatha Nath Mitra (AIR 1936 Patna 493), which has been relied upon by the trial court as also by Mr. Thakur Prasad, appearing for the plaintiffs of his contention that the provisions as contained therein can be taken aid of if the suit for ejectment is based only on the ground, of non-payment of rent and since the instant suit is based on other grounds as well the same shall not be applicable. Learned counsel also referred to the last part of section 114A, which reads as follows :- “Nothing in this section shall apply to .., or to an express condition relating to forfeiture in case of non-payment of rent.” It would appear that section 114A was inserted by amendment in 1929 in order to provide for relief against forfeiture in certain other cases. Both sections 114 and 114A provide for relief against forfeiture. While such a relief under section 114 is available to lessee in a suit for ejectment on the ground of nonpayment of rent, this relief is available to him under section 114A if the suit is instituted on other grounds except those mentioned in its last part including n0n-payment of rent, quoted above. A suit for ejectment may be composite on more than one ground. A suit for ejectment may be composite on more than one ground. If the grounds are independent and severable, the lessee may be entitled to the relief as regards non-payment of rent under section 114 and be may also be entitled to the similar relief under section 114A if the breach is capable of remedy. The ground of non-payment of rent was specifically excluded from the ambit of section 114A, since it was already covered by section 114. It is to be borne in mind, however, that while section 114A is mandatory in nature, grant of relief under section 114 is discretionary. The decision in Thakur Deyal Singh (supra)' was rendered in a case arising out of suit instituted prior to 1929. It did not and could not have taken notice of provisions of section 114A in order to consider the question of grant of the relief against forfeiture on the facts of the case. Since the suit in that case had been instituted on the ground other than non-payment of rent, it was held that the relief against forfeiture under section 114 was not available to the tenant. The reliance on the aforesaid decision, in my opinion, is misplaced. 9. The question as to the nature, scope and extent of power under section 114 of the Act is not res integra. The apex Court in Namdeo Lokman Lodhi v. Narmadabai (AIR 1953 Supreme Court, 228) had the occasion to consider the aforesaid question when their Lordships observed as follows: "In our opinion, in exercising the discretion, each case must be judged by itself, the delay, the conduct of the parties and the difficulties to which the landlord has been put should be weighed against the tenant This was the view taken by the Madras High Court in Appayya Shetty v. Mohammad Beari, A.I.R. 1916 Mad, 680 (2) (D), and the matter was discussed at some length. We agree with the ratio of that decision. It is a maxim of equity that a person who comes in equity must de equity and must come with clean hands and if the conduct of the tenant is such that it disentitles him to relief in equity, then the Court's hands are not tied to exercise in his favour." The aforesaid decision has been relied upon by learned counsel for both the parties; while Mr. Sinha and Mr. Sinha and Mr. Mazumdar, appearing for the principal defendants, contended that having regard to the conduct of the defendant it was entitled to exercise of discretion in its favour, Mr. Thakur Prasad, appearing for the plaintiffs, submitted that the materials on record on the point of conduct of the defendant disentitle it to such relief. Accordingly, it would be necessary to have a quick glance over the evidence relating to the conduct of the defendant no. 1 in the matter of non-payment of rent. 10. Mr. Sinha has submitted that non-payment was on account of the confusion created by the plaintiffs. He pointed out with reference to a number of letters Exhibit A series that in spite of repeated demands for furnishing copy (copies) of the sale deed the same was never made available. He submitted that defendant no. 1 being an undertaking of the Central Government it was necessary to examine and verify the quantum of shares purchased by the plaintiffs. On the other hand, Mr. Thakur Prasad submitted that defendant no. 1, the lessee, was not prepared to recognise the plaintiffs as lessors in spite of letters having been written to it by both the plaintiffs on 30th March 1982 (Exhibit 1) and their vendors i.e. the proforma defendants on 2nd April 1982 (Exhibit C/18). He also submitted that the so-called confusion was a bogey created by the defendants, which was only in their minds. He pointed out that in the absence of any dispute as to the entitlement to receive rent, having regard to the aforementioned two letters as also other letters, there was no occasion to file all inter-pleader suit (Title Suit No. 118 or 1982) which the defendant no. 1 instituted on 5th October 1982 which was dismissed on the very first day of its hearing on 29th October 1983, in view of the admission of the proforma defendants in that suit. The defendants, however, tried to linger the so called dispute by filing a revision being Civil Revision No. 362 of 1984, which was also rejected on 28th March 1984 as not maintainab1e. Learned counsel, accordingly, submitted that defendant no. 1 on account of its recalcitrant attitude is not entitled to the equitable relief against forfeiture under section 114. 11. The defendants, however, tried to linger the so called dispute by filing a revision being Civil Revision No. 362 of 1984, which was also rejected on 28th March 1984 as not maintainab1e. Learned counsel, accordingly, submitted that defendant no. 1 on account of its recalcitrant attitude is not entitled to the equitable relief against forfeiture under section 114. 11. The receipt of letters dated 30th March 1982 (Exhibit 1) and 2nd April 1982 (Exhibit C/11) is not in dispute, as would appear from letter dated 19th April 1982 (Exhibit A/3) written by defendant no. 1 to Paritosh Mazumdar, proforma defendant no. 5, and letter dated 15th May 1982 (Exhibit A/6) written by defendant no. 1 to Sri N.K. Agrawal Advocate, representing the purchasers. It is not necessary to refer to the other letters written by defendant no. 1 (Exhibit A series), which are written on different dates reiterating the demand for furnishing copy of the sale deed. It is important to mention here that when defendant no. 1 remitted the rent for April 1982 to Paritosh Mazumdar the same was returned along with the aforesaid letter dated 2nd April saying that the property had already been sold to the plaintiffs and, therefore, henceforth payment of rent should be made to them. It is true that in that letter the details of the purchase or the purchasers had not been stated but defendant no. 1 admittedly was already in receipt of the aforesaid letter dated 30th March in which details about the purchase and their addresses had been clearly stated. The plea that the cppy of the sale deed was necessary for verification as to whether the sale was in order and also as to clearly misconceived. In Badri Narain Jha v. ameshwar Dayal Singh (AIR 1951 Supreme Court, 186) the Supreme Court, while considering a similar question, held that the lessee has no lucus standi to insist on such a verification for the purpose of attornment. It was stated;- "Similarly, the allegation of partition inter se among the several owners of the Lakhraj holding subject to Mokarrari interest could not in any way affect the integrity of the lease in the absence of the allegation of a fresh contract between the split up owners of the holding & the different owners in the Mokarrari interest." The relationship of lessor or lessee as regards the proforma defendants and defendant no. 1 are concerned, is admitted. It is also admitted that Paritosh Mazumdar was authorised to receive rent on behalf of the other lessors proforma defendants and was exclusively dealing on their behalf. In view of the clear and unequivocal communication as contained in letter dated 2nd April 1982 read with letter dated 30th March 1982 and other letters, it does not stand to reason as to how the defendant no. 1 could justifiably insist on production of the copy of the sale deed saying' that other lessors had not sent similar communications nor the quantum of shares sold/purchased had been indicated. The lease was an integral unit and the mere fact that several persons together had purchased the property did not disintegrate the lease in the absence of any material showing any inter se partition between them. 12. Institution of the inter-pleader suit is yet another instance of the fact that in spite of several correspondences including notice determining the lease, defendant no. 1 chose to file the above suit on 5th October 1982. Section 88 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that "where two or more persons claim adversely to one another the same debt, sum of money or other property, moveable or immoveable, from another person, who claims no interest therein and who is ready to pay or deliver it to the rightful claimants, such other person may institute a suit for inter pleader against all the claimants for the purpose of obtaining a decision as to the person to whom the payment or delivery shall be made." In the instant case evidently there was no claim or counter claim inter se between the plaintiffs and their vendors. In spite of stand of the proforma defendants in Exhibit C/18, defendant no. 1 chose to institute a frivolous suit and thereafter, when the suit was dismissed on the admission of the proforma defendants, he carried the so caned dispute to this Court in revision. The petition seeking relief by deposit of the amount was filed only after the revision petition was dismissed. The conduct of defendant no. 1 shows that there was no 'readiness to pay' on its part and the filing of the inter pleader suit was a mere subterfuge to avoid payment of rent to the plaintiffs and intended to harass them. The petition seeking relief by deposit of the amount was filed only after the revision petition was dismissed. The conduct of defendant no. 1 shows that there was no 'readiness to pay' on its part and the filing of the inter pleader suit was a mere subterfuge to avoid payment of rent to the plaintiffs and intended to harass them. In Dwarika Prasad Arya v. Om Prakash Mohta (AIR 1967 Calcutta, 612) resort to false pleas and vexatious proceedings to delay payment of the Landlords' dues was held to constitute recalcitrance on the part of the tenant so as to disentitle him to the relief under section] 14 of the Act. In my opinion, in the instant case, filing of the aforesaid suit and the revision, coupled with the several correspondences is a strong circumstances showing that defendant no. 1 wanted to delay payment of rent and harass the plaintiffs and proves recalcitrance on its part. Resort to frivolous and vexatious proceedings disentitles the lessee to claim relief against forfeiture. I am conscious, of the fact that section 114 of the Act contains an equitable provision and is intended to secure payment of rent to the landlord. However, as observed by the Supreme Court in Namdeo Lokman Loddi (supra), in order to claim equity, the party must come with clean hands. The attitude displayed by the defendants' conduct to harass the plaintiffs, the intervening delay and the fall out of the exercise of discretion in favour of the defendants from the view point of the plaintiffs who are bona fide purchasers of the property, are relevant considerations and they all lead to one awl the only conclusion that the discretion should not be exercised in favour of the defendants. According to the plaintiffs, they are businessmen by profession and they have purchased the property investing 4 lacs rupees for the purposes of doing business themselves. In such a situation, the exercise of discretion in favour of the defendants is bound to put the landlord to certain difficulties. As the Supreme Court has observed this fact is also to be taken into consideration and "should be weighed against the tenant". In such a situation, the exercise of discretion in favour of the defendants is bound to put the landlord to certain difficulties. As the Supreme Court has observed this fact is also to be taken into consideration and "should be weighed against the tenant". I, accordingly, hold that the defendant, who is an admitted defaulter for a period of more than 60 days, is liable to its eviction for breach of the term of the lease as contained in clause 4(d) thereof and further that having regard to the attending facts and circumstances, it is not entitled to the equitable relief against forfeiture under section 114 of the Act. 13. Adverting now to the second ground for ejectment, namely, non-payment of municipal taxes, there is no dispute that in terms of the lease the lessee is liable to pay municipal taxes in respect of the premises “as and when it is assessed.” Mr. Sinha for the defendant-appellant submitted that the municipal taxes were being paid regularly though, in the absence of information regarding revised assessment, at the old rates. On 3rd September 1982 defendant no. 1 sent a letter (Exhibit A/5) to the Patna Municipal Corporation seeking necessary details regarding arrears of municipal taxes. The Corporation by its letter dated 15th September 1982 (Exhibit C/19) informed that the rates had been revised with effect from 1st April 1978 and that the total dues by the end of 2nd quarter of 1982-83 (that is upto September 1982) was Rs.3866.99, According to the defendants, a sum of Rs.4504.49 was duly paid being arrears of taxes upto March 1983 vide Exhibits E and E/1. Mr. Thakur Prasad submitted that the letter dated 15th September 1982 (Exhibit C/19) is not reliable and in this connection he placed reliance on the demand register of the municipal corporation (Exhibit 13). Mr. Sinha, on the other hand, pointed out that the amount mentioned in Exhibit C/19 is correct and it finds corroboration from the plaintiffs own document Exhibit 6 which is information chirkut in the prescribed proforma informing the plaintiffs at their request on 10th April 1986 that the amount of arrears upto 31.12.1982 was Rs.4,185.74. It is not in dispute that the revised municipal taxes per quarter during relevant period was Rs.318.75. It is not in dispute that the revised municipal taxes per quarter during relevant period was Rs.318.75. If according to Exhibit 6 the total amount of arrears was Rs.4185.74 inclusive of third quarter i.e. upto December 1982, it would automatically follow that after deducting sum of Rs.318.75 the dues as up to September 1982 would be Rs.3866.99, the amount mentioned in Exhibit C/19. Further if the taxes for the last quarter of 1982-83 i.e. upto March 1983 is added it would work out to be Rs.4185.74, which is the amount actually deposited by Exhibits E and E/1. As a matter of fact, a perusal of the relevant column of Exhibit 13 would also show that sum of Rs.4054.49 being dues upto 31.3.1983 had been paid. It is obvious that the figure mentioned in the relevant column of Exhibit 13, viz. 4054.49' is a slip of pen for the figure 4504.49'. It would, accordingly, appear that the entire municipal taxes stood duly paid during pendency of the suit. 14. Learned counsel for the principal defendants have also argued, that in view of the mandatory provisions of section 114A of the Act, 'the suit, as regards the ground of non- payment of municipal taxes, was not maintainable in the absence of any notice requiring the defendants to remedy the alleged breach. Since this aspect of the matter is common to both the grounds i.e. non-payment of municipal taxes as also user of the premises for an unspecified purpose, the provision may first be noticed:- "114A. Relief against forfeiture in certain other cases.-Where a lease of immovable property has been determined by forfeiture for a breach of an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter, no suit for ejectment shall lie unless and until the lessor has served on the lessee a notice in writing- (a) specifying the particular breach complained of; and (b) if the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the lessee to remedy the breach; and the lessee fails, within a reasonable time from the date of the service of the notice, to remedy the breach, if it is capable of remedy. Nothing in this section shall apply to an express condition against assigning, under letting, parting with the possession, or disposing, of the property leased, or to an express condition relating to forfeiture in case of non-payment of rent." A perusal of the provision would show that in cases of forfeiture for a breach, which are capable of being remedied, excepting those which are specified in the last part of the section, it is obligatory on the part of the lessor to serve a notice in writing specifying the particular breach and requiring the lessee to remedy the same. In the absence of such a notice, the suit for ejectment shall not lie. As regards the particular breach namely, non-payment of municipal taxes, there can be no doubt that the same was/is capable of being remedied. Mr. Thakur Prasad, no doubt, contended that the notice determining tenancy dated 14th August 1982 (Exhibit 2/A) fulfilled the requirements of this section but a perusal of the notice shows that all that has been said therein is to point out the breaches saying further that on account thereof the tenancy was being determined 30 days after receipt of the notice. As the section provides, what the lessor has to say, besides specifying the breaches is to further ask the lessee to remedy the breach, if it is capable of remedied, and only if the lessee fails within a reasonable time to remedy the same, that a suit can lie. No opportunity as envisaged under clause (b) of the said section requiring the defendants to pay the arrears of municipal taxes was given. In such a situation, even if it be assumed, without holding so, that the full amount of the arrears of municipal taxes had not been paid, as contended on behalf of the plaintiffs, the suit has to fail as regards the ground of non-payment of municipal taxes is concerned. I, accordingly, hold that the plaintiffs are not entitled to ejectment on the ground of the particular breach, namely, non-payment of municipal taxes in terms of clause 2 (c) of the lease deed and the finding of the trial court in this regard is not in accordance with law. 15. I, accordingly, hold that the plaintiffs are not entitled to ejectment on the ground of the particular breach, namely, non-payment of municipal taxes in terms of clause 2 (c) of the lease deed and the finding of the trial court in this regard is not in accordance with law. 15. The third ground on which ejectment has been claimed is that the premises are being used for the business in sale of scooters which is not provided for in the lease deed and therefore, the defendants have contavened the express covenant of the deed. The relevant part occurring in clause 1 of the deed is in these terms:- "...... to install, erect and maintain in and upon the said piece of land roadways and pathways and underground petrol' tanks and shelter for an attendant and any other building, erection or equipment whether of a permanent or temporary nature for the purpose of storing, selling or otherwise carrying on trade in petrol, petroleum products, oil and kindred motor accessories and any other trade or business that can conveniently be carried on therewith......" Use of the part of the premises for carrying on the business of sale of 'Vijay Scooters' is admitted. The question for consideration, therefore, is whether the aforesaid business can be carried on within the express covenants of the lease and, to be precise, whether the expression 'and any other trade or business that can conveniently be carried on therewith' would cover with in its fold the said business so as to be in conformity with the covenants of the deed. Learned counsel for the defendants submitted that in terms of the lease deed under clause 4(a), the lessee was at liberty to under-let the demised premise or any part thereof to any local dealer or Agent for uses for all or any of the purposes aforesaid without any consent of the lessors. It was submitted that the business in the sale of Vijay Scooters was being carried on for a long prior to the sale of property to the plaintiffs without any demur by the proforma defendants. It was also submitted that the aforesaid expression 'any other trade or business' would extend to any other kind of business having nexus with trade in petroleum products. Learned counsel pointed out that the word •therewith' has different meanings and one of the meanings is in addition to that. It was also submitted that the aforesaid expression 'any other trade or business' would extend to any other kind of business having nexus with trade in petroleum products. Learned counsel pointed out that the word •therewith' has different meanings and one of the meanings is in addition to that. My attention in this connection was drawn to the New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary 1987 Edition and the Random House Dictionary of English Language (Unabridged Edn. 1983) wherein the word 'therewith' has been defined in the following manner, respectively, (i) immediately after that, with this, that or it, in addition to that, (ii) with that, in addition to that, falling upon that thereupon. 16. It is a settled rule of interpretation that where a particular word has got more than one meaning the one which fits in the context has to be preferred. As noticed above the purpose for which the property was demised to the erstwhile Caltex (India) Limited was for storage, sale or otherwise carrying on trade in petrol, petroleum products, oil and kindred motor accessories. The word 'therewith' occurring in the clause 'or any other trade or business that can conveniently be carried on therewith" has to be interpreted to mean ejusdem generis or 'of the same kind or nature'. In other words, the lessee is permitted to do any other trade or business that can be carried on with petrol, petroleum products, oil and kindred motor accessories. Merely because petrol is used in driving scooter on road does not mean that it is of the same kind or nature, as vainly suggested by the counsel. It is a common knowledge that there are many by-products of petrol or petroleum products which are sold at petrol outlets. The expression 'any other trade or business', therefore, would include only such products, which are related to petroleum products. That, in my opinion, would be a reasonable interpretation. Mr. It is a common knowledge that there are many by-products of petrol or petroleum products which are sold at petrol outlets. The expression 'any other trade or business', therefore, would include only such products, which are related to petroleum products. That, in my opinion, would be a reasonable interpretation. Mr. Thakur Prasad, in this connection rightly pointed out that clause 1 of the deed, extracted above in the nature of the 'premises' of the deed and so far as the actual terms and conditions, which bind the lessee, are concerned, they are to be found in clause 2 and therein, while stating the purpose for which the premises can be used by the lessee, although the whole of the aforementioned (quoted) clause has been literally recited, the expression, "and any other trade or business that can be conveniently carried on therewith" is conspicuously absent. Learned counsel, accordingly, submitted that the aforesaid expression as occurring in clause 1 must be held to be redundant so far as the terms and conditions (covenant) binding the lessees are concerned. The plaintiffs' case that the use of the land for the aforesaid purpose was beyond the express covenants of the deed and amounts to breach of the terms appears to be correct. 17. The next question for consideration is whether the defendants are entitled to the relief against forfeiture in terms of section 114A of the Act or not. Learned counsel for the defendants in this connection submitted that the suit as regards the particular breach, must fail in the absence of any notice not only specifying the breach but also requiring the defendants to remedy the same. It was suggested that had notice to that effect been given, the particular breach could have been remedied within reasonable time. The question arising for consideration on the aforesaid submission, therefore, is whether the particular breach was capable of remedy or not, because so far as 'specifying the particular breach' in terms of clause (a) is concerned, I am satisfied that the notices Exhibits 2 and 2/A did specify that part of the premises were being used for purpose beyond the terms and conditions and constituted a breach of the covenant. There can be no two opinions that certain breaches by their very nature are Irremediable. There can be no two opinions that certain breaches by their very nature are Irremediable. Where the property has been sublet and the sub-lessee commits a breach, although with the consent of the lessee, can it be said that such a breach can be remedied merely at the instance of the lessor requiring the lessee to do so ? It is difficult to accept the argument that if notice in terms of section 114A had been given to defendant no. I requiring him to remedy the breach it could have asked defendant no. 2 to stop the business or vacate the premises and defendant no. 2 would have readily obliged. No doubt, defendant no. 1 could have stopped supply of its own products to defendant no. 2 but that could not have resulted in remedying the breach Admittedly, defendant no. 2 is carrying on the business of sale of scooter by virtue of an agreement with Scooters India Ltd. Mere stoppage of supply by defendant no. 1 of its own products could hardly have deterred defendant no. 2 from carrying on the aforesaid business which involves its (defendant no. 2) own obligations to the Scooters India Ltd., its principals. The agreement between defendants 1 and 2 has not been brought on record, but Mahabir Prasad Bidasaria, farther of defendant no. 2 as D.W. 7 has stated in his evidence that there is relationship of seller and purchaser between defendant nos. 1 and 2 in respect of the products of defendant no. 1, and so far as other business activities being carried on by defendant on the premises are concerned, it is not accountable to defendant no. 1. The plea that the particular breach could have been remedied, had only notice to that effect been given by the 'plaintiffs therefore, appears to be a lame excuse. The last part of section 114A excludes the application of the main provision in cases where the property, in breach of an express condition, has been assigned, under-let or is in possession of a third party or has been disposed of and, therefore, in either situation, the lessee is not in possession, the reason being that right, of third parties have interned rendering the breach irremediable by the lessee except by taking recourse to any legal proceedings. If for remedy of the particular breach, resort to some legal proceeding may become necessary, such a breach cannot be said to be capable of remedy within the meaning of section 114A. Although the instant case is not a case of breach of any such express condition as such, the property being in possession of defendant no. 2 as dealer, on the same principle, the breach cannot be said to be capable of remedy by the lessee defendant no. 1. 18. Two more aspects, in this connection may also be noticed. One is the averment made by defendant no. 1 in paragraph 12 of the written statement, the relevant part of which reads :- "As a matter of fact M/s Bidasaria Auto Service who is defendant no. 2 is a dealer of its principal i.e. of defendant no. 1 M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd." The aforesaid plea of the defendant no. 1 shows that defendant no. 2 being only a dealer of defendant no. 1, could have, in terms of the agreement (not brought on record), sold the products of defendant no. 1 only. If defendant no. 2 has entered into an independent agreement with Scooters India Limited and is carrying on the business of sale of Vijay Scooters as their dealer, it can be said that, that is beyond not only the terms and conditions of the lease deed between the proforma defendant and Caltex India Ltd. i.e. predecessor-in-interest of defendant no. 1 but also beyond the scope of the agreement between defendant nos. 1 and 2. The second aspect is that having regard to the objects for which M/s Caltex (India) Limited and the Caltex Oil Refining (India) Ltd. were taken over by the Caltex Act, namely, to implement the State policy of progressively securing the ownership and control of the petroleum products in the State and to vest it in the State to sub-serve the common good', it is difficult to appreciate if even defendant no. 1, had itself continued to be in actual occupation of the premises, could have carded on the business of sale of Vijay Scooter. If the principal i.e., defendant no. 1, had itself continued to be in actual occupation of the premises, could have carded on the business of sale of Vijay Scooter. If the principal i.e., defendant no. 1 as the successor-in-interest of Caltex (India) Ltd. could not have done the business by itself, having regard to the aims and objects of the take over as also the provisions of the Caltex Act, it would be difficult to hold that its agent namely, defendant no. 2 could do it. The agent cannot be said to possess better rights than its principal. I, accordingly, hold that the use of the part of the premises for carrying on business of sale of Vijay Scooters etc. by defendant no. 2 amounts to breach of the condition of the lease making the defendants liable to forfeiture of the lease and their ejectment from the premises. I further hold that the particular breach being not capable of remedy, they are not entitled to the relief against forfeiture under section 114A of the Act and, therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to decree for their ejectment on this ground also. 19. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that in any view the suit must fail on the ground of defective notice inasmuch as the notice dated 14th August, 1982 determining tenancy (Exhibit 2/A) is not in conformity with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The relevant part of the notice reads as follows :- "That I, hereby on behalf of my aforesaid clients, determine your tenancy thirty days after the receipt of this notice and require you to deliver vacant possession of the leasehold premises in your occupation fully detailed above on the grounds enumerated above by 30.9.82..." According to learned counsel, in terms of section 106 of the Act a lessee is entitled to notice 'expiring with the end of a month of a tenancy'. Defendant no. 1, according to him, was entitled to stay on in the premises till 30th September 1982 and the plaintiffs (lessors) were entitled to its possession only from 1st October 1982. There is no dispute that 30 days' time had been given to defendant no. 1. The only objection is in regard to use of the expression 'by 30.9.82'. 20. 1, according to him, was entitled to stay on in the premises till 30th September 1982 and the plaintiffs (lessors) were entitled to its possession only from 1st October 1982. There is no dispute that 30 days' time had been given to defendant no. 1. The only objection is in regard to use of the expression 'by 30.9.82'. 20. In Eastaugh v. Macpherson, (1954) 3 All E.R. 214 it was held 'by the date' means 'on or before the date' and not 'before the date' and a notice calling upon the tenant to vacate by the last date the tenancy was to be terminated, was valid. The aforesaid decision has been cited and followed by this Court in B.P. Saraogi v. S.N. Rohtagi (1974 BLJR 657) in which the notice had called upon the tenant to vacate the house by 31st of July 1961. It was held that the notice to quit cannot be' held to be invalid merely because the word 'by' has been used for the word 'on' in it. Again in Baijnath Pandit v. Smt. Narvada Devi Kejriwal (AIR 1973 Patna 286) the notice had stated "to kindly vacate the premises occupied by you on or before 31st January 1965". After referring to the well known treatise on the Law of Landlord and Tenant by Hill and Redman, Halsbury's Law of England and several judicial pronouncements, both English and of the High Courts of India, the notice was held to be valid. In Bhagwan Das Agrawala v. Bhagwan Das Kanu (AIR 1977 Supreme Court, 1120) the notice to quit required the tenant to vacate the premises "within the month of October 1962, otherwise he would be treated as tresspasser from 1st November 1962", While considering the validity of such notice their Lordships made the following observations while laying down the rule of interpretation of notice determining tenancy: "Now, it is settled law that a notice to quit must be construed not with a desire to find faults in it, which would render it defective, but it must be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat. "The validity of a notice to quit", as pointed out by Lord Justice Lindley, D.J. in Sidebotham v. Hollan, "ought not to turn on the splitting of a straw". "The validity of a notice to quit", as pointed out by Lord Justice Lindley, D.J. in Sidebotham v. Hollan, "ought not to turn on the splitting of a straw". It must not be read in a hyper-critical manner, nor must its interpretation be affected by pedagogic pendatism or over refined subtlety, but it must be construed in a common sense way." The notice was he1d to be valid determining the tenancy with effect from mid-night of 31st October 1962. In view of the aforementioned clear and authoritative binding pronouncements it has to be held that the' hair splitting' submission of the learned counsel is nothing but trying to make distinction between 'tweedledum and tweedledee' which really does not exist. I, accordingly, hold that the notice Exhibit 2/A determining tenancy was valid in law. 21. It was lastly submitted on behalf of the appellant that in terms of section 7 (3) of the Caltex Act, it is entitled to renewal of the lease, on the same terms and conditions as in the lease deed in question i.e. for another term of 20 years after the date of expiry i.e. 1st July 1985 with option of further renewal. Section 7 (3) of the Caltex Act says: "On the expiry of the term of any lease...... such lease... ...if So desired by the Central Government, be renewed... ... so far as may be, on the same terms and conditions on which the lease... ...was originally granted......" In my opinion, it is not necessary to refer to the affidavit and the reply affidavit filed in this regard on behalf of plaintiff-respondents and the appellant, respectively, after the close of the arguments, in view of the finding that the lease stood determined on 30th September 1982. Rights, if any, flow from the statute. Section 7 (3) entitled the defendant no. 1, even if it is assumed that it was competent to do so, to ask for renewal 'on expiry of the term of the lease' i.e. 30th June 1985. Lease was admittedly determinable for bleach of any of the terms of the lease even prior to expiry of the period. If the lease was validly determined with effect from 1st October 1982, there is no question of exercise of right of renewal under section 7 (3). This contention has thus no substance and is rejected. 22. Mr. Mazumdar on behalf of defendant no. If the lease was validly determined with effect from 1st October 1982, there is no question of exercise of right of renewal under section 7 (3). This contention has thus no substance and is rejected. 22. Mr. Mazumdar on behalf of defendant no. 2 respondent no. 13 pointed out the trial court has erred in passing a decree for arrears of rent and damages against the said defendant. Mr. Thakur Prasad fairly conceded that part of the decree may be modified. It is, accordingly done so. Mr. Mazumdar also, though half heartedly, brought to my notice certain errors of record in the judgment. They are too minor to deserve any mention in this judgment. 23. On the basis of the discussions and for the reasons stated above, the plaintiffs are held entitled to decree of ejectment against the principal defendants but on only two grounds, namely, non-payment of rent and use of the permises in breach of the terms of the lease. They are, however, not entitled to seek ejectment on the ground of non-payment of municipal taxes. The plaintiffs are further held entitled to decree for arrears of rent, damages and mesne profits, as decreed by the trial court, but only against defendant no. 1. Subject to these modifications in the judgment and decree, this appeal is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.