Goutam Chakraborty v. Central Bank of India — 1991 DIGILAW 486 (CAL)

JUDGMENT These two matters have been taken up for hearing analogously as the issues involved in both the matters are the same and arise out of same set of facts. 2. The petitioners in both the matters had registered their names with the Employment Exchange and on the request of the Central Bank of India, hereinafter referred to as the “Bank”, their names were forwarded by the local Employment Exchange to the Bank, for the purpose of recruitment of subordinate staff in the said Bank. The petitioners belonged both to the general category as well as the scheduled caste category. 3. The petitioners were directed to appear for a written test on 9th February, 1986, for recruitment of sub-staff in the West Bengal region. The petitioners were successful in the written lest and they were informed as such by the Chief Manager, Personnel of the Bank, by his letter dated 11th August, 1986. According to the petitioners, identical letters were sent to all the petitioners. A copy of the letter addressed to the petitioner No. 1 in Civil Order No. 8281(W) of 1989, has been made Annexure "C" to the said writ petition. Besides being informed of their success in the written test, by the said letter, the petitioners were also informed that an interview of the successful candidates would be conducted, and those found successful in the interview, would be absorbed in the Bank against clear vacancies. According to the petitioners, they were also successful in the oral interview and a panel was prepared by the Bank for making appointments to the post of sub-staff against clear vacancies, in which their names were duly included, some in the Scheduled Caste category and the others in the general category. 4. The grievance of the petitioners is that despite the fact that they were all successful in both the written test and the oral interview and their names were duly empanelled for appointment as sub-staff in the Bank, their cases have not been considered for appointment against the clear vacancies. According to the petitioners, some of the successful candidates, whose names had also been empanelled after the oral interview, have already been given appointment, and the petitioners were wailing their turn as per their position in the panel. According to the petitioners, some of the successful candidates, whose names had also been empanelled after the oral interview, have already been given appointment, and the petitioners were wailing their turn as per their position in the panel. However, since no steps were taken for their appointment even after about 2½ years, they made representations to the Chief Manager, Personnel, of the Bank, but they received no reply to their representation. It is the petitioners further case that on 6th October, 1988, without assigning any reason, the Chief Manager, Personnel, of the Bank, made a recommendation to the Regional Office, Calcutta South, for cancellation of the aforesaid panel prepared on the basis of the written test held on 9th February, 1986, and the oral interview held thereafter. 5. Aggrieved by such abrupt cancellation of the panel, without assigning any reason for the same, and without giving them an opportunity of hearing, the petitioners have filed the instant writ applications challenging the cancellation of the panel and praying for a direction on the Bank to continue recruitment of sub-staff from the said panel. 6. Appearing for the petitioners in Civil Order No. 8281(W) of 1989, Mr. K.L. Roy, learned Advocate, submitted that the cancellation of the panel, without assigning any reason therefore, was highly arbitrary and illegal and in complete violation of all the canons of natural justice and fair play. Mr. Roy also submitted that having appointed a number of persons from the said panel, the respondents had acted in a discriminatory manner in flagrant violation of Article 16 of the Constitution, in canceling the said panel. Mr. Roy submitted that the panel ought not to have been cancelled without giving the petitioners, whose names bad been duly empanelled, an opportunity of bearing, Mr. Roy submitted that since the cancellation of the panel gave rise to civil consequence, the petitioners were entitled to be heard before such cancellation was effected. 7. Mr. Roy further submitted that the respondents had adopted double standards by appointing 28 candidates in the general category from the panel in question and some other candidates from the Scheduled Caste category, while denying appointment to the petitioners, although, they had an equal right to be appointed along with those who had actually been given appointment. Mr. 7. Mr. Roy further submitted that the respondents had adopted double standards by appointing 28 candidates in the general category from the panel in question and some other candidates from the Scheduled Caste category, while denying appointment to the petitioners, although, they had an equal right to be appointed along with those who had actually been given appointment. Mr. Roy submitted that the persons who had been given appointment from the said panel, were continuing to work and their services had not been disrupted despite cancellation of the said panel. 8. Mr. Roy further submitted that having held out a promise of appointment, by including their names in the panel, the Bank could not now back track from its decision and direct that the panel be cancelled. In this connection, Mr. Roy also submitted that the stand taken in the Affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the Bank was wholly illegal, besides being unfair, since while taking a decision, on the one hand, to cancel the panel, the respondent Bank had made a requisition to the Director, Directorate of Employment Exchange, West Bengal, on 14th February, 1989, stating that it had been decided to prepare a panel of 125 candidates for recruitment of subordinated staff in the Bank. Mr. Roy submitted that while, on the one hand, the Bank had taken steps to cancel the existing panel, on the other, a fresh requisition had been made for preparing a fresh panel of 125 candidates. Mr. Roy submitted that if the Bank did not have genuine need for appointment of subordinate staff, there could be no earthly reason for making a requisition to the Employment Exchange authorities for sending the names of fresh candidates so that a fresh panel of 125 persons could be prepared for appointment to the self same post for which the earlier panel had been prepared, namely, that of subordinate staff in the Bank. 9. Apart from the above, Mr. Roy also alleged that even after the panel had been cancelled, the Bank authorities bad given appointment from the said panel, which would show that not only was the panel being given effect to but that the Bank was adopting a pick and choose method, which was highly discriminatory and in complete violation of the principles enshrined in Article 16 of the Constitution. 10. Mr. 10. Mr. Roy also disputed the contention of the Bank that after 1st January, 1987, no further appointments had been made from the said panel, because it had been detected that the original Employment Exchange cards of some of the candidates whose names had been empanelled and who were given appointments, had either been forged or were fake. Mr. Roy submitted that even after 1st January, 1987, as many as 15 persons had been appointed in the general category and 27 persons in the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes category out of the said panel. In fact, in view of such submissions of Mr. Roy at the time of hearing, I had given the Bank an opportunity to file a supplementary affidavit to refute such claim of the petitioners as contained in paragraph 5 of the Affidavit-in-Reply filed on behalf of the petitioners in Civil Order No. 8281(W) of 1989. In the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the Bank, the facts asserted on behalf of the petitioners were generally admitted, although, an attempt was made to justify the same. Mr. Roy submitted that even after the fraud had been detected, the panel had been allowed to continue for two years and appointments were made there from even after the panel had purportedly been cancelled. 11. Mr. Roy submitted that vacancies to be filled up were to be compulsorily notified under the provisions of the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959. Mr. Roy submitted that the same had not been done and, on the other hand, after cancellation of the panel, a fresh requisition had been made for further candidates from the Employment Exchange, excluding the names of the petitioner, for preparation of a fresh panel. This had created an anomalous situation, since, on the one hand, the petitioners who were successful, had been denied appointment, and, on the other hand, they were kept outside the zone of consideration by the Bank while taking steps to prepare a fresh panel. The petitioner were, therefore, totally eliminated from consideration for appointment, despite having succeeded earlier on, both in the written test as well as in the oral interview. Mr. Roy submitted that some of the candidates who had been empanelled in 1986 had crossed the age bar during this period, and were not therefore, eligible for being considered for fresh appointment. Mr. Mr. Roy submitted that some of the candidates who had been empanelled in 1986 had crossed the age bar during this period, and were not therefore, eligible for being considered for fresh appointment. Mr. Roy submitted that no fresh panel should be allowed to be prepared till such time as the existing panel, which was sought to be arbitrarily cancelled, was exhausted. 12. Mr. Roy submitted that at several stages the Bank had adopted double standards and the order canceling the panel prepared on the basis of the written test held on 9th February, 1986, and the subsequent oral interview should be quashed, and the Bank should be directed to make further recruitment of sub-staff from the panel prepared on 11th September, 1986. 13. In support of his aforesaid contentions, Mr. Roy first relied upon a Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of (1) Ashoka Roy and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., reported in 1989(2) Calcutta Law times at page 139. In the said case, this Court was considering the absorption of candidates as primary teachers from outside the panel which had been prepared in 1981 and had been cancelled in 1985. Some of the petitioners in the said case had moved a writ application and this Court had directed the respondents therein to absorb the said petitioners. Despite such directions, appointments were made not from the said panel but from outside the said panel. In the said case, this Court found that the State respondents had been giving appointments whimsically on a pick and choose basil from the panel of 1981, which according to the State respondents was no longer valid. Even candidates who had not been empanelled had been appointed. Disapproving of such action, this Court held that such action of the State Respondents violated the equality clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution. This Court directed the State respondents to appoint primary school teachers from the panel of 1981, till such time as all the writ petitioners in the said case were absorbed. This Court also held that age bar, if any, would not stand in the way of appointment of the writ petitioners and would be treated as waived. Mr. This Court directed the State respondents to appoint primary school teachers from the panel of 1981, till such time as all the writ petitioners in the said case were absorbed. This Court also held that age bar, if any, would not stand in the way of appointment of the writ petitioners and would be treated as waived. Mr. Roy submitted that the petitioners in the two instant writ applications were on a more or less similar footing with the petitioners in the aforesaid case involving the appointment of primary teachers and that the Bank authorities should not be allowed to prepare any fresh panel for appointment to the post of sub-staff till such time as the panel prepared in 1986 was exhausted. 14. The next case cited by Mr., Roy is another Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of (2) Amitava Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal and others, reported in 1991(1) Calcutta High Court Notes, at page 104. In the said case, the petitioner had sought to rely on the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. The petitioner had been informed in writing by the Director of West Bengal Fire Services that he had been selected for employment in the Directorate of West Bengal Fire Services, subject to verification of his antecedents by the police authorities. The grievance of the petitioner was that, although, the police verification bad gone in his favour, he had not been given appointment, as promised. According to the respondents, after another test and interview, a panel had been prepared strictly on merit basis and that appointments were given from time to time strictly from amongst those candidates whose names had been included in the panel. It was further contended on behalf of the respondents that, although, the petitioner's name had been included in the panel, he had not been given any appointment since he had obtained very low marks in the test, and, in any event, the inclusion of a name in the panel is not a guarantee for appointment and the petitioner could have no justification for demanding such appointment. The petitioner having been offered appointment, subject to police verification of his antecedents, it was held by this Court that the respondents could not back track from such a stand and adopt a different stand altogether, in view of the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. 15. The petitioner having been offered appointment, subject to police verification of his antecedents, it was held by this Court that the respondents could not back track from such a stand and adopt a different stand altogether, in view of the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. 15. The next case referred to by Mr., Roy is another Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of (3) Bikash Lal Dey and Another v. State of West Bengal; and Others, reported in 1990(1) Calcutta High Court Notes, at page 461. The said case vas cited by Mr. Roy is support of his contention that an employer was required to notify vacancies in his establishment under the provisions of the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959. In the said case this Court held that such notification having been made for filling up vacancies through the Employment Exchange, and the Employment Exchange having sent the names on the basis of records, and the authorities concerned having completed the necessary list wherein the petitioners who were successful had been included, it could not be said at a subsequent stage that there was an error in the records relating to seniority and it would be improper to withhold appointment to the petitioners on the basis of allegations of fraud on the records of the Employment Exchange in which the petitioners could not be involved. 16. In support of his contention that the panel could not be cancelled without giving the petitioners an opportunity of hearing, Mr. Roy relied on the following cases :- (4) Mohinder Singh Gill and Another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others reported in AIR 1978 SC at page 851. (5) M/s. Fedco (P) Ltd. and Another v. S.N. Bilgrami and Others, reported in AIR 1960 SC at page 415. (6) S. Govindaraju, v. Karnataka S.R.T.C. and Another, reported in 1986(3) SCC at page 173. 17. In the first case, while considering the other questions arising in the said case, the Supreme Court was also considering the question as to whether before the civil rights of a citizen were sought to be adversely affected, he had any right of being heard. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that where a persons civil right was adversely affected, he had a right to notice and to be heard, the quantum and quality being conditioned by the concatenation of circumstances. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that where a persons civil right was adversely affected, he had a right to notice and to be heard, the quantum and quality being conditioned by the concatenation of circumstances. In the second case, the Supreme Court, while considering the question of natural justice, held that where a licence was being sought to be cancelled on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud, the person holding the licence was entitled to an opportunity of being heard and that such opportunity must be reasonable. In the last case, while considering the question involving removal of a candidate's name from the select list for appointment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows :- "Once a candidate is selected and his name is included in the select list for appointment in accordance with the regulations he gets a right to be considered for appointment as and when vacancy arises. On the removal of his name from the select list serious consequences entail as he forfeits his right to employment in future. In such a situation even though the regulations do not stipulate for affording any opportunity to the employee, the principles of natural justice would be attracted and the employee would be entitled to the bare minimal requirement of natural justice of an opportunity of explanation. Therefore, before the services of an employee are terminated, resulting in forfeiture of his right to be considered for employment, opportunity of explanation must be afforded to the employee concerned. In the present case the appellant was not afforded any opportunity of explanation before the issue of the impugned order. Consequently the order is rendered null and void being inconsistent with the principles of natural justice and is liable to be set aside". 18. Appearing for the petitioners in Civil Order No. 12979(W) of 1989, Mr. Kalyan Bondopadhyay, learned Advocate, adopted Mr. Roy's arguments. Mr. Bandopadhyay, however, emphatically reiterated the submission of Mr. Roy that the panel of 1986 could not be cancelled without giving the petitioners, whose names had been included in the said panel, an opportunity of being heard. Mr. 18. Appearing for the petitioners in Civil Order No. 12979(W) of 1989, Mr. Kalyan Bondopadhyay, learned Advocate, adopted Mr. Roy's arguments. Mr. Bandopadhyay, however, emphatically reiterated the submission of Mr. Roy that the panel of 1986 could not be cancelled without giving the petitioners, whose names had been included in the said panel, an opportunity of being heard. Mr. Bondopadhyay also submitted that the vacancies, for which a subsequent requisition had been made by the bank authorities for creation of a fresh panel of 125 candidates, not having been notified in accordance with the provisions of the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959, the requisition itself was bad and no steps could be taken by the Bank on the basis thereof. Mr., Bondopadhyay further submitted that by cancelling the panel, after having made several appointments therefrom, the Bank authorities had discriminated against the petitioners and had acted in violation of the provisions of Article, 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Mr. Bondopadhyay submitted that as a result of cancellation of the panel, many of the candidates who had been empanelled, had crossed the age bar, and would not, therefore, be eligible to be considered for appointment afresh. This would have the effect of debarring such candidates from future employment, despite their success in the written test and interview. 19. Mr. Bondopadhyay submitted that the anomalous and unfair situation created as a result of the Bank’s decision to cancel the panel, warranted the Court's interference, so that the same could be remedied in the light of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 20. Mr. R.N. Majumdar, appearing for the Bank and the Bank authorities submitted that, though, initially it had not been the intention of the Bank to cancel the panel, as would be evident from the appointments made therefrom, the Bank had no alternative but to cancel the panel when it was discovered that large-scale fraud had been perpetrated in the matter of forwarding of names by the local Employment Exchanges. Mr. Majumdar submitted that the Bank had requested 19 local Employment Exchanges to send lists of suitable candidates for appointment as sub-staff in the Bank. The Bank received 32 lists from the said 19 Employment Exchanges containing 528 names. Mr. Majumdar submitted that the Bank had requested 19 local Employment Exchanges to send lists of suitable candidates for appointment as sub-staff in the Bank. The Bank received 32 lists from the said 19 Employment Exchanges containing 528 names. All the 528 persons, whose names had been included in the said 32 lists, were called for interview, and out of them, 387 candidates were selected for empanelment. Initially, 36 candidates were given appointment and at the time of their appointment, their original Employment Exchange Registration cards were collected from them and were sent for verification to the respective Employment Exchanges which were said to have issued the same. At the time of verification it transpired that 13 of the 36 cards were forged or fake. The Bank thereupon sent all the 32 lists to the respective Employment Exchanges, and, thereafter, it transpired that out of the 32 lists 5 lists, containing 133 names and purported to have been forwarded by 5 Employment Exchanges, were forged. By reason of the fraud detected, the services of the 13 persons holding fake cards were terminated on 20th March, 1987. According to the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed on behalf of the Bank, after the initial appointments, no further appointments were made from the panel after 1st January, 1987, in view of the fraud detected. 21. As mentioned hereinbefore, during the course of the hearing, the Bank was given an opportunity of affirming a supplementary affidavit, and in the said supplementary affidavit the aforesaid stand was to some extent modified in the light of the facts mentioned therein. 22. In the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the Bank it was admitted that altogether 79 subordinate staff had been recruited from the 1986 panel in different categories, such as, general category, physically handicapped category and the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes category, in between the period from 1st Jan, 1987, to 1st Nov., 1988. It is, therefore, apparent that apart from the 36 persons who had been initially appointed, 43 other persons were given appointment from the said panel even as late as on 1st Nov., 1988. Details of the 79 persons appointed have been given in the supplementary affidavit. It is, therefore, apparent that apart from the 36 persons who had been initially appointed, 43 other persons were given appointment from the said panel even as late as on 1st Nov., 1988. Details of the 79 persons appointed have been given in the supplementary affidavit. Of course, an attempt has been made to justify the appointments made after the initial 36 persons were appointed, by saying that the persons who had been appointed were either in a higher up position in the panel than the writ petitioners, or that a separate panel had been prepared for physically handicapped persons. Of the said 79 persons, 26 persons had been appointed in the general category, 35 persons had been appointed in the Scheduled Caste category, and 12 persons had been appointed in the Scheduled Tribe category. As stated hereinbefore, the services of 13 persons were terminated after it was detected that fraud bad been practised at the time their names were purportedly sent by the local Employment Exchanges. 23. Initially, it had been contended on behalf of the Bank that in terms of the requisition made in 1985-86 to the local Employment Exchanges, it had been shown that the vacancies which existed in 1985 were to be filled up within a period of one year. It had been sought to be argued that the presumption arising therefrom was that the life of the panel was to be for one year only. In the supplementary affidavit, however, a stand has been taken that the normal life of a panel remains valid for a period of 2 years only, and that consequently, the petitioners could have no grievance as the panel was prepared on 11th September, 1986, and was cancelled on 6th October, 1988, that is after a period of 2 years, the last appointment from the panel having been given on 10th June, 1988. 24. On behalf of the Bank it was also submitted that no promise had been held out to the writ petitioners, or to the persons whose names had been empanelled, that they would definitely be given appointment consequent to their empanelment after the written test and oral interview. It was submitted that the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel had no manner of application in the facts of the present case. It was submitted that the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel had no manner of application in the facts of the present case. Merely because the names of the writ petitioners had been empanelled for the purpose of recruitment, it did not mean that employment was guaranteed to them or that a promise of employment had been held out to them. Mr. Majumdar submitted that in all cases involving the preparation of a panel, the number of names required is always greater that the actual vacancies and the panel which is ultimately prepared contains more names than the actual vacancies, so that in the event a person who is selected declines to accept the post, the next person can be appointed in his place. Mr. Majumdar submitted that mere empanelment did not guarantee employment and it could not be contended that any promise had been extended by the Bank authorities to the empanelled candidates that they would all be given appointment in the post for which they had been empanelled. Mr. Majumdar submitted that no panel was actually prepared and that the candidates were chosen for appointments in order of merit. There was nothing on record to show that the petitioners had been superseded in the matter of appointment and that persons whose positions were below that of the petitioners had been given appointment. 25. In support of aforesaid contention, Mr. Majumdar relied on the following cases :- (7) State of U.P. and Another v. Ram Gopal Sukla, reported in AIR 1981 SC at page 1041. (8) Surendra Pal Singh and Others v. State of U.P. and Others, reported in 1990(5) Employer Employee Law Reporter, at page 394. 26. In the first case, the Supreme Court was considering the vires of Rules 7-A and 7-B of the U.P. Promotion by Selection in Consultation with the Public Service Commission (Procedure) Rules 1970, whereby candidates who had been included in the select list of 1966 were to be appointed against substantive vacancies to the post of Tehsildar in preference to any candidate selected in accordance with the provisions of the 1970 Rules, and unless the candidates in the select list of 1966 were exhausted, other eligible candidates were not to be considered for promotion. The Supreme Court held that Rules 7-A and 7-B, which had been introduced from 1972, violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that Rules 7-A and 7-B, which had been introduced from 1972, violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that there appeared to be no rational basis for a departure from the operation of the 1970 Rules envisaged the preparation of a new list every year and for singling out one particular fist for according preferential treatment to the persons whose names were contained therein. The Supreme Court further observed that the Rules which contemplated that unless the list of persons selected earlier is exhausted no other persons can be selected, was obviously unjust as it deprived other persons in the same situation of the opportunity of being considered for promotion. 27. In the second case, the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that as all vacancies were required to be notified and a selection for recruitment was to be made every year, the select list prepared under Rule 15 of the Subordinate Officers, Ministerial Staff (Direct Recruitment) Rules, 1975, could not last for more than a year. The select list would only continue for one year for which the vacancies were notified and after a period of one year, the list did not survive. 28. I have carefully considered the facts relating to the writ applications before me, which are identical in nature, as also the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, and I find it difficult to appreciate the two different stands taken by the Bank in support of its decision to cancel the panel prepared on 11th September, 1986. Initially, it was contended on behalf of the Bank that since fraud had been detected in respect of the lists of candidates sent by the local Employment Exchanges, it had been decided not to give any further appointments from the said panel. At the first instance 36 candidates had been appointed from out of the said panel, of which on verification 13 candidates were found to have held fake and/or forged registration cards. From the facts disclosed during the hearing, it appears that the fraud was detected almost immediately after the appointments had been made. While the appointments were made on 1st January, 1987, the services of the 13 candidates were terminated on 20th March, 1987, which means that the fraud was detected soon after their appointments. From the facts disclosed during the hearing, it appears that the fraud was detected almost immediately after the appointments had been made. While the appointments were made on 1st January, 1987, the services of the 13 candidates were terminated on 20th March, 1987, which means that the fraud was detected soon after their appointments. If no further appointments had been given from the panel thereafter, one could have appreciated the stand taken by the Bank that in view of such fraud it had been decided not to give any further appointments from the said panel. 29. Of course, no explanation is forthcoming as to why the Bank waited for about 2 years to cancel the penal, despite detection of the fraud as early as between the months of January, 1987 and March, 1987. If may be mentioned that the panel was sought to be cancelled on 6th October, 1988. After it was pointed out on behalf of the petitioners that the statements made by the Bank in its affidavit-in-opposition to the effect that no appointments had been made from the said panel after 1st January, 1987, were incorrect, the Bank in its supplementary affidavit came out with a different story and admitted that 43 appointments had been made from the panel even after the fraud had been detected. As mentioned in paragraph 14 of the supplementary affidavit affirmed on behalf of the Bank, the panel was prepared on 11th September, 1986, and appointments from the said panel were made till 1st November, 1988. The new plea being sought to be taken by the Bank is that the life of a panel prepared normally remains valid for a period of 2 years and as a result it was decided to cancel the panel after the expiry of 2 years, that is, on 6th October, 1988. Such a stand is not, however, compatible with the earlier stand and the two different stands are inconsistent and irreconcilable. 30. Unfortunately, even the subsequent stand taken on behalf of the Bank is not corroborated by its actions, since, it has been admitted on behalf of the Bank that appointments were made from the panel even till 1st November, 1988, that is after the panel had been cancelled. Whatever be the explanation, it is difficult to understand as to how Mr. Unfortunately, even the subsequent stand taken on behalf of the Bank is not corroborated by its actions, since, it has been admitted on behalf of the Bank that appointments were made from the panel even till 1st November, 1988, that is after the panel had been cancelled. Whatever be the explanation, it is difficult to understand as to how Mr. Swapan Kanti Sarkar, who had been empanelled in the Scheduled Casts category, was recruited by the Bank on 14th October, 1988, after the panel had been cancelled. Not only has the Bank adopted two different stands, but the Bank has adopted double standards in giving appointments to a person from the said panel, even after it had been cancelled. 31. Apart from the above, the Bank has admitted that 5 lists containing 133 names had been found to be forged. There is no reason as to why after discarding the successful candidates from amongst the said 133 candidates, the remaining candidates, whose names had also been empanelled, were not considered for recruitment. That the Bank required further sub-staff cannot be denied in view of the requisition made by the Bank on 14th February, 1989, for creation of a fresh panel of 125 candidates. It is not denied that while making its requisition in 1986, the Bank had not mentioned as to how long the panel to be prepared would remain alive. Even with regard to such question, the Bank has taken two stands. Initially, it was argued that since only the vacancies for 1985 were to be filled up it must be presumed that the life of the panel was made for a period of one year only. In the supplementary affidavit a different stand has been taken to the effect that normally the life of a panel is for two years and that the panel had been cancelled just after the expiry of the period of two years from the date of its preparation. Obviously, this is just a defence being put forward by the Bank to justify its decision to cancel the panel. There is, in fact, nothing to indicate that it was the intention of the Bank that the panel should be alive only for one/two years. In my view, therefore, is cannot be contended that the panel was cancelled, inasmuch as, its life was for a period of two years only. There is, in fact, nothing to indicate that it was the intention of the Bank that the panel should be alive only for one/two years. In my view, therefore, is cannot be contended that the panel was cancelled, inasmuch as, its life was for a period of two years only. In any event, the said submission is obviously an after thought after the Bank realised that in contradiction to its initial stand, appointments had been made from the panel, even after the fraud relating to 133 candidates had been discovered. It is obvious that the subsequent stand taken by the Bank was in effect an attempt to reconcile the fact that appointments had been made from the panal even after 1st January, 1987, in contradiction to its earlier stand that no appointments had been made from the panel after the said date, as the fraud had been detected and it had been decided by the Bank not to give appointments from the said panel, in view of such fraud. 32. While it may be argued that the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel would not apply in the matter of a panel prepared for recruitment, one cannot escape from the fact that the Bank has not taken a consistent stand relating to its decision to cancel the panel. In view of the averments made in the supplementary affidavit, there is no foundation for the initial stand taken by the Bank regarding its decision not to make any further appointments from the panel in view of the fraud detected. The subsequent stand taken by the Bank relating to the life of the panel is obviously an after thought to reconcile the fact that appointments had been made from the panel even after the fraud had been detected. 33. The decisions relied upon on behalf of the Bank do not also come to its aid. In both the two cases, cited on behalf of the Bank, the Rules provided that the life of the panel prepared was to be for one year only. That is not, however, so in the present case. In the said two cases the authorities had decided to extend the life of the panel which had been prepared earlier, in contravention of the existing Rules. That is not, however, so in the present case. In the said two cases the authorities had decided to extend the life of the panel which had been prepared earlier, in contravention of the existing Rules. In the present case there was nothing to show that there was any provision, statutory or otherwise, which provided that the life of the panel was to be only for a period of one/two years. On the other hand, the learned Advocate for the Bank relied on presumption and supposition in submitting that the life of the panel was to be valid for a period of one/two yean only. The facts of the said two decisions relied upon by the Bank were, therefore, different from the facts of the present writ applications and the said decisions are therefore of no help to the respondents. 34. In that view of the matter, and particularly in view of the pre-varicating attitude adopted on behalf of the Bank, it must be held that the cancellation of the panel of 11th September, 1986, was arbitrary and illegal. It should also be kept in mind that the Bank made appointments from the panel, even after the same was purportedly cancelled. Such action on the part of the Bank, which is a public undertaking, cannot but be said to completely contradictory to the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In my view, the Bank’s decision to cancel the panel of 1986 was unfair and arbitrary and the Bank has discriminated against the petitioners and has denied them the equal opportunity contemplated in matters of employment by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 35. Considering the view I have taken, it is not necessary for me to advert to the arguments made and decisions cited on behalf of the writ petitioners. 36. The two writ applications must succeed in view of my aforesaid findings. The decision to cancel the panel prepared on 11th September, 1986, is hereby quashed. The Bank authorities are directed to give appointments to the petitioners in the two writ applications under consideration to the post of subordinate staff from the panel prepared on 11th September, 1988, and only, thereafter, to prepared a fresh panel. The decision to cancel the panel prepared on 11th September, 1986, is hereby quashed. The Bank authorities are directed to give appointments to the petitioners in the two writ applications under consideration to the post of subordinate staff from the panel prepared on 11th September, 1988, and only, thereafter, to prepared a fresh panel. If, however, a fresh panel has been prepared as per the requisition made on 14th February, 1989, and appointment have been made therefrom, the writ petitioners are to be placed above the persons appointed from the subsequent panel for the purpose of computing their seniority. It may be mentioned that on 14th August, 1986, an interim order had been passed in Civil Order No. 8281(W) of 1989, whereby the respondents were given the liberty to prepare the next panel but were directed to keep six posts vacant for the petitioners therein. In the other writ application (C.O. No. 12979(W) of 1989), an interim order had been passed on 2nd November, 1989, whereby appointments made daring the pendency of the writ application were to abide by the result of the writ application. Keeping in mind the said interim orders, it is directed that for purposes of seniority the writ petitioners are to be placed above the persons appointed from the subsequent panel, if prepared, in terms of the liberty given by this Court. The writ applications are, therefore, allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove, but there will be no order as to costs.