JUDGMENT L.M. Ghosh, J.: The respondents 1 and 2 filed an application under s. 29B of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. While the application was being heard, the petitioner, in his revisional application, raised a point that the learned Rent Controller bad no jurisdiction to entertain the application. That was overruled by the learned Controller and after completion of hearing, order for eviction was passed against the petitioner. The petition was filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before this Court for quashing the proceedings before the learned Rent Controller, i.e, the proceedings in Ejectment Case no. 1 of 1989. On the 25th of February, 1991, this Court listed the application for hearing. But no interim order was passed. So, while this revision case was pending before this Court, the learned Rent Controller passed the final order on 8.3.91. It is to be noted that the revisional application, purportedly under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, was filed even before the final order was passed by the Rent Controller, so that, the final order of the Rent Controller is not challenged directly. That, however, does not make any difference because under the proviso to sub-s. (9) of s. 29B of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the High Court may call for the record and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit in order to satisfy itself that an order made by the Controller under the section is according to law. That means, this Court can even call for the record suo motu and pass an appropriate order. Even though the final order was not challenged in the revisional application, the entire matter is before this Court and it can pass such order as it deems fit after scrutiny of the records. We also make it clear that although the application is styled as one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as there is a special provision in S. 29B itself, the Court would be guided by that. The proviso to sub-s (9) of S. 29B does not militate against Article 227 of the Constitution of India so the statutory, provision of the Act will guide the Court. The proviso to sub-s (9) of S. 29B does not militate against Article 227 of the Constitution of India so the statutory, provision of the Act will guide the Court. So, therefore, we would have to examine not only about the maintainability, of the proceedings, as it was urged before the Controller but also the propriety of the final order which was passed after the application was filed. 2. The respondents, who were the applicants before the Rent Controller, made a prayer for an order of eviction on the grounds that the applicant no. 2, Sri Ajit Kumar Bhadury, was a member of the military service since 1963. The applicant no 1, Smt. Sadhana Bhadury, is the wife of the applicant no. 2. The case made out in the application was that Sri Ajit Kumar Bhadury, after joining the army in 1963, retired from the army in 1985. During that course, he was given different ranks. It is also set out that Sri Ajit Kumar Bhadury was transferred to Calcutta by the Ministry of Railways in August, 1988 and he joined the Eastern Railways on the 6th of September, 1988 Before coming to Calcutta, Sri Ajit Kumar Bhadury was posted at New Delhi as Chief Safety Superintendent, Northern-Railway. We further get that while in New Delhi. Sri Bhadury was staying in a quarter allotted by the Railway authorities. The applicant no. 1 is at present residing in the same quarter. A list of the members of the family of the applicant no 1. is given. The applicant no.1, Smt. Bhadury, is the owner of the suit property. It was submitted that the applicant no. 2, on transfer to Calcutta, was not allotted any quarter by the Railway authorities. The applicant no. 2 became liable to pay at penal rate of rent. The railway authorities, as set out in the petition, further directed that if the said quarter be not vacated by April, 1991, then eviction proceedings would be started. Besides, the applicant no. 2 would be retiring from his present position in the Ministry of Railways within September, 1991. So, on the ground of reasonable requirement under s. 13(1)(ff) and on the ground that the applicant no. 2 was a member of the army, the application was filed for eviction. 3. The opposite party in the original application, namely, Sri B.K. Roy, filed a written statement. So, on the ground of reasonable requirement under s. 13(1)(ff) and on the ground that the applicant no. 2 was a member of the army, the application was filed for eviction. 3. The opposite party in the original application, namely, Sri B.K. Roy, filed a written statement. He Submitted that the applicant no 2 was never a regular army officer and he was all along an officer under the Northern Railways who voluntarily joined the Railway Engineering Regiment of the Territorial Army. Other allegations were also denied. 4. A supplementary affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioner in this Court. It was merely contended in the Supplementary Affidavit that Sri Bhadury acted as an officer of the Indian Railways and performed military service in the Territorial Army only occasionally when he was called upon to do so. It was mooted out that his substantive post was that of a Railway Officer and not that of an army officer. It was argued in the supplementary affidavit itself that an employee could not hold substantive posts in the two departments of the Government at the same time. Further, the post in the Territorial Army cannot be a substantive one. The objects and reasons of the Territorial Army Act (T.A. Act) were set out. Mainly, the supplementary affidavit is argumentative in nature. An affidavit in opposition was filed on behalf of the respondents. In paragraph 5(c) it is mentioned that Sri Ajit Kumar Bhadury joined the Indian Railways in 1958 and the Territorial Army in 1963. Then in paragraph 5(d) it is mentioned that while serving, as an officer of the territorial army, the respondent no. 2 had not severed his link with the Indian Railways. At the same time, however, it is sought to be made out that the respondent no. 2 had to discharge administrative job as commanding officer of his battalion while he was at the same time engaged in his job as Railway Officer. 5. These, in short, are the respective contentions of the parties. 6. Mr. Ray, the learned advocate for the petitioner in the revisional application, has submitted that the learned Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the application under s. 29B of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, as be was never a member of the Naval Force, Military or Air Force of the Union of India. 6. Mr. Ray, the learned advocate for the petitioner in the revisional application, has submitted that the learned Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the application under s. 29B of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, as be was never a member of the Naval Force, Military or Air Force of the Union of India. He bas next contended that in any event, the application under s. 29B of the Act is barred by limitation. 7. Mr. Samaddar, the learned advocate for the opposite parties, on the other hand, bas strenuously argued that the respondent no. 2 was a member of the Military Force of India, by virtue of his having been a member of the Territorial Army. 8. At the very outset, we may point out that in this matter, we cannot go into questions of fact. The learned Rent Controller, while disposing of the application, not only decided that he was competent to deal with the application, but also that the respondents here who were the petitioners before the Rent Controller, required the premises reasonably for own use and occupation. For that, he has relied upon the Ext. 4, the certificate granted by authorities concerned. He also relied upon the evidence led by the petitioners before him (the Rent Controller) and pointed out that the opposite party did not produce any evidence in rebuttal. Upon a consideration of all these matters, he reached the conclusion that the petitioners before him (the Rent Controller), reasonably required the suit premises. That aspect of the matter is purely a factual question and we cannot enter into that matter. We have only to consider the legal aspects, namely, whether the petition was barred by limitation and whether the petitioner no. 2 before the Rent Controller, (the respondent no. 2 before this Court) can be considered as having belonged to the Military service. 9. Now coming to the question of limitation, we are of the view that this contention is misconceived. Section 29B does not prescribe any period of limitation for an officer who has already retired. The only period prescribed is relating to an officer who has not yet retired. In case of a serving officer, application can be filed within a period of less than one year; a serving officer cannot apply earlier. Section 29B does not prescribe any period of limitation for an officer who has already retired. The only period prescribed is relating to an officer who has not yet retired. In case of a serving officer, application can be filed within a period of less than one year; a serving officer cannot apply earlier. But when an officer has already retired, there is no limitation prescribed According to the petitioners before the Rent Controller, the petitioner no, 2 retired from the Territorial service in 1985. It is the case of petitioners that the necessity of getting vacant possession of the suit premises arose in 1988 only, after the petitioner no. 2 was transferred to Calcutta from Delhi. The notice of ejectment was served shortly thereafter-on 6.12.88 Eviction case was started in 1989. Thus when according to the petitioners themselves, they did not require the suit premises earlier to 1988, we do not understand how time can be reckoned from 1985. Whether the petition is maintainable otherwise is another question, but undoubtedly, there cannot be any question of limitation because according to the petitioners themselves, cause of action arose in 1988. There is no scope for application of Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The question of limitation does not arise. 10. The essential point is whether the petitioner no. 2, before the Rent Controller, can be considered to have belonged to military service. Evidently, he was not an officer of naval or air force. If he belonged to the military, only then he could be considered as a military officer, referred to in s. 298 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Mr. Samaddar has strenuously argued that as Mr. Bhadury was a member of the Territorial Army, and was granted, different ranks in that army, he should be considered as having been a member of the Indian Army. Mr. Ray, on the other hand, has submitted that the mere fact that Mr. Bhadury was a member of Territorial Army, will not make him a military officer. The position can be resolved after considering closely the two Acts. From the objects and reasons of the Territorial Army Act, 1948, it appears that the main purpose was to provide a second line of defence. Bhadury was a member of Territorial Army, will not make him a military officer. The position can be resolved after considering closely the two Acts. From the objects and reasons of the Territorial Army Act, 1948, it appears that the main purpose was to provide a second line of defence. The different provisions of the Territorial army Act also suggest that the officers and other persons in connection with the territorial army are not required to do military service all the time. Section 4 of the Territorial Army Act specified that the Territorial Army would consist of officers and enrolled persons. Section 2(a) of the Act has defined “Regular Army”. That expression, under the definition clause, means officers and other ranks who, by their commission, terms of enrolment or otherwise are liable to render continuously for a term military service under the Army Act, 1950. Then we may consider the effect of s. 7(3) of the Territorial Army Act. It enacts that every officer or enrolled person shall be liable to perform military service in certain contingencies. That clarifies the position that every officer of the territorial army is not liable to perform military services always but only during certain periods It also makes it clear that territorial army is something different from military service. Only in certain cases and during certain periods, the officers of the Territorial Army can be considered as Army Officers during the temporary periods. Section 9 of the T.A. Act removes all doubts in that respect. It lays down in clear terms that every officer, when doing duties as such officer and other enrolled person when called out or embodied or attached to the regular army shall be subject to the provisions of the Army Act, 1950, and the rules and regulations made thereunder. Clearly, an officer of the Territorial Army will be subject to the Army Act only when doing duty as such officer ; otherwise the use of the expression “when doing duty as such officer” would become meaningless. So it is clear that a member of the territorial army can be considered an army officer only during the period he is called upon to do full time job in the territorial army. An officer may be an officer under the Territorial Army Act, still he would not be considered as an Army Officer all the time. So it is clear that a member of the territorial army can be considered an army officer only during the period he is called upon to do full time job in the territorial army. An officer may be an officer under the Territorial Army Act, still he would not be considered as an Army Officer all the time. This is the clear intention of the Act, when we bear in mind the different provisions of the Territorial Army Act, already referred to. The same conclusion would be reached when we consider the different provisions of the Army Act. Clause (e) of sub-s. 7 of s. 2 of the Army Act, 1950, lays down that officers of Territorial Army, when doing duty as such officers, and enrolled persons of the said army when called out or embodied or attached to any regular forces shall be subject to the Army Act. Here again, it is stressed that the officers of the territorial army when doing army duty, such officers, will be subject to the Army Act. That clearly indicates that the officers of the territorial army are not to be considered as army officers every time but only when doing duty as such officers. If an officer of that category was in tended to be considered as army officer all the time, then there would be no necessity for employing the further expression “when doing duty as such officer”. Again in the definition clause occurring in (XVIII)(b) of S. 3 of the Army Act, it is set out that an officer in the Army means and includes, amongst others an officer holding a commission in the Territorial Army who is for the time being subject to the Army Act. Once again, it is clear that an officer of the Territorial Army is not always subject to the Army Act, but only for some time. All these illustrate amply that an officer of the territorial army is not always to be considered an army or military officer, but only during certain times. If Mr. Bhadury was actually serving in the Territorial Army, then during that period only he would be considered to have been doing military service. Mr. Bhadury was examined and cross examined as PW.2. We get from him that he joined the Indian Railways on 28.4.58 and became a member of the Territorial Army in June, 1963. If Mr. Bhadury was actually serving in the Territorial Army, then during that period only he would be considered to have been doing military service. Mr. Bhadury was examined and cross examined as PW.2. We get from him that he joined the Indian Railways on 28.4.58 and became a member of the Territorial Army in June, 1963. Further, as per his own evidence, he enjoyed the benefit of continued services under the Railways from the period of joining to coming back from the Territorial Army. Then he seeks to explain that his service in army was parallel, continuous and without break as in the railway service for the entire period of, his service till he retired from the army. As a railway officer, he was doing the different functions at different places and lastly he was transferred to Calcutta. That is to say, he was all along doing active railway service, though he was carrying all the time his designation in the Territorial Army. We have made it clear that the mere designation would not make a member of the Territorial Army a military service man. There cannot be any escape from that position. That was also the ratio in the case of Atul Kumar Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1983 Allahabad 281). It has been laid down that an officer of the Territorial Army is not liable to render military service continuously for a term. It is further noticed that in emergent situation he may be called out to act in support of the civil -power or to provide essential guard. This in our view is the correct legal position. Though the matter before the Allahabad High Court arose in a different context, the ratio is the same. Mr. Samaddar, the learned advocate for the respondents, has submitted that as the petitioner did not raise the question of jurisdiction at the earlier stage, that question of jurisdiction cannot be considered by this Court. We feel that this argument has no substance. We have already pointed out that under the proviso to sub-s. 9 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the High Court itself can scrutinise, in order to find the legality or otherwise of the order made by the Rent Controller. Mr. Samaddar has relied upon the decision of Bahrein Petroleum Co. We feel that this argument has no substance. We have already pointed out that under the proviso to sub-s. 9 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the High Court itself can scrutinise, in order to find the legality or otherwise of the order made by the Rent Controller. Mr. Samaddar has relied upon the decision of Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. ( AIR 1966 SC 634 ) for the principle that if objection as to the jurisdiction is not raised at the very outset, the same can be taken to have been waived. But that was relating merely to the place of suing Moreover, there is the specific s. 21 of the C.P.C. as to when objection regarding place of suing can be taken. There is no such statutory provision-and indeed there cannot be–regarding waiver as to jurisdiction when there is complete lack of jurisdiction, as when a usurper exercise power not at all vested in him. This decision is of no assistance to the learned advocate. 11. We find that the petitioner no. 2 before the Rent Controller, namely Mr. Bhadury, cannot be considered to have been a military officer. 12. There is yet another reason why the application before the Rent Controller is not maintainable. Even if we assume that the petitioner was a military officer upto 1985, the case was not filed on the ground of the retirement of the military officer. Mr. Bhadury retired in 1985 from the Territorial Army. He filed the case long after that on the ground that his necessity after his transfer to Calcutta in 1988. Then the necessity spelt out is the necessity of a civil officer. It is true that there is no period of limitation for a retired military officer for filing a case but there must be a nexus between the retirement of the military officer and his actual requirement. That is the meaning of s. 29B. In short, a person is enabled to file a case under s. 29B of the Act on the ground that his necessity or requirement arose by reason of his having retired from military service. That necessity is not spelt out. On that ground also the application before the Rent Controller is not maintainable. 13. In short, a person is enabled to file a case under s. 29B of the Act on the ground that his necessity or requirement arose by reason of his having retired from military service. That necessity is not spelt out. On that ground also the application before the Rent Controller is not maintainable. 13. As we find that the application under s. 29B of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act before the Rent Controller is not maintainable, his order of eviction is liable to be quashed. We are not making any observations al to the other aspects of the case, since the application itself is not maintainable. 14. The revisional application is allowed. The order of the learned Rent Controller, Calcutta, allowing the application of the petitioners there and passing an order of eviction are hereby quashed. We make no order for costs. Amarabha Sengupta, J. - I agree. Application allowed; Order of eviction quashed.