Judgment Ajit K. Sengupta, J. 1. IN this reference under Section 27(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, for the assessment years 1969-70, 1970-71 and 1971-72, the following common question of law has been referred to this court : "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and on a correct interpretation of Section 5(1)(iv) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the assessee was entitled to deduction under Section 5(1)(iv) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, in respect of his leasehold property?" 2. THE disputes relate to the assessee's claim for exemption under Section 5(1)(iv) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, in respect of the property at 15, Shib Thakur Lane, Calcutta. THE Wealth-tax Officer noticed that the assessee had taken a lease of this building for 35 years with an option for a further renewal for 35 years. THE value of the leasehold property was not disclosed in the return in the first instance. Later, the assessee showed it at 12 times the net rental income which came to Rs. 1,61,888. THE Wealth-tax Officer estimated it at Rs. 1,75,680 and included the same in the net wealth of the assessee. On appeal, the assessee claimed deduction under Section 5(1)(iv) as two-thirds portion of the premises was being used by him for residential purposes and the same was allowed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. 3. THE Revenue came up in second appeal before the Tribunal which upheld the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner with the following observations : "We have heard the representatives of the parties at length in these appeals. THE main reliance of the representative of the Revenue was that, under the relevant Clause (iv) of Section 5(1), the exemption can be claimed only in respect of a house belonging to the assessee. In the present case, the house in question did not belong to the assessee and, therefore, he was not entitled to any exemption. For this purpose, reliance was placed upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in CWT v. Bishwanath Chatterjee [1976] 103 ITR 536. In this case, the question in dispute was the liability to wealth-tax in respect of property held jointly by the members of the family by the Dayabhaga school of Hindu law." 4. For this purpose, reliance was placed upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in CWT v. Bishwanath Chatterjee [1976] 103 ITR 536. In this case, the question in dispute was the liability to wealth-tax in respect of property held jointly by the members of the family by the Dayabhaga school of Hindu law." 4. THE Tribunal did not accept the contention and, on a consideration of the facts and circumstances, held that the assessee was entitled to deduction under Section 5(1)(iv) of the Act in respect of his leasehold residential house property. In this view, the application of the Revenue was dismissed. At the hearing before us, the contentions raised before the Tribunal have been reiterated. Much has been sought to be made out from this decision of the Supreme Court in Bishwanath Chatterjee's case [1976] 103 ITR 536 by the Revenue to lead us to the conclusion that, in order to obtain the benefit of Clause (iv), the assessee must be the owner of the property and mere possession or any leasehold right therein was not sufficient to enable him to do so. But that ratio is quite unrelated to the issue. It propounds that unlike a Mitakshara joint family, the Dayabhaga family is based on mere joint possession without joint ownership. In a Mitakshara family, both ownership and possession are joint. It does not lay down that the right to beneficial enjoyment does not come within the pale of the words "belonging to" or that there can be no ingredients of belonging without absolute ownership. 5. THERE is also a fundamental self-contradiction in the Revenue's stance. It cannot, in the same breath, include an asset under Section 2(m) as belonging to the assessee and deny it exemption as an asset not belonging to him. Such ambivalence is a fallacy. 6. AFTER carefully considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to accept this contention. The dispute before the Supreme Court did not relate to leasehold rights at all. Such ambivalence is a fallacy. 6. AFTER carefully considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to accept this contention. The dispute before the Supreme Court did not relate to leasehold rights at all. In fact, if the assessee cannot get the exemption, it can be very well argued that no addition can be made to the net wealth of the assessee because the asset in question, i.e., the house, does not belong to him, because the same expression " belonging to " is used in Clause (m) of Section (2) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, which defines " net wealth ". Secondly, it is not necessary that a person should be the exclusive owner of the property so as to claim the benefit of Clause (iv) of Section 5(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. A part ownership or co-ownership may be sufficient for this purpose. What is probably required is that he should be having some right of ownership and not merely a right of possession. What we find in the present case is that the right of the assessee was fairly comprehensive. He had the power to demolish the existing old building situated at the said premises and to construct a new structure thereon, the right to raise loans from the Life Insurance Corporation and/ or any other financial institution and/or bank for constructing a new building on the security of the demised premises and the lessor had thereby given his consent to the same. 7. THE lease itself was for a period of 35 years with an option of renewal for a further period of 35 years. In CED v. Jyotirmoy Raha, it was held that : "Though the word 'belonging' in Section 33(1)(n) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, is capable of denoting an absolute title, yet it is not confined to that sense. Even possession of an interest less than that of full ownership could be signified by that word." 8. SIMILARLY, in CWT v. Md. Even possession of an interest less than that of full ownership could be signified by that word." 8. SIMILARLY, in CWT v. Md. Ismail, it was held that : "The right of a lessee under a lease is an interest in property within the meaning of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and where the period of a lease is over six years, an assessee's right as a tenant created thereby is an ' asset' within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, and the value thereof is to be included in computing the net wealth of the assessee." The Supreme Court in Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur, had construed the meaning of the word "belonging" as capable of signifying possession of an interest less than that of full ownership. The ratio in CWT v. Bishwanath Chatterjee is in no way incongruous or inconsistent with or in conflict with the said construction. Because, in the latter case, the issue was whether a joint Hindu family unless having jointness of ownership and possession could be held to be assessable in respect of the asset. Their Lordships answered the question in the negative. Possession bereft of a shade of ownership cannot bring in exigibility of the asset to wealth-tax. The Revenue as earlier said was playing a wrong note. 9. THE decision of the Supreme Court in R.B. Jodha Mal Kuthiala [1971] 82 ITR 570 has classified "ownership" broadly into two genres-legal ownership and the right to exercise the benefits of ownership. This also supports the view that there can be an asset belonging to a person who could exercise the rights of the owner without being the owner in the fullness of its meaning. 10. THERE could be some justification for citing Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan (Late) v. CWT on behalf of the Revenue. But that case is also distinguishable. It settles the principle that an unregistered seller continues to be taxable for the asset sold and delivered by reason of not being divested of the legal estate, one part of ownership. The word "belonging" ropes in the holder of empty legal estate. Far from discarding, it relaxes the meaning of "belonging" to include any slice of ownership. Even according to the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, there are several modes of transferring property. The word "belonging" ropes in the holder of empty legal estate. Far from discarding, it relaxes the meaning of "belonging" to include any slice of ownership. Even according to the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, there are several modes of transferring property. Lease is one of them and involves transfer of a right. It is correct that mortgage is also termed as a transfer of an interest but the purpose thereof is obviously to secure the repayment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, or the performance of an engagement and normally there normally there no right to the usufrnet of the property. 11. IT was argued that it is quite possible that, in the present case, both the lessor and the lessee may ultimately claim the benefit of this exemption. This does not necessarily result in denial of the assessee's I claim. IT is also always possible to have a set of ownerships subsisting in a property. The rights of the holders may not be exactly similar. One person may have one kind of right and another person another kind, but both are the owners of the rights. So, this argument by itself should not be fatal to the assossce's claim. The rights may flow from the same property in separate streams converging on different persons. 12. FOR the reasons aforesaid, the question in (his reference is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee.