Judgment :- 1. The prayer in the writ petition is for the issue of writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of writ, directing the respondent “to appoint the petitioner in any suitable job in the Integral Coach Factory, Madras, on compassionate grounds as a legal heir of deceased Durgaiya Naidu who died as a S.K. Welder, Token No. 11/1837 in Integral Coach Factory, Madras” 2. The petitioners father Durgaiya was employed as S.K.. Welder in Integral Coach Factory, Madras. He died intestate in October, 1980. He had a first wife by name Suguna and she had no issues. The said Durgaiya had manied the mother of the petitioner one Rani on 7-6-1986 (sic) (1970?) and he was born on 7-10-1970. It seems that the said Durgaiya had nominated the petitioner when he was a minor, as his nominee in respect of death-cum-retirement benefits in respect of Railway Employees Insurance Fund. The abovesaid first wife Suguna filed O.S. No. 155 of 1981 in the District Munsifs Court, Villupuram, against the petitioner, his mother Rani and his aunt Pachia Ammal, for declaration that she is the only legally added wife of the deceased Durgaiya The learned District Munsif held by his judgment and decree dated 8-8-1983 that Suguna was the only legally wedded wife of Durgaiya. However, the learned District Munsif held that the petitioner is entitled to half of the amount in respect of the Railway Employees Insurance amount and Death cum Retirement Gratuity, the other half going to Suguna. This conclusion the learned District Munsif had reached in view of S. 16(1) of the Hindu Maniage Act. It is alleged in the affidavit that the petitioners mother and step-mother had been requesting the respondent to appoint him in some service in the Integral Coach Factory, Madras, on compassionate grounds on his attaining the prescribed age limit for such appointment. It seems the legally wedded wife of Durgaiya, namely Suguna, represented to the respondent in 1988 that she has no issues and as such the petitioner is the sole bread winner of the family and he should be appointed in the Integral Coach Factory on compassionate grounds. It seems that the petitioner also applied in April 1989 requesting an appointment as he has already become a major on 7-10-88. The petitioner seems to have studied upto S.S.L.C. but had not passed. It seems that the petitioner also applied in April 1989 requesting an appointment as he has already become a major on 7-10-88. The petitioner seems to have studied upto S.S.L.C. but had not passed. However, the said Sugana, the stepmother of the petitioner, received a communication on 18-8-89 from the respondent stating that her/request for appointment of the petitioner cannot be acceded to. After that, the petitioner issued a notjce to the respondent and reiving upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A.I R. 1989 S.C. 1976 he was emboldened to come before this Court with the prayer stated supra. 3. The respondent/Integral Coach Factory has filed a counter affidavit and it stated that one Rani requested that her son, the petitioner, may be considered for appointment on compassionate grounds on attaining the age of 18 years by her letter dated 31-7-84. A reply was sent on 15-5 85 that her request cannot be acceded to as he is not the legally wedded wife of Durgaiah. The fact of filing of suit in the District Muasifs court is not denied. However, it is stated that the petitioner is applying for the post after 8 years from the date of expiry of Durgaiah. It is stated that Suguna alone is the legally wedded wife of Durgaiah, the deceased, and as per the judgment in OS.No 155 of 1981, the settlement dues had been shared between his first wife and the petitioner. The counter states that the civil court has also held that Suguna is the legally wedded wife of late Durgaiah. Suguna alone being the legally wedded wife of late Durgaish, is entitled for appcintraent on compassionate grounds and she cannot authorise anybody else for such appointment. It is stated that the case has been examined sympathetically and there is no provision in the rule for appointing the children of other than those of the legally wedded wife. It is stated that according to the instructions issued by the Railway Board in April 1979 the petitioner is not entitled to the appointment. 4. Mr. Thiagarajan, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the respondent is not concerned with the question whether the petitioner is the son of legally wedded wife or not. The learned counsel states that it is true that the civil court has held that Suguoa alone is the legally wedded wife. 4. Mr. Thiagarajan, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the respondent is not concerned with the question whether the petitioner is the son of legally wedded wife or not. The learned counsel states that it is true that the civil court has held that Suguoa alone is the legally wedded wife. But, at the same time, it contended, the respondent cannot overlook the provisions of sub-S.(1) of S. 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act by which the petitioner is treated to be a legal son. In other words, the illegitimacy has been erased by the enactment of sub-S (I) of S. 16 of the Act. The learned counsel points out that even under the Hindu Succession Act, under* Class I heirs, the petitioner could be taken as the son. As such the petitioner is entitled to be given an appointment on compassionate ground, notwithstanding the fact that his mother is not the legally wedded wife of the deceased Durgaiah. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel that Suguna herself has stated to the respondent that she is not for any job and the petitioner could be given a job on compassionate grounds, as he is the bread winner of the family. As such be is entitled to get an appointment on compassionate grounds. 5. Per contra, Mr. Venkateswara Rao, learned counsel for railways-respondent, contends that according to the instructions with regard to appointment on compassionate grounds, the appointment can be given only to a son/daughter/widow of the employee who died in harness and if the widow cannot take up the employment and if the sons and daughters are minors, the same may be kept pending till the first son/first daughter becomes a major. Learned counsel points out that clause 1 of the Instructions says ‘dependent relatives’ should be compensated for the loss of their support by offering them appointment. The definition of ‘dependent relatives’ for the purpose of appointment on compassionate grounds will be the same as for “Pass Rules.” According to the learned counsel, so far as the petitioners mother cannot be said to be a widow under Hindu Law as she is not a legally wedded w ife, the petitioner cannot also get an appointment on compassionate ground. The learned counsel argues that the intention of the Boards Circular is not to give appointments to sons born through illicit intimacy and marriage. The learned counsel argues that the intention of the Boards Circular is not to give appointments to sons born through illicit intimacy and marriage. The learned counsel contends that the Supreme Court has held in Violet Issaac v. Union of India 1991-(I)-S.C.C. 725, in the case of family pension, there is no right of succession to claim a pension, and that only designated persons, i.e., widow, minor sons, and unmarried daughters of the deceased employee are entitled to the family pension and the claim of the brother on the basis of will made by the deceased is not sustainable. Learded counsel points out that the decision is on the basis of the Railway Pension Rules and the same principles apply to the executive instructions issued by the department and as such only designated persons are entitled to get appointment on compassionate grounds and no one else can be considered by going out of the Circular and taking note of sub-S (1) of S. 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act. According to the learned counsel, the legitimate wife of the deceased Durgaiah, Suguna is the widow and she has no son and as such she cannot authorise somebody else to get appointment and under the instructions of the Railway Board it cannot be done. 6. After considering the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Thiagarajan and the learned counsel for the respondent-railways 1 am of the opinion that the contentions raised by Mr. Venkateswara Rao is well-founded. I am of the view that the appointment on compassionate grounds has to be done only within the four corners of the Circular. Cl. 2 of the Circular states: — “Appointments on compassionate grounds can also be made in the case of staff who the in harness but in such cases it should be restricted to a son/daughter/widow of the employees. Where the widow cannot take up employment the sons/daughters arc minors, the same may be kept pending till the first son/daughter becomes a major, i.e., attains the age of 18. Such cases should be kept pending only for 5 years after which the claim will lapse. Where the widow cannot take up employment the sons/daughters arc minors, the same may be kept pending till the first son/daughter becomes a major, i.e., attains the age of 18. Such cases should be kept pending only for 5 years after which the claim will lapse. However, in cases coming under priority ‘.4) 0) below, if an appointment could not be made within five years due to the son/daughter being minor, the G M. may personally authorise relaxation of the 5 year limit in deserving cases.” It is also worth to mention Cl. 5 which is to the following effect:— “When offering appointment On compassionate grounds to a widow, son or daughter, it need not be checked up whether another son/daughter is already working. But there should in no case be more than one appointment against one death/medical incapacitation, e.g., it should not be permitted that after one appointment is made, later, the family wants that another son/daughter be employed in lieu in addition.” Cl. 13 is as follows:— “In case any other deviation from the above instruction is considered necessary in any particular case, the same should be obtained from the Ministry of Railways before any offer of appointment is made.” The Circular starts saying that dependent relatives of the Railway employees who lose their lives in the course of duty should be compensated for the loss of their support by offering them appointment. The definition of “dependent” will be the same as per “Pass Rules.” I have gone through the rules and in the rules a wife does not come in the definition of dependant. So we have to fall back upon the executive instructions which has been issued in 1979. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel Mr. V enkateswara Rao, in my view, Cl. 2 restricts the appointment to a widow, a son and a daughter of the employee. Giving a plain meaning to the Circular, a legally wedded wife, alone can be a widow. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel Mr. V enkateswara Rao, in my view, Cl. 2 restricts the appointment to a widow, a son and a daughter of the employee. Giving a plain meaning to the Circular, a legally wedded wife, alone can be a widow. That is a status which is acquired as held by the Supreme Court in Jodh Singh v. Union of India 1980-4-S.C.C. 306, it is stated by the Supreme Court that: “Where a certain benefit is admissible on account of status and a status that is acquired on the-happening of certain event, namely, on becoming a widow on the death of the husband, such pension by no stretch of imagination could even form part of the estate of the deceased. If it did not form part of the estate of the deceased it could never be the subject matter of testamentary disposition.” 7. As such it is very clear that the family pension in that case was held to be admissible on account of the status of a widow and not on account of the fact that there was an estate of the deceased which devolved on his death to the widow. That position has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Violet Issaac and others v. Union of India 1991-1-S.C.C. 725. and considering the effect of bequeath tng the family pension, it has been held that family pension could not be bequeathed by Will as it does not form part of the estate of, the employee and only designated persons, i.e., widow, minor son and unmarried daughter of the deceased employee are entitled to family pension under the rules. On a consideration of these two decisions 1 am of the view that the contention, of Mr. Venkate-swara Rao is acceptable The argument of Mr. Thiagarajan that whatever may be the status of his mother, yet the petitioner is a ‘son’ under sub-S.(1) of S 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act and as such his claim has to be considered cannot countenanced. So far, as there is no provision in the Circular for giving appointment to persons like the petitioner on compassionate grounds I do not think that this Court can read something into the Circular to inter pret the Circular in such a way as Mr. Thiagarajan wants roe to interpret. So far, as there is no provision in the Circular for giving appointment to persons like the petitioner on compassionate grounds I do not think that this Court can read something into the Circular to inter pret the Circular in such a way as Mr. Thiagarajan wants roe to interpret. Apart from that, the Circular is very clear as it refer s only to legitimate wife in the sense that when the widow cannot take up employment and when the sons and daughters are minors, the same may be kept pending till the first son/daughter becomes major and attains the age of 18 years. As such the Circular has to be interpreted the way in which Mr. Venkateswara Rao wants it to be interpreted. It should be interpreted in such a way as is in tune with the law. The legitimacy given to the children out of the illegitimate wedlock under sub-S.(1) of S. 16, in my view, cannot be extended to such an issue as the present one on hand. It may be true that the petititoner may be entitled to succeed to the properties of his father, but to get an appointment on compassionate ground which is not a matter as of right, the principles cannot be extended. In this view of the matter, though the legally wedded wife of Durgaiah, namely Suguna wanted that the petitioner be given an appointment on compassionate ground, I do not think that it can be given as per the instructions as it stands tcday. As such I do not think that there is any merit in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The writ petition has to fail. 8. Having held the law in favour of the department, this Court cannot ignore Cl. 13 of the Instructions. Cl. 13 of the Instructions gives some sort of a power of relaxation to the Ministry of Railways. If any deviation is to be made from the Instructions in a parti cular case, the same should be obtained from the Ministry of Railways before any offer of appointment is made. In my view, this is a fit case where Clause 13 has to be invoked in favour of the petitioner. If any deviation is to be made from the Instructions in a parti cular case, the same should be obtained from the Ministry of Railways before any offer of appointment is made. In my view, this is a fit case where Clause 13 has to be invoked in favour of the petitioner. Though in law, I have held against the petitioner, yet, the de partment/Railways has to take note of the amendments made to the Hindu Marriage Act where the Parliament thought it fit enough to protect peisons like the petitioner so far as their legitimacy is concerned. In fact, in the Hindu Succession Act, I find that the son born of the void or voidable marriage is deemed to be a legitimate child of the parents and is entitled to succeed to such of the pro perty of his father as if he is born of a lawful wedlock. (See Schedule I, clause (a) : Clause I—Mullahs Principles of Hindu La*, 16th Edition, page 783). As such though in my view the petitioner cannot be granted an appointment within the four corners of the Circular which has been issued in May, 1979, yet this is a fit case where the department can consider as a special case to give him appoint ment on compassionate ground 9. As sucb while dismissing the writ petition, a direction is issued to the respon dent to consider about applying Cl. 13 of the Circular dated 26.5 1979 in favour of the peti tioner on the peculiar facts of this case. No costs.