JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J.—The only point that requires determination in this appeal may be stated as follows : "Whether the deed of gift Ex. P-4 under which the properties were given to Smt Lachhmi predecessor in-interest of defendant-appellant before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for maintenance falls within section 14 (1) or is covered by section 14 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 ?" 2. Puran Gir alias Hira Lal-plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of possession of the suit property against Sahab Singh and Jagta-defendants on the ground that the suit property which belonged to Gauri Gir was gifted by him to Smt. Lachhmi by way of gift on the basis of deed of gift dated 22-11-1907 registered on 5-12-1907. The said gift deed was conditional one and Smt. Lachhmi was conferred only a restricted estate. She had no right to alienate or gift the property. She contrary to the conditions contained in the gift on 6-7-1965 alienated the property to Sahab Singh which transaction was illegal and void and was not binding upon his rights and he was entitled to a decree of possession. The suit was contested by the defendants who alleged that Smt, Lachhmi was holder of life estate which had been enlarged under the provision of section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1^56 and as such, she as full and absolute owner was competent to alienate the property and had rightly done so. Shri Jagta during the pendency of the litigation had admitted the claim of plaintiff. On the basis of this admission, decree for half share was granted The suit thereafter continued to be contested by Sahab Singh alone On the basis of evidence the Court found that as property was given to Lachhmi by her husband Gautam Gir prior to her marriage with him, therefore, sub-section (i) of section 14 of the Act was not applicable and it was sub-section (2) of section 14 which was applicable. On this basis the remaining suit of plaintiff with respect to half share of the property was also decreed. 3. Feeling aggrieved Sahab Singh preferred an appeal. The Lower Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Second appeal was preferred by Sahab Singh but he died during the pendency of the appeal. Present appellants are his legal representatives. 3. Feeling aggrieved Sahab Singh preferred an appeal. The Lower Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Second appeal was preferred by Sahab Singh but he died during the pendency of the appeal. Present appellants are his legal representatives. Puran Gir also died during pendency of the appeal. Respondents are his legal representatives. Jagta is proforma respondent. 4. It is not disputed and has also been found by the Courts below that at the time when Smt Lachhmi was engaged to Gauri Gir, her father agreed to perform the marriage subject to one condition of Gautam Gir transferring the property by way of gift for her maintenance and it was in pursuance thereto that on 21-11-1907 corresponding to 12th Manghar, 1964 Bikrami i. e prior to the Lachhmis marriage with Gauri Gir that the gift deed Ex, P-4 was executed and it was on the basis of this document that Lachhmi acquired the property. The gift deed further recites that the same was to become effective from the crop of Rabi Sambat-1965 Bikrami and Lachhrai would have no right to sell or mortgage the property and after her death, the property was to revert back to the heirs of Gauri Gir. It is in the light of these facts that the arguments of the respective parties will have to be appreciated. 5. Learned Counsel for the appellants has argued that Smt. Lachhmi acquired the property by way of gift which was given to her by Gautam Gir for her maintenance and as the gift deed was to become effective from Rabi 1965 Bikrami, as such, the same has to be considered as a gift made by her husband for her maintenance and in view of judgments of Supreme Court in Badri Pershad v. Smt Kanso Devi, AIR 1970 SC 1963, Veddeboyina Tulasamma and others v. Veddeboyina Sesha Reddi, AIR 1977 SC 1944 and Bat Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai and others, AIR 1979 SC 993 and in view of two judgments of this Court in Dalip Chand and Smt. Mlinhom v. Chuhru Ram, 1988 (2) SMC 266-and Smt. Namo Devi v. Rattan Chand and others, (1989) 2 SLC 277. The limited estate became enlarged on coming into force of the Act and she became full owner. The limited estate became enlarged on coming into force of the Act and she became full owner. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondents has urged that Smt. Lachhmi had on the date when gift was made no pre-existing right of maintenance and it was for the first time that on the basis of gift she acquired property which prescribed a restricted estate and the case, as such, is squarely covered by sub-section (2) of section 14. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the records. 7. The basic consideration in the instant case is as to whether Smt. Lachhmi when she had not yet been married, to Gautam Gir could on the day when the gift deed was executed by Gautam Gir in her favour claim a right of maintenance or that she had any pre-existing right of maintenance. It is not ia dispute that she acquired the property for the first time on the basis of this document only. The learned Counsel for the appellants was not in a position to cite any text of Hindu law or other provision under which an unmarried girl could claim such a right from her prospective husband It was on the basis of settlement arrived at the time of her engagement for providing maintenance to her after her marriage that Gautam Gir agreed to execute gift deed as a condition precedent for the marriage and it was prior to marriage that gift deed was executed and Smt. Lachhmi acquired restricted estate prior to her marriage. Then can it be said that what Smt. Lachhmi acquired was by way of pre-existing right of maintenance. It has clearly bean held in the case of Veddeboyina Tulasamma (supra) that sub-section (2) of section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of section 14 (1) materially and it applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc. It has clearly bean held in the case of Veddeboyina Tulasamma (supra) that sub-section (2) of section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of section 14 (1) materially and it applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm and endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights The Supreme Court summarised the legal conclusions reached by it after an exhaustive consideration of the authorities on the question of law involved as to the interpretation of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 14 of the Act by holding as follows. "(1) The Hindu famales right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing rights. (2) Section 14 (1) and the Explanation thereto have been couched in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-economic ends sought to be achieved by this long needed legislation. (3) Sub-section (2) of section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of section 14 (1) materially. (3) Sub-section (2) of section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of section 14 (1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by section 14 (1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision. (4) Sub-section (2) of section 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and section 14 (I) will not operate in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the famale is entitled, the sub-section has absolutely no application and the females limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of section 14 (1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be governed by section 14 (1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee. (5) The use of express terms like "property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition", "or in lieu of maintenance" "or arrears of maintenance etc in the Explanation to section 14 (1) clearly makes sub-section (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of subsection (2). (5) The use of express terms like "property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition", "or in lieu of maintenance" "or arrears of maintenance etc in the Explanation to section 14 (1) clearly makes sub-section (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of subsection (2). (6) The words "possessed by" used by the Legislature in section 14 (1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a property even though the owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of section 14 (1) she would get absolute interest in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title. (7) That the words "restricted estate" used in section 14(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in section 14 (1) and they include not only limited interest, but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.” 8. The female as on the date when right in the property is acquired must have, as on that date, a pre-existing right of being maintained and for this reason alone the instrument on the basis of which rights are acquired will be deemed to be merely confirming, endorsing, declaring or recognising such pre-existing rights. In the absence of any right existing on that day, effect has to be given to the terms of instrument and the same will be covered by sub-section (2) of section 14. As Smt Lachhmi had not yet been married and she for the first time acquired property without there being any pre-existing right, therefore, it cannot be said that the restricted estate stood enlarged. 9. In the light of aforementioned, the appeal has no force and the same is dismissed by holding that the deed of gift under which Smt. Lachhmi acquired the property fails under sub-section (2) of section 14. 9. In the light of aforementioned, the appeal has no force and the same is dismissed by holding that the deed of gift under which Smt. Lachhmi acquired the property fails under sub-section (2) of section 14. Parties are left 10 bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.