D. M. PATNAIK, J, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is against the appellate judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Ganjam, confirming the judgment of conviction and sentence of the petitioner by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrme, Charapur, under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act (hereinafter referred to as tllc E. C. Act) read with clause 3 of the Orissa Declaration of Stocks and Price of Essential Commodities Order, 1973) for short T1the Order. The learned Magistrate convicted and sentenced this petitioner and his father Kluilli Panigrahi to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- each, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. On appeal the learned Sessions Judge upheld the lower Court findings and confirmed the judgment Since that learned lower appellate Court found accused Khalli Panigrahi was an old man of 77 years of age, he released him under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. ( 2 ) PROSECUTION case in brief is that P. W. 6, the Inspector of Vigilance, on 25. 12. 1980 at about 3 p. m. along with the Additional C. T. O; and other staff inspected the business premises of accused Khalli Panigrahi in his village. He found accused Khalli Panigrahi was a dealer transacting business in various essential commodities, such as, groundnut oil, paper, cereal, torch light bettry etc. But at the relevant time, the accused did not display the stock position nor the prices of the essential commodities on the board as required under the Order. Therefore, in presence of the witnesses, he seized the board and various quantities of essential commodities mentioned in the plain paper F. I. R. (Ext. 4 ). At the relevant time, accused Khalli Panigrahi was absent, but P. W. 6 found the present petitioner transactingt business in the shop. 1. The plea of accused Khalli Panigrahi is, at the time of inspection -of the premises; he was absent from village. That apart, his plea with regard to violation of the Order is, the prices of the stock available 011 the previous day were correctly displayed on the board, but he denied his knowled2. ge as to what happened thereafter. The present petitioner pleaded that the vigilance people called him and forced him to open the shop and thereafter inspected the same. ge as to what happened thereafter. The present petitioner pleaded that the vigilance people called him and forced him to open the shop and thereafter inspected the same. He pleaded his ignorance as to the reasons for absence of any entry on the board. He pleaded, being forced he signed some papers without knowing the contents thereof. 3. Mr. B. Rath, learned counsel for the petitioner, did not assail findings of both the Courts below with regard to the date and time of the inspection of the shop of Khalli Panigrahi, secondly, that Khalli Panigrahi was a dealer transacting business in village Tahara in respect of essential commodities mentioned above and that the vigilance staff did seize the board on which the position of stock and the prices of the essential commodities were not displayed and seizure of the various essential commodities as mentioned in the FJ. R. (Ext. 4 ). His only contention was that once the prosecution came forward with the case that Khalli Panigrahi was the dealer and was required under the provisions of the Order to display the stock position as on the date and the prices thereof on the board with regard to the essential commodities, it was he alone, who was liable for infraction of the provisions of the Order for not displaying the stock and the prices of the commodities. Thus, according to Mr. Rath, the present petitioner not being a dealer, cannot be convicted for the acts and omissions of Khalli Panigrahi. There is a great force in the contention of Mr. Rath which needs examination. 4. Accused Khalli Panigrahi, who is admittedly a dealer, though has been convicted for violation of the Order, but has not challenged-the appellate Court's judgment, presumably because he has been released under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. It is proved from the materials on record and correctly held by both the Courts below that Khalli Panigrahi was not present at the time of inspection. The evidence on record or the witnesses examined have been accepted by the Courts below that the present petitioner was present at the time of inspection and both the Courts below have also come to the finding that this petitioner at the relevant time was carrying on business (emphasis supplied) in the shop. This fact has been denied by the petitioner in his statement under section 313, Cr. This fact has been denied by the petitioner in his statement under section 313, Cr. P. C. where he claimed that the shop was closed on that day, but at the instance of the vigilance staff he was forced to open the shop. I am not inclined to disbelieve the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that the vigilance squad forced this petitioner to open the shop. Therefore, it is held to have been proved that the present petitioner was in the shop at the time of inspection. The only question for consideration is whether the present petitioner, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, can be considered to be a dealer as defined under the Order or can be considered to be a person carrying on business with regard to the essential commodities mentioned above. 5. There is no evidence on record which obviously should have been from the side of the prosecution that the shop stood in the name of the present petitioner, nor there is any document to come to a finding that the present petitioner was a dealer. There is also no evidence on record to hold that the present petitioner along with his father Khalli Panigrahi was a person transacting business in respect of essential commodities in the capacity of a member of the joint Hindu family. In other words, there is no material on record to hold that it was a joint family business. No constructive liability can be attributed for violation of the Order so far as this petitioner is concerned. The prosecution, on the other hand, has come forward with tile case that Khalli Panigrahi was the dealer dealing with the purchase and sale of essential commodities; There is no law on the basis of which the petitioner can be held liable for the acts or omissions of the dealer, his father Khalli Panigrahi, unless it is a case of abetment of the offence by the present petitioner. 6. The learned Magistrate in para 7 of his judgment relying on the evidence of P. W s. 3 and 6 came to a finding that the petitioner was transacting business at the time of inspection of the shop. 6. The learned Magistrate in para 7 of his judgment relying on the evidence of P. W s. 3 and 6 came to a finding that the petitioner was transacting business at the time of inspection of the shop. The fact of seizure of various articles as per the prosecution report and the seizure list, as well as the signature of accused Raghunath Panigrahi on various documents, very much weighed in the mind of the learned Magistrate and thus propelled him to arrive at a conclusion that since the present petitioner was found transacting business at the relevant time, he could be considered to be a dealer dealing with the essential commodities as defined under the Order. This finding of the learned Magistrate that the present petitioner was also a dealer was confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge though with little difference in the reasoning given by him. In para 7 of the lower appellate Courts judgment, it is observed that the word dealer under clause 3 of the Order has been defined as a person carrying on business on sate of essential commodities. Though it was urged before him from the side of the petitioner that a person transacting business casually in a shop cannot be considered to be a dealer as defined under the Order, yet the learned Sessions Judge did not accept the coqlandltion and held that such an expression also includes a casual dealer (emphasis supplied) in a shop. 7. I do not agree with the views taken by both the Courts below for the reasons hereunder: I have already observed in the above paragraph that the present petitioner cannot be constructively held liable for the acts and omissions of the actual dealer, his father Khalli Panigrahi. Clause 2 (a) of the Order defines a dealert as follows: (a) dealer means any person carrying on business of selling any essential commodity, and includes a producer, wholesaler or retailer. Both the Courts below have stretched the meaning of dealer with regard to the present petitioner for the reasons that both of them found the present petitioner transacting business in the shop at the relevant time. As per the definition, this petitioner was neither a producer, a whole saler nor a retailer. The definition of dealer as per the Order does not predicate a person carrying on casual business. As per the definition, this petitioner was neither a producer, a whole saler nor a retailer. The definition of dealer as per the Order does not predicate a person carrying on casual business. This reasoning finds support from various decisions some of which are quoted below. In a case reported in Essenti Krishna Chandra Patra v. The State, it is observed that a person can be punished under section 7 of the E. C. Act read with the Orissa Food Grains Dealerst Licensing Order, 1964. Under clause 3 (2) of the Order; if he happens to be a dealer as defined in that Order and contravenes the provisions thereof, the Court was of the opinion that whether a person is a dealer or not would depend upon the further finding whether he was engaged in the business of storage for sale of rice and that the concept of business in the context must necessarily postulate continuity of transaction. It is not a single casual or solitary transaction of sale, purchase or storage that would make a person dealer. Further it must be shown that there is a sort of continuity of one or the other of the said transactions. In the case referred to above the accused was found on a single occasion to have stored certain quantities of food grains for sale. Following the above view, this Court again in a case reported in M. Suryanarayan v. State, held that, the term business connotes a concept of continuity of transaction with a view to make profit. In the case, the accused had purchased 50 monds of paddy in one calendar year. However, he was acquitted on this ground. Same is the view taken in a decision reported in Harshad Rai Desai v. The State, where it has been held that carrying on business does not mean any stray act or any sporadic act. The case was one under the present Order. In the decision reported in Govind Prasad Jaiswal v. The State of Orissa, for contravention of section 7 of the E. C. Act read with the present Order, this Court also took the same view that carrying on business takes within its element a continuity of the business in order to attract the provisions of the Order. In the decision reported in Govind Prasad Jaiswal v. The State of Orissa, for contravention of section 7 of the E. C. Act read with the present Order, this Court also took the same view that carrying on business takes within its element a continuity of the business in order to attract the provisions of the Order. In the case it was held that the accused was not a dealer with regard to essential commodities like til oil and torch cells on the ground that more existence of stock of these articles did not ipso facto prove that the petitioner carried on business in a regular course in these essential commodities. The view taken by me above with the reasoning that the present petitioner cannot be held liable under the Order finds support in a case reported in T. Susila Patra and another v. State, In the case referred to, the licence for dealing with the controlled cement was in the name of wife, but the husband was found transacting business. The lower appellate Court confirmed the orders of conviction and sentence of both the accused passed by the trial Court. This Court held that the husband could not be convicted since he was not a licensee as a stockist. To add to this, reliance is also placed in another decision of this Court reported in, Siwaparasad Agarwal v. State of Orissa, a case like the one at hand. In the light of the above proposition of law, no liability can be fixed on the petitioner for contravention of the order as alleged by the prosecution. 8. In the result, the revision is allowed. The petitioner is acquitted of the charges. The conviction and sentence of both the Courts below are set aside. Bail bonds, if any, stand discharged. Revision allowed.