M. RAMA JOIS, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant has presented this appeal against the order made by Shivaraj Patil, j. , in Writ Petition No. 7290 of 1991, dismissing (he writ petition, in which the appellant had challenged the order of the State Government terminating his appointment as Member (Technical) of the Karnataka Electricity Board. ( 2 ) BRIEF facts of the case, arc these: The appellant joined the services of the Department of Electricity of the former State of Mysore in October 1954. On the formation of the Electricity Board, the appellant became an employee of the Board. During 1961-62, the appellant was deputed to England for training in respect of transformers in connection with the Sharavathy Valley Hydro Electric Project for about nine months by the Government of Karnalaka. After return from training, the appellant was posted as Assistant Engineer. The petitioner was thereafter promoted as Executive Engineer. He was subsequently promoted as Chief Engineer in the year 1984. He served as Chief Engineer from 1984 to 1989 and during the year 1989 the appellant was promoted as Chief Engineer, Electricity (General) of the Karnataka electricity Board. In the normal course, the appellant would have retired on superannuation on attaining the age of 60 years. Shortly prior to his retirement, by notification dated 16-7-1989 issued under sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 5 of the electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 read with Rule 3 of the Karnataka State Electricity (Supply) Rules, 1957, the Stale Government appointed the appellant as Member (Technical) of the Karnataka Electricity Board. The notification (Annexure-A3) reads:"xxx xxx xxx. NOTIFICATION in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-scctions (2) and (4) of Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (Central Act No. LIV of 1948) read with Rule 3 of the Karnataka State Electricity (Supply) Rules, 1957, the Government of karnataka hereby appoint Sri S. Govindappa,chief Engineer,electricity (General), Karnataka Electricity Board, as Member (Technical), Karnataka electricity Board, for a period of three years with effect from 1-7-1989 in place of Sri A. K. Nagaraju, retiring on 30-6-1989. He shall hold office subject to the pleasure of the State Government. He shall hold office subject to the pleasure of the State Government. " (emphasis supplied) as can be seen from the above notification, though the (enure of office of Ihc appellant as Member (Technical), was stated to be for a period of three years, it also added that be shall hold office subject to the pleasure of the Stale Government. While the appellant was continuing as Member (Technical), pursuant to the aforesaid notification, his appointment came to be terminated by notification dated 15-3-1991. The relevant portion of the notification (Anncxure-A5) reads:"notification the services of Sri S. Govindappa, Member (Technical), Karnataka electricity Board, Bangalore, who was appointed as such in Notification No. PWD 127 EBS 89, dated 17-6-1989 for a period of three years with effect from 1-7-1989 or to hold office subject to the pleasure of the Slate Government, are terminated with immediate effect". Questioning the legality of the aforesaid notification, the appellant presented the writ petition. Before the learned Judge, the appellant contended that in terms of the order of appointment, he had a right to continue as Member (Technical) in the Karntaka electricity Board, for a period of three years and his premature termination from that office was violalive of Section 10 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. It was also contended that in any event before terminating the appointment, an opportunity to show cause against Ihc termination ought lo have been given. The learned Judge dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has presented this appeal. ( 3 ) SRI H. B. Datar, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellant, urged the following contentions: (i) The termination of appointment as Member (Technical) of the Karnataka electricity Board, before he completed his tenure of three years, for which he was appointed, was violative of Section 10 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. (ii)In any event, the action of the State Government terminating the appointment of the appellant was arbitrary and is therefore liable to be struck down ys being violalive of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. ( 4 ) IN order to appreciate the contention of the petitioner, it is necessary to sct out Section 8 of the Act, as it stood immediately prior lo the appointment of (he appellant. ( 4 ) IN order to appreciate the contention of the petitioner, it is necessary to sct out Section 8 of the Act, as it stood immediately prior lo the appointment of (he appellant. It reads: " (1) The Chairman and other Members of the Board shall, subject to the pleasure of the State Government hold office for such period and shall be eligible for reappointment under such conditions, as may be prescribed". (emphasis supplied) the language of Section 8 is very clear. The Chainnan and other Members of the board arc to hold office subject to the pleasure of the State Government for such period and shall be eligible for rcappoinument under such conditions, as may be prescribed. Rule 3 of the Rules, framed under the Act, reads: "term of office and conditions tor appointment as the Chairman and members. The Chairman and other Members shall, subject to the pleasure of the State Government hold office for a period of three years and shall on the expiration of their term of office, be eligible for rcappointnent, as the State government, may, from time to lime, by order or direct". (emphasis supplied) as can be seen from the wordings of Rule 3, while the term of office of the chairman and other Members of the Board is three years, they hold the office subject to the pleasure of the State Government. Section 10 of the Act provides for removal or suspension of Chairman and Members of the Board. It reads:"10. REMOVAL or suspension of Members. (1) The State Government may suspend from office for such period as it thinks fit or remove from office any member of the Board who, (a) is found lo be a lunatic or becomes of unsound mind; or (b) is adjudged insolvent; or (c) fails to comply with the provisions of Section 9; or (d) becomes or seeks lo become a Member of Parliament or State Legislature or any local authority; or (c) in the opinion of me State Government (i) has refused to act; or (ii) has become incapable of acting; or (iii) has so abused his position as a member as to render his continuane on the Board detrimental to the interests of the general public; or (iv) is otherwise unfit to continue as a member; or (f) is convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude. (2) The State Government may suspend any member pending an Section 5 to fill up the vacancy. (3) No order of removal shall be made under this section unless the member coucetned has been given an opportunity to submit his explanation to the State government, and when such order is passed, the seat of the member removed shall become vacant and another member may be appointed under Section 5 to fill up the vacancy. (4) A member who has been removed shall not be eligible for reappointment as member or in any other capacity to the Board". A reading of Section 10 would indicate that it provides for termination of tenure of chairman and Members on specific grounds set out in the section and also to determine the tenure of office by way of removal or dismissal for misconduct. Thus it may be seen that there is a clear distinction between determining the tenure of office of chairman or Member by the exercise of the power of pleasure, subject lo which he is appointed, in view of Section 8 read wilh Rule 4 of the Rules, and removal or dismissal from such office for cause as specified in Section 10 of the Act. The termination of office of a person appointed as Chairman of an Improvement Board under the provisions of the Karnataka Improvement Boards Act, 1976, came up for consideration before this Court in the case of B. S. Siddappa v State of Karnataka, 1979 (2) Kar. L. J. 238. The provisions of Sections 5 and 8 of the Karnataka Improvement Boards act, are in pari materia with Sections 8 and 10 of the Act. In the said case also the tenure of office of a person who had been appointed for a specific period under section 5 of the Act subject to the pleasure of the State Government, was terminated before the completion of term of office by the exercise of pleasure. Challenging the legality of the said action of the State Government, the petitioner therein contended that the termination of his appointment amounted to removal from his office under scction 8 of the said Act and therefore the termination was bad for non-complying with the provisions of Section 8 of the said Act as also the rules of natural justice. Challenging the legality of the said action of the State Government, the petitioner therein contended that the termination of his appointment amounted to removal from his office under scction 8 of the said Act and therefore the termination was bad for non-complying with the provisions of Section 8 of the said Act as also the rules of natural justice. Jagannatha Shetty, J. (as he then was), while rejecting the contention of the petitioner therein, stated thus:"we will first consider the second contention urged for the petitioner. It is said that the Chairman by reason of his appointment becomes a Member of the board and a member could be removed only in accordance wilh the provisions of section 8 after affording an opportunity of making his representation. This contention would have been accepted if the petitioner had been removed for disqualifications set out under Section 7 or 8. But admittedly, he was not removed on any such ground. He was apparently removed at the pleasure of the government. Section 5 provides that the Chairman and other members appointed shall hold office for a period of three years subject lo the pleasure of the Government. Lord Reid in Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation, 1971 (2) All. E. R. 1278 at 1282 said 'acting at pleasure means that there is no obligation to formulaic reasons'. The power to appoint includes the power to remove; or the power to remove is implicit in the power lo appoint. Further, 'removal at pleasure' is quite distinct from removal 'for cause'. In the latter there is an obligation to give reasons, but there is no such obligation in the former. That is why the Court insists that a parly removed 'for cause' should be afforded an opportunity against the proposal. The petitioner cannot demand that opportunity as he was not removed for cause set out under Section 7 or 8 of the Act. The next question is whether the petitioner was entitled to a notice under the rules of natural justice. This contention proceeded on several assumptions. It is said that under Section 5 the petitioner had a right lo continue in office for a period of three years and his removal affected his civil rights. This assumption appears to be not correct. The order appointing him did not specify any fixed term. This contention proceeded on several assumptions. It is said that under Section 5 the petitioner had a right lo continue in office for a period of three years and his removal affected his civil rights. This assumption appears to be not correct. The order appointing him did not specify any fixed term. If that order had prescribed a definite term, then we could have said that it expressly excluded the power to remove at pleasure. Section 5 no doubt provides that the Chairman and other members appointed by the Government shall hold office for a period three years. But then, the period prescribed thereunder is not a security for the holder of the office. According lo us, it appears to be a limitation imposed by the Legislature on the Executive for appointing a person al pleasure. The petitioner, therefore, cannot contend that he had a right lo hold the office for a fixed period of three years". A similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Anjunan-E- islam v Karnataka Board of Wakfs, 1990 (1) Kar. L. J. 1 : ILR 1990 Kar. 214. In the said case, the question for consideration was, whether the termination of office of the committee, whose Icrm of office was subject to Ihc pleasure of llic Wakfs Board, prior to the complclion of term of office was illegal Tlic Division Bench held that the term of office was subject to Ihc pleasure of the Board and therefore the termination was in accordance with law. These two Division Bench decisions, in our opinion, apply on all fours to the facts of this case. ( 5 ) AS staled earlier, Section 8 of the Act expressly provides that the appointment of Chairman or Member of the Board for such period as may be prescribed in the rule, shall be subject to the pleasure of the Stale Government. Under Rule 3, the period of office of a person appointed as Chairman or Member under Section 8 is fixed at 'three' years. As held by the Division Bench of this Court in Siddappa's case, 1979 (2) Kar. L. J. 238, that is the outer limit, in that, no person can be appointed as Chairman or Member of the Board for a period exceeding three years. As held by the Division Bench of this Court in Siddappa's case, 1979 (2) Kar. L. J. 238, that is the outer limit, in that, no person can be appointed as Chairman or Member of the Board for a period exceeding three years. But in view of the condition imposed in the section to the effect that the appointment is subject to the pleasure of the Stale Government, it can be terminated by (he exercise of pleasure at any time earlier. A person whose tenure is determined under this provision, is eligible for reappointment as indicated in Section 8 as also under Rule 3. The determination of tenure under Section 10 is entirely different. The power under that section can be exercised only on the grounds specified therein and after complying with the mandatory procedure prescribed under the said Section. A person removed or dismissed in exercise of the power under Section 10 becomes ineligible for reappointment. In other words, an action taken under Section 10 results in evil consequences. Such is not the position of termination brought about by the exercise of pleasure under Section 8 of the Act read with Rule 3 of the Rules. We are in respectful agreement with views expressed by the Division Bench in S'lddappa 's case, 1979 (2) Kar. L. J. 238 and also the views expressed by another Division Bench in the case of Anjumam-E-Islam,1990{1) Kar. L. J. I :ilr 1990 Kar. 214. Therefore, we hold that the termination of tenure of the appellant by the exercise of pleasure under Section 8 of the Act is in accordance with law. That being the position, the question of complying with the rules of natural justice does not arise as held in siddappa's case, 1979 (2) Kar. L. J. 238, in that, as a person appointed as Chairman or Member under Section 8 of the Act has no right to continue for the complete period of three years and his tenure is determinable by the exercise of pleasure, there exists no right to continue and consequently no right is taken away by determination of tenure by the exercise of pleasure and therefore the rules of natural justice has no application. ( 6 ) SRI H. B. Datar, however, strenuously contended that every exercise of administrative power must be informed by reasons and cannot be exercised arbitrarily without reasons. ( 6 ) SRI H. B. Datar, however, strenuously contended that every exercise of administrative power must be informed by reasons and cannot be exercised arbitrarily without reasons. In support of this contention, the learned counsel relied on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v State of UP, air 1991 SC 537 . That was a case in which the new Government which fame to power in Utlara Pradesh, made an order terminating the tenure of all Law officers appointed by the previous Government and directed the preparation of fresh panels for making fresh appointments. In the said case, the Supreme Court has elaborately dealt with the requirements for the exercise of administrative power. The Supreme court has held that any arbitrary exercise of administrative power without reasons, even in cases where appointments are contractual in nature, would be violalive of article 14 of the Constitution of India. The relevant portions of the Judgment, on which the learned counsel relied, read:"2. By one stroke, seemingly resorting to the Spoils System alien to our constitutional scheme, the Government of State of Uttar Pradesh has terminated by a general order the appointments of all Government counsel (Civil, Criminal, revenue) in all the districts of the Slate of UP w. e. f. 28-2-1990 and directed preparation of fresh panels to make appointments in place of the existing incumbents. This has been by Circular G. O. No. D-284-Scvcn-Law Ministry, dated 6-2-1990 terminating all the existing appointments w. c. f. 28-2-1990, irrespective of the fact whether the term of the incumbent had expired or was subsisting. The validity of this Slate action is challenged in these matters after the challenge has been rejected by the Allahabad High Court. They have all been heard together since the common question in all of them is the validity of the circular G. O. No. D-284-Seven-Law Ministry, dated 6-2-1990 issued by the government of Stale of Uttar Pradesh. XXX XXX XXX. 13. The learned Additional Advocate-General contended that Clause 3 of para 7. 06 says that the appointment of a District Government counsel is only professional engagement terminable at will on eithc'r side and not appointment to a post under the Government; and the Government has the power to terminate the appointment at any time 'without assigning any cause'. 13. The learned Additional Advocate-General contended that Clause 3 of para 7. 06 says that the appointment of a District Government counsel is only professional engagement terminable at will on eithc'r side and not appointment to a post under the Government; and the Government has the power to terminate the appointment at any time 'without assigning any cause'. He contended that this power to terminate the appointment at any time without assigning any cause and the clear statement that the appointment is only professional engagement terminable at will on either side is sufficient to indicate that the relationship is the same as that of a private client and his counsel. In our opinion, this provision has to be read not in isolation, but in the context in which it appears and along with the connected provisions, already referred. The expression 'professional engagement' is used therein to distinguish it from 'appointment to a post under the Government' in the strict sense. This, however, does not necessarily mean that a person who is not a Government servant holding a post under the government docs not hold any public office and the engagement is purely private with no public element attaching to it. This part of Clause 3 of para 7. 06 means only this and no more. The other part of Clause 3 which enables the government to terminate the appointment 'at any time without assigning any cause' can also not be considered in the manner, suggested by the learned additional Advocate-General. The expression 'at any time' merely means that the termination may be made even during the subsistence of the term of appointment and 'without assigning any cause' means without communicating any cause to the appointee whose appointment is terminated. However, 'without assigning any cause', is not to be equated with 'without existence of any cause'. It merely means that the reason for which the termination is made need not to be assigned or communicated to the appointee. It was held in Liberty Oil Mills v union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1271 that the expression 'without assigning any reason' implies that the decision has to be communicated, but reasons for the decision have not to be stated; but the reasons must exist, otherwise, the decision would be arbitrary. It was held in Liberty Oil Mills v union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1271 that the expression 'without assigning any reason' implies that the decision has to be communicated, but reasons for the decision have not to be stated; but the reasons must exist, otherwise, the decision would be arbitrary. The non-assigning of reasons or the non-communication thereof may be based on public policy, but termination of an appointment without the existence of any cogent reason in furtherance of the object for which the power is given would be arbitrary and, therefore, against public policy. Clause 3 of para 7. 06 must, therefore, be understood to mean that the appointment of a District Government Counsel is not to be equated with appointment to a post under the Government in the strict sense, which docs not necessarily mean that it results in denuding the office of its public character; and that the appointment may be terminated even during currency of the term by only communicating the decision of termination without communicating the reasons which led to the termination. It does not mean that the appointment is at the sweet will of the Government which can be terminated at any time, even without existence of any cogent reason during the subsistence of the term. The construction, suggested on behalf of the State of UP of this provision, if accepted, would amount to conceding arbitrary power of termination to the government, which by itself is sufficient to reject the contention and then by save it from any attack to its validity. XXX XXX XXX. 22. . . . . However, to the extent, challenge is made on the ground of violation of Article 14 by alleging that the impugned act is arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable, the fact that the dispute also falls within the domain of contractual obligations would not relieve the State of its obligation to comply with the basic requirements of Article 14. To this extent, the obligation is of a public character invariably in every case irrespective of there being any other right or obligation in addition thereto. An additional contractual obligation cannot divest the claimant of the guarantee under Article 14 of non-arbitrariness at the hands of the state in any of its actions. XXX XXX XXX. 24. . . . . An additional contractual obligation cannot divest the claimant of the guarantee under Article 14 of non-arbitrariness at the hands of the state in any of its actions. XXX XXX XXX. 24. . . . . There is a basic difference between the acts of the Slate which must invariably be in public interest and those of a private individual, engaged in similar activities, being primarily for personal gain, which may or any not promote public interest. Viewed in this manner, in which we find no conceptual difficulty or anachronism, we find no reason why the requirement of Article 14 should not extend even in the sphere of contractual matters for regulating the conduct of the Slate activity. XXX XXX XXX. 30. . . . . The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State and we find it difficult to accept that the Stale can be permitted to act otherwise in any field of its activity, irrespective of the nature of its function, when it has the upper most duty to be governed by the rule of law. Non-arbitrariness, in substance, is only fair play in action. We have no doubt that this obvious requirement must be satisfied by every action of the Slate or its instrumentality in order to satisfy the test ofvalidity. XXX XXX XXX. 35. It is now too well settled that every State action, in order to survive, must not be susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness which is the crux of Article, 14 of the constitution and basic to the rule of law, the system which govern us. Arbitrariness is the very negation of the rule of law. Satisfaction of this basic test in every State action is sine qua non to its validity and in this respect, the Slate cannot claim comparison with a private individual even in the field of contract. This distinction between the State and a private individual in the field of contract has to be borne in the mind". (emphasis supplied) relying on the above decision, the learned counsel contended thai the impugned order was made without reason and was therefore liable to be struck down as an instance of arbitrary exercise of power and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (emphasis supplied) relying on the above decision, the learned counsel contended thai the impugned order was made without reason and was therefore liable to be struck down as an instance of arbitrary exercise of power and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. ( 7 ) PER contra,sri Muthanna, the learned Advocate-General, contended that theratio of the decision in Kumari Shrilekha 's case, AIR 1991 SC 537 , was not apposite to the present case in which the tenure of appointment was subject to the pleasure of the Government as expressly provided in the Act and also Rule 3 of the Rules made in exercise of the power conferred under the Act. He submitted that the ratio in kumari Shrilekha's case, AIR 1991 SC 537 can be invoked only in cases where the constitution or the laws docs not prescribe that a person appointed to an office holds it during the pleasure of the designated authority. He submitted that once such a power is conferred, a person appointed for a specified period, but subject to the pleasure of the designated authority, can be terminated by exercise of pleasure and such termination would be in accordance with law. He submitted that the ratio of the division Bench decision of this Court in Siddappa 's case, 1979 (2) Kar. L. J. 238 and in the case of Anjuman-E-Islam,1990 (1) Kar. L. J. 1: ILR 1990 Kar. 214, applies on all fours, and the ratio of the decision in Kumari Shrilekha's case, AIR 1991 SC 537 , is distinguishable. In particular, he invited our attention to paragraphs 18 and 25 of the Judgment of the Supreme Court. They read:"18. The scope of judicial review permissible in the present case, does not require any elaborate consideration since even the minimum permitted scope of judicial review on the ground of arbitrariness or unreasonableness or irrationality, once Article 14 is attracted, is sufficient to invalidate the impugned circular as indicated later. We need not, therefore, deal at length with the scope of judicial review permissible in such cases since several nuances of that ticklish question do not arise for consideration in the present case. XXX XXX XXX. 25. . . . . The view, we are taking, is, therefore, in consonance with the current thought in this field. We need not, therefore, deal at length with the scope of judicial review permissible in such cases since several nuances of that ticklish question do not arise for consideration in the present case. XXX XXX XXX. 25. . . . . The view, we are taking, is, therefore, in consonance with the current thought in this field. We have no doubt that the scope of judicial review may vary with reference to the type of matter involved, but the fact that the action is reviewable, irrespective of the sphere in which it is exercised, cannot be doubted". (emphasis supplied) the learned Advocate-General submitted that as expressly stated in paragraph 18, the extent of judicial review in other circumstances have been left open. He submitted that the scope of judicial,review gets reduced having due regard to the statutory provision concerned and in particular in a case where the tenure of office is subject to the pleasure of the appointing authority. The learned Advocate-General invited our attention to Article 156 of the Constitution, which prescribes the term of office of Governor of a State. It reads: "156. Term of Office of Governor. (1) The Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. (2) The Governor may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office. (3) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this Article, a Governor shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office: provided that a Governor shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office". (emphasis supplied) though under Clause (3) of Article 156, the term of office of the Governor is fixed at five years, it is expressly made subject to the pleasure of the President as specified in Clause (1 ). The learned Advocate-General submitted that under this Article the president has the power to determine the tenure of office of a Governor even before the expiry of five years by the exercise of his pleasure and it cannot be said that the court can go into the existence or otherwise of valid reason for determining the tenure of Office of a Governor by the President by exercise of pleasure. He also invited our attention to Article 165 (3) of the Constitution relating to the term of office of Advocate-General. It reads:"165. He also invited our attention to Article 165 (3) of the Constitution relating to the term of office of Advocate-General. It reads:"165. Advocate-General for the State. xxx xxx xxx. (3) The Advocate-General shall hold office during the pleasure of the governor and shall receive such remuneration as the Governor may determine". He submitted that though the Governor may appoint an Advocate-General for any specific period, his term of office can always be determined by the exercise of pleasure by the Governor under Article 165 (3)of the Constitution. ( 8 ) AFTER giving careful consideration to the argument addressed by the learned counsel for the appellant relying on the ratio of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Kumari Shrilekha's case, AIR 1991 SC 537 , and the arguments of the learned Advocate -General to the effect that the ratio of the said decision is distinguishable and not apposite to the case of termination of tenure of office of a person appointed to an office terminable at pleasure, we are inclined to agree with the argument advanced by the learned Advocate-General. It may be that even in the case of the exercise of power under doctrine of pleasure, there would be scope for judicial review if it is alleged and proved in a given case that the power was exercised mala fide, for, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Pratap Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 at paragraph 5, if it is found that a public functionary in exercise of an administrative /statutory power was actuated by mala fides, such action would be vitiated. In other words, such an action is no action at all in the eye of law. In the present case, tltere is no allegation that the power was exercised mala fide. Further, it may also be pointed out that by a notification issued on the date on which the tenure of office of the appellant as Member (Technical) was determined, the State Government issued notification appointing the appellant as a Director on the Board of Directors of Karnataka vidyulh Kharkbane, which is a Government of Kamataka undertaking and by the second paragraph of the same notification he was also appointed as the managing Director of the said company. The said notification indicates that the termination of tenure of appointment of the appellant as Member (Technical) of the karnataka Electricity Board, has been effected in the exigencies of administration. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in status the said post was inferior. It is unnecessary for us to go into the correctness of the submission made by the learned counsel that the office of Member (Technical) is of a higher status compared to the office to the office to which he was appointing. Whatever that may be the fact remains that he was appointed as the Managing-Director of the Kamataka vidyuth Kharkhane in the place of an I. A. S. Officer which shows the Government wanted to utilise his services in that capacity, ( 9 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, we respectfully agree with the views expressed by Shiva raj Patil,j. , in the order made in the writ petition and make the following order: the writ appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. --- *** --- .