Judgment : 1. Thepetitioner has filed this petition under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. praying for permission to have the assistance of an Advocate of his choice at the time of interrogation and any statement that may be obtained from him by officials of the respondents. 2. The allegations in the petition are briefly as follows: The petitioner is a permanent resident of Kodikadu in Vedaranyam Taluk. He is not involved in any case. He has to connection with L.T.T.E. or in any other orgainisation. One week ago, personnel from ‘Q’ Branch of the first respondent came to the house of the petitioner during night time and wanted the pet: tioner to go over to their office. The petitioner was not in the house at that time. Continuously the personnel from ‘Q Branch are coming to petitioner s house and warning the inmates that petitioner must appear before the first or second respondent for interrogation. Respondents 1 and 2 are taking; many persons into custody and are keeping them in prolonged confinement. The petitioners has therefore genuine apprehension that he may be implicated in a nonbailable offence. He has no objection for appearing before the first or second respondent and answer questions. He fears that he may be illtreated. Therefore, in exercise of his fundamental rights under Arts.21 and 22 (1) of the Constitution of India., the petitioner seeks a direction to appear before the respondent along with an advocate of his choice. That right is a constitutional entitlement. Hence the petition. 3. Mr.B.Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner stated that subsequent to the filing of this petition, petitioner surrendered on the night of 14/15th of July, 1991 before the second respondent and now the petitioner is under the custody of the third respondent. Mr.P.Rajamanickam the learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent stated that on the date of hearing of this case viz., 17.7.1991 his status is that of a witness who is being interrogated. Mr.B.Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, would contend that Sec.161, Crl.P.C. provides for examination of witnesses by police and that Sec.161, sub-sec.(2) gives the right to any witness to remain silent and as well the right not to give any statement or answer which would incriminate him. Mr.B.Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, would contend that Sec.161, Crl.P.C. provides for examination of witnesses by police and that Sec.161, sub-sec.(2) gives the right to any witness to remain silent and as well the right not to give any statement or answer which would incriminate him. Sec. 161(2) reads as follows: “Such person shall be bound to answer truly all questions relating to such case put to him by such officer, other than questions the answers to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture. A plain reading of the section would show that a witness is given the aforesaid rights. The learned counsel also relied upon the ruling reported in Nandini Satpathy v. Dani, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1025: 1978 Crl.L.J. 968: (1978) 2 S.C.C. 424 : 1978 S.C.C. (Crl.) 236: (1978) 3 S.C.R. 608 . In this ruling this right has been upheld by the apexcourt. Percontra. Mr.B. Sriramulu the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents, 1 and 2 and Mr.P. Rajamanickam the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent would contend that petitioner was being interrogated in the case registered in Crime No. 9 of 1991 in connection with the murder of former Prime Minister Mr.Rajiv Gandhi and 15 others, and though the case was originally registered for offences under Secs.302, 307 and 326, I.P.C. and Secs.3 and 5 of the Explosives Act, later the offence under Secs. 3, 4 and 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 were also added up in view of this development, the jurisdiction and power of the High Court under the Crl.P.C. in respect of offences punishable under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (which I shall hereinafter refer to as TADA Act) are taken away by the provisions of the said act and as such the petitioner cannot rely upon Sec.161(2) of the Crl.P.C. (which I shall hereinafter be referred to as the Code) to seek his relief. The learned counsels further contended that since the power of the High Court under the Code with respect to offences under TADA Act is taken a way, Sec.482 of the Code can neither be invoked and this petition under Sec. 482 of the Code is to be necessarily dismissed. The learned counsels further contended that since the power of the High Court under the Code with respect to offences under TADA Act is taken a way, Sec.482 of the Code can neither be invoked and this petition under Sec. 482 of the Code is to be necessarily dismissed. Since this contention goes to the root of the matter touching upon the very maintainability of this petition, I shall first take up this point for consideration. In respect of this contention Mr.B.Sriramamulu, the learned Public Prosecutor for the respondents 1 and 2 relied upon the ruling of the apex Court reported in Usmanbhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 922. Thatmatter came up on appeal from the judgment of Gujarat High Court which was reported in Usmanbhai Pareedbhai v. State of Gujarat, 1987 Crl.L.J. 1955. The applicants before the Gujarat High Court were alleged to have committed offences punishable under the I.P.C. and is well under Secs.3 and 4 of the TADA Act. They moved for bail before the designated court. The designated court dismissed those applications for bail. The matter was taken up before the learned single Judge of Gujarat High Court. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the State of Gujarat that against the order passed by the Designated court under TADA Act, the application under Sec.439 or 482 of the Code is no maintainable before the High Court. The learned single Judge referred to whole matter to the Division Bench for deciding the question whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain application under Sec.439 or under Sec.482 of the Code in view of the provisions of TADA Act. While discussing that point, the Gujarat High Court has referred to the provisions of Sec.2 (1)(c) of TADA Act which defines Designated Court and Sec.9 which provides for trial of offences punishable under the provisions of TADA Act only by Designated Court. Sec.12 of the said act provides the procedure and power of the Designated Court Sec. 19 of the said act provides for appeal frorn any judgment sentence or order not being at interlocutory order of a Designated Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on law. Sec.12 of the said act provides the procedure and power of the Designated Court Sec. 19 of the said act provides for appeal frorn any judgment sentence or order not being at interlocutory order of a Designated Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on law. it also ordains that no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Designated Courtexcept as aforesaid after referring to the various provisions of the TADA Act in the appeal judgment, Gujarat High Court has held at 8 para as follows: “The aforesaid provisions of the Terrorist Act clearly show that the entire Crl.P.C. is not made applicable but only specific provisions thereof are made applicable. Then again in para 14, the Gujarat High Court has stated as follows: “Entire Crl.P.C. is not made applicable but some specific provisions are made applicable or some provisions of the Crl.P.C. with modifications are made applicable.” In para 15 the learned Judges have stated as follows: “In this view of the matter, it is amply clear that the entire Crl.P.C. is not made applicable to Terrorist Act, but some provisions of the Crl.P.C. are made applicable with or without modifications. Therefore there is no reason to hold that provisions of Sec.439 or 482 of the Crl.P.C. are applicable to a person accused of an offence punishable under the Terrorist Act.” The learned Judges have stated at para 18 as follows: “Sec.482 does not confer fresh or new or additional powers on the High Court. It saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. If the court had jurisdiction to entertain an application or appeal, then its powers are not circumscribed by anything in the Code except in so far as the sections expressly dealing with them do so. But if the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any appeal or application, there is no question of exercising inherent jurisdiction.” (Emphasis supplied). Holding as above the High Court has dismissed the application filed under Sec.439 or 482 of the Code are not maintainable. But if the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any appeal or application, there is no question of exercising inherent jurisdiction.” (Emphasis supplied). Holding as above the High Court has dismissed the application filed under Sec.439 or 482 of the Code are not maintainable. Aggrieved by this order, the applicants took up the matter to Supreme Court, and thus the matter came up to the Supreme Court and the ruling rendered is the one reported in Usmanbhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 922 referred to supra. 4. In the ruling reported in Usmanbhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 922 the apex Court has referred to Secs.3, 4, 19 and 20 TADA Act. Sec3(1) gives the meaning of the expression“Terrorist Act.” Sec.4 provides for punishment. Sec. 19 ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court and it reads as follows: “19(1) No with standing any thing contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie as a matter of right from any judgment, sentence or order not being an interlocutory order, of a designated court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on law. 2. Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a designated court.” Sec.20 provides for modified application of certain provisions of the Code. After referring to the above provisions in TADA Act the apex Court has held in para 16 as follows: “Under the scheme of the act, there is complete exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court in any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence punishable under the act or any rule made thereunder.” In para 17, the apex Court has stated as follows: “Just as the legislature can create a special court to deal with a special problem it can also create new procedure within the existing system. Parliament in its wisdom has adopted the framework of the Code, but the Code is not applicable. The act is a special act and creates a new class of offences called terrorist acts and disruptive activities as defined in Secs.3(1) and 4(2) and provides for a special procedure for the trial of such offences. Parliament in its wisdom has adopted the framework of the Code, but the Code is not applicable. The act is a special act and creates a new class of offences called terrorist acts and disruptive activities as defined in Secs.3(1) and 4(2) and provides for a special procedure for the trial of such offences. Then again in para 18 is observed as follows: “The manifest intention of the legislature is to take away the jurisdiction and power of the High Court under the Code with respect to offences under the Act. No other construction is possible. (Emphasis supplied). In para 22 it is laid down as follows: “In view of the explicit bar in Sec. 19(2) there is exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court. It interdicts that no appeal or revision shall lie to any court, including the High Court, against any judgment sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a designated court.” The apex Court has considered the various provisions of TADA Act and has laid down that the manifest intention of the legislature is to take away the jurisdiction and power of the High Court under the Code. 5. Mr.B.Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that Sec.20 of TADA Act provides for modified application of certain provisions of the Code and that would imply that other provisions of the Code are applicable, and the High Court can give a direction under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. to implement the right of the petitioner under Sec.161 (2), Crl.P.C. This contention would not hold good in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court though the matter came up before the Supreme Court in an application with regard to bail under Sec.439 or 482 of the Code, the apex Court has considered all the provisions of TADA Act and has laid down as above. So the petition under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. is not maintainable. It is needless for me to say that neither any claim can be made on the strength of Sec. 161(1) of the Code in the High Court. 6. So the petition under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. is not maintainable. It is needless for me to say that neither any claim can be made on the strength of Sec. 161(1) of the Code in the High Court. 6. Mr.P.Rajamanickam the learned counsel Central Government P.P. appearing for the third respondent further relied upon the ruling reported in Bashi Ammad v. State, (1990)2 Crimes 502.In this ruling the Jammu and Kashmir High Court has held that the intention of the Legislature appears to take away the jurisdiction and powers of this Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure with respect to the offences triable under the Act. 7. Mr.P.Rajamanickam the learned Government Public Prosecutor appearing for the third respondent, would contend that the petitioner cannot insist on the presence of the lawyer at the time of interrogation and relied upon the ruling rendered in W.A.No.1454 of 1987 and connected writ appeals by Division Bench of this Court, in para 89, the learned Judges have slated as follows: “The rights guaranteed under Art.22 (1) of the Constitution, did not include a right to the accused to have the presence of his counsel during interrogation by the police.” He also relied upon the ruling reported in Senior Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Madras v. V.M. Premkumar and V.N. Ravi Senior Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, 1990 L.W. (Crl.) 247. Since I have held that petition under Sec.482 of the Code is not maintainable, this question is not considered in this petition. 8. Mr.B.Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, also relied upon Arts.20 (3), 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India, Art.20(3) reads as follows: “No person accused of any offenee shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” Art.21 reads as follows: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” Art.22(1) reads as follows: “No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consuls, and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice.” At the time of the hearing of this petition, Art.22(1) did not have any application. Any way, in view of the stark fact that this petition is filed under Sec.482 of the Code which is not maintainable, this claim cannot be considered in this petition. Mr.P.Rajamanickam the learned counsel C.G.P.P. appearing for the third respondent has rightly pointed out that for enforcing the right under the above Articles of Constitution of India, the remedy lies elsewhere. In the ruling reported in Usmanbhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I. R. 1988 S.C 922 referred to supra in para 12, the apex Court has stated that Mr.Poti, learned counsel appearingfor the State Government with his usual fairness unequivocally accepted that the provisions of the act do not take away the constitutional remedies available to a citizen to approach the High Court under Art.226 or Art.227 or move this court by a petition under Art.32 for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order. But in this petition filed under Sec.482 of the Code which is clearly not maintainable those rights, cannot be considered and hence not considered. 9. The picture that emerges, out of the law laid down, can be formulated as follows 1. The manifest intention of the legislature is to take away the jurisdiction and power of the High Court under the Code with respect to offences under the TADA Act. 2. As a corollary No.1 above the provisions of Sec.482 of the Crl.P.C. are not applicable to a person accused of an offence punishable under TADA Act. 10. In view of the above, this petition under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. is dismissed as not maintainable.