JUDGMENT - M. F. SALDANHA, J.:---This is an unfortunate proceeding that bristles with mala fides and, consequently, compels the conscience of this Court to pass an order that is in consonance with the principles of fairness and equity. The respondent, Dr. Subbarao, had filed Criminal Writ Petition No. 966 of 1990 which was a comprehensive challenge to the very validity of the main prosecution that had been instituted against him. Rule had been issued and the matter was pending for final hearing before a Division Bench of this Court in the month of February 1991. The Petition was high on the daily board and was due for final hearing. It is relevant to mention that when the petition was admitted, the Court had granted stay of the proceeding before the trial Court because the petition challenged the validity of those proceedings. Until the disposal of that petition, therefore, there could have been no question of the trial commencing or of the petitioner, who was the original accused, being required before that Court for any purposes. 2. The respondent, Dr. Subbarao, made an application before the Division Bench after producing all the relevant documents, for permission to visit the U.S.A. along with a team from Reliance Industries Ltd. for only three days. The respondent's services were engaged on the basis of being an expert in the field. The respondent made a strong plea to the Court that after the trauma undergone by him in the preceding three years that for his and his family's very survival it was very essential for him to take up at least a few assignments and earn some money to keep afloat. He established that Reliance Industries Ltd. were to pay him a sum of Rs. 25,000/- by way of consultancy charges for this particular assignment. The Division Bench was unable to dispose of the main writ petition at that point of time because the State of Maharashtra had sought adjournments earlier and it was at the relevant time in the midst of certain detention matters. 25,000/- by way of consultancy charges for this particular assignment. The Division Bench was unable to dispose of the main writ petition at that point of time because the State of Maharashtra had sought adjournments earlier and it was at the relevant time in the midst of certain detention matters. The Division Bench (Puranik and Saldanha, JJ.) directed the parties to the trial Court for the purposes of disposal of the petitioner's application since it, prima facie, appeared that if the Court was satisfied about the fact that the accused will not abscond, there was no reason why he should not be permitted to leave the country for a short period of three days. It is crucial to record that the State was represented before the Division Bench by Mrs. Manjula Rao, learned Special Public Prosecutor, who was present on each date of hearing and was fully aware of the fact that this application was an off-shoot of the main proceeding with which the Division Bench was seized and further that the issues involved had effectively been argued before that Court. The Division Bench to which I was a party had occasion to scrutinise the documents and to hear the parties and since it appeared to be genuine case where no prejudice would have been caused to the Prosecution, the parties were directed to the learned Additional Sessions Judge, who was requested to hear them and pass appropriate orders. This the learned Additional Sessions Judge did and by an order dated 14-2-1991 the respondent was granted permission to leave India between 17-2-1991 and 21-2-1991. This order was passed in open Court on 14-2-1991and the respondent was due to fly out of the country on 17-2-1991, i.e., within three days. According to the respondent, he genuinely apprehended that an application would be made to the High Court against this order for which purpose he came to the High Court and remained here in the Court premises and before the Division Bench on 15-2-1991 as he did not desire that any ex parte order should be obtained against him. He genuinely expected, and rightly so, that any further application which the State would make could only be addressed to the Court before which the main petition was pending. No such application was made to the Division Bench on 15-2-1991. He genuinely expected, and rightly so, that any further application which the State would make could only be addressed to the Court before which the main petition was pending. No such application was made to the Division Bench on 15-2-1991. The Petitioner was informed in the evening of 15-2-1991 that an ex parte order had been obtained from the learned Single Judge staying the order of the Sessions Court and that this order had been served on the U.S. Consulate pursuant to which the Consulate revoked the visa granted to the respondent. The respondent made a grievance of this fact before the Division Bench on 16-2-1991 whereupon since the matter related to a judicial order passed by the learned Single Judge, all that the Division Bench could do was to request the learned Single Judge to look into the matter and, if appropriate, to reconsider his order after hearing the respondent. According to Dr. Rao, the learned Single Judge would not hear him because on 15-2-1991 the following order had already been passed. "Notice before admission returnable on 18-2-1991. Ad-interim stay of part (c) of the impugned order." The Rozanama endorsement indicates that Mrs. M. A. Rao, the learned Special Public Prosecutor, had appeared on behalf of the State when the above ex parte order had been passed. The record also indicates that the application had been drafted by the said Public Prosecutor and had been affirmed by P. W. Sawant, Senior Inspector of Police. It is of some consequence to mention here that even though 16-2-1991 was a Saturday, that it was a Court working Saturday. The respondent was due to fly on Sunday, the 17-2-1991; whereas the notice obtained from the learned Single Judge was returnable on Monday, the 18-2-1991, by which time the delegation from Reliance Industries Ltd. had left the country and there was no question of he respondent, even if the order was vacated, being able to join them because the delegation was due to return to this country by 22-2-1991, having fixed up meetings and appointments at the other end during the intervening period. This itinerary is of some consequence because the obtaining of the ad-interim order of stay would have the effect of completely nullifying the purpose for which the respondent desired to travel. 3. During the hearing of Criminal Revision Application No. 123 of 1991, Dr. This itinerary is of some consequence because the obtaining of the ad-interim order of stay would have the effect of completely nullifying the purpose for which the respondent desired to travel. 3. During the hearing of Criminal Revision Application No. 123 of 1991, Dr. Subbarao, attacked the fairness or what he categorised as total absence of fairness with regard to the manner in which the proceedings against him have been conducted by the State from time to time. He referred to this particular incident and I have recorded in that judgement my conclusions, that after hearing the parties, to my mind, the manner in which this order was obtained was not only unfair but that it constituted a sharp practice. Dr. Rao, has applied for disposal of this petition. After hearing Counsel for the State, who had no objection, the matter has been placed on board for disposal. 4. Dr. Rao, appearing in person, and Mrs. Usha Purohit have very strongly and in very unequivocal terms condemned the manner in which the order dated 15-2-1991 was obtained from the learned Single Judge. They stated that the entire operation was totally devoid of any honesty and constitutes virtually playing hide and seek with judicial process. In support of this submission, they have drawn my attention to the false statements contained in the petition which were to the effect that the trial was fixed for hearing on 18-2-1991 and that the same has been adjourned to 24-2-1991. The manner in which the learned Single Judge was misled in evident from ground (6) which states: "The Learned Judge cured in not considering the fact that the trial was fixed for 18-2-91." The second head of arguments canvassedits that it was manifestly wrong on the part of whoever represented the prosecuting authorities and the State to have suppressed from the learned Single Judge the fact that the main writ petition was pending before the Division Bench on the daily board, that it was about to be taken up for hearing, that as far as the application to go out of the country was concerned that it had initially been made before the Division Bench which, in turn, had heard the parties and thereafter directed the parties to the learned Additional Sessions Judge for want of time. Under these circumstances, the submission that if the State were aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the forum before which the matter should and could have been re-agitated was the very Court before which the main proceeding was pending and the Court which had sent the matter down to the learned Additional Sessions Judge. A perusal of the petition dated 15-2-1991 indicates that the aforesaid facts had been suppressed for the Court. This could not have happened by accident. 5. The only explanation submitted by learned Counsel on behalf of the State before me is that the present writ petition being one under Article 227 of the Constitution and under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that under the High Court Rules, such an application normally lies to a Single Judge and, therefore, the matter went to the learned Single Judge. What is conveniently overlooked while tendering this lame explanation is the fact that such an application, if it is connected with or arises out of a proceeding before the Division Bench, would have, as of necessity, been placed before that very Court by the office of the High Court provided it was so pointed out. 6. In this view of the matter, there can be no dispute whatsoever about the fact that the ad-interim order obtained by the State, which had directly resulted in substantial loss and prejudice to the respondent, has been done under the circumstances that are not at all happy and under the circumstances that would, consequently, call into question the validity of that order because it was obtained by suppression of the true facts and by making positively false statements in the petition. Whether or not the Division Bench would have upheld the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is not relevant because, where it is demonstrated the circumstances under which an order is obtained are bordering on fraud, the likelihood of any other order being passed is not the relevant consideration. That there was an attention to create all sort of prejudice in the mind of the Court is evident because the prosecution annexed xerox copies of some matrimonial advertisement relating to the year 1991 from a spinster in the U.S. which the accused is supposed to have respondend to. That there was an attention to create all sort of prejudice in the mind of the Court is evident because the prosecution annexed xerox copies of some matrimonial advertisement relating to the year 1991 from a spinster in the U.S. which the accused is supposed to have respondend to. Regardless of this, I do not see, having regard to the background of this case; why notice could not have been given by the prosecution to the respondent prior to moving the Court and if there was any semblance of fairness in the action as to why the order could not have been made returnable on the 16th so that the respondent could have had a fair chance of pointing out whatever he wanted to. I need to further add that the respondent was attending this Court from day to day night through the period that Writ petition No. 966 of 1990 was on board before the Division Bench for final hearing which fact was to the knowledge of the learned Special Public Prosecutor , who represented the State; as applications had been made on behalf of the State from time to time in that proceeding by the respondent for expedited hearing and by the State for accommodation on the ground that Counsel was not available. Apart from this, the Investigating Officer, Mr. Sawant, was fully aware of the residential address of the respondent- accused and there could have been no difficulty whatsoever in giving him notice of the Proceeding before moving the Court. The order passed under these circumstances is the one that has directly resulted in serious prejudice and loss to the respondent and, to my mind , the least that will have to be done to correct this injustice is that the equivalent of that will have to be made up by the State. 7. The rule issued in this writ petition is discharged, The writ petition is dismissed and the interim order vacated. The petitioner-State is directed to deposit with the Registrar of this Court within a period of 6 (six) weeks from to-day costs quantified in the sum of Rs. 25.000/- The Registrar of this Court is directed to forthwith pay over to the respondent the said amount on his applying for withdrawal of the same. The petitioner-State is directed to deposit with the Registrar of this Court within a period of 6 (six) weeks from to-day costs quantified in the sum of Rs. 25.000/- The Registrar of this Court is directed to forthwith pay over to the respondent the said amount on his applying for withdrawal of the same. The payment of costs shall be condition precedent for any further steps which the State may desire to take in respect of this particular order. The State is also directed, in the event of such further proceedings, to give to the respondent 10 (ten) days' written notice before obtaining any orders from any superior Court in respect of this proceeding. Operation of the order is stayed for 6 weeks from the date when certified copy is ready. Petition dismissed. -----