P. K. SHYAMSUNDAR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners are the elected directors of the sixth respondent co-operative society which goes under the name and style of muslim co-operative credit society Ltd. ('the society' for short) situate at talikoti. They deeply resent the action taken by the government to induct three persons as members of the executive committee of the society by an executive order at Annexure-D , dated 30th april, 1991 in the purported exercise of the power of the state government under Section 29 (1 ). ( 2 ) THE challenge to the aforesaid order rests on the fact that induction of the nominees of the state government into the executive body of the society which is an autonomous institution run by the share-holders, who are members thereof, was clearly impermissible because the right to nominate members of the executive of the co-operative society is circumscribed by several limitations as enjoined by Section 29 of the Co-Operative Societies Act (for short 'the act') under which the impugned order is professed to have been passed. ( 3 ) SECTION 29 (1) of the act reads:"nominees of the government on the committee of a co-operative society: (1) where the state government (a) has subscribed to the share capital of a co-operative society, or (b) has assisted indirectly in the formation or augmentation of the share capital of a co-operative society as provided in chapter vi, or (e) has guaranteed the repayment of principal and payment of interest on debentures issued by a co-operative society, or (d) has guaranteed the repayment of principal and payment of interest on loans and advances to a co-operative society, the state government or any authority specified by the state government in this behalf, shall notwithstanding anything contained in this act or the rules or the bye-laws of the co-operative society, but subject to any notification or Order, for the time being in force, issued or made under Section 54 or 121, have the right to nominate as its representatives not more than three persons or one-third of the total number of members of the committee of the co-operative society, whichever is less. "inter alia I may also except Section 53 of the act on which learned sr. Counsel vijayashankar who led on behalf of respondents 3 to 5 relies upon. "inter alia I may also except Section 53 of the act on which learned sr. Counsel vijayashankar who led on behalf of respondents 3 to 5 relies upon. Section 53 of the act reads:"other forms of state aid to co-operative societies: notwithstanding anything contained in any taw for the time being in force, the state government may- (a) give loans or make advances to co-operative societies; (b) guarantee the repayment of principal and payment of interest on debentures issued by a co-operative society; (c) guarantee the repayment of share capital of a co-operative society and dividends thereon at such rates as may bw specified by the slate government; (d) guarantee the repayment of principal and payment of interest on loans and advances to a co-operative society; and (c) give financial assistance in any other form, including subsidies, to any co-operative society. "the stand-point of the society is that the institution had not received any financial assistance except a loan of Rs. 10,000/- from the government out of which it would appear Rs. 9,000/- had already been returned and only Rs. 1,000/- remained to be re-paid on the date of the impugned order and it now transpires had also been paid subsequently on 15 th may, 1991, as indicated in the endorsement produced at r1 the question for consideration is whether government could by merely granting a loan, the purpose for which it was granted not be (sic) ascertained even from the learned government advocate, can (sic) assume to itself the power under Section 29 (1) of the act to (sic) its nominees to the committee of the society. ( 4 ) AS mentioned earlier neither side has been able to throw any light as to why and what was the object of sanctioning the loan of Rs. 10,000/- by the government. In that hazy situation none can possibly predict that the loan in question was in the nature of assistance doled out to the society to assist in the formation or the augmentation of the share-capital of the Co-Operative society. I am told by learned Sr. Counsel Sri Vijayashankar the society itself came to be founded and floated way-back in 1930. If that is so, at this distance of time a loan granted by government cannot possibly be treated as assistance given indirectly towards the formation or augmentation of the share capital. I am told by learned Sr. Counsel Sri Vijayashankar the society itself came to be founded and floated way-back in 1930. If that is so, at this distance of time a loan granted by government cannot possibly be treated as assistance given indirectly towards the formation or augmentation of the share capital. Learned counsel does not dispute that if the right exercised by the government in this case does not come within clause (b) of Section 29 then it would lead to exercise of power which in law would be treated as nudum pactum. ( 5 ) BUT, then, the learned sr. Counsel sought to derive some support from Section 53 of the act I have already excerpted. Reliance in particular is placed on clause (c) which speaks of financial assistance in any other form including subsidies given to societies. 1 am afraid the nominated members would profiy litle by relying on Section 53. If the loan, subsidy or aid or call it by whatever name, if it goes indirectly towards formation or augmentation of the share capital of the society as provided in chapter vi, there can be no further controversy at all as to power of the state government to sent its representatives to the society. But, then, if it is not shown that the financial assistance given is for the aforesaid purpose of formation or augmentation of the share capital of the society, no amount of emphasis placed on clause (c) of Section 53 would improve the prospects of the nominated members since Section 53 only speaks of the different forms of aid that could he extended to the co-operative societies and stops at that. Section 53 does not refer to or does not concern itself with the management of the society as Section 29 does. In fact the only common factor between sections 29 and 53 is the lending of financial assistance. But, there all comparison ends. The two sections arc not in para-materia, operating as they do in different fields. Section 53 does not refer to or does not concern itself with the management of the society as Section 29 does. In fact the only common factor between sections 29 and 53 is the lending of financial assistance. But, there all comparison ends. The two sections arc not in para-materia, operating as they do in different fields. Merely because Section 53 refers to financial assistance given and enjoins the flow of capital intended to be regulated under chapter 6 of the Act, it does not mean that any loan or subsidy or any financial assistance given to the society and regulated by chapter vi could be treated as aid, assistance or subsidy granted under Section 29 (b) of the Act, so as to (sic) government with power to induct into the society representatives of its choice. Section 53 which empowers the state government to extend aid. Assistance or subsidy and therefore it is a general power. What is covered under Section 53 is type of aid and assistance is not covered by other types of aid given to a society under any other provision of the act. The provision under Section 53 is a general one whereas the power under Section 29 is a special one. In such cases the principle of gcneralibus specilia not derogant is a special provision is not controlled by a general provision. The general provision does not make a dent in the special provision so long as it holds sway. Only where the special provision cannot be invoked, the general provision takes over. Therefore, the fact that government under Section 53 can also give other aid, assistance etc. By way of loans and subsidies will not give it power to dictate terms to an autonomous society by inducting into the board of the society its own nominees. That right can be exercised only if it had given to the society the assistance, aid or succour typified by clauses (a) to (d) of Section 29 and not otherwise. Power to make an order which is traceable to a particular provision can be exercised only under that provision and it would certainly be futile to appeal to some other provision for no two Provisions can operate in the same field and the cardinal principle of interpretation is no statute can be treated as being tacitological. Power to make an order which is traceable to a particular provision can be exercised only under that provision and it would certainly be futile to appeal to some other provision for no two Provisions can operate in the same field and the cardinal principle of interpretation is no statute can be treated as being tacitological. Therefore, both on principle and on the construction of the two Provisions on which the learned sr. counsel relied on, I find the argument put forward to sustain the impugned order is clearly untenable and totally impermissible. ( 6 ) BUT, then, Sri Vijayashankar, learned Sr. Counsel invited my attention to two decisions of this court. The first decision is the case of Munivenkataswamy v State of Karnataka, ILR 1937 (1) Karnataka 650. 1 am not quite sure on what part of the judgment the learned sr. Counsel wants to rely upon but I see from that decision the question that had arisen for consideration herein had not arisen at all in that case. That case deals with the scope of Section 29 (1 ). On the scope of Section 29 (1) it was held that any guarantee given by the state government in terms of Section 29 (1) (c) and (d) to the parental bank enabled the state government to exercise power of nomination to nominate its representatives on the board of directors of the bank. The next decision relied on is the one rendered of C. E, Krishnegowda v State of Kamataka, 1991 (2) KAR. LJ. 273 : ILR 1991 KAR. 2218. Even that decision is not on point. The question for consideration therein was whether the power of nomination under Section 29 (1) of the act could be circumscribed by a bye-law. The court held that Section 29 vested in government an independent power to nominate its representatives and the same could not be whittled down or circumscribed by any bye-law. That situation is something I am unconcerned with in this writ petition. The crux of the matter in this writ petition is whether the loan given to the society could be said to be of the category typified by Section 29 (1 ). That situation is something I am unconcerned with in this writ petition. The crux of the matter in this writ petition is whether the loan given to the society could be said to be of the category typified by Section 29 (1 ). Regard being had to my view that the aid extended to this society was of a kind not covered by Section 29 (1) of the Act, government could not have legitimately exercised its power under Section 29 of the act to induct people of its choice into the board of management of the petitioner-society. ( 7 ) IN the view I have taken, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order at anncxure-a stands quashed. Rule issued and affirmed. No costs. --- *** --- .