Judgment :- Mishra, J.: This appeal is being disposed of after notice of motion. 2. Plaintiff in O.S.No.347 of 1977, Subordinate Judge’s Court, Cuddalore, has preferred appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court against the judgment and in A.S.No.93 of 1980 of a learned single Judge of this Court. 3. The case in the plaint in short is as follows: The properties set out in ‘A’ schedule plaint were the absolute properties of one Joseph D.Gonzaga. He married one Viyakula alias Arumal Kannu in or about the year 1914. Through her Joseph had five children whom defendants 1 and 2 alone are alive. He, however, married another woman by Roger in or about the year 1927. Through her he begot the third defendant. He died 15.10.1956. The three defendants succeeded to the ‘A’ schedule properties left by tenants in common with equal rights. The first defendant, however, sold under a registered sale deed items 1 to 4 in ‘A’ Schedule (separately described as ‘B’ schedule to the plaint) 7.2.1959 for a consideration of Rs.1,000 to the plaintiff. On 6.6.1962, however, defendant executed a sale deed in respect of the same property in favour of Govindarayulu for an apparent consideration of Rs.2,000. Govindarayulu filed a suit O.S.No.229 of 1963 on the file of the District Munsif ’ s Court, Cuddalore, for declaration title to the said properties and also for possession against the plaintiff and the defendant in the present suit. That suit was dismissed in the trial court on the finding the third defendant had no title to convey to Govindarayulu. Govindarayulu filed an appeal A.S.No.138 of 1965 on the file of the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Cuddalore. That appeal also dismissed. Govindarayulu filed a second appeal being S.A.No.1431 of 1973. It was in that appeal, however that the plaintiff therein will be entitled to a one-third share properties and therefore, a decree for partition and separate possession was granted 6.7.1976. Govindarayulu died. Fourth defendant and defendants 5 to 11 are his wife children. That appeal also dismissed. Govindarayulu filed a second appeal being S.A.No.1431 of 1973. It was in that appeal, however that the plaintiff therein will be entitled to a one-third share properties and therefore, a decree for partition and separate possession was granted 6.7.1976. Govindarayulu died. Fourth defendant and defendants 5 to 11 are his wife children. Twelfth defendant, who had purchased items 5 and 6 in ‘A’ Schedule from the defendant under a sale deed dated 5.11.1958 for a sum of Rs.900 and 13th defendant, had purchased items 7 and 8 in ‘A’ Schedule from the third defendant under Registered deed dated 17.2.1960 for a sum of Rs.700 have also been impleaded as party-defendants the suit for, according to the plaintiff, they by virtue of their sale deeds are entitled extent of the share of their vendor. Praying in the suit that sale in excess of the shares of the individual members of the family who were entitled to the extent third, is invalid and that under the law in equity, the plaintiff having purchased items in ‘A’ schedule properties is entitled in a general partition of all the co-sharers, to allotment of ‘B’ schedule properties, the plaintiff filed the suit for partition. 4. Defendants 1, 3, 5 and 12 remained ex parte. The second defendant in the statement contended inter alia that the suit is barred by res judicata in view of the in S.A.No.1431 of 1973. Defendants 4 and 6 to 11, however, contended that in respect schedule properties already a preliminary decree has been passed in the second appeal the final decree proceedings have been initiated and therefore, the present suit for of the properties by the plaintiff is not maintainable. The thirteenth defendant separate written statement, however, claiming exclusive right to suit item No.7 by purchase from the third defendant for valid consideration and that he had acquired adverse possession. 5. The thirteenth defendant separate written statement, however, claiming exclusive right to suit item No.7 by purchase from the third defendant for valid consideration and that he had acquired adverse possession. 5. The learned trial Judge held that by virtue of the decision in S.A.No.1431 of 1973, is barred by the principles aires judicata and that the plaintiff, when she purchased schedule properties under Ex.A-2 sale deed knew that there was other co-owner property but in spite of it she purchased and therefore, she has to bear the consequences arising therefrom and hence she cannot claim any larger share than one held by her which alone had passed under the sale deed, by asking for a general partition properties including the suit properties and other properties owned by the sons and of Joseph. The trial Court also held that the 12th defendant, who had purchased items 6 of ‘A’ schedule properties on 5.11.1958 had perfected title by adverse possession therefore, there cannot be allotment of shares in these items to the plaintiff by Ex.A-2 sale deed and that the plaintiff not being a purchaser from a member coparcenary Hindu joint family, she cannot ask for general partition of all the properties the three co-owners, namely, the sons and daughter of Joseph. 6. Learned single Judge has held in agreement with the decree of the trial Court that of the decree in S.A.No.1431 of 1973 under which defendants 4 to 11 and 2nd defendant entitled to 2/3rd share against which the plaintiff cannot have any say, it is not possible allot the B schedule properties to her and that the 13th defendant, the alienee purchaser, having been in uninterrupted possession for more than 17 years, had acquired adverse possession. 7. There cannot be any question to the case pleaded by the defendants that the three of Joseph were co-parceners and that the law applied to a Hindu Co-parcenary applicable to the properties in dispute. It also cannot be disputed that as co-owners the sons of Joseph were entitled to equal share and that in the capacity of co-owners they entitled to transfer their respective shares. The question here however, is how purchaser from one of the co-owners, the plaintiff, would be entitled to get possession properties transferred to her. The decision in Visalakshi Animal v. Narayanaswami (1977)2 M.L.J. 88 , provides an answer to this question. The question here however, is how purchaser from one of the co-owners, the plaintiff, would be entitled to get possession properties transferred to her. The decision in Visalakshi Animal v. Narayanaswami (1977)2 M.L.J. 88 , provides an answer to this question. That is the judgment in the Appeal 1431 of 1973. It says. “....The succession in this case opened on the death of Joseph on 15th October, 1956. that date, John, the vendor of the plaintiff, Biera, the vendor of the second defendant the third defendant alone were alive. They would each be entitled to one-third Arumaikannu, the widow of Joseph who was alive was only entitled to maintenance out income from the property. But since she is dead now, that question also does not arise. John, the vendor of the ‘plaintiff had one-third share in the suit properties which he have legally conveyed under Ex.A-11, dated 6th June, 1962 to the plaintiff. Thus, though plaintiff claimed the entirety of the suit properties, he had established his title to one the suit properties. It is well-settled that when the plaintiff claims a larger interest able to establish a lesser interest, to the extent he was able to establish his decree could be granted. The plaintiff is accordingly, given a preliminary decree for and separate possession of his one-third share in the suit properties. I may add view that he will be a co-owner of the suit property, the defendants will not be entitled improvements even if they had made any such improvements.” The above gives us an idea of the law that has to be applied to a transfer by a co his share in tenancy in common. The sale deed which Gov-indarayulu had obtained from third defendant with respect to items 1 to 4 in ‘A’ schedule (schedule ‘B’ properties) ordered to be confined to the extent of the share of his vendor, that is to say, defendant in so far as the suit properties in O.S.No.229 of 1963 are concerned. The herein, however, who also is a purchaser from one of the co-owners, i.e., first defendant, sued for a share in the properties held in common by the sons of Joseph or their transferees, alleging that not items 1 to 4 in A schedule but other properties also fell in the common of the tenancy in common. The herein, however, who also is a purchaser from one of the co-owners, i.e., first defendant, sued for a share in the properties held in common by the sons of Joseph or their transferees, alleging that not items 1 to 4 in A schedule but other properties also fell in the common of the tenancy in common. According to her, if the sale deed has to be limited to the of the share of the vendor, such share has to be determined not only in items 1 to schedule but in all the properties held in common with equal rights of the three Joseph. 8. Both the plaintiff in the instant suit, who is a purchaser from the first son of Joseph Gov-indarayulu were parties to the suit, O.S.No.229 of 1963. The adjudication as shares of the three sons of Joseph and the rights which the purchasers from them may has taken place in their presence. Both of them are bound by the adjudication in the said and the appeals. But still it has to be decided, whether any principle of res judicata attracted on the facts of the case to defeat the suit of the plaintiff on the ground adjudication has already been made in respect of the properties involved in the said shares of the sons of Joseph have already been determined. Res judicata is a rule applied to any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has directly and substantially determined in a former suit between the same parties or parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title in a competent Court. 9. On somewhat similar facts, however, in Morusu Lakshmamma v. Bella Maoccra, 1982 NOC. 259, a learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has said, “The preliminary decree in the earlier partition suit against the defendant would not be to the maintainability of the subsequent action by him for partition, where the relief given only to the plaintiff and where the rights of the defendants were only declared executable decree was passed in their favour.” We have quoted the finding in the second appeal. It is clear, therefore, that preliminary decree has been passed for partition and the decree has been given not defendants but to the plaintiff (in the said suit) alone, the court in that case would adjudicate as to the validity of the sale deed of the plaintiff in the instant suit. The only involved was whether the plaintiff in the said suit was entitled to the properties conveyed the third son of Joseph to him or not. He was given a preliminary decree for partition separate possession of his one-third share in the suit properties. 10. As a purchaser from the first son of Joseph, who admittedly had one-third share properties of Joseph like the vendor of Govindarayulu, the plaintiff in the instant entitled to pray for a decree. That she has asked for in the instant suit. The however, is whether while asking for such a decree the plaintiff has to confine properties which were mentioned in the earlier suit or not? It is well-settled preliminary decree only declares the shares of the parties and determines the extent right of the persons who are co-owners of a property. It does not finally determine number of items of properties. Such items of the properties may be found subsequently which were not included in the hotchpot of the family and thus, were subjected partition. Such properties which were left out can always be a subject of partition course of the final decree, if at all the partition is between the parties or in a separate a decree for partition is granted to the plaintiff only and other members are left owners of the property. In the instant case the plaintiff has been able to show properties belonged to Joseph and thus belonged to the sons of Joseph. She has the right which has been created in her favour by virtue of the sale deed, if dispute as to the validity of the sale deed or if there is a dispute, the sale deed is valid. It will be improper in such a situation to defeat the suit of the plaintiff on that in the previous suit instituted by Govindarayalu, a preliminary decree has been in his favour. 11. It is not understandable how the case of the 13th defendant has been accepted by the court below and it has been held that he perfected title by adverse possession. 11. It is not understandable how the case of the 13th defendant has been accepted by the court below and it has been held that he perfected title by adverse possession. Such a finding will stand in conflict with the law stated in S.A.No.1431 of 1973. Moreover, unless it is shown that someone exercised possession openly and hostile to the interests of those who are entitled to the possession of property, a purchaser from one co-owner will be entitled to only the equity and not possession. He shall have to ask for partition and only when such partition decree is granted that he would be entitled to separate possession. 12. So that as it may, since we do not propose in the instant case to decide any issue finally as in our view it would be incorrect to say that the suit will be barred by res judicata, intend to remit the case to the Court below for a re-hearing and disposal in accordance law. 13. In the result, the appeal is allowed; the judgments and decrees of the court below set aside; the suit is remitted to the trial court for re-hearing and disposal in accordance with law. No costs. Appeal allowed.