JUDGMENT - SRIKRISHNA B.N., J.:—This writ petition impugns an order of the Industrial Court. Bombay, dated 22nd March, 1984, in Appeal (IC) No. 75 of 1983, by which the appeal of the first respondent was allowed and an order of reinstatement with full back wages, granted in favour of one employee, Baldevraj Bharadwaj, was reversed. The proceedings in the two courts below arose under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). 2. The petitioner is the representative and approved union of the employees in Silk Industry in the local area of Greater Bombay. One employee, by name Baldevraj Bharadwaj, was employed as a permanent weaver in the services of the first respondents (hereinafter, he shall be referred to as “the employee”). The employee was issued a charge-sheet dated 28th August, 1980, alleging certain misconduct against him. It appears that an enquiry was held into the charge-sheet, which resulted in his being found guilty of misconduct and dismissed from service on 31st October, 1980. The petitioner challenged the order of dismissal issued against the employee by making an Application (LCB) No. 1441 of 1980 before the Labour Court, Bombay, under section 78 of the Act. A number of contentions were taken in the application to show that the enquiry held against the employee was illegal, contrary to the provisions of Standing Orders and natural justice, as a result of which, it was contended that the order of dismissal issued against the employee was illegal and improper and relief was sought by way of setting aside the said order of dismissal, and a direction to the first respondent for reinstatement of the employee with continuity of service and full back wages. The first respondent was served with a notice of the Labour Court, calling upon it to file a written statement, if it so desired. The notice was issued to the first respondent on 15th January, 1981 and it was called upon to file its written statement on 3rd February, 1981. On 12th February, 1981, an Advocate appeared for the first respondent, and, having undertaken to file his authority, applied for extension of time to file the written statement, which was granted. The matter stood adjourned to 31st March, 1981 for written statement. On 12th February, 1981, an Advocate appeared for the first respondent, and, having undertaken to file his authority, applied for extension of time to file the written statement, which was granted. The matter stood adjourned to 31st March, 1981 for written statement. On 31st March, 1981, the story was repeated, and the matter came to be adjourned, on the same undertaking and the same prayer for extension of time till 28th April, 1981. On 28th April, 1981, the Advocate for the first respondent (who had earlier given his undertaking to file his appearance) filed an application under his signature before the Labour Court. The purport of the application was that the first respondent's factory was situate in Dahisar in Thane District, and, as such, the cause of action had arisen beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Labour Court at Bombay, and, therefore, the application was not maintainable. A prayer was made that the jurisdictional issue may be first determined, and thereafter, if jurisdiction was there, leave may be given to the first respondent to file its written statement. Thereafter, applications were filed from time to time for adjournments, in which the same prayer was repeated up to 25th November, 1982. Till that date, no written statement had been filed by the first respondent. On that date, when the matter was called out, no one appeared for the first respondent. The Labour Court directed the petitioner to prove its case by filing an affidavit, which was done. After considering the material before it, the Labour Court decided the application by its Order dated 30th November, 1982. 3. By its order, the Labour Court overruled the objection as to territorial jurisdiction by taking the view that no material had been placed on record, from which the objection could be sustained. On merits, it held that the employee had been illegally suspended under a colourable charge-sheet and after being subjected to the farce of an enquiry. It was also held that the dismissal was by way of victimization for legitimate trade union activities, illegal, improper and mala fide. On relief, the Labour Court held that the employee was entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. It was also held that the dismissal was by way of victimization for legitimate trade union activities, illegal, improper and mala fide. On relief, the Labour Court held that the employee was entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. Consequently, the application was allowed, the order of dismissal against the employee quashed and set aside, and the first respondent was directed to reinstate the employee in service with continuity and full back wages from 29th August, 1980. 4. The first respondent, after receipt of the order of the Labour Court, perhaps, became fully awake. It rushed to the Industrial Court and filed an appeal thereagainst, which was numbered as (IC) No. 75 of 1983. The principal contention advanced in the appeal was that there was material on record of the Labour Court, by which the jurisdictional issue could have been answered. It was contended that there was reference to a relevant notification issued by the Industrial Court, and said reference was made in the application for adjournment dated 14th December, 1981 (Exhibit C-6 before the Labour Court). This application did refer to Circular No. 1 of 1976, issued by the President of the Industrial Court, and published in Maharashtra Government Gazette, Part 1-L, at page 6629, in its issue of December, 1976. The Industrial Court was very much impressed by this contention. It held that, in the face of this material available on record, the Labour Court had wrongly assumed jurisdiction to entertain the application. Perusal of the said circular, published in the said Gazette, would have shown that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction, in the view of the Industrial Court as the factory of the first respondent was situate in the District of Thane, which was outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Labour Court at Bombay, as indicated in the aforesaid circular. Reading the circular in this fashion, the learned Judge of the Industrial Court reversed the finding of the Labour Court on the jurisdictional issue, and allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Labour Court appealed against and ordered that the application be returned to the petitioner for presentation to the appropriate Court. It is this order of the Industrial Court in appeal, which is impugned by the present petition. 5. Mrs. Mhatre, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, vigorously assailed the order of the Industrial Court. It is this order of the Industrial Court in appeal, which is impugned by the present petition. 5. Mrs. Mhatre, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, vigorously assailed the order of the Industrial Court. She pointed out that the Circular No. 1 of 1976, relied upon by the Industrial Court, is published at page 6629 of the Maharashtra Government Gazette, Part One-L dated 16th December, 1976. She pointed out that this circular is a circular issued by the President of the Industrial Court in exercise of his powers under section 85-A of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, and that, by this circular, it has been directed that cases arising from the local areas in the districts of Thane, Kolaba and areas of two Municipal Wards viz. Ghatkopar and Mulund on and from 23rd August, 1976 would be filed in the Labour Court, Thane. In the submission of the learned Advocate, this notification, whatever its worth, cannot determine the territorial jurisdiction of the Labour Court constituted under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. There is considerable merit in the contention. 6. Section 9 of the Act provides that the State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Labour Courts having jurisdiction in such local areas as may be specified in such notification and shall appoint persons having the qualifications as prescribed in the said section. It is thus clear that the power to constitute a Labour Court and delineate its jurisdiction is that of the State Government and not of the Industrial Court. Section 85-A of the Act merely empowers the Industrial Court to withdraw proceedings under the Act pending before a Labour Court and transfer them to another Labour Court, for disposal. Section 85-A does not empower the Industrial Court to define the territorial limits of jurisdiction of the Labour Court established under section 9 of the Act. In my view, therefore, the Circular No. 1 of 1976 dated 20th August, 1976, on which reliance was placed by the first respondent and which was accepted uncritically by the Industrial Court, has no relevance whatsoever to the issue in question. As a matter of fact, a notification does appear to have been issued under section 9, by which the limits of territorial jurisdiction of the Labour Court constituted at Thane have been laid down. As a matter of fact, a notification does appear to have been issued under section 9, by which the limits of territorial jurisdiction of the Labour Court constituted at Thane have been laid down. Such notification is the Notification dated 16th January, 1981, issued under section 9 of the Act by the State Government and is published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette in its issue dated 12th February, 1981, on pages 869 to 871. This notification states that it was issued in suppression of all previous notifications. It also constituted several Courts at Bombay and Thane, and indicates the territorial jurisdiction of the various Labour Courts. The notification says that the Labour Courts indicated in Column 1 of the Schedule would exercise jurisdiction in the local areas specified against them in column 2 of the Schedule to the said notification. A reading of this notification makes it clear, beyond doubt, that, at the relevant time, 9 Labour Courts constituted in Bombay simultaneously had territorial jurisdiction over causes of action arising in the local areas in Greater Bombay as defined in Clause (al) of section 3 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. Thane District, Raigad District, Nashik District, Jalgaon District and Dhule District. The factory of the first respondent was situated at Swami Vivekanand Road, Dahisar, Bombay 400068. Though there is some dispute as to whether this location would fall within Greater Bombay Municipal Corporation limits or Thane District, for the purposes of the present petition, it makes no difference. At the relevant time, both these local areas fell within the territorial jurisdictional limits of the Labour Courts at Bombay, including the 5th Labour Court, which entertained the application of the petitioner. I am, therefore, of the view that the impugned judgment and order of the Industrial Court dated 22nd March, 1984 is clearly erroneous, as it proceeds by placing reliance on a wholly irrelevant and inapplicable circular. The correct state of affairs was that, at the relevant time, the Labour Courts at Bombay, including the 5th Labour Court, had jurisdiction over the cause of action arising out of the dismissal of the employee from service of the first respondent-factory at Dahisar. Consequently, the impugned order of the Industrial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. 7. The correct state of affairs was that, at the relevant time, the Labour Courts at Bombay, including the 5th Labour Court, had jurisdiction over the cause of action arising out of the dismissal of the employee from service of the first respondent-factory at Dahisar. Consequently, the impugned order of the Industrial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. 7. The petition is allowed, the order of the Industrial Court dated 22nd March, 1984, made in Appeal (IC) No. 75 of 1983, is hereby quashed and set aside, and the Order of the 5th Labour Court, Bombay, dated 30th November, 1982 in Application (LCB) No. 1441 of 1980 is restored. Rule is, accordingly, made absolute with costs. Petition allowed. -----