Judgment S.B.Sinha, J. 1. This writ application is directed against an order dated 22-4-1991 passed by respondent No. 1 in Case No. M J. 1/1986 as contained in Annexure-4 to the writ application whereby and whereunder he allowed an application filed by respondent No. 2 purported to be under Sec. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 directing the petitioners to pay a sum of Rs. 1,53,287.00 within a period of 60 days from the date of the said order. 2. The fact of the matter is not at all in dispute. 3. Respondent No. 2 joined services as a Routine Clerk in the Department of F.A.s CAD, East India Railway under the Railway Board In 1956 his services were transferred to NCDC Ltd. (since known as Central Coalfields Ltd). On the basis of some complaint received as against respondent No 2 by NCDC Ltd., the matter was referred to the Central Bureau of Investigation and a chargesheet was issued as against him. Thereafter, by an order dated 4/5-1-1972, respondent No. 2 was compulsorily retired The said respondent filed an application under Section 26(2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 before respondent No. 1 and by an order dated 20th January 1979 the said application was allowed ; as a result whereof the order of compulsory retirement passed as against respondent No 2 was set aside and he was held to be entitled to the back wages also till the attainment of the age of superannuation less what he had received as pension The said order dated 20th January, 1979 is contained in Annexure-1: 4. It was further directed that from the date, the respondent No 2 attained the age of 58 years, he would be entitled to full pension gratuity and other benefits less what he has already received. A writ petition was filed in this Court by the petitioner against the said order dated 20th January, 1979, which was registered as C.W.J.C. No. 326 of 1979 (R) and by judgment dated 31-7-1985, the said writ application was dismissed. Thereafter the petitioner filed a petition for grant of Special Leave to Appeal before the Hon ble Supreme Court of India which was also dismissed by an order dated 13-2-1986. 5. Thereafter the petitioner filed a petition for grant of Special Leave to Appeal before the Hon ble Supreme Court of India which was also dismissed by an order dated 13-2-1986. 5. In the year 1988, the petitioner filed an application before respondent No. 1 purported to be under Sec. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act claiming interest from the petitioners for non-payment of his retiral benefits and other dues amounting to Rs. 1,89,705-details whereof have been mentioned in Annexure-A thereto. 6. By reason of the impugned order, as indicated hereinbefore, the respondent No. 1 has held that respondent No. 2 is entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,53,287.00 by way of interest. 7. Mr. M.M. Banerjee learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that as no interest was directed to be paid by respondent No. 1 in his order dated 20-1-1979 as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ application nor any such order granting interest has been allowed by this Court in the aforementioned writ application ; the respondent No. 2 cannot be said to have any legal right to claim interest as against the petitioners in a proceeding under Sec. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 8. Learned Counsel in this connection has relied upon Management of Nathans Press V/s. Krishnan and Ors. reported in 1988 LAB IC 700. Learned Counsel further submitted that a proceeding under Sec. 38-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act being in the nature of an execution proceeding, respondent No. 1 should not have directed the petitioner to pay interest in respect whereof, the respondent No. 2 was not entitled to in law and, thus, had no legal right to maintain such an application. The said application was thus not maintainable at all. Learned Counsel in this connection has relied upon a decision of this Court in Bihar Water Development Corporation and Ors. V/s. Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Ors. reported in 1989 (1) Bihar Law Judgment 252. 9. Mr. C.B. Mitter learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2, on the other hand, submitted that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of India, a person is entitled to pension, gratuity and other retirement benefits immediately after his retirement as a matter of right. reported in 1989 (1) Bihar Law Judgment 252. 9. Mr. C.B. Mitter learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2, on the other hand, submitted that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of India, a person is entitled to pension, gratuity and other retirement benefits immediately after his retirement as a matter of right. According to the learned Counsel if such a right had been denied to the respondent No. 2 by the petitioner, an application under Sec. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act would be maintainable for a direction upon the petitioner to pay interest in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court of India. Learned Counsel in this connection ha; relied upon State of Kerala and Ors. V/s. M. Padmanabhan Nair reported in 1985 LAB IC 664: in O.P. Gupta V/s. Union of India and others reported in 1987 LAB IC 1904; and in Gammon India Ltd. V/s. Niranjan Dass . 10. It was further submitted by the learned court that from a comparison of the provisions contained in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Sec. 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, it would be evident that whereas in terms of Sub-section (1), the reliefs granted under an award, settlement etc, can be executed, but no such restrictions have been imposed in relation to a proceeding under Sub-sec. (2) thereof. 11. According to the learned Counsel, Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 33 of the Act is much wider in its operation than Sub-sec. (1). Learned Counsel in this connection has relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Bihar State Transport Corporation V/s. Bhawsagar Mishra and Ors. reported in 1979 (1) Labour Law Journal 237. 12. In this case, the basic facts are not disputed. It is not disputed that respondent No. 2 was compulsorily retired and the Labour Court in an application filed on his behalf under Sec. 26(2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 held that said order dated 6-1-1982 of compulsory retirement was illegal. It is further not in dispute that the petitioner filed writ application being C.W.J.C. No. 326 of 1979 (R) in this Court which was dismissed on 21-7-1985. 13. It is further not in dispute that the petitioner filed writ application being C.W.J.C. No. 326 of 1979 (R) in this Court which was dismissed on 21-7-1985. 13. It is further admitted case of the parties that the petitioner filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court of India against the aforementioned judgment of this Court which was dismissed on 13-2-1986, It is further admitted that the respondent No. 2 reached his age of superannuation on 2-8-1975 that is while the proceedings before the Labour Court under Sec. 26 (2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act was pending. 14. The petitioner paid all dues of the respondent No. 2 on 18-8-1986. Before respondent No. 1, in his application under Sec. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, respondent No. 2 claimed interest on his dues as detailed hereinbelow:- - I. Arrear interest due @ 12% per annun on: 1. Salaries from 1-2-1979, Rs. 94,319 2. Pension from 2-8-1975 Rs. 35,401 3. Gratuity and Leave Salary from 2-8-1975 Rs. 55,541 4. Compensation from 1-2-1979 Rs. 795 5. Bonus Rs. 3,649 _________ Total Interest upto 31-1-1988 Total Rs. 1,89,705 15 Respondent No. 1 allowed the claim of the respondent No. 2 to the extent of Rs. 153.287 but held that he is not entitled to any interest on the aforementioned amount. 16. In view of various decisions of this Court as also the Supreme Court of India, the scope of the provisions contained in Sec. 33-C(2) is not longer res-integra. 17. In Bihar Water Development Corporation and Ors. V/s. Presiding Officers, Labour Court and Ors. reported in 1989 (1) Bihar Law Judgment 252, a Division Bench of this Court has held as follows:- - We must accordingly hold that Sec. 33-C(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claim that the benefit to which they are entitled would be computed in terms of money even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers. 8. On the basis of the observations of the Supreme Court in the Central Bank case, it was urged on behalf of the O.P. No. 2 that the Labour Court was perfectly justified in making an incidantal inquiry for determination as to whether the claim of O.P. No. 2 would be on the basis of the pay-scale of Rs. 165-204 or the pay-scale of Rs. 205-315. 165-204 or the pay-scale of Rs. 205-315. It was also pointed out that even in the case reported in AIR 1974 SC 1604 , the Supreme Court had observed that it was within the competence of the Labour Court while dealing with an application under Sec. 33-C(2) to enter into an incidental inquiry for determining whether the workman was entitled to the benefit claimed by him. 18. It is, therefore, not in dispute that generally a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) is in the nature of execution proceeding but when a question arises as to whether the petitioner is entitled to a benefit or not, such a question may be considered incidentially in appropriate cases by the Labour Court. 19. In Bharat Coking Coal Ltd V/s. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City reported in 1991 (2) BLJ 266 , this Court while considering various decisions of the Supreme Court namely, Central Bank of India Ltd. V/s. P.S. Rajagopalan reported in -- ; in C.I.W.T. Corporation V/s. Workman reported in -- and in P.K. Singh V/s. Presiding Officer reported in AIR 1988 1618 SC held as follows:- - I have analysed above the position of law with respect to the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Act as determined from time to time by the Hon ble Supreme Court and this Court. From these it would appear that a proceeding under Sec. 33-C(2) is a proceeding generally in the nature of an execution proceeding in which the labour court is called upon to calculate and determine the amount of money due to workman from his employer, or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being paid in terms of money, the labour court will proceed to compute the benefit in terms of money. This calculation or computation, however, has to be done upon an existing right to the money or benefit in view of its being previously adjudged. However, for any such claim for the relief involved, an investigation is directed for the determination of the plaintiffs right to the relief or the corresponding liability of the defendant it will not to be within the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Act. 20. However, for any such claim for the relief involved, an investigation is directed for the determination of the plaintiffs right to the relief or the corresponding liability of the defendant it will not to be within the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Act. 20. The question, therefore, which arises for consideration in this case is as to whether a claim of interest can be said to be an existing legal right or not which can be enforced in a proceeding under Sec. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 21. It is true that in a given case, the High Court or the Supreme Court while considering an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India or Article 32 and 136 thereof arising out of an order of reinstatement and back wages may allow interest on the back wages and other benefits payable to the workmen if it be held that the employer has without any just cause withheld the lawful dues of the workmen. 22. In Gammon India Ltd. V/s. Niranjan Dass , 12% interest was granted on buck wages and other benefits. In Bihar State Transport Corporation V/s. Bhawsagar Mishra and Ors. reported in 1979 (1) Labour Law Journal 232, the question which arose for consideration was as to whether the increments in the pay of the respondents had been reasonably withheld in accordance with the service rules and instructions. The Division Bench held that such an investigation is within the ambit of the power of the Labour Court .is the same would be merely incidental to the main question viz. the amounts to which the respondents are entitled had they been allowed to cross the efficiency bar at the proper time. In that case, it was further held that the legal right of the workmen flew from the instructions issued by the Government inasmuch as the terms and conditions of the services of workmen of the Bihar State Transport Corporation are also governed by the Bihar Service Code. 23. In State of Kerala V/s. Padmanabhan Nair reported in 1985 LAB IC 664, the Supreme Court held that the pension and gratuity are no longer any bounty to be distributed by the Government and if there was any culpable delay in settlement and disbursement thereof must be visited with the penalty of payment of interest. 23. In State of Kerala V/s. Padmanabhan Nair reported in 1985 LAB IC 664, the Supreme Court held that the pension and gratuity are no longer any bounty to be distributed by the Government and if there was any culpable delay in settlement and disbursement thereof must be visited with the penalty of payment of interest. The Supreme Court held that the liability to pay penal interest on these dues at the current market rate commences at the expiry of two months from the date of retirement. (underlining is mine) 24. In O.P. Gupta V/s. Union of India and Ors. reported in 1987 LB IC 1904, it was held that it is a settled practice to allow interest at 12% if the employee has not been paid his pension. Normally, this Court, as a settled practice, has been making direction for payment of interest at 12% on delayed payment of pension. There is no reason for us to depart from that practice in the facts of the present case. 25. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is, thus, clear that only in case where a retired employee approaches the Court for a direction to pay unto him the pension to which he is entitled to as matter of right, interest @ 12% per annum is granted by way of practice. Strictly speaking, therefore, it is not right of anybody to be awarded with interest. 26. Thus, if anybody has any legal right under the terms and conditions of service or under the relevant statutory Rules to obtain interest on the amount due no legal right exists on him, to enforce so far as his claim of interest is concerned in a proceeding under Sec. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 27. In The Management of Nathans Press V/s. K. Krishnan and Ors. reported in 1988 LAB IC 700, a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court has clearly held that where the award reinstated the workman with full back wages, the Labour Court under Sec. 33-C((sic)) while making the computation has got only role of an executing court and it cannot go beyond the award unless the question is incidental to working the reliefs on the basis of the award. 28. 28. It was further held: The heads of claim could be based only on the award and in the absence of any provision for the payment of interest in the award there cannot be any claim for any such interest. The claim for interest could not be said to be incidental to computation of the benefits given under the award. Therefore, the award of interest by the Labour Court would not be justified. 29. It is, therefore, clear that the application filed by respondent No. 2 under Sec. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was not maintainable. Further in this case, although the petitioner filed an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India before this Court challenging the order the Labour Court under Sec. 26(2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, it did not pray for any stay of the award. It was, thus, open to respondent No. 2 to file a suitable application in this Court for a direction upon the employer to pay the amount or in the alternative he could have taken steps for executing the said order. It is not the case of the respondent No. 2 that any prayer was made for grant of interest either before this Court in the aforementioned C.W.J.C. No. 326 of 1979 (R) or in the Special Leave Petition filed before the Supreme Court of India. 30. However, the question which now arises is as to whether it would be equitable to set aside the order of the respondent No. 1 in its entirety or not. 31. Recently a Division Bench of this Court in Suku Mahto and Anr. V/s. State of Bihar and Ors. being CWJC No. 427 of 1991 (R) held as follows:- - In Joy Bharat Transport Co. and Anr. V/s. Central Coalfields Ltd. reported in 1988 BLJ 192,1 had held: It is now well known that this Court does not interfere with a given case only because it would be lawful to do so. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India may refuse to issue writ in the event it is found that substantial justice has been done to the parties or in larger interest it would not be prudent to issue a writ. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India may refuse to issue writ in the event it is found that substantial justice has been done to the parties or in larger interest it would not be prudent to issue a writ. It is also known that the right of an individual sometimes has got to give way to the right of the public at large. Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, a High Court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who has not approached the Court with clean hands. This aspect of the matter has also recently been considered by the Supreme Court in Orissa Cement Limited V/s. State of Orissa and Ors. reported in -- wherein the Supreme Court opined: It will be appreciated that it is not always possible in all situation give a logical and complete effect to a finding. Many situations of this type arise in actual practice. For instance, there are cases where a Court comes to the conclusion that the termination of the services of an employee is invalid. Yet, it refrains from giving him the benefit of reinstatement (i.e. continuity in service) or back wages. In such cases, the direction of the Court does result in a person being denied the benefits that should flow to him as a logical consequence of a declaration in his favour. 31. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India cannot refuse to interfere with the order or a part thereof passed by an authority subordinate to it if it finds that substantial justice has been done to the parties. 32. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the petitioner should be held to be at least liable to pay interest on the amount of pension and gratuity to the respondent No. 2 from 1st October, 1975, that is, after the expiry of two months @ 12% per annum. 33. In the result, this application is allowed in part and the matter is remanded back to respondent No. 1 to dispose of the application of respondent No. 2 in the light of the directions made hereinbefore. 33. In the result, this application is allowed in part and the matter is remanded back to respondent No. 1 to dispose of the application of respondent No. 2 in the light of the directions made hereinbefore. The respondent No. 1 shall dispose of the matter with utmost expedition and not later than two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Both the petitioner and respondent No. 2 are directed to appear before respondent No. 1 by 10th of January, 1992. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the petitioner shall also bear the cost of respondent No. 2 which is quantified at Rs. 1000.