JUDGMENT K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. - Common question arises in all these writ petitions. For the sake of convenience, facts in W.Ps. No. 258 and 259 of 1988 are referred. The petitioner is a dealer registered under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (for short, "the Act") as also under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (for short, "C.S.T. Act"). Petitioner purchases "coal ash" from a cement company and sells the same either locally or in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. The petitioner was notified under section 12-B of the Act to pay sales tax on sale of coal ash under section 5(1) at the rate of 7 per cent, which is a multi-point levy. Similar notices were issued to pay tax under section 9 of C.S.T. Act read with section 5(1) of the Act at the rate of 10 per cent on sale of coal ash without "C" forms. Subsequently demands were issued to make payment as per the notices. The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, in his circular dated June 24, 1987 expressed his view that "boiler ash" is taxable at 7 per cent and "coal ash" is not a Fourth Schedule item and is therefore taxable under section 5(1) of the Act. The petitioner's contention is : The Fourth Schedule to the Act enumerates the "declared goods"; item 1 thereof refers to "coal, including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal"; similar is the wording of item (1-A) of section 14 of C.S.T. Act. Therefore, coal in any of its forms is a declared goods (so long as it is not charcoal); if so, under section 15 of C.S.T. Act, if sales tax is levied under the local law the same shall have to be refunded to the dealer who effected inter-State sales of such declared goods; there is a bar to levy tax at more than one stage. To the same effect is section 5(4) of the Act. Coal ash is nothing but coal which is a declared goods and therefore the demands made against the petitioner are illegal. Since the highest authority of the department has already expressed a view contrary to the petitioner's contention, no useful purpose will be served by agitating the question by resorting to the statutory forums. Coal ash is nothing but coal which is a declared goods and therefore the demands made against the petitioner are illegal. Since the highest authority of the department has already expressed a view contrary to the petitioner's contention, no useful purpose will be served by agitating the question by resorting to the statutory forums. The respondents contended that the rate of tax leviable in respect of sale of Fourth Schedule goods is 4 per cent; but coal ash does not come within the purview of this Schedule, that coal ash is commercially a distinct commodity from coal, therefore the 1st respondent was justified in demanding the taxes under section 5(1) of the Act. According to the respondents coal ash is "waste" or "residue" of coal and that the consumers and merchants do not treat it as "coal" at all. Since the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes has already circulated his opinion on the question involved, I am of the view that the petitioner is justified in not pursuing the remedy under the Act. The preliminary objection of the respondents against the maintainability of the writ petition is therefore rejected. On merits, as usual, the learned counsel placed reliance on several decisions. One principle is now fully established; in a taxing statute words of every day use must be construed not in their scientific or technical sense but as understood in common parlance. In Porritts & Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana [1978] 42 STC 433 (SC); AIR 1979 SC 300 the question was whether cotton and woollen "dryer felts" which are woven textile felts of a kind commonly used in paper making machinery are "textile fabrics". "Textile" was held as having only one meaning, namely, "woven fabric" and therefore "dryer felts" were held to be "textiles". The Supreme Court cautioned against an approach of a conditioned mind, at page 438 of STC; 303 of AIR : "It is true that our minds are conditioned by old and antiquated notions of what are textiles and, therefore, it may sound a little strange to regard 'dryer felts' as 'textiles'. But it must be remembered that the concept of 'textiles' is not a static concept. But it must be remembered that the concept of 'textiles' is not a static concept. It has, having regard to newly developing materials, methods, techniques and processes, a continually expanding content and new kinds of fabric may be invented which may legitimately, without doing any violence to the language, be regarded as 'textiles'." In Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. v. Union of India [1987] 64 STC 180 (SC); AIR 1985 SC 1201 , the question pertained to the item under which "properzi rods" fell for Central excise levy. After referring to the principle of construing the meaning, the Supreme Court observed at page 185 of STC; 1205 of AIR : "Commercial parlance assumes importance when goods are marketable. It is therefore not possible to hold that the goods in question are not wire rods. There is preponderating evidence on record to show that they are nothing but a species of wire rods despite the special method of their manufacture and the use to which they are put." Thus the "end use" of the commodity by itself, was held not a conclusive test. The main question in State of Gujarat v. Raipur Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1967] 19 STC 1 (SC); AIR 1967 SC 1066 was whether the respondent - company was carrying on business in some of the goods which were discarded machinery, coal and by-products and subsidiary productions such as "kolsi", etc. Kolsi was obtained not as the main product at all. It was a by-product. "Kolsi" (cinders) were found to be small pieces of coal which are not fully burnt. The Supreme Court held at page 9 and 10 of STC; 1070 of AIR : "It appears that 'kolsi' is not capable of 'extreme fuel potency required in the furnaces' of the appellant - company, but it is still capable of being used in 'lighter furnaces'. This 'kolsi' is discharged from the furnaces regularly and continuously day after day. The company collects that 'kolsi' and sells it to intending purchasers in bulk. 'Kolsi' would be appropriately regarded as a subsidiary product in the course of manufacture. 'Kolsi' results from coal which remains unburnt : it is on that account a subsidiary product. This 'kolsi' is discharged from the furnaces regularly and continuously day after day. The company collects that 'kolsi' and sells it to intending purchasers in bulk. 'Kolsi' would be appropriately regarded as a subsidiary product in the course of manufacture. 'Kolsi' results from coal which remains unburnt : it is on that account a subsidiary product. When such subsidiary product is turned out in the factory regularly and continuously and is being sold from time to time, an intention to carry on business in 'kolsi' may be reasonably attributed to the company." This decision was referred to by the learned counsel on both sides, to convey the meaning of "cinder". However, the learned Government Pleader stressed the fact that "cinder" is not coal, but its by-product and therefore a different commodity. Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh [1967] 19 STC 469 SC; AIR 1967 SC 1454 , was cited to show that "charcoal" primarily falls within the concept of "coal". The Supreme Court pointed out that : "..... a merchant dealing in coal and a consumer wanting to purchase it would regard coal not in its geological sense but in the sense as ordinarily understood and would include 'charcoal' in the term 'coal'. It is only when the question of the kind or variety of coal would arise that a distinction would be made between coal and charcoal; otherwise, both of them would in ordinary parlance as also in their commercial sense be spoken as coal." Alladi Venkateswarlu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh [1978] 41 STC 394 (SC); AIR 1978 SC 945 is an authority for the proposition that "parched rice" and "puffed rice" are "rice". It was held that "rice in all forms" would include those forms of rice, though, in actual use they may be different. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in [1972] 29 STC 418 [App.]. Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Samrathmal Dhoolchand said that the dictionary meaning of "coal" includes coal ash; to the same effect is another decision of same High Court found in [1972] 29 STC 413 (Binod Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax). However, a Full Bench of the same High Court in Hukumchand Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1988] 71 STC 101 held that coal ash is different from coal, because the former is the product of the latter. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax). However, a Full Bench of the same High Court in Hukumchand Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1988] 71 STC 101 held that coal ash is different from coal, because the former is the product of the latter. Similarly in [1972] 30 STC 57 (Venkataraman and Company v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer) Madras High Court held that cinder is different from coal, a similar view was taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Chitta Reddi v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1969] 24 STC 317. In my view, the language employed by the statute is to be the primary consideration, to understand the meaning of the words used. "Coal in all its forms but excluding charcoal" is a very comprehensive phraseology. The law levying the tax, here, expressed clearly to cover all forms of coal under the particular item. The Supreme Court pointed out that when a commodity is stated, all its varieties are to be normally included in it (Jaswant Singh's case [1967] 19 STC 469 (SC) quoted above). Similarly, Alladi Venkateswarlu's case [1978] 41 STC 394 (SC) points out that "rice" includes all its forms (or varieties). In the decision of the Supreme Court State of Gujarat v. Sakarwala Brothers [1967] 19 STC 24, it was held that "sugar" includes all forms of sugar irrespective of its density. If these decisions are taken as a guidance, there can be no doubt that coal ash, though has a lesser degree of combustible nature from the parent coal, also would be a variety of coal; its fuel potency may be lower. The court is not concerned with the subtle distinction from a scientific or technological point of view. The Legislature has clearly excepted "charcoal" from "coal" and similarly, if "coal ash" was to be excluded, such an exclusion would have been stated. This clearly indicates that the word "coal" was used in a generic sense. For the reasons stated above, these writ petitions are to be allowed. The demands made against the petitioners treating "coal ash" as different from "coal" are set aside. Accordingly all writ petitions are allowed, without any order as to costs. Rule made absolute in all these petitions. Petitions allowed.