M. C. Jain, J. ( 1 ) THIS civil revision raises an important question as to the interprctation of Section 3 (c) as inserted by the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, (for short, the Amendment Act) That question arose before Hon ble Mr. Justice N. N. Goswami in the aforesaid revision. He, by his order dated 9 1. 19k9, referred the question to be answered authoritatively by the Division Bench of this Court. The question that arose before him was as to whether the Amendment Act applies to the pendicg proceedings and according to him as the question would arise in a number of pending cases before this court as well as before the Rent Controller and the Appellate authority, so for deciding the question authoritatively, reference was made by him for deciding the said question by the Division Bench. ( 2 ) WE may state a few relevant facts giving rise to the present reference. ( 3 ) THE petitioner in this petition, Mrs. Nirmaljeet Arora let out the premises in question to the respondent on 14. 7. 80 at a rental of Rs. 5000. 00 per month for a period of 3 years. On 18. 2. 1985, the petitioner filed a petition filed a petition for eviction under Section 14 (1 ) (e) read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act) against the respondent. The said petition after trial was dismissed by the Rent Controller, Delhi, On 7. 3. 1987. It was found that the petitioner acquired a rented premises being M-137, Greater Kailash-II, New Delhi, and the need of the petitioner has extinguished. Aggrieved from the order of the Rent Controller, the petitioner filed thin revision petition under Section 25-B (8) of the Rent Act, on 26 5. 1987. The respondents filed anapplication being CM. 2892/88 on 2. 12. 88, raising a plea that a new clause (c) has been added to Section 3 of the Rent Act, by the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 198x which lays down that the Act shall not apply to any premises whether residential or not whose monthly nt exceeds Rs. 3,500. 00 per month. In view of the above amendment, the premises in question were not covered by the provisions of Rent Act, 1958, as the agreed rent was more than Rs. 3,500. 00. 3,500. 00 per month. In view of the above amendment, the premises in question were not covered by the provisions of Rent Act, 1958, as the agreed rent was more than Rs. 3,500. 00. The Amendment baa come into effect from 1. 12. 88 and so the revision was not maintainable. Areplytothe said application was filed on 5. 12. 88 in which the plea raised in the application was stated to be untenable and it wai submitted that added provision section 3 (c) would not apply to the pending proceedings. It is under these circumstances that the question arose before the learned Judge who has referred the question to be answered by the Division Bench. ( 4 ) WE have beared Shri R. K Makhija, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sbri S. N. Marwaha, learned counsel for the respondent. A notice. was also sent to the Bar, calling upon the members of the Bar, calling upon the members of the Bar that the question aforesaid has arisen and if any lawyer is interested to assist the court for answering the said question, be may appear before the court and make his submissions. Mainly, the learned counsel for the parties made their submissions before us ( 5 ) BY Section 2 of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, clauses (c) and (d) have been added in Section 3 of (he Act. Section 2 of the Amending Act reads as under :- 2. Amendment of Section 3.-In Section 3 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958), (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act)- (i) in clause (a) the word "or" shall be omitted; (ii) after the proviso, the following clauses shall be inserted, namely :- " (C) to any premie, whether residetial or not, whose monthly relit exceeds three thousand and five hundred rupees; or (d) to any premises constructed on or after the commencement of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 19u, for a period of ten years from the date of completion of snch coastruction. " ( 6 ) SECTION 3 makes a provision that the Act shall not apply to premises which fall under clauses (a) (b) (c) and (d ). ( 7 ) THE expression "premiles" has been defined under Section 2 (i) which is as under :. " ( 6 ) SECTION 3 makes a provision that the Act shall not apply to premises which fall under clauses (a) (b) (c) and (d ). ( 7 ) THE expression "premiles" has been defined under Section 2 (i) which is as under :. " (I) "premises" means any building or part of a bnilding which is, or is intended to be, let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose, and includes,- (i) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any, appertaining to such building or part of the building ; (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of the building ; but does not include a room in a hotel or lodging house;" ( 8 ) THE provisions of the Rent Act would not be attracted in respect of the premises covered by clauses (a) to (d) of Section 3. . . So far as clauses (c) and (d) are concerned, they have come into-effect on 1. 12. 88. The question that arises for consideration, therefore, is that actions that petitions, revisions, or other proceedings which arc pending on 1. 12. 88, whether are to be governed by the Act or whether even to the pending actions and proceedings, Clause (c) of Section 3 would apply i c. whether the provisions of the Act would not apply to the pending actions and proceedings. The question, therefore, would be as to whether the amended provision of Section 3 (c) is prospective in operation or retrospective in operation. If the provision is prospective, then the question of application of section 3 (c) to the pending proceedings does not arise. It is only when it is found that Section 3 (c) is retrospective in operation, in that situation, the Act will not apply even to the pending proceedings. ( 9 ) BEFORE proceeding to consider the question, it would be appropriate to examine as to how such like provisions ire to be interpreted and construed. First we may refer to some of the authorities on Interpretation of Statutes. ( 10 ) MAXWELL on Interpretation of Statutes. Twelfth Edition, at page 215, under the heading. retrospective Operation of Statutes writes, "upon the presumption that the legislature does not intend what is unjust rests the leaning against giving certain statutes a retrospective operation. First we may refer to some of the authorities on Interpretation of Statutes. ( 10 ) MAXWELL on Interpretation of Statutes. Twelfth Edition, at page 215, under the heading. retrospective Operation of Statutes writes, "upon the presumption that the legislature does not intend what is unjust rests the leaning against giving certain statutes a retrospective operation. They are construed as operating only in cases or on facts which come into existence after the statutes were passed unless a retrospective effect is clearly intended. It is a fundamental rule of English law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. The statement of the law contained in the preceding paragraph has been "so frequently quoted with approval that it now itself enjoys almost Judicial authority. " ( 11 ) HE further referred to the observation of the judgment in Re: Athlumney by R S. Wright, J. The passage reads as under :- "perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this- that a retrospective operation is not to he-given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only. " The rule has, in fact, two aspects, for it "involves another and subordinate rule, to the effect that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary. " ( 12 ) THE Rule is further stated as under :- "if, however, the language or the dominant intention of the enactment so demands, the Act must be construed so as to have a retrospective operation, for "the rule against the retrospective effect of statutes is not a rigid or inflexible rule but is one to be applied always in the light of the language of the statute and the subjectmatter with which the statute is dealing. " ( 13 ) WITH regard to pending actions, on page 220, it is stated that in general, when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun unless the new statute shows its clear intention to vary inch rights. Reference was made by him to a decision of the Houses of Lordi in Att.-Gen v. Vernazsa [1960] A. C. 965. Lord Denning said (at p. 978) that it was "clear that ij the ordinary way the Court of Appeal cannot take into account a statute which has been passed in the interval since the case was decided at first instance, because the rights of the litigants are generally to be determined according to the law in force at the date of the earlier proceedings. But it is different when the statute is retrospective either because it contains clear words to that effect or because it deals with matters of procedure only, for then Parliament has shown an intention that the Act should operate on pending proceedings, and the Court of Appeal are entitled to give effect to this retrospective intent as well as a court of first instance. " ( 14 ) CRAIES on Statute Law, Seventh Edition at page 387, deals with retrospective Enactments . It is stated that a statute is to be deemed to be retrospective, which takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under. existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. The passage was exttacted from the Judgment in Lauri v. Renad [1892] 3 Ch. 402, by Lindley L J. that it is a fandamental rule of English Law that no statute shall beconstrued so as to have a retrospective operation, unless its language is such as plainly to require such a construction. And the same rule involves another and-subordinate rule, to the effect that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders 240 neccssary. And the same rule involves another and-subordinate rule, to the effect that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders 240 neccssary. At pafe 398, it is atated that it is well racognised rule that statutes should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect vested reghts," but such a construction should never be adopted if the words are open to another construction. It is also stated that if a statute be ambigaous, the court should lean to the interpretation which would support existing rights. ( 15 ) CRAWFORD on construction of statutes deals with Amendatory Acts, in paragraph 295 and he states that he states that as with statutes generally, an amendment will have no retrospective operation, unless its terms clearly indicate a different intent. There is also a presumption that amendments are effective prospectively. Consequently, rights acquired under a statute before its amendment are not affected, unless the amending statute, expressly or by necessary implication so provides. But if the legislative intent requires it, retroactive operation must be given to the amendments ( 16 ) SHRI R. K. Makhija, learned counsel for the petitioner cited quite a good deal of case law, but we would like to refer to some of the important decisions out of them. ( 17 ) IN United Provinces v, Aliqa Begum. AIR 1941 Federal Court 16, the question was with regard to the applicability of U. P. Regularisation of Remissions Act to the pending proceedings. In that case, the suit was instituted on 5. 12. 1934, by two land-holders for their share of the arrears of rent for the period 1931-1934 A. D. against the defendants who were thekadars fixing an annual rent of Rs. 948. 00 and entitling the thekadars to make collection of rents from tenants. The defendants claimed a deduction on account of remissions of rent which had been ordered. The plaintiff s contention that remissions could not be set off was rejected by the Assistant Collector and deductions were made and the suit was decreed in part. The District Judge On appeal rejected the contention that the scale of remission of rent was excessive and the first court s decree was upheld. The appeal was preferred to the High Court. The High Court held that the remissions not being in accordance with Section 73, Agra Tenancy Act. The District Judge On appeal rejected the contention that the scale of remission of rent was excessive and the first court s decree was upheld. The appeal was preferred to the High Court. The High Court held that the remissions not being in accordance with Section 73, Agra Tenancy Act. were ultra Vires and illegal and Section 04 of that Act was not a bar to that suit; but the suit was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs should have sued his tenants ignoring the remissions, lt was during the pendency of the appeal in the High Court the U. P. Regularisation of Remissions Act came into force on 24ih September, 1938, The U. P. Government entered as a party. Sniaiman J. observed that the intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the language actually employed in the Act. For statutes which confer or take away legal rights. whether public or private, or alter the jurisdiction of Courts of Law, express and unambiguous words arc necessary. No loophole should be left for escape. It was observed tha,t the order of remission dealt with by the U. P. Act is not necessarily within the four coiners of Sec. 73. nor ii there any specific reference to that section. The language actually used caa suggest that the section was intended to prevent the order of the Provincial Government, or any authority empowered by it in that behalf from being questioned. At page 39, column the learned Judge observed as under : "as already mentioned, the landholders in the present case ignoring the order of remission had claimed the full amount of the arrears of rent from the very beginning. Even in the second appeal before the High Court, they had challenged the order of remissions of rent in grounds Nos. 2, 3 and 6 of their memorandum of appeal, several years before the impungued Act came into force. They bad already called the previous order in question, and that plea was already before the High Court of consideration. The Legislature was presumably aware of the previous decision in KLR (1938) ALL 114 and must also have been aware that numerous other suits for arrears of rent must be pending. And yet no express words were pat in the impugned Act to show that it should apply to all actions pending in appeal. The Legislature was presumably aware of the previous decision in KLR (1938) ALL 114 and must also have been aware that numerous other suits for arrears of rent must be pending. And yet no express words were pat in the impugned Act to show that it should apply to all actions pending in appeal. Further, the provisions that no such order shall be called in question has a certain amount of ambiguity in it and leaves it doubtful whether only the parties are prevented from questioning the order or even the Court is debarred from ignoring it as having been issued by an unauthorised body, and enforcing the law that has not been repealed or amended by the U. P. Act, Of course, no such bar would exist against the Federal Court but in declaring what decree should be passed by the High Court it cannot ignore such a bar if it exists. In view of the trend of judicial decisions already referred to, I am of the opinion that the impugned Act was not applicable to the appeal pending before the High Court. " ( 18 ) IN Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay, AIR (38) 1951 S. C. 128, the question that arose for consideration was as to whether Article 13 (1) of the Constitution of India has a retrospective operation. Article 13 (1) declared that all laws in force in the territory of India which are inconsistent with the provisions of the fundamental rights to be void to the extent of inconsistency. In para 7, it was stated that all that this clause declares is that all existing laws in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of Part III shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. It was observed that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implications made to have retrospective operation. It was observed that before the Constitution came into force, there was no such thing as fundamental rights. As the fundamental rights being operative only on and from the date of Constitution, the question of the inconsistency of the existing laws with these rights must necessarily arise on and from the date those rights came into being. It must follow, therefore, that Article 13 (1) can have no retrospective effect but is wholly prospective in its operation. As the fundamental rights being operative only on and from the date of Constitution, the question of the inconsistency of the existing laws with these rights must necessarily arise on and from the date those rights came into being. It must follow, therefore, that Article 13 (1) can have no retrospective effect but is wholly prospective in its operation. ( 19 ) ANOTHER case cited by Shri Makhija is Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan and others. AIR I960 S. C. 655. In that ease. Section 13 (3) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947 was amended. The application for ejectment was made on August 28, 1956 and the Act was amended by the amending Act 29 of 1956 on September 24, 1956. Sections 13 and 13 were amended. Section 13 provided inter alia that a tenant in possession of a building shall not be evicted therefrom except in accordance with the provisions of that section, or in pursuance of an order made under Section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947 as subsequently amended. Sub-section (2) of Section 13 provided for anapplication to be made by a landlord who seeks to evict his. tenant for a direction in that behalf. Section 13 (3) (a) (Hi) as it stood at the date of the application made by respondent no. 1 provided that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession in the case of any building if be requires it for the reconstruction of that building or for its replacement by another building or for the erection of other buildings This provision was substantially modified by the amending Act. The question arose as to whether the amended provision applies to the present proceedings The question was coasidered in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the report. It was observed that if the amended pro- vision applied to the present we, respondent no. 1 would not be entitled to obtain an order of ejectment. It is plain that by the amendment Legislature bag imposed rigorous limitations on a landlord s right to recover possession in the case of any building or rented land. The question was whether the amendmest is retrospective in operation. It was obrerved, It is clear that the amendment made is not in relation to any procedure and cannot be characterised as procedural. The question was whether the amendmest is retrospective in operation. It was obrerved, It is clear that the amendment made is not in relation to any procedure and cannot be characterised as procedural. It is in regard to a matter of substantive law since it affects the substantive rights of the landlord. It may be conceded that the Act is intended to provide relief to the tenants and in that sense is a beneficial measure and as such its provision should be liberally construed; but this principle would not be material or even relevant in deciding the question as to whether the new provision is retrospective or not It is well-settled that where an amendment affects yested rights the amendment would operate prospectively unless it is expressly made retrospective or its retrospective operation follows as a matter of necessary implication. The amending Act obviously docs not make the relevant provision retrospective in terms and we see no reason to accept the suggestion that the retrospective operation of the relevant provision can be spelt out. as a matter of necessary implication. " ( 20 ) IT wasfurther considered as to what would be the consequences the provision is held to retrospective. It was observed that inevitably pending actions in which landlords may have applied for possession of their Itdtngs 1st out to the tenants under the provisions of Section 13 (3) (a) (iii) it stood before the amendment. would automatically fail because they would satisfy the tests imposed by ibe amended provision. If such a drastic nsequence was really intended by the Legislature, it would certainly have ade appropriate provisions in express terms in that behalf, lt was observed at when the Legislature intends to make substantive provisions of law etrospective inoperation, it generally makes its intention clear by express provisions in that behalf. It was concluded that, "we are, therefore, satisfied that Section 13 (3) (a) (iii) as amended cannot apply to proceedings which were pending either before the Controller or before the appellate authority at the time when the amendment was made. " ( 21 ) IN the present case, admittedly, the amendment Act came into force during the pendency of the revision petition. " ( 21 ) IN the present case, admittedly, the amendment Act came into force during the pendency of the revision petition. ( 22 ) IN Arjun Singh and another v. The State Punjab and others, AIR 1970 S. C. 703 the Question that arose for consideration was as to whether the insertio32 KK in Pepsu Act,1955 would be taken to be from 30. 101956 or will have a retrospective effect so as to be operatice the date of operation of the Principal Act no. 13 of 1955 i. e. from 6-3-1955 After stating the rule of construction, in para 4, was obseved para 5 that if the line of reasoning adopted by the learned Judge of the High Court is accepted, it would mean ignoring of subsection (2) of Section the 1962 Amendment Act. That section in specific terms says that Section 32-KK shall be deemed to have come into force on the 30th day of October 1956. It was observed that, that promion clearly brings out the intention There is no-ambiguity in it. It is not possible to adopt any rule of construction which would necessitate the Court ignore that provision and it it not possible to accept the conclusion of the High Court that Section 32-KK. must be deemed to have come into force on the date the principal Act came into force, namely, on March 6, 19s55. ( 23 ) REFERENCE has also been made to Sri Vijayalakshmi Rice Mills. New Contractors Co. etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh. AIR 1976 S. C. 1471. In that case, the question was as to whether enhanced price of rice can be demanded under the Rice (Andhra Pradesh) Price Control (Third Amendment) Order, 1964. Clause (2) of the Third Amendment Order, 1964 substituted the maximum prices of the varieties of rice. A contention was advanced on behalf of the appellants that the claim of the appellants cannot be calidly ignored as the word substituted occurs in clause (2) tel Third Amendmeat Order. It was claimed by the appellants that they have to be paid at the controlled price as fixed vide the Rice. (Andhra Pradesh) Price Control (Third Amendment) Order, 1964, regardless of the dates on which (be supplies were made. This contention was not acceded to. It was claimed by the appellants that they have to be paid at the controlled price as fixed vide the Rice. (Andhra Pradesh) Price Control (Third Amendment) Order, 1964, regardless of the dates on which (be supplies were made. This contention was not acceded to. It was observed that it is no doubt true that the literal meaning of the word substitute is to replacs" but the question is from which date the substitution or replacement of the new schedule took effect. It was observed that there is no deeming clause or some such provision in the Rice (Andhra Pradesh) Price Control (Third Amendment) Order, 1964 to indicate that it was intended to have a retrospective effect, it was further observed that, "it is a well recognised rule of interpretation that in the absence of express words or appropriate language from which retrospectivily may be inferred, a notification takes effect from the date it is issued and not from any prior date. The principle is also well settled that statutes should not be construed so as to create new disabilities or obligations or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time the Amending Act came into force. (See Nani Gopal Mitra v. State of Bihar, (1969) 2 SCR 411 )== air 1970 SC 1636 . " ( 24 ) IN the present case, by Section 2 of the Amending Act. 1988 after the proviso clause (c) was inserted, there is no deeming clause that it shall always be deemed to have been inserted. ( 25 ) REFERENCE has also been made to Govinddas and others . The Income-tax Officer and another, AIR 1977 S. C. 552. The question that arose for consideration in that case wa as to whether Section 171 (6) of the Incometax Act. 1961 is retrospective in operation. In that case, the assessment of HUF for assessment years 1950 5! to 1956-57 was completed under Section 25-A of the old Act. Tax was determined in reassessment proceedings. The question arose as to whether recovery can be effected under Section 171 (6) of the 1961 Act. P. N. Bhagwati, J. , as he then was, speaking for the Court observed, "sub-SECTION (6) of Section 171 applies only a situation where the assessment of a Hindu undivided family is completed under Section 143 or Section 144 of the new Act. P. N. Bhagwati, J. , as he then was, speaking for the Court observed, "sub-SECTION (6) of Section 171 applies only a situation where the assessment of a Hindu undivided family is completed under Section 143 or Section 144 of the new Act. It can have no application where the assessment of a Hindu undivided family is completed under the corresponding provisions of the old Act. Such a case would be governed by Section 25-A of the old Act which does not impose any personal liability on the members in case of partial partition and to construe Sub section (6) of Section 171 as applicable in such a cage with consequential effect of casting on the members personal liability which did not exist under Section 25-A. would be to give retrospective operation to Sub-section (6) of, Section 171 which is not warranted either by the express language of that provision or by necessary implication. Thus, Sub-section (6) of Section 171 of the new Act cannot be given retrospective operation. " ( 26 ) IN M/s Punjab Tin Supply Co. , Chandigarh, etc. v. Central Government and others, AIR 1984 S. C. 87, the exemption was granted by the Home Department Notification dated 3 I. I. I 973. as modified by notifications dated 24. 9. 74 to those buildings which were given sewerage connection or electric connection or which arc occupied, as the case may be, on or after January 31, 1973. It was held that the benefit of the notification cannot be extended the buildings which were given the sewerage connection or electric connection or which were occupied, as the case may be, prior to January 31, 1973. Those buildings are governed by the provisions of the Act and any decrees passed in respect of them are governed by Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as applicable to Union Territory of Chandigarh. Their Lordships, with regard to the rule of interpretation regarding retrospectivity observed: -. I "all laws which affect substantive rights generally operate prospectively and there is a presumption against their retrospectivity if they affect vested rights and obligations unless the legislative intent is. clear and compulsive. Such retrospective effect may be given where there are express words giving retrospective effect or where the language used necessarily implies that such retrospective operation is intended. I "all laws which affect substantive rights generally operate prospectively and there is a presumption against their retrospectivity if they affect vested rights and obligations unless the legislative intent is. clear and compulsive. Such retrospective effect may be given where there are express words giving retrospective effect or where the language used necessarily implies that such retrospective operation is intended. Hence, the question whether a statutory provision has retrospective effect or not depends primarily on the language is which it is couched. If the language is clear and unambiguous effect will have to be given to the provision in question in accordance with its tenor. If the language is not clear then the Court has to decide whether in the light of the surrounding circumstances retrospective effect should given to it or not. " ( 27 ) IN Amireddi Raja Gopala Rao and others v. Amireddi Sitharamamma and others, AIR 1965 S. C. 1970. the question was as to whether illegitimate son of a Sudra from Brahim concubine and the concubine are entitled io maintenance from the estate of the deceased and whether their rights were affected by Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 The provisions of Section 4, Section 2 and Section 22 came up for consideration. Section 4 provides that any text, rule or interpretation. of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act. Section 21 defines "dependants" and Section 22 created a liability that the heirs of a deceased Hindu are bound to maintain the dependants of the deceased out of the estate inherited by them from the deceased. It was observed that before the Act came into force, rights of maintenance out of the estate of a Hindu dying before the commencement of the Act were acquired and the corresponding liability to pay the maintenance was incurred under the Hindu Law in force at the time of death. The death in this case occurred in the year 1948 much before the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act came into force. The death in this case occurred in the year 1948 much before the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act came into force. It was observed that it was a well-rcognised rule that 245 a statute should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect vested rights, and such a construction should never be adopted if the words are open to another constraction. The claimants under the new law were not entitled to maintenance but it was observed that Sections 21 and 22 read with Section 4 do not destroy or affect the rights out of the estate of a deceased Hindu vested on his death before the commencement of the Act under the Hindu law in force at the time of his death. ( 28 ) THE case of State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh. AIR 1955 S. C. 84 cited by Shri Makhija, deals with the consequences of repeal of an enactment. It was observed : "whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the Section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the Court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. The court cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the Section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. The provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal even if there is simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new enactment. The provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal even if there is simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new enactment. " ( 29 ) THE case S. S. Gadgil v. Messrs. Lal and Co. , AIR 1965 S. C. 171 is a case under the Income-tax Act. The question in that case was as to whether under the Amending Act by Section 18 of the Finance Act, 1956. the authority was conferred upon the Income-tax Officer to assess a person as an agent of a foreign party under Section 43 within 2 years from the end of the year of assessment. The right to commence a proceeding for assessment against the assessee as an agent of a non-resident party under the Income-tax Act before it was amended ended on 31. 356. It was held that the authority of the Income-tax-Officer under the Act before it was amended by the Finance Act, 1956 having already come to an end. the amending provision will not assist him to commence the proceeding even at the date when when issued the notice. it is within the period provided by the Amending Act was interpreted in the manner that the power which had already come to an end prior to amendment that power cannot be exercised under the Amending Act. It was observed that the provision must be read subject to rule that in the absence of an express provision or clear implication, the legislature does not intend to attribute to the amending provision a greater retrospectivity than is expressly mentioned, nor to authorise the Income-tax Officer to commence proceedings which before the new Act came into force had by the expiry of the period provided, become barred. The legislature gave to Section 18 of the Evidence Act, l956 only limited retrospective operation ie. upto April ,1956. ( 30 ) IN Mohd Idris and other v. Sat Narain and others, AIR 1966 S. C. 1499, the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act came into force w. e. f. Jully 1, 1952. The suit was filed on May 27. 1992 when the Abolition Act was not on the Statue book. When the Abolition Act was pasud, it did not repeal the U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act. Both the Acts continued on the Statute Book till July 12, 1953. The suit was filed on May 27. 1992 when the Abolition Act was not on the Statue book. When the Abolition Act was pasud, it did not repeal the U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act. Both the Acts continued on the Statute Book till July 12, 1953. On that date. Act 16 of 1953 i. e. U. T. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Amendment Act was passed and by Section 67, U. P. Agriculturists. Relief Act was repcaled. While repealing the Act, it was not stated whether the repeal was to operate retrospectively or not But by Section 1 (2), the amending Act ilself was deemed to nave come into force from the first day of July, 1952 that is to say, simultaneously with the Abolition Act. Thus, it may be assumed that the U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act was also repealed retrospectively from July 1, 1952. The question was whether the right ot the plaintiff to continue the suit under the old law was in any way impaired. The question was examined in the light of Section 6. U. P. General Clauses Act The question was whether a different intention appears in either the Abolition Act or the Amending Act. 16 of 1953. For otherwise, the old proceeding could continue before the Munsif It was held that, "there is nothing in the Abolition Act which takes away the right of suit in respect of a pending action. If there be any; doubt, it is rermoved when we consider that the U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act was repealed retrospectively from July 1, 1952 only and it; is not, therefore, possible to give the repeal further retrospectively so as to affect a suit pending from before that date. The jurisdiction of the Assistant Collector wassitself created from July 1, 1952 and there is no provision in the Abolition Act that pending cases were to stand transferred to the Assistant Collector tor disposal. Such provisions are commonly found in a statute which takes away the jurisdiction of one court and confers it on another. From these two circumstances, it is to be interred that if there is at all any expression of intention, it is to keep S. 6 of the General Clauses Act applicable to pending litigation. Such provisions are commonly found in a statute which takes away the jurisdiction of one court and confers it on another. From these two circumstances, it is to be interred that if there is at all any expression of intention, it is to keep S. 6 of the General Clauses Act applicable to pending litigation. " ( 31 ) IN K Eapen Chako v. The Provident lnvestment Company (P) Ltd. , AIR 1976 S. C. 2610, Section 125 (1) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (1 of 1964) created a bar against Civil court to settle, decide or deal with the questions required to be settled by the Land Board in accordance with the provisions of the Act There was a clear provision in the proviso to Section 125 (1) of the Act that Section shall not apply to proceedings pending in any Court at the commencement of the Act of 1969 on 1st January, 1910. The effect of the proviso was to carve out by way of exception what would otherwise have fallen within the provision to which it is a proviso. It would follow that the pending proceedings were saved from the operation of Section 125 (1) of the Act, and are to be determined by the Civil court It wai also observed that same is the position if viewed in the light of Section 125 (3) of the Act and that provision is also prospective. It ia a case where there was change in procedure and it was held that if the Legislature forms a new procedure alterations in the form of procedure are retrospective unless there is some good reason why they should not be. In other words, if a statute deals merely with the procedure in anaction and does not affect the rights of the parties, it will be held to apply primafacie to all actions, pending as well as future. In other words, if a statute deals merely with the procedure in anaction and does not affect the rights of the parties, it will be held to apply primafacie to all actions, pending as well as future. ( 32 ) IT would appear from the case law considered above that the rule of construction or interpretation is very well settled and well established that 247 laws generally are prolsective in character more particularly, laws affecting vetted or substantive rights or laws creating new liabilities or imposing new disabilities, unless there are express words in the statute affecting the existing fights or unless there is clear manifestation of the intention of the Legislature on the basis of which it can bet said that the law is retrospective in character, and even vested rights have been taken away or new liabilities have been created or disabilities have been imposed. There are laws and laws and cases and cases, the real question is the question of application of the cardinal rule of construction which is propounded and considered above. It is also well established that there is a presumption against retroaclivity and this presumption can only be rebutted by express words in the Statute or by necessary intendment of the statute, it is also well established that only to that extent, retroactivity may be considered of the provisions in the statute which necessarily arises from the express words or from necessary intendment. Beyond that extent, retroactivity should not be considered to have arisen. ( 33 ) MR. Makhija, therefore, has vehemently submitted in the light of the case law considered above that in the present Section 3 (c), it cannot be found that it has retrospective operation. There is no deeming clause in Section 2 of the Amending Act, and "besides that, the Legislature was well aware that under the Rent Act, petitions and revision petitions and other proceedings are pending if the Legislature had intended that the Rent Act should not apply to a situation as envisaged in Section 3 (c), then the Legislature would have made its intention clear that even for the pending proceedings the Rent Act willnot apply where the rental exceeds Rs. 3,500. 00 in respect of any premises. On account of insertion of clause (c), it would appear that it will have operation from the date the Amending Act came into operation i. e. 1. 12. 1988. 3,500. 00 in respect of any premises. On account of insertion of clause (c), it would appear that it will have operation from the date the Amending Act came into operation i. e. 1. 12. 1988. The intention of the Legislature, so far as insertion of clause (d) in Section 3 it concerned, is clear and manifest as the language of clause (d) is to the effect that the Act shall not apply to any premises constructed on and after the commencement of the Amending Act for a period of 10 years. So, building or premises which are constructed on or after the amendment of the Act to such buildings or premises (Section 3 will not apply for a period of 10 years from the date of completion of such construction. Clause (d), therefore, has a prospective operation. The intention to that effect is expressed in the words of clause (d ). So, it is urged that if the legislature had intended to apply clause (c) to the pending proceedings as well, the Legislature would have expressed so. In that situation, that is, in the situaation when Section 3 (c) was to apply to pending cases and proceedings, then all pending cases and proceedings would fail, as the provisions of Section 3 (c) would exclude the operation of the Rent Act to such premises whose monthly rent exceeds Rs. 3,500. 00. ( 34 ) SHRI Marwaha, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that Section 3 declares that the Act shall not apply to premises as described in clauses (a) (b) (c) and (d) Clause (c) clearly declares that the Act shall not apply to premises whether residential or not whose monthly rent exceeds Rs. 3. 500. 00. The intention of the Legislature is, therefore, clear that the Act shall not apply to such premises. When the Act itself shall not apply to the premises, then the necessary result would be that no new proceedings can continue under the Act and the parties arc left to have their remedy before the civil court. It is only a case of change of forum and as such Clause 3 (c) has a retrospective operation and no pending proceedings can continue under the Rent Act. Mr. Marwaha. It is only a case of change of forum and as such Clause 3 (c) has a retrospective operation and no pending proceedings can continue under the Rent Act. Mr. Marwaha. referred to the Statement of Object and Reasons of the Amending Act and emphasised that having regard to objects of the Ametding Act, the intention of the Legislature is all 248 the more inanifest that Section 3 (c) should have retrospective operation. The object of the amending Act is, a) to rationalise the present Rent Control law by bringing about a balance between the interest of landlords and tenants; b) to give a boost to house building activity and maintain the existing housing stock in a reasonable state of repairs. c) to reduce litigation between landlords and tenants and to ensure expeditious disposal of disputes between them. ( 35 ) MR. Marwaha urged that the amending Act classified the premises into two categories, those whose monthly rent exceeds Rs. 3,500. 00 and those whose monthly rent is Rs. 3,500. 00 or less than that. The Act will have no application to premises whose monthly rent exceeds Rs. 3,500. 00. So in respect of such premises, the ordinary remedy in law is only available and the protection afforded to tenants under the Rent Act in respect of premises fetching rent more than Rs. 3,500. 00 has been taken away. It would be easier for the landlords to avail the remedy against such tenants under the ordinary law and in this manner, the legislative object would be achieved. According to Mr. Marwaba, no one has a vested right related to forum and by legislation, change of forum can be created and it is only a procedural law, so, it will have a retrospective operation. He also urged that there is no saving for pending cases and as such having regard to the language of the Act, the object of the Act, the nature and character of the Act and the provision according to Shri Marwaha, Section 3 (c) will apply even to pending cases and proceedings and all such proceedings will terminate w. e. f. 1. 12. 1988. In support of his contention, Mr. Marwaha placed reliance on a number of decisions. 12. 1988. In support of his contention, Mr. Marwaha placed reliance on a number of decisions. ( 36 ) REFERENCE was made by Shri Marwaha to a decision of the Supreme Court in Nand Kishore Marwaha and others v. Smt. Sumundri Devi, AIR 1987 S. C. 2284. In that case, the question was as to whether the provisions of U. P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 will be applicable to the proceedings in view of the fact that although the premises were let out in June, 1976, but as the assessment was made in October 1. 1976, the provisions of the Act will not apply for 10 years from October 1, 1976 and, therefore, the suit could be decreed as the protection available under the Act will not be available to the tenant. In that case. the suit was dismissed by the trial court but the High Court set aside the conclusion of the trial court. The suit was decreed by the High Court in view of the language of Section 2 (2) explanation I, according to which, period of 10 years will commence from the date of first assessment i. e. October 1,1976. On behalf of the appellant, reliance was placed on an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in 0m Prakash Gupta v. Dig Vijendrpal Gupta, AIR 1982 SC 1230 (2) and Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, AIR 1985 SC 817 . The respondents relied on a decision in Firm Amar Nath Basheshar Dass v. Tek Chand, AIR 1972 S. C. 1548. ( 37 ) SUB-SECTION (2) of Section (2) of Section 2 of the Act made a provision that nothing in the Act shall apply to a building during the period of 10 years from the date on which its construction is completed except as provided in various provisions mentioned in Sub-section (2) and sub section further made provisions as to when construction would be considered to becompleted. Section 39 of the Act provided for pending suits for eviction 249 relating to buildings, brought under regulation for the first time. This section applies to those suits which are pending on the date of commencement of the Act i. e. 5th day of July, 1972 The suit was not pending on the date on which the Act came into force. This section applies to those suits which are pending on the date of commencement of the Act i. e. 5th day of July, 1972 The suit was not pending on the date on which the Act came into force. This view was taken in 0m Prakash Gupta s case that the suit must b pending on 157. 72. Section 40 of the Act deals with pending appeals or revisions in suits for eviction relating to buildamgs, brought under regulation for the firm time. The provision of Section 40, therefore, would apply only to the suits from which revision or appeal arose was pending on ihe date of commencement of the Act. Their Lordships, observed that it is well settled that the rights of the parties will be determined on the basis of the rights available to them on the date ot the suit but in Vineet Kumar s case, the Supreme Court took the view that if dining the pendency of the proceedings 10 years have clapsed then tenant is entitled to the protection under the Act. Their Lordships quoted para 17 of the judgement in Vineet Kumar s case and expressed that unfortunately intention of the court was not drawn to 0m Parkash Gupta s case. which has specifically considered the Act and the Act and the language ot the Section and ii a decision by a Bench of three Judges Their Lordships then considered the provision of Section 20. It provided that gave as provided in Sub section (2), no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on expiry of notice to it or in any other manner. It was observed that the language of Section 20 clearly indicates that the restriction put under Section 20 is to the institution of the suit ilself and therefore, it is clear that if the provision or the Aci applies, no suit for eviction can be instituted except on the ground specified in the sub-section of Section 20. It was. It was observed that the language of Section 20 clearly indicates that the restriction put under Section 20 is to the institution of the suit ilself and therefore, it is clear that if the provision or the Aci applies, no suit for eviction can be instituted except on the ground specified in the sub-section of Section 20. It was. observedthat keeping in view the language of Section 20 and in the light of the provisions of Sub-section 2 of Section 20, it will be clear that for a newly constructed building, the provision of the Act will not apply for 10 years and so, the restriction under Section 20 will not apply.-So if during the pendency ot the litigation. even if during the pendency of the litigation even if 10 years expired, the restriction will not be attracted as the suit has been instituted within 10 years and fresh restriction as provided for in Section 20 cannot be attracted. ( 38 ) THIS case does not in any way help the respondents. In this case the decree for eviction passed by the High Court was maintained as the Suit was instituted within 10 years and the period ot 10 years expired during the pendency of the litigation and the bar of Section 20 was held to be not attracted. It is pot necessary to deal with the authorities considered in this decision, ( 39 ) REFERENCE was also made to decision in Ramjilal v. Rainkishan, air 1975 Rajasthan 167. It was also a case where the Act was not applicable to the clashes of premises, mentioned in Section 2 (2) The Act was. made applicable to the town of Hindaun but because of clause (e) of the proviso, the provisions of tho Act did not apply to the shop of the plaintiff landlord for a period of seven years from the date of its completion. After the expiry of seven years, the provisions of the Act came into force, and section 13 came into play. Section 27 was enacted as an abundant causion to apply to pending matters In that case, as the period had expired, so the tenant was protected and except under the circumstances enumerated in section 13, he could not be dispossessed. The shop was constructed on 23,459 It was rented our on 14. 9. 62 The landlord needed the shop for personal use. The shop was constructed on 23,459 It was rented our on 14. 9. 62 The landlord needed the shop for personal use. He determined the tenancy and a suit for arrears ot rent and ejectment was filed on 27 8 54 Ths trial court dismissed the suit in view of the findings that the plaintiff failed to prove that ,the shop was newly cons- tructed and completed on 23 4 59 and that the plaintiff requires the premises bonafide and reasonably. The appellate court agreed with the (rial court with regard to the reasonable bonafide need but reverted the finding on the new construction of the shop. The learned Judge opined that the shop was; completed on 23. 4 59 but he concluded that 7 years bad elapsed after the completion of the shop and as such the provisions of Section 13 would apply and exemption provided under clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Act beyond a period of 7 years could not be availed of by the plaintiff. Decree of dismissal was upheld. In view of the fact that 7 years had expired. Section 13 was made applicable. Consequently, the plaintiff s second appeal was dismissed by the High Court. This is a case of expiry of the exemption period and on account of expiry the law was made applicable ( 40 ) IN K. C. Mukerjee v. Mt. Ramratan Kuer and others, AIR 1936 p. C. 49. the occupancy-holder had transferred his holding and a Suit for ejectment was brought. During the pendency of the Suit. Bengal Tenancy act was amended by Bihar Tenancy Amendment Act. 1934. The amended. provisions provided for continuance of occupancy holding by the lessees. Their Lordships held that both Section 26 (N) and 25 (0) contained deeming ;provisions and as such. they are retrospective in nature. Under Section 26 (N), landlord s consent will be deemed. Similarly, under Section 26 (0) as well. it the transferee pays to the landlord transfer fee or deposits the landlord s transfer fee with the Collector, every person claiming an interest as a. landlord shall be deemed to have given his consent to every transfer made before 1. 1. 1923. The Act contained no saving clause modifying Section 26 (N) and 26 (0 ). it the transferee pays to the landlord transfer fee or deposits the landlord s transfer fee with the Collector, every person claiming an interest as a. landlord shall be deemed to have given his consent to every transfer made before 1. 1. 1923. The Act contained no saving clause modifying Section 26 (N) and 26 (0 ). Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that the question is not whether general language shall be taken only in a prospective sense. The object of this Section can only be to quiet titles which are more than ten years old, and to ensure that if during those ten years the transferee has not been ejected he shall have the right to remain on the land. Within this class the legislature has not thought it to discriminate against tenants whose right is under challenge in a suit, a course which it may well have regarded as invidious or unnecessary. As substantive rights of landlords and their accrued causes of action were to be abrogated, respect for pending suits over old transfers cannot be assumed. Their Lordships also dealt with the provisions of Section 26 (O), and observed that it is reasonably plain that no such saving can be implied under Section 26 (0 ). It would appear from this case that in view of the deeming provisions, it was held that the provisions were retrospective. ( 41 ) REFERENCE has also been made to a decision in Mula and others v. Godhu and others. AIR 1971 S. C. 89. There was a pre-emption decree passed by the trial court. During the pendency of the appeal. Section 31 was amended by Act 10 of 1960. In respect of Section 31, as amended, it was plain and comprehensive enough to require an appellate Court to give effect to the substantive provisions of the Amending Act whether the appeal before it is one against a decree granting pre-emption or one refusing that relief. Relying on an earlier decision in the case of Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 s. C. 553, it was held that it was not open to this court to pass a decree of pre-emption in favour of the appellants who were deprived in 1960 of their right to secure such a decree in the present suit. Relying on an earlier decision in the case of Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 s. C. 553, it was held that it was not open to this court to pass a decree of pre-emption in favour of the appellants who were deprived in 1960 of their right to secure such a decree in the present suit. It was also observed that it was not even open to the High Court to pass a decree of pre-emption in favour of the appellants on January 6, 1967. The argument that the appellants had already seamed a decree,has become final and that they -have fully complied with its terms and further that in the present appeal, they arc merely seeking modification ol the decree of the High Court without claiming any right of pre-emption in their own favour is unsustainable. Section 31 prohibited the Courts from passing decrees inconsistent with the amended Act. It is noteworthy that the courts jurisdiction to pass a decree inconsistent with. the amended Act was taken away. ( 42 ) IT is not necessary to deal with Ram Sarup s case (supra) considered in this decision. ( 43 ) MR. Marwaha then referred to the decision of the Rajasthan High court relating to Rajasthan Moneylenders Act. Section 26-B of the rajasthan Moneylenders Act 1964, as amended in 1966, was applicable to pending: cases also. This view was taken in Kanhiyalal v. Sri Lal. 1980 Raj. L. W. 301, and by another judgement, the same view was taken in Ranchordas v. Malookchand, 1980 WLN 580. Two sections, namely, 11 and 26 were amended by the amending Act whereas in Section 11, theLegislature expressly provided an exception of its application to those cases pending but no such exception was carved out in Section 26 (b ). It was observed that when the legislature, acts at a particular point of time in legislating two provisions in the same Act, and in one retrospective effect is avoided by making an exception and in the other drastic consequences arc contemplated by not enacting such an explanation, or exception. It was observed that while interpreting: the law, that court had no option but to respect the wishes of the legislature,. though seemingly it may create hardship to those moneylenders who have: already filed their suits and were not aware of the drastic consequences of non-compliance of the sections of the Act. It was observed that while interpreting: the law, that court had no option but to respect the wishes of the legislature,. though seemingly it may create hardship to those moneylenders who have: already filed their suits and were not aware of the drastic consequences of non-compliance of the sections of the Act. Such an intention of the legisla- lature cannot be challenged unless it lacks any legislative authority or becomes violative of any of the provisions of the Constitution. It was observed so in Ramchandra v. Prabhulal, AIR 1982 Raj. 211, and to the same effect is yet another decision in Arora Finance Company Tank and others v. Nazeer Ahmed, AIR 1988 Raj. 220 . ( 44 ) ANOTHER decision cited by Shri Marwaha from Rajasthan is kishan Lal v. Shyam Lal and others, AIR 1990 Rajasthan 114. In that case, a decree for eviction was passed prior to extension of Section 13 and 26 in the area where premises in question were situated. It was held that the decree could be executed provided any of the grounds in Section 13 existed. The executed court itself should satisfy about the existence of sach grounds. Section 26 of the Act clearly provided that no decree for eviction of a tenant from any premises in an area to which this Act shall, in so far as it relates to eviction of such tenant, be executed against him except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 and under the circumstances specified in the Act. this case turned on the specific provision contained in Section 26 of the Act. ( 45 ) REFERENCE has also been made to Shah Bhojrai Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1956. In that case. after termination of tenancy, suit for possession was filed by landlord. During the pendency of the Suit. Part II of the Act was extended to that area contained in Section 12. The language of Section 12 (1) was to the effect that a landlord is not entitled to possession if the tenant pays or shows his readiness and willingness to pay standard rent and to observe the other conditions of the tenancy. Sub section (1) of Section 12 applies from the date of which part II of the Act is extended to the particular area by a notification issued under Sec. 6. Sub section (1) of Section 12 applies from the date of which part II of the Act is extended to the particular area by a notification issued under Sec. 6. Sub-section (1) disentitles the landlord to the recovery of possession of any premises. In,other words, no decree can be passed granting possession to the landlord if the tenant fulfils the conditions mentioned therein The point of time when the sub-section will operate is when the decree for recovery of possession will have to be passed. Thus, in the light of the language of the sub-section, the provision applies equally to suits pending and also to those filed subsequently. This contention was negatived that the operation of Section 12 (1) is limited to suits filed after the Act comes into force in a particular area. ( 46 ) IT would appear that the language of the Section was clear so as apply to pending suits. ( 47 ) MR. Marwaha also cited the case of Lakshmi Narayan Gum and others v. Niranjan Modak, AIR 1985 S. C. 111. This case is also similar 10 the cases cited above, in this case as well, there was extension of the West bengal Premises Tenancy Act to the area after passing of eviction decree but during pendency of appeal, it was held that Section 13 can be invoked and the tenant is entitled to claim protection as appeal is in continuation of suit change in law pending appeal can be taken into account. Section i3 (1) was to the effect thai notwithstanding anything to the contrary, in any other law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the grounds. Their Lordships referred to the earlier decision in shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory case AIR 1961 SC. l596 (supra), Mst Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahudur Chetri, AIR 1964 SC 1511 , Ram sarup v. Munshi Alr i963 SC 553, (supra) and Mula v. Godhu AIR 1971 SC 89 (Supra ). Their Lordships referred to the earlier decision in shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory case AIR 1961 SC. l596 (supra), Mst Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahudur Chetri, AIR 1964 SC 1511 , Ram sarup v. Munshi Alr i963 SC 553, (supra) and Mula v. Godhu AIR 1971 SC 89 (Supra ). The following passage was quoted from Dayawati v. Inderjit, air 1966 SC 1423 : "if the new law speaks in language which expressly or by clear intendment, lakes in even pending matters, the Court of trial as well as the Court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the Court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgement of she Court of first instance. "and reference was also made to Amarjii Kaur v. Pritam Singh, AIR 3974 SC 2068. Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal. (1902) ILR 26 Mad. 91 (FB ). and Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukut v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhury, AIR 1941 F. C 5. ( 48 ) THE case of Mst. Rafiquennessa supra) was a case under Assam non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act. The scope of Section 5 (1) (a) was considered. It was held in that case that Section 2 clearly indicates that the legislature wanted the beneficent provisions enacted by it to lake within their protection not only teases executed after the Act came into force, but also leases executed prior 10 the operation of the Act; and in that sense, the act clearly affects vested rights of the landlords who had let out their urban properties to the tenants prior 10 the date of the Act. That is one important fact which is material in determining ihe scope and effect of Section 5. It was also observed that Section 5 itself gives an unmistakable indication of the legislative intention to make its provisions retrospective. The plain object of section 5 is to protect the tenants who have" busk a permanent structure either for business or for residence, provided it has been built within 5 years from the date of contract of tenancy; So such case would fall within Section 5 (1) (a) even though the constructions had been made before the date of the Act. It. would then appear that there was a clear indication of the legislative intentions under the provision itself. ( 49 ) MR. It. would then appear that there was a clear indication of the legislative intentions under the provision itself. ( 49 ) MR. Marwaha also referred to a decision in Memon Abdul Karim haji Tayab. Central Cutlery Stores Veraval v. Deputy Custodian General, New delhi and others. AIR l964 SC l256. In that case, the Administration of evacuee Property Act, 1950 was amended by Act 91 of 1956, which came into force on October 22, i956 With regard to Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 48, it was observed that they arc clearly procedural and would apply to all cases which have to be investigated in accordance therewith after october 22, 1956, even though the claim may have arisen before the amended section was inserted in the Act. It was a case of procedural law. Such law would operate retrospectively to all actions after they came into force. ( 50 ) MR. Marwaha further cited a ease on the Citizenship Act, 1955. The case is State of U. P. and others v. Shah Mohammad and another, Alr 1969 sc 1234. In that case, the plaintiff had gone to Pakistan after 26th January, 1950 but before the commencement of the Act, returned to India on a visa issued by the Indian High Commission, Pakistan. He instituted a suit before the commencement of the Act for a declaration that his nationality never changed and he continued to remain a citizen of India. The plaintiff succeeded but the appeal was preferred to the High Court and a contention was raised that the civil court had no jurisdiction to decide the question arisen in the suit in view of section 9 of the Citizenship Act which had been passed during the pendency to the proceedings read with rule 30 of the Citizenship Rules, i956. The High Court framed the issue and remitted the case to lower appellate court Their Lordship of the Supreme Court held that he High Court should not have called for a decision on that issue but should have ordered its determination of the question by the Central Government. IE was held that the questions falling within Section 9 (2) have 10 be determined by; the Central government and not by the courts. IE was held that the questions falling within Section 9 (2) have 10 be determined by; the Central government and not by the courts. And it was also held that it is clear from the language of Section 9 (1) that it cannot be given prospective operation only and that it would cover all cases where an Indian citizen has acquired foreign nationality between January 26, 1950 and its commencement or where he acquires such nationality after its commencement. The case turned on the language of Section 9 (2) and Rule 30, Section 9 (2) provided that if any question arises as to whether, when and how any person has acquired the citizenship of another country, it shall be determined by such authority in such manner and having regard to such rules of evidence as may be prescribed in this behalf And Rule 30 provided that if any question arises, the authority to determine such question shall, for the purpose of Section 9 (2 ). be the central Government. Thus, Section 9 of the Citizenship ACT. 1955 applied to pending suits as well in the light of its ladguage and the rules framed there under. ( 51 ) MR. Marwaha also referred to the decision in the case of Mithilesh kumari and another v. Prem Behari Khare, AIR 1989 S. C 1247, where the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act were held to be retroactive. Their Lordships considered the rule of interpretation in para 21 as under:- "we read in Maxwell that it is a fundamental rule of English Law that no statute shall be construed to have retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly at the time of the ACt, or arises by nccessary and distinct implication. A retrospective operation is, therefore, not to be given to a statute so as to impair existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure unless that effect cannot be avoided without going violence to the language of the enactment. Before applying a statute retrospectively the Court has to be satisfied that the statute in fad retrospective. The presumption against retrospective operation is strong in cases io which the statute, if operated retrospectively would prejudicially affect vested rights or the illegality of the past transactions, or impair contracts, or impose now duty or attach new, disability in respect of past transactions or consideration already passed. The presumption against retrospective operation is strong in cases io which the statute, if operated retrospectively would prejudicially affect vested rights or the illegality of the past transactions, or impair contracts, or impose now duty or attach new, disability in respect of past transactions or consideration already passed. However, a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. We must look at the general scope and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former State of Law and what the legislation contemplated. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective and is generally unjust and may be oppressive. But laws made justly and for the benefit of individuals and the community as a whole, as in this case, may relate to a time antecedent to their commencement. The presumption against retrospectivity may in such cases be rebutted by necessary implications from the language employed in the statute. It cannot be said to be an invariable rule that a statute could not be retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the Section which had to be construed. The question is whether on a proper construction the legislature may be said to have so expressed its intention. Craies on Statute Law, 7th Ed. writes that the general rule of law that statutes arc not operated retrospectively may be departed from (a) by express enactment and (b) by necessary implication from the language employed'and the author goes on to say :. "if it is,a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective: operation, the Court will give it such an operation. . . "baron parke" said lord Hatherley in Pardo v. Birtgham. (1869) LR 4 Ch App 735) did not consider it an invariable rule that a statute could not be retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the section which had to be, construed, and said that the question in each case was whether the legislature had sufficiently expressed that intention. In fact, we must look to the general scope and purview of the statute, and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what it was that the legislature contemplated. In fact, we must look to the general scope and purview of the statute, and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what it was that the legislature contemplated. "but a statute is not to be read retrospectively except of necessarily,. . In Main v. Stark, (1890) 15 ac 384) Lord Selborne said :"their Lordships, of course, do not say that there might not be something in the context of an Act of parliament, or to be collected from its language, which might give towards prima facie prospective a larger operation unless you find some reason for giving it. . . In all cases it is desirable to ascertain the intention of the legislature. "he went on :"words not requiring a retrospective operation, so as to affect an existing statute prejudicially, ought not to be so construed", but in Reynolds v. Att. Genl. for Nova Scotia (1896 AC 240) it was held that this rule did not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal a privilege which did not amount to an accrued right. " ( 52 ) IN that case, a Suit was instituted in the court of Civil Judge by the plaintiff-respondent Prem Behari, praying for the reliefs inter alia that he be declared to be the sole and real owner of the suit house and the defendant- appellant be restained from transferring the same. The suit was decreed on 13. 3. 74. On first appeal, the appeal filed by the defendant on 23. 12. 74 and the defendant's second appeal was also dismissed by the High Court on 27. 3. 78. On behalf of the appellant, a contention was advanced that the benami Transaction Prohibition Act, 1988 has put a complete bar to the plaintiff's suit. Section 4 of the Benami Act prohibited the right to recover property held benami by providing that no suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any properly held benami shall lie by or on behalf of person claiming to be the real owner of the property and Section 4 also provided that no defence based on any right in respect of any property held benami shall be allowed in any suit, claim or action by and on behalf of person claiming to be the real owner of such property. The suit house was held benami by the respondent in the name of the appellant. The Act was not made retrospective by any specific provision. Their Lordships referred to the relevant report of the Law Commission and the facts and circumstances attending to the issuance of the statute. Their Lordships considered the question as to whether the Suit is still pending in the Supreme Court on construction of section 4 alongwith the report of the Law Commission and examined the question that the suit is still pending before the Supreme Court. Their Lordships held that the consequence is that the plaintiff-respondent's suit or action cannot be decreed under the law and hence the decree passed by the lower courts is annihilated and the suit dismissed. The legislative intention was gathered from the language employed in Section 4 and the report of the Law Commission. ( 53 ) IN view of this decision of the Supreme Court, it is not necessary to discuss the decision of the Kerala High gcourt in. AIR 1989 Kerala 12, cited by Shri Marwaha. ( 54 ) IN the authorities cited by Shri Marwaha, it would be clear that either the provisions were very express giving them retrospectivity or retrospectivity has been found by necessary implication or intendment. As already stated above, there are no express words in Section 3 (c) giving this provision retrospective effect. Clause (c) has been added w. e f. 1. 12. 88. It will have operation from that date. It would be considered to be law on the statute book on 1. 1-2 88. As already stated, there is no deeming clause in the amending section 2. The absence of the deeming clause also manifests the intention of the legislature that the Legislature did not want to give retrospective effect to the insertion of clause (c) in Section 3. It was easy for the legislature to have stated in Section 5 of the amending Act that the clause shall always be deemed to have been inserted. Had there been such a language employed in section 2, Section 3 (c) would have been given retroactive operation. Besides the absence of deeming provision, even in the language of Section 3 (c), there is nothing from which it can be said that Section 3 (c) would apply from before 1. 12. 88 i. e. even to pending cases. Had there been such a language employed in section 2, Section 3 (c) would have been given retroactive operation. Besides the absence of deeming provision, even in the language of Section 3 (c), there is nothing from which it can be said that Section 3 (c) would apply from before 1. 12. 88 i. e. even to pending cases. This knowledge can be attributed to the legislature that thousands of matters are pending at various stages under the Rent Act. If the Legislature intended to have such a serious and grave consequence to follow, that all proceedings should terminate under the, rent Act, it would not have rest contented by simply making a provision of insertion after the proviso to clause (b) of Section 3. It would have categorically provided that the provisions of clause 3 (c) shall apply to all pending actions and proceedings. From the objects of the amending Act as well, it cannot be found that such were the intentions of the legislature so as to give retrospective effect to Section 3 (c ). Having regard to the rule of interpretation of Statutes, as considered above, and in the light of the provision contained in Section 3 (c) and in the light of the amending Section 2 of the amending Act, and having regard to the consequences which would follow, it' section 3 (c) is given retrospective effect, which could not have been intended by the Legislature, we are clearly and firmly of the opinion that Section 3 (c) is only prospective in character and has no retrospective operation, and as such, it will not apply to the pending actions and proceedings. The pending actions and proceedings shall continue to be governed by the Rent Act as if in respect of the pending matters. Section 3 (c) is not on the statute book. When we express that Section 3 (c) has operation prospectively. w. e f. 1. 12. 88 it would mean that Section 3 (c) would apply front 1. 12. 88 and in that event, if the rent of the premises exceeds Rs. 3,500/- p. m. , the provisions of section 3 (c) would apply and as such the Rent Act would have so application to such premises. This is the necessary result of the prospective operation of Section 3 (c ). It cannot be said that if Section 3 (c) is applied from 1. 12. 3,500/- p. m. , the provisions of section 3 (c) would apply and as such the Rent Act would have so application to such premises. This is the necessary result of the prospective operation of Section 3 (c ). It cannot be said that if Section 3 (c) is applied from 1. 12. 88, it will still be retrospective as it would apply to existing tenancies of the premises fetching rent exceeding Rs. 3. 500/. Mr. S. Ganesh, teamed counsel for the petitions submitted that the vested rights of the tenants under the existing tenancies arisen under the existing tenancies arisen under the existing tenancies arisen under the Rent Act cannot be taken away. There is no express provision to that effect in Section 3 (c) nor there is necessary intendment lo that effect. Suffice or to say. Section 3 is a provision declaring, non-application of the Act to certain premises and according to Section 3 (c ). the Rent Act will not apply to premises described in clause (c ). The expression to that effect is clear in specific words There is a clear mandate of the legislature. Thus, from 1 12 88, the Rent Act will not apply to such premises. We have already considered some case law cited by Shri S. Ganesh. ( 55 ) SECTION 3 (c) is not simply a provision of change of forum as contended by Shri Marwaha, learned counsel for the respondent. By non- application of the Rent Act to the premises described under Section 3 (c), the tenants of such premises have been deprived of the benefits and protection conferred on them by the prpvisions of the Rent Act like fixation of standard rent and protection against exiction. Changes of forum also the consequence of the non-application of the Act. If the law would have been a law relating to change of forum only, the pending cases could be dealt with by the new forum according to the Rent Act. But here the provision under section 3 (c) is that the Rent Act shall have no application. So,it is not a law whereby simply change of forum is effected. ( 56 ) MR. Marwaha also contended that revision is not a matter of right. It is only a discretion with the High Court and there is no vested right of the petitioner like that of appeal. So,it is not a law whereby simply change of forum is effected. ( 56 ) MR. Marwaha also contended that revision is not a matter of right. It is only a discretion with the High Court and there is no vested right of the petitioner like that of appeal. So, no vested right of the petitioner is affected. Mr Makhija, on the other hand, submitted that revision under Section 25 B (8) is a matter of right. It is to some extent invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, Cases have been cited at the bar in support of the respective contentions. However, it is not necessary for us to examine this ques:ion for the simple reason that we have held that section 3 (c) being prospective in nature has no effect on the pending actions and proceedings and the pending actions and proceedings shall continue to be governed by the Rent Act, as if Section 3 (c) was not on the statute book. ( 57 ) WE therefore, answer the question referred to us in the manner that Section 3 (c) has a prospective operation and this Section will not apply to the pending proceedings. The case will now go back to the learned. Single Judge for decision of the revision petition in accordance with law.