ORDER 1. Applicant Roshan Lal Chauhan is a tenant in the ground floor of Overvale Cottage, Shimla, since the year 1980. The premises were later purchased by the respondent-landlord, Roshan Lal Pokta in April 1982. The landlord made an application on May 5, 1984, under Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act (briefly, "the Act") seeking ejectment of the tenant on the basis of personal need. The petition was allowed by the Rent Controller on June 28, 1986. The tenant filed an appeal against this order in which a caveat petition was filed by the landlord under Section 148-A CPC. 2. The matter was taken up before the Appellate Authority on June 12, 1987. A statement was made by the tenant on that date, inter alia, saying that he had entered into a compromise with the landlord that the order of eviction shall not be executed by the landlord till March 31, 1989, and that he (tenant) undertook to deliver vacant posses-sion of the premises on or before March 31, 1989. It was also stated by the tenant that he conceded that the premises were bona fide required by the landlord for his own use and occupation. Further, that in case he violated the undertaking given by him to deliver vacant possession to the landlord on or before March 31, 1989, he would be liable for contempt of Court. The landlord also made a statement saying that he had no objection if the tenant was given time up to March 31, 1989, to vacate the premises provided the undertaking given by the tenant, as mentioned in his statement, was accepted by the Court. 3. The Appellate Authority passed an order on June 12, 1987 itself wherein the essential facts were noticed and it was said that : "He (meaning thereby the tenant) has further undertaken ....... to deliver the vacant possession to the landlord on or before 31-3-1989. He has given the undertaking to the landlord as also to the Court and the court has hereby accepted his undertaking. It has been made clear to the tenant that in case he violates the undertaking given by him to the Court, he shall be liable for contempt of court. He has given the undertaking to the landlord as also to the Court and the court has hereby accepted his undertaking. It has been made clear to the tenant that in case he violates the undertaking given by him to the Court, he shall be liable for contempt of court. In view of the abovesaid compromise between the parties, it is ordered that the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller (I), Shimla, shall not be executed on or before 31-3-1989, provided the tenant abides by the undertaking given by him to the Court. It is clarified that in case the tenant violates any of the undertakings given by him, the order passed by the learned Rent Controller (1), Shimla, shall become executable at once." 3A. On June 17, 1988, this Court decided the case of Gauri Shankar v. Tilak Raj Sharma, Civil Revision No. 224 of 1982, (1988 (2) Rent CR 279). In it, it was held that any proceedings initiated by a landlord for regaining possession of a demised premises on the ground of personal bona fide need by an application before expiry of a period of five years from the date of acquisition by him of the premises by transfer are void. The tenant filed an application dated March 6, 1989, before the Appellate Authority under Section 151 CPC for discharging him from the statement dated June 12, 1987, given in the caveat application aforesaid. This application was filed on March 9, 1989. In paragraph 6 of this application it was said that : "......under the Act of 1987, no petition can be filed by a landlord for his bona fide requirement within five years of the purchase of the premises. As submitted above, the premises in question were purchased by the landlord on 12-4-1982 whereas the petition was filed on 5-5-84 i.e. within 5 years of the purchase,. as such the same was not main-tainable." And, in paragraph 8 that : "......for the reason of the enforcement of the Act of 1987, the applicant-tenant is not required to vacate the premises. It is also submitted that there was no lawful compro-mise before this Honble Tribunal in which the Eviction Order could be passed." 4. as such the same was not main-tainable." And, in paragraph 8 that : "......for the reason of the enforcement of the Act of 1987, the applicant-tenant is not required to vacate the premises. It is also submitted that there was no lawful compro-mise before this Honble Tribunal in which the Eviction Order could be passed." 4. The prayer which the tenant made in this application was that he may be discharged of his statement dated June 12, 1987, and the order of the same day, founded thereon, be set aside. The application was, however, rejected by the Appellate Authority on August 17, 1990. The tenant has now approached this Court for relief in the present revision petition. 5. In paragraph 7 of the order under challenge the Appellate Authority has observed that the statement was made by the tenant on June 12, 1987, voluntarily without any inducement, coercion, duress or intimidation from any quarter. He was in perfect senses and was duly represented by an Advocate, and that : "Legally speaking, the tenant/applicant cannot be permitted now to withdraw or resile from the said statement simply with the object to get himself "discharged" from the liability created thereunder. No person after making statement on oath in the court can claim later on withdrawal of it or obligations so created or undertaken there under. The reason is that such kind of permission or allowance would tend to create an embarrassing and disastrous situation. The entire sanctity would be lost which is otherwise accorded to a statement made in the court on oath by the party(ies) spontaneously ................" 6. In the next paragraph of the order, the Appellate Authority has noticed the submiss-ion made on behalf of the tenant regarding the change in law contemplated by Section 14(6) of the Act under which the demised premises could not be restored to the landlord because five years had not elapsed from the date of acquisition of the property by him. About it the Appellate Authority observed that : "I have closely considered this argument. I am of the considered opinion that the change in law is distinctly separate subject or matter than the factual statement made on merits by the parties before the court on oath. About it the Appellate Authority observed that : "I have closely considered this argument. I am of the considered opinion that the change in law is distinctly separate subject or matter than the factual statement made on merits by the parties before the court on oath. The statement is made on oath by the tenant applicant on 12-6-1987 on merit regarding the bona fide requirement of personal use and occupation by the landlord - respondent. He conceded this bona fide requirement of him, inter alia, other explanatory disclosures on oath. The change of law would be operative despite any such statement on oath or promise ventured by the tenant/applicant. The tenant cannot be absolved, as observed supra, on making such a routine application without making any such substantial cause in his favour. Accordingly, it is concluded that he cannot be absolved of the obligations or the concessions offered in the statement on oath." 7. What has been urged with some emphasis by Shri A. K. Goel, appearing for the tenant, in this court is that, in the circum-stances of the present case, the appellate authority should have permitted the tenant to withdraw his undertaking, particularly when due to the declaration of law by this Court in Gauri Shankar v. Tilak Raj Sharma, (1988 (2) Rent Control Reporter 269) on June 17, 1988, it became clear that the entire proceedings in which an order of ejectment was passed by the Rent Controller and an appeal filed by the tenant against it, in which statement was made by the tenant, were non est. Shri Goel also emphasised that the conduct of the tenant in making the application for being permitted to withdraw the undertaking given by him before the Appellate Authority showed his bona fides, inasmuch as, the order passed by the Rent Controller against the tenant could not be executed at all irrespective of the observations contained in the order dated June 12, 1987 of the Appellate Authority that in case there was violation of any undertaking given by the tenant, the order passed by the Rent Controller shall become executable at once. That was because of the decision in Gauri Shankar. 8. The present revision petition purports to be one under Section 115 CPC. The power of revision is conferred upon the High Court under Section 24(5) of the Act which says : "24(5). That was because of the decision in Gauri Shankar. 8. The present revision petition purports to be one under Section 115 CPC. The power of revision is conferred upon the High Court under Section 24(5) of the Act which says : "24(5). The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party or on its own motion call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or pro-ceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit." 9. The revision petition is attributable to this provision which also enables this Court to examine the propriety of any order passed under the Act. 10. It is true, as observed by the Appellate Authority in the order under challenge, that a party should normally not be permitted to go back upon an undertaking given before a Court in a routine manner without there being a substantial cause in his favour, yet the circumstances of a particular case may justify an order by a Court relieving a party from the obligation undertaken by him before it. As a matter of law, it cannot be laid down as an inflexible rule that the Court should not relieve a person of the obligation undertaken by him in an undertaking given before the Court, which is accepted by it irrespective of the peculiar circumstances of a case wherein a prayer to that effect is made by the party. The undertaking given before the Court, and accepted by it, cannot act, as it were, as a fetter upon the discretion of the Court to relieve a party from the obligation under-taken by him on pain of contempt of court. The discretion is always there with the Court which is, of course, to be exercised judicially. The circumstances of the present case clearly show that when the undertaking was given by the tenant, in his statement before the Court on June 12 1987, there was no statutory bar upon a landlord seeking ejectment of a tenant from the demised premises at any time on the ground of bona fide personal need. The circumstances of the present case clearly show that when the undertaking was given by the tenant, in his statement before the Court on June 12 1987, there was no statutory bar upon a landlord seeking ejectment of a tenant from the demised premises at any time on the ground of bona fide personal need. The bar of five years was introduced by the Act (No. 25) of 1987, which received the assent of the President on October 20, 1987, giving it retrospective effect from November 17, 1971. The legal position was made clear by this Court by its judgment of June 17, 1988, in Gauri Shankar by holding that any proceeding for ejectment brought by a landlord within five years of the date of acquisition of the property by him were non est and without jurisdiction. Obviously, when the undertaking was given by the tenant he was not aware, nor could he be advised, that the landlord could not seek his ejectment on the ground of bona fide personal need till the period of five years from the date of acquisition by him of the premises by transfer had elapsed. The fact that he was absolutely protected from ejectment, at the instance of the respondent-landlord, till after a period of five years from the date of purchase of the premises by the landlord, under the provisions of the Act could hardly be in the contemplation of the tenant of June 12, 1987, when he undertook to vacate the premises by March 31, 1989. It is not possible to say that when the tenant made an application on March 9, 1989, for being relieved of his undertaking he was trying to wriggle of an obligation consciously under-taken by him before the Court that irrespective of the protection which the Act provided -to him, he was undertaking an obligation to give up possession. 11. Law, undoubtedly, frowns upon an attempt by a party to get but of an obligation solemnly undertaken by him before a Court. Permitting a party to do so easily would be destructive of the faith of the society in the solemnity of proceedings before a Court of law and would be inconsistent with public interest on that account. 11. Law, undoubtedly, frowns upon an attempt by a party to get but of an obligation solemnly undertaken by him before a Court. Permitting a party to do so easily would be destructive of the faith of the society in the solemnity of proceedings before a Court of law and would be inconsistent with public interest on that account. Yet, where, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is found that an undertaking was given by a party without being conscious of its import, albeit, on account of a subsequent retrospective amendment in the law, the court would be free to judge his conduct a little more liberally and may be inclined to relieve him of the obliga-tion which may have been undertaken before it. 12. The judgment of this Court in Gauri Shankar was given on June 17, 1988. It found its way in the law reports sometime thereafter. Legal advice, founded upon it, may have been available to the tenant quite sometime after the decision. The application for being relieved of the undertaking was made by the tenant on March 9, 1989, in which the fact that the landlord could not seek his ejectment, on account of the bar of five years from the date of acquisition of the property by transfer, was asserted. The application was made sufficiently in advance of the date when the premises were to be vacated by him in terms of his undertaking. The conduct of the tenant in not attributing any element of inducement, coercion or intimidation to the making of the undertaking by him is suggestive of a bona fide conduct on his part. The circumstances of the present case are such in which the tenant should have been relieved of this undertaking. 13. What was urged on behalf of the landlord by Shri Bhupinder Gupta was that the tenant had, admittedly, given the under-taking voluntarily at a time when he was in imminent danger of being evicted in pursu-ance of the order of the Rent Controller and that having obtained the advantage of being permitted to stay in the premises till March 31, 1989, and having deprived the landlord of opportunity to execute the order of eviction, it would be inequitable to permit the tenant to go back upon his undertaking. The submission is attractive but does not merit accept-ance in the present case. The submission is attractive but does not merit accept-ance in the present case. The order of eviction was made by the Rent Controller on June 28, 1986. An appeal had been filed against that order which, in the normal course, would have taken sometime in its disposal. The tenant, if the decision had gone against him, could have approached this Court by filing a revision against the appellate order which, again, may have taken sometime in its disposal. Normally, an order of ejectment is not allowed to be executed during the pendency of an appeal or revision. The tenant could have reasonably expected to be permit-ted to remain in possession of the premises during the pendency of these proceedings. The legal position, as declared by this Court in its judgment. in Gouri Shankar would have rendered the order of ejectment inexecutable. The undertaking given by the tenant on June 12, 1987 gave him the benefit of less than two years of stay in the premises till March 31, 1989. It is difficult to comprehend, having regard to the time which is usually taken in the disposal of proceedings before the Appellate Authority and in this Court in revision, that the tenant would not have continued in possession for this period even if he had not given an undertaking. Obviously, by giving the undertaking the tenant cannot be said to have obtained any unfair advantage in this respect in the present case. The circumstances pointed out by Shri Bhupinder Gupta can, therefore, not be construed against him in this case. 14. In sum, the revision deserves to succeed and is allowed. The order of the Appellate Authority under challenge is set aside. The tenant-applicant is relieved of the obligation to vacate the premises (by March 31, 1989) undertaken by him in his statement made before the Appellate Authority, on June 12, 1987. Revision allowed.