Judgment S. B. Sinha, J. 1. This writ application is directed against an order as contained in a letter dated 9-8-1990 issued by respondent No.2 and as contained in Annexure-5 to the writ application as also the office order dated 20th September, 1990 issued by respondent No.3 and as contained in Annexure-4 to the writ application, whereby the appointment of the petitioner as a teacher has not been approved and his services had been terminated by respondent Nos.2 and 3. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 3. The petitioner applied for appointment as a teacher pursuant to an advertisement issued by Gosmer High School, Main Road Ranchi in ranchi Express dated 26-8-1988 being an eligible candidate therefor as he had been holding a Degree in Bachelor of Science as also is a holder of a b. Ed. degree. 4. The petitioner appeared before the Interview Board and was appointed to the said post by respondent No.3 by a letter dated 31-1-1989 and pursuant thereto, he jointed his duties on 1-2-1989. The said letter of appointment is contained in Annexure-3 to the writ application. According to the petitioner, Gosmer High School is a recognised minority school declared as such by respondent No.1. The post held by the petitioner is a sanctioned post. According to the petitioner, his appointment was required to be approved in terms of the provisions of Sec.18 of the bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking Over of Management and Control) Act, 1981. By reason of a letter dated 20th September, 1990, he was, however, informed that his appointment has not been approved by the respondent No.2 and thus his services shall stand terminated with effect from 22-10-1990. The petitioner could obtain a copy of the letter dated 22-10-1990 wherein it has been stated that as the petitioners name did not appear as the first name in the panel but was second in tha serial and in view of the fact that respondent No.3 issued an appointment letter to Sri Daniel hari who joined the said post, but resigned thereafter his name could not be approved. According to the petitioner, in similar situation respondent No.2 has approved the appointment of other teachers. 5. According to the petitioner, in similar situation respondent No.2 has approved the appointment of other teachers. 5. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No.3 wherein it has been contended that in terms of sub-section 3 (kha) of section 18 of the said Act, approval of appointment has to be obtained from Vidyalaya Seba Board (School Service Board) and accordingly his name was sent for approval but as his appointment was not approved, respondent No.3 has to act in terms of the provisions of the Statute. 6. A counter-affidavit has also been filed on behalf of respondent no.2 wherein it has, inter alia, been contended that the appointment of the petitioner was prim a facie illegal and by reason of the impugned order as contained in Annexure-4 he had merely made a suggestion to the managing Committee for making appointment, in the vacant post after issuing fresh advertisement. According to respondent No.2, as Sri Daniel hari joined his services, the panel prepared by the Selection Committee ceased to exist. It was further contended that the Managing Committee has realised its mistakes and, thus, terminated the services of the petitioner. 7. Mr. Sohail Anwar learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the Gosmer High School being a minority Institution, respondent No.2 has no jurisdiction to interfere, with the management of the said School. It was further submitted that the Education Department had issued specified directions that in the matter of grant of approval in respect of appointment of a teacher ; only qualification for appointment of teacher can be fixed as is evident from the letter dated 3-2-1977 (Annexure-7) and further the School Service Board is required only to consider as to whether the proposed appointment is in accordance with rules laying down the qualification prescribed by the Government and in accordance with the procedure of the Managing Committee on a sanctioned post as would appear from the letter dated 11-9-1981 as contained in annexure-8. 8. Mr. Anwar in support of his contentions has relied upon sidhrajbhai V/s. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1963 SC 546 ; in W. Proost v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1969 SC 465 ; in Ramji Lal V/s. Ram Babu reported in AIR 1970 SC 2077 ; in St. 8. Mr. Anwar in support of his contentions has relied upon sidhrajbhai V/s. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1963 SC 546 ; in W. Proost v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1969 SC 465 ; in Ramji Lal V/s. Ram Babu reported in AIR 1970 SC 2077 ; in St. Xaviers College V/s. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1974 SC 1389 ; and in All Bihar Christian Schools association V/s. State of Bihar reported in 1988 PLJR 7 (SC ). 9. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand submitted that the appointment of the petitioner by the respondent No.3 by a letter dated 31-1-1989 as contained in Annexure-3 to the writ application was itself illegal inasmuch as the petitioners name was at Serial No.2 in the panel. 10. It was further submitted that as the Managing Committee was bound to obtain the approval of respondent No.2 in terms of the provisions of Sec.18 of the Act, the appointment of the petitioner having not been approved, the impugned orders as contained in Annexures-4 and 5 to the writ application cannot be said to be illegal. 11. The said Act (Bihar Act 33 of 1982), was enacted inter alia for taking over the management and control of the Non-Government Secondary schools as also for the purpose of development of the secondary education in the State of Bihar. 12. Section 18 of the said Act which occurs in Chapter V thereof provides that any minority institution established by a minority community based on religion or language may be declared and recognised as such in the event the said Institution had been established by a minority community and fulfils all the conditions for grant of such recognition. Sub-section (3) of Sec.18 of the said Act provides that all such minority Institutions declared and recognised by the State would be managed and controlled in terms of the conditions laid down therein. Clause (kha) of sub-section (3) of Sec.18 of the said Act reads as follows :- 13. From a perusal of the aforementioned provisions, it is evident that if approval is sought for by any minority Institution, such a matter has to be dealt with by the School Service Board. The jurisdiction of the school Service Board is also confined to the matters covered under Section 18 (3) (kha) of the said Act. From a perusal of the aforementioned provisions, it is evident that if approval is sought for by any minority Institution, such a matter has to be dealt with by the School Service Board. The jurisdiction of the school Service Board is also confined to the matters covered under Section 18 (3) (kha) of the said Act. In this view of the matter, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that respondent No.2 on his own could not have given any direction or made a request to the respondent No.3 to fill up the post upon making an advertisement in that regard once again. 14. It is now well settled that if an authority is to act in terms of the provisions of the Statute, he must confine his jurisdiction within the four corners of the Statute itself. It is also well settled that a statutory authority can neither give any opinion contrary to the provisions of the Statute nor any other authority which is bound by the provisions of such Statute can act in terms thereof. 15. Mr. Jai Prakash learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3 has also raised a preliminary objection to the effect that even if the order as contained in Annexure-5 to the writ application is quashed, no writ can be issued quashing the order of respondent No.3 inasmuch as no writ can be issued against it as it is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 16. It is not in dispute that respondent No.3 is a minority Institution within the meaning of I Sec.2 (ga) of the Act and is declared and recognised as such by the State of Bihar in terms of the provisions of section 18 of the said Act. It is also not in dispute that it is an aided school. 17. The Supreme Court in All Bihar Christian Schools Association and another V/s. State of Bihar and others, reported in 1988 PLJR 7 (SC) has held that neither Sec.3 nor Sec.18 of the said Act encroaches upon the guarantee of freedom of a minority under Article 31 of the Constitution, but the same are regulatory in nature. 17. The Supreme Court in All Bihar Christian Schools Association and another V/s. State of Bihar and others, reported in 1988 PLJR 7 (SC) has held that neither Sec.3 nor Sec.18 of the said Act encroaches upon the guarantee of freedom of a minority under Article 31 of the Constitution, but the same are regulatory in nature. The Supreme Court in Paragraph 13 of the aforementioned decision while considering the scope of Sec.18 (3) (b) of the said Ad stated the law thus : "clause (b) provides for two things, firstly it requires the managing committee of a minority school to appoint teachers possessing requisite qualifications as prescribed by the State Government for appointment of teachers of other nationalised schools, secondly, the managing committee is required to make appointment of a teacher with the concurrence of the School Service board constituted under Sec.10 of the Act. Proviso to clause (b) lays down that the School Service Board while considering the question of granting approval to the appointment of a teacher, shall ascertain if the appointment is in accordance with the rules laying down qualifications and manner of making appointment framed by the State Government. The proviso make it clear that the School Service board has no further power to interfere with the right of managing committee of a minority school in the appointment of a teacher. Under Clause (b) the Managing Committee is required to make appointment of a teacher with the concurrence of the school Service Board. The expression concurrence means approval. Such approval need not be prior approval, as the clause does not provide for any prior approval. Object and purpose underlying Clause (b) is to ensure that the teachers appointed in a minority school should possess requisite qualifications and they are appointed in accordance with the procedure prescribed and the appointments are made for the sanctioned strength. The selection and appointment of teachers is left to the management of the minority school, there is no interference with the managerial rights of the institution. In granting approval the School Service Board has limited power. The appointment of qualified teachers in a minority school is a sine qua non for achieving educational standard and better administration of the institution. Clause (b) is regulatory in nature to ensure educational excellence in the minority school. " (Italisize is mine for emphasis) 18. In granting approval the School Service Board has limited power. The appointment of qualified teachers in a minority school is a sine qua non for achieving educational standard and better administration of the institution. Clause (b) is regulatory in nature to ensure educational excellence in the minority school. " (Italisize is mine for emphasis) 18. In terms of Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Sec.18 of the said act, the managing committee has the power to remove a teacher or to terminate his service or to dismiss or discharge him with the approval of the School Service Board. 19. In this case, the petitioner has contended that he had resigned from the post of teacher in St. Annes Jyoti Girls High School in order to join in the School in question. He was 31 years of age at the time of filing of the writ petition and there was no chance of his being appointed as a teacher in any recognised School. 20. We are further of the view that keeping in view the aforementioned facts into consideration, it will cause an undue hardship upon the petitioner if at least his case is not alloved to be considered for approval by the School Service Board in terms of Clause 18 (3) (B) of the said Act. In our opinion, prima facie, it cannot be said that only because one Daniel hari was at Seril No.1 of the panel and only because he joined the post for a short time, respondent No.3 had no jurisdiction to appoint the petitioner out of the said panel. 21. The petitioner has given several examples wherein similar situations, the School Service Board has approved the appointment of a teacher out of the panel prepared by the Selection Committee of the minority institution when a post fell vacant by reason of resignation submitted by another teacher who was appointed out of the same panel within a short period. 22. The submission of Mr. Jai Prakash to the effect that no writ can be issued as against respondent No.3 has also no force. Respondent no.3 School is a recognised institution and, thus, has a statutory duty to perform. 23. 22. The submission of Mr. Jai Prakash to the effect that no writ can be issued as against respondent No.3 has also no force. Respondent no.3 School is a recognised institution and, thus, has a statutory duty to perform. 23. Recently in Tejaswini Patil V/s. Bangalore University and others, reported in AIR 1991 Karnataka 352, it was held that when a college is affiliated to a Board and is governed by the provisions of the Act, it is amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court, under Article 226 of the constitution. 24. In Shri Anadi Mukta Sadgura Shree Muktajee Vamdasjiswami suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and others V/s. V. R. Rudani and others, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1607 , which was also followed by the karnataka High Court, it was held : "14. If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to mandamus. But once these are absent and when the party has no other equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied. It has to be appreciated that the appellants-trust was managing the affiliated college to which public money is paid as Government aid. Public money paid as Govt. aid plays a major role in the control, maintenance and working of educational institutions. The aidded institutions like government institutions discharge public function by way of imparting education to students. They are subject to the rules and regulations of the affiliating University. Their activities are closely supervised by the University authorities. 19. The term authority used in Article 226, in the con text, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High court to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words any person or authority used in article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. what is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The words any person or authority used in article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. what is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists, mandamus cannot be denied. " 21. Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, professor De Smith states to be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by character, common law, custom or even contract. (Judicial review of Administrative Act 4th Ed. p.540 ). We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water-tight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandawus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available to reach injustice wherever it is found. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We, therefore, rejected the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition. " 25. Yet recently in Raj Soni V/s. Air Officer Incharge Administration, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1305 , it was held : "the recognised private schools in Delhi whether aided or otherwise are governed by the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The respondent-management is under a statutory obligation to uniformily apply the provisions of the Act and the Rules to the teachers employed in the School. When any authority is required to act in a particular manner under a statute it has no option but to follow the statute. The authority cannot defy the statute on the pretext that it is neither a State nor an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. When any authority is required to act in a particular manner under a statute it has no option but to follow the statute. The authority cannot defy the statute on the pretext that it is neither a State nor an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. " it was held by the Karnataka High Court in the aforementioned case, AIR 1991 Karnataka 352 at 370. "once we find that the activities of a private educational institutions is regulated by the provisions of the Act and the Universities act, the mere fact that the institution is not receiving financial aid, makes no difference for the issue of a writ under Article 226 for the enforcement of public duty and/or the provisions of the Act. " 26. In Smt. Manju Devi V/s. Distt. Supdt. Bhagalpur, reported in 1987 bbcj 598 upon which reliance has been placed by Mr. Jai Prakash, the school in question was a middle School purely private in character and was being run by managing committing of its own. The said school was also not taken over under the provisions of Bihar Non-Government elementary (Taking over of Control) Act, 1976 and in that situation, it was held that no writ is maintainable. In that case the Special Bench itself referred to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Radha kumari V/s. The Government body of the Mahanth Mahadevanand Mahila mahavidyalaya, reported in 1977 PLJR 110 wherein it was held : "therefore unless there was an element of public employment or service, having support of any statute, or an office or status capable of protection, no writ can be issued against respondent no.1 simply because it happened to be an affiliated college to the Magadh University. " 27. In Francisc John V/s. The Director of Education and others, reported in AIR 1990 SC 423 , it was held : "any private schools which receives aid from the Government under the Grant-in-aid Code, which is promulgated not merely for the benefit of the Management but also for the benefit of employees in the School for whose salary and allowances the Government was contributing from the public funds under the Grant-in-aid Code cannot escape from the consequences flowing from the breach of the Code and particularly where the director of Education who is an instrumentality of the State js participating in the decision making process. Under these circumstances we find that the High court was wrong in upholding that the orders of the Director of Education and of the Dispute Settlement Committee were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution since the matter squarely falls within the principles laid down by this Court in Taka rams case AIR 1984 SC 1621 . " 28. In Manmohan Singh Jaitla V/s. Commissioner, Union Territory, reported in AIR 1985 SC 364 , the Supreme Court held : "the educational institution receiving financial grant from the government is a State as denned under Article 12 of the Constitution. " 29. It is therefore, clear that if the decision of a statutory authority in relation to the management of a private school is amenable to writ jurisdiction, this Court also may interfere with the decision of an authority who has exceeded, his jurisdiction and/or assumes jurisdiction not vested in it by law. In this case, as respondent No.2 has no jurisdiction to perform any of the duties as contained in Sec.18 (3) (b) of the said Act and the same is merely to be performed by the School Service Board constituted under Sec.10 of the Act, this Court in our opinion, is entitled to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 30. In Paragraph 9 of the counter-affidavit, the respondent No.3 has clearly stated that it had acted in terms of the Statute as the name of the petitioner was sent to respondent No.4 for recommendation and since his name was not recommended by respondent No.2, he could not have been kept in service because in that case it would have amounted to violation of the statutory provisions contained in Sec.18 (3) (b)of the Act. In view of the stand taken by respondent No.3 itself that it has acted in terms of the impugned order passed by respondent No.2 as contained in Annexure-5 to the writ application, the order dated 20th september, 1990 issued by it (Annexure-4) must also fail if the order dated 9-8-1990 as contained in Annexure-5 is quashed by this Court. 31. In view of the stand taken by respondent No.3 itself that it has acted in terms of the impugned order passed by respondent No.2 as contained in Annexure-5 to the writ application, the order dated 20th september, 1990 issued by it (Annexure-4) must also fail if the order dated 9-8-1990 as contained in Annexure-5 is quashed by this Court. 31. As noticed hereinbefore, in this case, the services if the petitioner has to be approved by the School Service Board in terms of the provisions of the Statute and the respondent No.2 has exceeded his limit in issuing Annexure-4 and similarly respondent No.3 who is bound by the terms and conditions laid down under Sec.18 (3) of the Act committed an illegality in following the direction of respondent No.2 which is in violation of the provisions of the said Act and, thus, respondent No.3 although is bound by the term and conditions as laid down under Section 18 (3) of the said Act, has acted in violation thereof by issuing the impugned order as contained in Annexure-4 in terms of the directions of respondent No.2 as contained in Annexure-5 to the writ petition. 32. The petitioners services was protected in terms of Sec.18 (3)of the Act and his service could have been terminated only in the event the same was not approved under Sec.18 (3) (b) of the Act. Further the order of termination passed as against a teacher must also have the approval of the School Service Board in terms of Sec.18 (3) (b) of the Act. 33. In this view of the matter, this writ application is allowed. The impugned orders as contained in Annexures-4 and 5 are quashed and respondent No.2 is hereby directed to send the case of the petitioner to the School Service Board which shall decide the matter relating to grant of approval of the appointment of the petitioner in terms of Section 18 (3) (b) of the said Act with utmost expedition and not later than six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is needless to say that respondent No.3 shall act in terms of the decision of the School Service Board. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Writ application allowed.