JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 31.7.1986 and the award dated 10.2.1989. 2. The petitioner, Smt. Pista Devi, is the wife of Brij Mohan Agrawal. Suraj Mal Agrawal, father of the petitioner, was the owner of khasra no. 1/1 measuring 27 bighas and 13 biswas in village Mahapura alias Kukarkheda, district Jaipur. He was dealing .with the joint family properties and died on 26.1.1980 leaving behind him the petitioner, her two sisters and one brother. 3. After the death of her father, the aforesaid land was mutated in the names of aforesaid brother and sisters. The petitioner claims that she constructed a residential house and an electrified well on the disputed land. Neither the petitioner nor any member of her family had the knowledge about the acquisition proceedings being pending under the Land Acquisition Act till 7.1.1989 when she found some of the officers of the Agriculture Department as also the Agriculture Production Secretary on the land in question. She, thereafter, inspected the records and found that notification No. F-10 (214) Agri./Gr.2B/ 74-III dated 31.7.1986 was issued under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1953 by the Government if Rajasthan. This notification covered the aforesaid land of the petitioner's father It was notified that the land was required by the State of Rajasthan for construction of sub-market yard of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Jaipur. The relevant portioi of the notification is being reproduced below:- " vr% jkT; ljdkj dks ;g izrhr gksrk gS fd fuEu of.kZr LFky esa lkoZtfud iz;kstukFkZ vFkkZr d`f"k mit e.Mh lfefr] t;iqj ds }kjk xkS.k e.Mh ;kMZ t;iqj ds fuekZ.k gsrq Hkwfe dh vko';drk gS vFkok gksus dh lEHkkouk gSA---- " 4. No notice of the intended acquisition, as said above, was served on her late father-Suraj Mal Agrawal. Another notification dated 4.12.1987 purporting to be under section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1953 was issued by the State of Rajasthan, which is annexure 5 to the writ petition. By this notification, enquiry as contemplated by S. 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, had been dispensed with in exercise of its power under section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1953 on the proclamation that land was urgently required by the State Govt. By this notification, enquiry as contemplated by S. 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, had been dispensed with in exercise of its power under section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1953 on the proclamation that land was urgently required by the State Govt. The relevant portion of the said notification is quoted below:- " ----vkSj mDr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 6 ds vfxze vuqlj.k esa ,rn~}kjk ?kks"k.kk djrh gS fd iwoksZRd Hkwfe mDr lkoZtfud iz;kstukFkZ vfr vko';d gS vkSj vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 6 ( 4 ) ( 1 ) ds vfxze vuqlkj.k es jkT; ljdkj Hkwfe vokfIr vf/kdkjh] t;iqj dks mDr vokfIr ds fufer vkKk izkIr djus gsrq ,rn~ }kjk funsZ'k nsrh gS fd mDr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 17 dh mi /kkjk ( 1 ) ds vxzslj vuqlj.k esa jkT; ljdkj Hkwfe vokfIr vf/kdkjh t;iqj dks /kkjk 9 dh mi/kkjk ( 1 ) esa mfYyf[kr uksfVl ds izdk'ku ls 15 fnol dh lekfIr ij iwokZRd Hkwfe----- " 5. By this notification, the State Government further authorised the Land Acquisition Officer to take possession of the land within 15 days. Thereafter, the State Govt. issued another notification on 12.2.1988 wherein it was notified that the Government was satisfied that the lands covered by the notifications, aforesaid, were needed for public purpose. 6. Aggrieved, through the present petition, which was filed on 11.7.1990, the petitioner sought quashing of the aforesaid notifications. 7. Sri R.M. Lodha, learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection for the dismissal of the writ petition on the ground that the same was highly belated and there being no explanation for the delay in filing the same, it deserves to be dismissed. In support of his contention, he cited a number of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Court is not bound to reject a petition only on the ground of delay as every Court has the discretion to interfere and quash the impugned order, where ever it feels that way. 9. There may not be any denial to this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, but Courts have also found that where a party is guilty of ladies or undue delay, for which no satisfactory explanation has been given, the High Court can refuse its extraordinary power. The party which comes for relief must invoke jurisdiction within a reasonable time. The party which comes for relief must invoke jurisdiction within a reasonable time. In the instant case, there is no doubt that the writ petition has been filed after a long delay and in our opinion, death of the father of the petitioner, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, could not be a good ground for explaining the delay. 10. In this connection, another aspect of the matter, which was emphasised by learned counsel for the respondents was that after acquiring possession of the land in dispute, the concerned respondents had got a boundary wall constructed by spending a huge money. Learned counsel for the respondents urged that it is also a ground for refusal of the prayers made in the writ petition. 11. From the submissions of the learned counsel and record, we find that it is correct that some constructions have been made on the disputed plot after its acquisition. In spite of the knowledge of such constructions, the petitioner did not approach the court earlier and the petition deserves dismissal on this ground also. As regards the lapse of time to be considered as constituting delay, the appropriate view seems to be that no hard and fast rule can be laid down in such matters and each case has to be decided in accordance with the circumstances of each case without adhering to any fixed period - long or short. In the instant case, no explanation worthy of reliance has been offered by the petitioner. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents next contended that the brother of the petitioner had filed a suit for the same relief and on the same grounds, as in the present case, but the same was deliberately concealed by. the petitioner from this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner repelled the argument by contending that the petitioner, in fact, did not have the knowledge of the said suit. 13. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that she did not have the knowledge of filing of suit for the same relief by her brother, is un believable. The relationships between the petitioner and her brother has not been shown to be such that she could not even know about the filing of the aforesaid suit by her brother, more particularly when the brother and sisters have the 'common interest. The relationships between the petitioner and her brother has not been shown to be such that she could not even know about the filing of the aforesaid suit by her brother, more particularly when the brother and sisters have the 'common interest. Therefore, we are not inclined to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner did not argue before us that the acquisition of land for the purpose of construction of Krishi Utpadan Mandi or market yard could not be regarded for public purpose. Similarly, dispensing with enquiry by Government under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act was of subjective nature and the dispensation could not be challenged in the writ petition. 15. As already said above, the land in question was acquired for construction of a sub-market yard and the learned counsel for the petitioner admitted that such a construction does amount to 'public purpose'. 16. There was no definition of 'public purpose' in the Land Acquisition Act. For obvious reasons, the legislature left the same at the absolute discretion of the Government. In Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, ( 1961 (1) SCR 128 : AIR 1960 SC 1203 ) , the term 'public purpose' was defined by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following words : "It will thus be noticed that the expression 'public purpose' has been used in its generic sense of including any purpose in which even a fraction of the community may be interested or by which it may be benefited." The above definition was adopted verbatim in Samawanti v. State of Punjab, ( AIR 1963 SC 151 ) . 17. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no force in this writ petition, which is dismissed without any order as to costs.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******