(1) THE judgment under appeal was passed by a division bench of the Punjab and Haryana High court in Civil Writ Petition No. 4000 of 1978 dismissing the writ petition of the appellant in limine. (2) THE appellant was imposed a penalty of Rs. 4 lakhs under the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. He was required to make deposit thereof within 45 days of 10/08/1973 when his guilt was adjudicated upon. At that time the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, for short the old Act, was in operation. Then came on the scene with effect from 1/04/1974 the FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION ACT, 1973 , for short the new Act. As was permissible under old law and kept permitted under the new law, when the appellant failed to pay the penalty as ordered within time, a complaint was filed against him by the Directorate of Enforcement, New Delhi before a criminal court for punishing the appellant under S. 23-F of the old Act corresponding to S. 57 of the new Act. The appellant pleaded guilty and having been ordered to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year, underwent the same. Later the Directorate of Enforcement took resort to S. 70 of the new Act, which provides inter alia that if a penalty imposed on any person under the Act is not paid, the adjudicating officer, may by exclusion of other priorities, prepare a certificate signed by him specifying the amount due from such person and send it to the Collector of the district in which such person owns any property or resides or carries on his business, and the said Collector on receipt of such certificate is required to proceed to recover from the said person the amount specified as if it were an arrear of land revenue. (3) HAVING become aware of such proceedings somewhere in the year 1978, the-appellant approached the Punjab and Haryana High court by means of a writ petition primarily basing his claim on the ground that when he had been found guilty of the violation of the provisions of the old Act having committed the offence of non-payment of penalty under the old Act and suffered punishment he could not thereafter be put to the pain of recovery of penalty as if arrears of land revenue, and the new Act having granted such right to the adjudicating officer should be read in the context to apply prospectively to a violation taking place after 1/04/1974 when it came in operation. It was further pleaded that since he had undergone the sentence imposed for commission of the criminal offence for non-payment of the penalty, that by itself wiped out the civil liability of payment of penalty and thus resort could not be had to S. 70 of the new Act. The High court having repelled these contentions, these again have been reiterated before us in the same strain. (4) IT is no doubt true that in the old Act no provision enabled the adjudicating officer to take the aid of the Collector in recovering the amount of penalty as if arrears of land revenue. That by itself can be not enough to mean that the amount of penalty was otherwise not due or recoverable. The existence of S. 23-F in the old Act whereunder a defaulter could criminally be punished, cannot lead to mean that his civil liability was wiped out on suffering the punishment as if a barter. Sec-. tion 23-F of the old Act and S. 57 of the new Act make the failure of any person to pay the penalty an offence attracting punishment of imprisonment as specified thereunder, or with fine or with both. The right of the State to effect recovery of the penalty is besides the failure of the defaulter inmaking timely payment as per order of imposition. The civil liability inherent in the event of prosecution does not get wiped out. The mode of recovery, being procedural in nature, could well be provided in the new Act even though a specific provision in that regard was not available in the old Act. This legislative exercise created no new liability. The civil liability inherent in the event of prosecution does not get wiped out. The mode of recovery, being procedural in nature, could well be provided in the new Act even though a specific provision in that regard was not available in the old Act. This legislative exercise created no new liability. We see no difficulty in reading S. 70 of the new Act in that light, more so in view of S. 81 of the new Act which provides that even though the old Act is repealed still notwithstanding such repeal anything done or any action taken under the Act repealed, insofar as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the later Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the new Act. The imposition of penalty and the criminal prosecution deemingly can be taken to have been under the new ¯Act and there being no apparent inconsistency the outstanding penalty can be recovered by the mode and methods of S. 70 of the new Act. This is besides Ss. (3) of S. 81 preserving the applicability of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 in relation to the effect of repeal. Viewed thus from any angle the appellant has no case to fight the recovery process. The view of the High court in these circumstances appears to us to be unexceptionable. This appeal thus necessarily has to fail, and fails accordingly, with no order as to costs.