Judgment B.P.Singh, J. 1. The petitioner, who was appointed as a public prosecutor, Purnea, by order dated 7-2-1990, has been removed by the State of Bihar by its order dated 25-9-1991 cancelling the earlier appointgent of the petitioner for a period of three years. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 25-9-1991 (Annexure-1) cancelling his appointment. 2. The facts of the case are not in dispute. The petitioner was appointed as a public prosecutor, Purnea, by order dated 9th April, 1986, for a period of three years. The term of the petitioner expired on 25-4-1989, as he had joined his office on 15-4-1986 pursuant to his appointment. It appears from Annexure-3 that even before his term had expired, the Deputy Secretary, Law, of the Government of Bihar by his communication dated 17th March, 1989 had informed the District Magistrate Purnea to continue the petitioner as the public prosecutor till such time an appointment was made. Accordingly, the petitioner continued to discharge the duties of a public prosecutor. Annexure-3 is the order of the District Magistrate dated 28-4-89 directing the petitioner to continue as a public prosecutor till a new public prosecutor was appointed. It appears that recommendation had been called for from the District Magistrate, Purnca, in consultation with the District Judge, Purnea, for appointment of the public prosecutor. The name of the petitioner was also one of the names recommended by the District Magistrate and the District Judge, Purnea. The matter remained under consideration of the Government and finally by an order dated 7th February, 1990(Annexure-l), the petitioner was appointed as the public prosecutor, Purnea for a term of three years with the effect from 25-5-1989, since he had been functioning as a public prosecutor upon expiry of his first term. In the month of March, 1990, there was a change of Government and the earlier ruling party failed to secure majority in the Legislative Assembly, with the result that another political party came in power. The impugned order was on 25-9-1991 (Annexure-1) whereby the appointment of the petitioner was cancelled and respondent No. 3 was appointed in his place as the public prosecutor, Purnea, with a tenure of three years. The petitioner has assailed (Annexure-1) in this writ petition- 3. The impugned order was on 25-9-1991 (Annexure-1) whereby the appointment of the petitioner was cancelled and respondent No. 3 was appointed in his place as the public prosecutor, Purnea, with a tenure of three years. The petitioner has assailed (Annexure-1) in this writ petition- 3. Counsel for the petitioner cuntended that the petitioner had been appointed after following the procedure prescribed by Sec. 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and on the basis of the recommendation of the District Magistrate and District Judge. The order was made by the Government, which was competent to do so and, therefore, there was no illegality which vitiated his appointment. The cancellation of the order was, therefore, illegal. It was further alleged that the impugned order was passed mala fide. It was a fraudulent exercise of power, because the successor Government wanted to appoint its own nominee in place of the petitioner. He submitted that the change of Government did not imply that the appointments made by the earlier Governmennt should be cancelled, uuless there be some good reason to terminate the appointment. He submitted that having regard to the nature of duties performed by a public prosecutor, the office of the public prosecutor was invested the with attribute of holder of pub c office and such an appointment could not be prematurely terminated at the sweet will of the Government, in the absence of any cogent reason. He submitted that the Government could be justified in prematurely terminating the appointment of a public prosecutor where the interest of administration of justice so required. He has relied upon the decisions, . 4. The learned Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the State contended that there was juctification for the Government to terminate the appointment of the petitioner. He submitted that the term of the petitioner as a public prosecutor expired on 25-4-1989. He was asked to continue till the Government took a decision to appoint another public prosecutor in his place. The matter kept pending with the Government and only on 6th February, 1990 the Cabinet approved the appointment of the petitioner as a public prosecutor. Consequently, the order (Annexure-2) appointing him as a public prosecutor was issued on 7th February, 1990. He submitted that the appointment of the petitioner took place at a time when the election process had begun. The matter kept pending with the Government and only on 6th February, 1990 the Cabinet approved the appointment of the petitioner as a public prosecutor. Consequently, the order (Annexure-2) appointing him as a public prosecutor was issued on 7th February, 1990. He submitted that the appointment of the petitioner took place at a time when the election process had begun. The Government in power knew that the elections were round the corner and hence it was improper on the part of the Government to make any appointment at that stage. He submitted that a public prosecutor must enjoy the confidence of the Government and, therefore, it is open to the successor Government to appoint another person as a public prosecutor, if the incumbent of the post did not enjoy the confidence of the Government. He further submitted that when the new Government took over in the month of March, 1990 a policy decision was taken by the Government to review all appointments made by the erstwhile Government to the post of public prosecutor, on the eve of the assembly election. Consequent to the above policy decision, therefore, recommendation was asked for from the District Magistrate in consultation with the District Judge of Purnea. Eleven name were recommended including the name of respondent No. 3. The matter was examined by the Law Department and after full consideration the State Government took the decision to appoint respondent No. 3 as a public prosecutor. He justified the action of the Government having regard to the policy decision taken by the Government to review all appointments made by the earlier Government. 5. It is now well settled, having regard to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Kumarl Shrilekha Vtdyarthi etc. etc. V/s. State of U. P. and Ors. -- that having regard to the functions performed by the public prosecutor which relate to a public purpose entrusting him with the responsibility of so acting only in the interest of administration of justice, invest the public prosecutors with the attribute of the holder of a public office, which cannot be whittled down by the assertion that their engagement in purely professional between a client and his lawyer with no public element attaching to it. It was held that through the appointment of a public prosecutor is not to be equated with appointment to a post under the Government in the strict sense, it did not necessarily mean that it results in denuding the office of its public character and that the appointment may be terminated even during currency of the term by only communicating the decision of termination without communicating the reasons which led to the termination. It does not mean that the appointment is at the sweet will of the Government which can be terminated at only time, even without the existence of any cogent reason during the subsistence of the term. The reasons for the decision may not be stated in the order, but they must exist, otherwise the decision would be arbitrary. Termination of an appointment, without existence of any cogent reason in furtherance of the object for which the power is given would be arbitrary and, therefore, against the public policy. 6. In Mundrika Sinha V/s. State of Bihar -- the Supreme Court clearly held that having regard to the fact that Government Pleader of this Court is appointed by the State on remuneration paid from the public exchequer and having regard to the various functions and duties to be performed by him in due exercise of that office, most of which are of an independent and responsible character, the office must be held to be a public office within the scope of a quo warranto proceeding. The Court sounded a warning that it is in the best interest of the State that it should engage competent lawyers without hunting for political partisans regardless of capability. Public offices and Government pleadership is one shall not succumb to Tammany Hall or subtler spoils system, if purity in public office is a desideratum. 7. It is, therefore, f utile to equate the office of the public prosecutor with a political office. The public prosecutor holds a Public Office and is charged with the duty of so acting as to best serve the interest of administration of justice. His appointment is not due to his political affiliation, but in recognition of his merit as a competent and honest lawyer. He is not to be dictated by the Government and in all cases must give his honest opinion. His appointment is not due to his political affiliation, but in recognition of his merit as a competent and honest lawyer. He is not to be dictated by the Government and in all cases must give his honest opinion. He is appointed by the Government, but is also an officer of the Court and, therefore, fairness, objectivity and impartiality are the hallmarks of that office. 8. Learned Advocate General sought to distinguish the decision in Kwnari Shrilekha Vidyarthis case (supra) on the ground that in that case by one order the Government had sought to terminate the appointment of all State Counsels, whereas in the instant case the Government has considered the case of the petitioner elaborately and passed an appropriate order. It may be that in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthis case the Government sought to terminate the employment of all Government counsels. In that sense that fact and background of the two cases may be different, That, however, will not make any difference in principle, because the two principles which that judgment lays down, have universal appl-cation. Firstly, it has been held that the office of the public prosecutor is invested with the attribute of a holder of a public office. Secondly, it has been laid down that before any decision is taken to terminate such an appointment, there must be some cogent reason justifying the action. These two principles apply whether the termination is in a particular case or a general order is issued terminating all appointments made. In a case where all appointments are terminated by a single order, that action may be open to challenge additionally on the ground of non-application of mind. 9. In the instant case a reason has been assigned for the removal of the petitioner as a public prosecutor. The reason given is that the earlier Government on the eve of the elections to the Legislative Assembly appointed the petitioner as a public prosecutor. When the new Government came in power, it decided to review all such appointments made earlier on the eve of the elections and, pursuant to that decision, the tenure of the petitioner was prematurely terminated. It was submitted, as I have observed earlier that the public prosecutor must enjoy the confidence of the Government and, therefore, it became necessary for the Government to appoint another public prosecutor. Can the reason be sustained as a cogent reason ? It was submitted, as I have observed earlier that the public prosecutor must enjoy the confidence of the Government and, therefore, it became necessary for the Government to appoint another public prosecutor. Can the reason be sustained as a cogent reason ? In my view, the reason given is not merely not cogent, but wholly irrelevant. I will first deal with the factual aspect of the matter. The petitioner had served one term as a public prosecutor on the basis of the recommendation of the District Magistrate in consultation with the District Judge and in accordance with the procedure contemplated by Sec. 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Upon expiry of his first term he had been asked as early as in April 1989 to continue as a public prosecutor till a new appointment was made. Accordingly, the petitioner had continued to discharge his duties and functions of the publice prosecutor. The matter remained under consideration of the Government and ultimately the order of appointment for a second term was passed on 7th Febraury, 1990 with effect from 25-4-1989 with a tenure of three years. This was also done on the basis of the recommendation of the District Magistrate in consultation with the District Judge and in accordance with the legal procedure. In such a case, it is difficult to sustain the argument that an appointment made by the Government, which may go out of power, is illegal. At the most, some may consider it to be an act of impropriety. In the instant case, I am concerned with a public office and, therefore, with the legality of the appointment. The question as to whether on the eve of elections appointments should or should not be made must be left to the wisdom of those who wield political power. As long as the actions taken by them are in accordance with law and are nal tainted with malice, courts cannot go into the question of propriety of the action. In my view, therefore, the appointment of the petitioner by Annexure-2 was made in accordance with law and, therefore, the appointment was not tainted with any illegality. As long as the actions taken by them are in accordance with law and are nal tainted with malice, courts cannot go into the question of propriety of the action. In my view, therefore, the appointment of the petitioner by Annexure-2 was made in accordance with law and, therefore, the appointment was not tainted with any illegality. I find no material to support the contention that it was tained with mala fide, because undoubtedly his name had been duly recommended by the District Magistrate in consultation with the District Judge and had the Government not changed, it could not be said that the appointmnet was illegal. 10. The second aspect the submission urged by the Advocate General is about the Public Prosecutor enjoying the confidence of the Government. The confidence must not be confused with mere closeness with the political powers that be. The existence of confidence or loss of confidence must be judged by refence to the actions of the person holding a public office and not by his closeness to the political ruler of the State. The Government may be justified in losing confidence in the holder of a public office, if it is shown that the holder of the public office has acted in disregard of his duties and obligations and/ or has acted in illegal manner contrary to public interest. If there was any evidence to show that the Government had before it material to show that the actions of the petitioner were such as were not in the interest of administration of justice, the Government may have been justified in terminating the appointment of the petitioner in accordance with law. That would have furnished a cogent reason for the action of the Government. The mere fact that the petitioner was appointed as a public prosecutor by the Government on the eve of the election, by itself will not furnish justification for his removal from the office on the ground of loss of confidence, unless there is something more to justify the action. Mere change of Government is wholly irrelevant to justify removal of a public prosecutor who holds a public office and is charged with the duty of acting honestly, impartially and objectively in the interest of administration or justice. 11. Mere change of Government is wholly irrelevant to justify removal of a public prosecutor who holds a public office and is charged with the duty of acting honestly, impartially and objectively in the interest of administration or justice. 11. I therefore find no illegality in the order dated 7-2-1990 (annex-ture-2) appointing the petitioner as a public prosecutor the procedure prescribed by law was followed and the Government which appointed him as a public prosecutor had the necessary legal authority to apponit him as a public prosecutor notwithstanding the impending elections. There is nothing to show that the appointment of the petitioner as a public prosecutor was tainted with mala fide. It, therefore, follows that the appointment could not be cancelled unless there was some cogent reason for terminating the appointment. Mere change of Government cannot be a cogent reason for the removal of a public prosecutor. Particularly when there is nothing against the conduct of the Public Prosecutor and nothing to show that he had acted in, such a manner as to lose the confidence of the Government. The reason, therefore, furnished to the Court justifying the removal of the petitioner as a public Prosecutor is not germane and, therefore, the order terminating or cancelling the appointment of the petitioner cannot be upheld. 12. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the order dated 25th September, 1991, issued by the Government of Bihar is quashed. There will be no order as to costs.