Judgment :- This petition under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is by the judgment debtors 2 and 3 in E.P. No. 6 of 1985 arising out of decree in O.S. No. 6 of 1971. The respondent No.1 is the decree holder. Respondent No. 2 is the judgment debtor No. 1. Respondent Nos. 3 to 8 are the legal representatives of the decree holder. They have not been joined as petitioners in the execution petition. The question is whether the Execution Petition No. 6 of 1985 filed on 1-1-1985 for execution of the decree made on 7-4-1971 is barred by limitation prescribed by Article 136 of the Limitation Act; 2. A decree for recovery of Rs. 11,885/- with interest was made on 7-4-1971. After directing the judgment debtors to pay the decretal sum, the decree goes on to record: "That the defendant be entitled to the benefit under Act II of 1970". Act II of 1970 is the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act (hereinafter referred to as the act). 3. The execution petition was filed on 1-1-1985. It was filed 13 years 8 months and 23 days after the date of the decree. Article 136 of the Limitation Act which governs this case prescribes the limitation for filing an application. "For the execution of any decree or order of any civil court". The execution petition in question is an application to which article 136 applies. The period of limitation is 12 years. The time from which the period begins to run has been specified in article 136 as under: "When the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment or money or delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods; when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is Bought, takes place". 4. Therefore in order to consider the date when the time begins to run three facts need to be ascertained: i) Whether the decree directs payment to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods; ii) When the decree became enforceable or; iii) When default in making "payment in respect of which execution is sought", took place. The Act came into force on 9-7-1970. The suit was pending. The decree was made nine months after the commencement of the Act. The Act came into force on 9-7-1970. The suit was pending. The decree was made nine months after the commencement of the Act. The object of the Act is to provide relief to agriculture debtors. In order to understand the arguments addressed in this case, a brief outline of the scheme of the Act is sketched below: No suit for recovery of any debt and no application for execution of a decree for debt can be filed against an agriculturist debtor until the expiry of six months from the date of commencement of the Act (S.3 of the act). On the date of commencement of the Act (14-7-1970) the suit was pending and decree had not yet been made. Decrees made before the commencement of the Act and those made after such commencement have different legal effects under the Act. Whereas, prior to the commencement of the Act, any decree may be passed against an agriculturist debtor, a decree made after such commencement must conform to the benefit created by the Act. S.10 of the Act lays down how decrees and orders against debtors maybe made and executed. Decrees made before the commencement of the Act may be executed in respect of a defaulted instalment (S.10(1) of the act). In a suit pending on the date of commencement of the Act, as in this case, if the debtor satisfies the court that he is an agriculturist, then, the court may pass a decree for payment of money. But there is a statutory stipulation that the court shall pass a decree for payment of such instalments as would be payable under sub-ss.(2) and (3) of S.4. (Sub-sec. 2 of S.10 of the act). Therefore, the decree against an agriculturist debtor, made after commencement of the Act is, of necessity, an instalment decree, the instalments being as stipulated in sub sections (2) and (3) of S.4. It is therefore, necessary to see what S.4 provides. The section operates notwithstanding anything contained any law or contract or in any decree or order. It therefore, overrides every other law/ decree or order. It follows therefore that no decree can be made which is at variance with S.4 If it is made, the section overrides the decree and the debtor is entitled to discharge the decretal debt in accordance with S.4. The expression 'debt' is wide enough to include a sum payable under a decree. It follows therefore that no decree can be made which is at variance with S.4 If it is made, the section overrides the decree and the debtor is entitled to discharge the decretal debt in accordance with S.4. The expression 'debt' is wide enough to include a sum payable under a decree. (S.2(4) of the Act - Definition of "debt"). The mode or manner in which a debt is discharged is laid down in sub sections (2) and (3) of S.4 of the Act. a) The whole debt under the decree shall be deemed to have been discharged if paid in 17 half yearly instalments at the rate of interest provided in S.5 of the Act. (S.4(2) of the act). b) The first instalment of the debt shall be payable before the expiry of six months from the commencement of the Act (14-7-70) and each of the remaining instalments on or before the expiry of six months from the last date on which the previous instalment was due. c) If a debtor commits default in payment of instalment on the due date, the creditor may recover the instalment due as provided in S.10 of the Act. "But the debtor shall not forfeit the benefits of S.4" of the Act. (emphasis supplied) d) Upon commission of default in payment of three consecutive instalments, the whole debt shall be payable forthwith. (Proviso to sub-sec. (5) of S.4). 5. There is another Act relevant to this case. That is Kerala Debtors (Temporary Relief) Act 1975 (Act 30 of 1975). It came into force on 6-10-1975. Under this Act also, debt has been defined to include a debt under a decree. (S.2(4) - Act 30 of 1975). S.3 provides that no suit for recovery of debt shall be instituted and no application for execution of a decree in respect of a debt shall be made before the expiry of one year from the commencement of the Act 30of 1975 or such longer period as may be specified by the Government by notification in the Gazette. The Kerala Debtors (Temporary Relief) Act 1975 came into force on 6-10-1975. The decree sought to be executed by the petitioner made on 7-4-1971 was alive and executable on 6-10-1975. An application for execution of the decree could not have been filed before 6-10-1976. 6. The Kerala Debtors (Temporary Relief) Act 1975 came into force on 6-10-1975. The decree sought to be executed by the petitioner made on 7-4-1971 was alive and executable on 6-10-1975. An application for execution of the decree could not have been filed before 6-10-1976. 6. Parties through counsel have agreed before me that the first instalment, under the decree, became payable on 14-1-71, the second on 14-7-1971 and the third on 14-1-1972 and that there was a default in payment of these three consecutive instalments. Counsel also agreed that exclusion of one year and three months is permissible for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. They agreed that if the Execution Petition were filed on or before the expiry of 13 years and 3 months from the date on which the decree became enforceable, the execution petition is within time. 7. But counsel for the petitioners urged that even after excluding one year and 3 months from the delay of 15 years, 8 months and 23 days, the institution of the execution petition is barred by 2 years 5 months and 23 days. The respondent No.1 on the other hand, urged that the decree became enforceable only upon the commission of three consecutive defaults. The last default was committed on 14-1-1972. The entire decretal sum became payable on the date of the last default. The proviso to sub section (5) of S.4 makes the entire decretal sum payable and the decree for the whole amount executable. The period of limitation of 12 years commenced on 14-1-1972 and ended on 14-1-1984. After making allowance for the admitted period of 1 year and 3 months, the time to file the execution petition stood extended to 14-4-1985. The execution petition filed on 1-1-1985 is clearly within time. 8. The first question is whether the decree "directs any payment or money to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods". (Words used in Art.136 - Limitation act. ) As already stated "an agriculturist debtor may discharge his debt in the manner -specified in sub sections (2) and (3) of S.4." Sub section (2) of S.4 provides for payment by 17 half yearly instalments, and the resultant discharge of the debt. The provision of discharge by payment of the debt in half yearly instalments has overriding effect. ) As already stated "an agriculturist debtor may discharge his debt in the manner -specified in sub sections (2) and (3) of S.4." Sub section (2) of S.4 provides for payment by 17 half yearly instalments, and the resultant discharge of the debt. The provision of discharge by payment of the debt in half yearly instalments has overriding effect. In view of this overriding effect, a decree for money made under S.10 of the Act must conform to this provision of payment of decretal sum by instalments. In this case, the decree does not, in so many words, provide for payment of the decretal sum by half yearly instalments. To this extent it does not appear to conform to S.10 of the Act. Nevertheless, it says "that the defendant be entitled to the benefit under Act II of 1970". The court which made the decree, aware of the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act, referred to the "benefit under the Act". Sub section (2) of S.10 of the Act enacts that in suits pending on the date of commencement of the Act the court "shall pass a decree for the immediate payment of such instalment or instalments as would have become payable under the provisions of sub sections (2) and (3) of S.4". Therefore, there is a duty cast on the court to make a decree for immediate payment of instalments in accordance with sub sections (2) and (3) of S.4. The benefit under the Act means the benefit of paying debt in instalments. That is why the court in its decree referred to the "benefit" under the Act. The proviso to sub section (5) of S.4 also refers to the denial of "the benefit of the provisions of sub sections (2) and (3)" in the event of three consecutive defaults in payment of instalments. In the circumstances, therefore, the benefit referred to in the decree means the benefit of discharging the debt by payment in instalments provided in sub sections (2) and (3) of S.4. 9. The overriding statutory provision of S.4 commands that any decree that may be made under S.10 against the debtor must conform to the benefit conferred by S.4 of the Act. 9. The overriding statutory provision of S.4 commands that any decree that may be made under S.10 against the debtor must conform to the benefit conferred by S.4 of the Act. The mandatory words "shall pass a decree for immediate payment of such instalment or instalments" used in sub section (2) of S.10 leaves no alternative to the court but to pass a decree in accordance with the command. Once this is accepted, the next question is; what is the legislative command? The mandate of the statute is the grant of benefit under sub sections (2) and (3) of S.4 to the debtor who, by the decree, is required to repay the debt. In construing the decree, effect must be given to the intention of the legislature, that, no decree shall be made which does not conform to the benefit to the debtors. The reference in the decree to the "benefit under the Act II of 1970" and the mandatory language of S.4 and 10 of the Act, mean only one thing viz. that debtor shall pay in accordance with the instalments provided by S.4 of the Act. Therefore, in my opinion, the decree is an instalment decree. Payment in 17 half yearly instalments is the statutory benefit. The decree grants this benefit. Therefore on a true construction of the decree in the light of the statutory provisions, I have no doubt that, the "decree directs payment of money to be made at certain date or at recurring periods" within the meaning of article 136 of the Limitation Act. 10. The period of limitation for execution of decrees generally, is 12 years from the date on which decree became enforceable. If the decree provides for payment to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, the commencement of the period of limitation depends upon the nature of the decree. Thus Article 136 of the Limitation Act distinguishes decrees directing payment of money, at certain or at recurring periods, from the decrees which become enforceable immediately. The decree sought to be executed in E.P.No. 6 of 1985 is a decree which directs payment at recurring periods set out in paragraph 6 above. This fact is, important, for determination of the question arising in this petition. 11. The decree sought to be executed in E.P.No. 6 of 1985 is a decree which directs payment at recurring periods set out in paragraph 6 above. This fact is, important, for determination of the question arising in this petition. 11. If one instalment is defaulted, the decree holder has a right to execute the decree in respect of the instalment which is in arrear ( S.4(5) of the act). Thus under the decree the judgment debtor shall pay each instalment on the due date which if not paid, may be recovered by execution of the decree for that amount. For instance, the decree means that the first instalment shall be paid on 14-1-1971. The limitation for the purpose of executing the decree in respect of this instalment commences upon commission of the default on 14-1-1971. The following chart will show the date of the instalment, the expiry of the period of limitation of 12 years and extended period for the purpose of filing execution petition. Date of instalment fell due. 1 Expiry of Expiry of the extended 12 years period of limitation 3 The decree holder did not choose to execute the decree for each individual instalment. He invokes the proviso to sub-section (5) of S.4 of the Act. He waited until the judgment debtor committed three consecutive defaults set out in the above table. He rightly invokes the proviso to sub-section (5) of S.4 of the Act. The effect of the proviso is twofold. Firstly the judgment debtor committing default in payment of three consecutive instalments, loses the benefit of the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of S.4. Secondly, upon commission of the third consecutive default "the whole debt together with such interest as may have accrued thereon shall be payable forthwith". The words "and the whole debt ....shall be payable forthwith" create a liability to pay the whole debt in one sum. Thus. On the date of the third consecutive default the decree for the whole amount becomes enforceable. 12. Art.136 of the Limitation Act clearly conceives that the decree holder can choose to recover one or more instalments or wait and recover the whole debt. If he wants to recover the amount of a single default he may seek execution in respect of such default. 12. Art.136 of the Limitation Act clearly conceives that the decree holder can choose to recover one or more instalments or wait and recover the whole debt. If he wants to recover the amount of a single default he may seek execution in respect of such default. If he wants to recover the whole amount, he would wait until the defaults entitling him to recover the whole debt are committed. Such a choice is inevitable where the Limitation Act deals with a decree by instalments which provides for recovery of the whole debt upon commission of the stipulated number of defaults. The period of 12 years commences, in the case of decree of instalments, when "default in making payment in respect of which execution is sought" is committed. (emphasis supplied). The words "in respect of which execution is sought" are significant. When an 'application for execution is made, the question is:- In respect of which default, is execution sought? Is it in respect of a single default, referred to in subsection (5) of S.4 of the Act? Or is it a default referred to in the proviso to sub-section (5) of S.4 of the Act which makes the whole debt payable? If it is the third default referred to in the proviso to sub-section (5) of S.4, upon commission of such default the whole debt becomes payable and may be recovered by execution. The decree holder has the choice of seeking execution of a part -of the decree or the whole amount when it becomes payable (Appicha Asari Unni Asari v. Vairavan Asari Sathavasari, 1979 KLT 23). Therefore the question is: when did the "default in respect of which execution is sought" take place? The decree holder seeks to recover by execution the entire decretal sum. The last default was committed on 14-1-1972. It is on this date that the entire decretal sum became payable forthwith. That is the plain effect of the proviso to sub-section (5) to S.4 of the Act. Unless the debtor had committed three consecutive defaults, the entire decretal sum would not have become due and payable. It is upon commission of these defaults that the decree for the whole sum became enforceable. The default in payment of the third consecutive instalment made the entire decretal sum, then due, payable. Unless the debtor had committed three consecutive defaults, the entire decretal sum would not have become due and payable. It is upon commission of these defaults that the decree for the whole sum became enforceable. The default in payment of the third consecutive instalment made the entire decretal sum, then due, payable. The execution is sought not of a solitary instalment but of the "whole debt" referred to in the proviso to sub-section (5) of S.4 of the Act, which became due and payable upon the commission of the third default which occurred on 14-1-1972. 13. In my opinion, therefore, the period of limitation of 12 years for execution of the whole debt commenced on 14-1-1972. That was the date on which the defaults in payment, which entitled the respondent to recover the whole debt, took place. 14. In Janamma (Janamma Bhagavathy v. Raman Nadar, 1977 KLT 491) and Varghese (Varghese v. Ouseph, (1974 KLT 553) the decree was made before commencement of the Act and the execution petition filed 12 years after the date of the decree. The Act had come into force between the date of the decree and the date of filing the execution petition. These cases hold that a decree for money passed before the commencement of the Act, does not, by the intervention of the Act, get transmuted into an instalment decree and consequently therefore the limitation starts from the date of the decree. In the case which I am considering, the decree was made not only after the commencement of the Act but, under the Act. I have construed the decree as a decree for payment of money at recurring periods. Hence the two judgments cited by counsel for the petitioner have no application. 15. I summarise my conclusions as under: (i) Decrees made before the commencement of the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act and those made after such commencement have different legal effects. (ii) A decree for money made after the commencement of the Act must conform to the benefits granted to the Agriculturist debtors by the Act. (iii) A decree made after the commencement of the Act is, by reason of Ss.4 and 10 of the Act, an instalment decree. (iv) Upon commission of three consecutive defaults in payment of instalments the debtor loses the benefit under the Act and thereupon the whole debt becomes payable. (iii) A decree made after the commencement of the Act is, by reason of Ss.4 and 10 of the Act, an instalment decree. (iv) Upon commission of three consecutive defaults in payment of instalments the debtor loses the benefit under the Act and thereupon the whole debt becomes payable. (v) The decree holder has a choice of recovering a single instalment or of recovering the whole debt by execution whenever it becomes due and payable. Where, upon commission of three consecutive defaults the whole decretal debt becomes payable, the period of limitation for a suit to recover the whole debt, commences upon the commission of the third default. 16. In view of my conclusions set out in the foregoing paragraphs, the Execution petition No. 6 of 1985 arising out of the decree in O.S. No. 6 of 1971 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Palghat, was filed within the period of limitation prescribed by Art.136 of the Limitation Act. In the result the impugned order of the Subordinate Judge, Palghat, is set aside. The proceedings of E.P.No. 6 of 1985 are remanded to the trial court for disposal in accordance with this order. No order as to costs.